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Administration , Training and Policy Studies 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War are widely recognized as 
watershed events in the history of world affairs. Decision-makers and scholars in many fields are 
only beginning to understand the profound shifts and realignments in global political and 
economic relationships in a post-Cold War world . An important link between the United States 
and the former Soviet republics is the foreign assistance program in the region, since assistance 
efforts often serve as an important lens through which to view strategic relationships between 
nations. 
This evaluative policy research explores that link through qualitative case studies of three 
US Agency for International Development (USAID} projects in the region . Each qualitative case 
study represents a distinct approach to foreign assistance delivery in the region : classical 
technical assistance (represented by ZdravReform in contracts with Abt Associates), formal site 
partnership (in cooperative agreements with the American International Health Alliance), and 
experimental technology (a cooperative agreement with the former Selentec, Inc.). Three policy 
context chapters (Chapters I, II , and Ill} introduce the case studies , in which historical trends of 
the assistance effort and of the domestic foreign policy-making framework in Washington, DC, 
are highlighted . A final chapter (VII} examines the findings from the study and recommends a 
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refocusing of the foreign assistance effort in the NIS toward more long-term developmental 
strategies. 
Theoretical and methodological assumptions in the study are informed by the 
constructionist approach to policy evaluation described by Guba and Lincoln (1989). This broad 
approach assumes that different constructions or interpretations exist concerning the nature and 
goals of projects . Unlike typical project evaluations, this approach does not assume that 
stakeholders in projects share common perceptions of the expected goals for and outcomes of 
their projects. Constructionist approaches to qualitative study fall within the interpretative stream 
of social science explored by theorists and researchers from a number of disciplines (Geertz, 
1973; Denzin, 1992; Hammersley, 1989; Bruner, 1990). More specific conceptual assumptions 
also are explored in Chapter I, drawn from the literature on institutional research . Emphasis is 
placed in the evaluative analysis on how effectively conflicts that arose among the multiple 
stakeholders in each project were addressed . 
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General Introduction 
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11 , 
2001 , followed by the war in Afghanistan , have led to sudden and dramatic shifts in foreign policy 
for the United States. Decision-makers in US federal agencies whose missions emphasize 
foreign affairs are bracing for long-term changes in diplomatic relationships as the Bush 
Administration promises that a relentless and ever-broadening war on terrorism will be the 
guiding force behind U.S. foreign policy. In recogn ition of the importance of building coalitions in 
the war on terrorism and of the relationsh ip between terrorism and poverty, the Bush 
Administration announced in 2002 a plan to increase the foreign aid budget by 15 percent per 
year after 2004, reversing more than a decade of declines (Kahn & Weiner, 2002). Foreign aid is 
a broad categorization that includes such diverse policy tools as shipments of short-term 
humanitarian aid, deployment of peacekeeping forces, and implementation of long-term 
development assistance projects . President Bush's plan includes increasing aid for military 
purposes and placing more conditions on the receiving of aid . Far smaller amounts would be 
directed to combating poverty and AIDS. 
These shifts in foreign policy since September 11 will continue to have a major impact on 
the country's relationship with the New Independent States (NIS) , a region of the world emerging 
from a tumultuous and unsettling period following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
Though many foreign affairs analysts believed increasingly that the end of the Cold War and the 
economic struggles of the NIS in the 1990s reduced the region 's importance in the world political 
and economic balance of power, foreign policy sh ifts since September 11 once again have 
emphasized the importance of build ing strategic relationships with republics throughout the NIS, 
far beyond the borders of the Russian Federation, the region 's largest and most high-profile 
republic. 
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But this is not a policy study about the sh ifting alliances now underway in the post-
September 11 international community. This research began some five years ago as an 
exploration into the strategic objectives of U.S. fore ign assistance in the NIS and the pol icy-
making framework for assistance in Wash ington, DC. Eventually the concept of the study 
evolved into policy case studies on three projects funded by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID}, the country's main bilateral aid agency. The primary 
purpose for compiling this research was to develop a tool for discussion for foreign assistance 
decision-makers and students alike. The case studies, which form the main body of the study, 
provide a concrete springboard for discussing the broader objectives of American assistance in 
the region and beyond . 
Since the case studies employ qualitative methodologies enhanced with descriptive 
statistics, they are not intended to be generalizable to the US foreign assistance program as a 
whole, regionally or globally. In some senses, each project, each program, each sector, and 
each region of US foreign assistance face unique conditions and challenges. However, the cases 
do provide modest lessons on working toward institutional change in transitional nations with 
markedly different social, political, cultural and economic values from those which tend to be 
dominant in the United States. 
Organization of the study 
The study contains three preliminary chapters that describe the decision-making process 
for delivery of foreign assistance in the United States and highlight assistance trends for the 
Former Soviet Union after its dissolution in 1991 . The three case studies follow, each of which 
illustrate a somewhat different approach for delivery of U.S. foreign assistance: classical 
assistance, partnership and experimental technology. ZdravReform , a large health systems 
project awarded to Abt Associates in Bethesda, Maryland, under direct contract with USAID, 
represents the classical assistance approach . The agency's cooperative agreement with the 
American International Health Alliance (AIHA) forms the basis for discussion of the partnership 
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approach. The third delivery approach, featuring experimental technology, is represented in the 
cooperative agreement between USAID and Selentec, Inc. 
Each case study shares a common four-part format: 1) a problem statement describing 
an array of issues that the project is intended to address; 2) a description of the project and its 
implementation process, described primarily from the viewpoints of the contractors; 3) a reflective 
section in which multiple stakeholders provide perspectives on the problem and the project; and 
4) an evaluative summary of the facets of the project utilizing categorizations developed by 
Peters and Linder (1993). A conclusion follows the case studies, in which emerging themes in the 
study are discussed. Based on these findings, it is recommended that the US strategic effort in 
the former Soviet Union pay closer attention to long-term institutional change in the NIS. A 
renewed emphasis on international development is suggested based on Sen's (1999) complex 
concept of development as freedom. 
Clarification of the study's approach and methodology 
As Rist (1994) and other scholars have noted, the types of policy research conducted 
over the past few decades have proliferated greatly. The appearance of more approaches, 
conceptual frameworks and methodologies, not to mention variations on methodologies, has 
without question enriched policy research and evaluation . But this very richness can lead to 
confusion for those who must sort through the growing array of approaches in conducting their 
own research or in interpreting the research of others. Since the objective of this study is primarily 
educative, it will be helpful to provide a brief overview of the epistemological assumptions and 
methodological basis of this research, in particular, to serve as a guide for navigating through the 
unique conceptual features of the text. 
Broadly stated, the present study is aligned with the interpretivist stream in social science 
research, combining qualitative case study and evaluation. Scholars who have studied 
methodological developments over the past few decades identify the interpretivist stream as the 
convergence of such historical intellectual approaches as hermeneutics and phenomenology and 
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the Verstehen tradition in sociology. These longstanding approaches--and more recently various 
versions of constructivism--have emphasized the differences between mental or cultural sciences 
and the natural sciences (Gage, 1989; House, E., 1977; Guba, 1990; Phillips, 1987; Schwandt, 
1994; von Wright, 1971 ). The goal of the former is to grasp or understand the meaning of social 
phenomena, whereas the goal of the latter is to provide scientific explanation . Scientific 
explanation in turn is lodged within the various branches of empirical science. For an empiricist, 
social reality is comprised of testable social facts that include the acts or behaviors of ind ividuals 
that are defined physically or institutionally and of the bel iefs and affective states that are 
described in terms of behavioral motivations. In contrast, with their emphasis on understanding, 
interpretivist scholars emphasize the meanings that selected societies, organizations or 
individuals create or construct in context and on the processes by which these meanings are 
created and modified. Though such broad differences are not typically discussed in the everyday 
business of conducting research and evaluations, these contrasts have important implications for 
the intent of research, including pol icy research and evaluation . 
Such broad assumptions of interpretivist inquiry inform this evaluative study on US 
foreign assistance on the former Soviet Union . Though the area of social program evaluation is 
more restricted in the kinds of methodologies that have been explored in the past two decades, 
the variety of stakeholders acknowledged in evaluation have become more vocal and thus the 
approaches employed to include their perspectives have expanded along with other areas of 
applied research in the social sciences. It should be noted that most evaluative studies today, 
including qualitative case studies, remain in the dominant traditions found in empirical science. 
Since this is the case, some attention should be directed toward current understanding of the 
approaches to evaluation and their diverse purposes. 
Two scholars who have made a major contribution to the advancement of interpretivist 
evaluation are Guba and Lincoln (1985, 1994), and their work plays a major role in this study. 
Guba and Lincoln (1985, 1994) position themselves as constructivists , so some attention to this 
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approach should be given. The table below, which was developed by Guba and Lincoln (1994) to 
illustrate the dominant approaches to qualitative research today, is shown below. 
Issue Postpositivism Critical Theory Constructivism 
Understanding; 
Inquiry Explanation; prediction Critique and reconstruction 
aim and control transformation; 
restitution and 
emancipation. 
Nature of Nonfalsified hypotheses Structural/historical Individual 
knowledge that are probable facts insights. reconstructions 
or laws. coalescing around 
consensus. 
Knowledge Generalizations and Historical revisionism; More informed and 
accumulation cause-effect linkages; generalization by sophisticated 
adding to the edifice of similarity. reconstructions; 
knowledge. vicarious experience 
Goodness Conventional benchmarks Historical situatedness; Trustworthiness and 
or quality of rigor: internal and erosion of ignorance; authenticity and 
criteria external validity; action stimulus. misapprehension . 
reliability and objectivity. 
Values Excluded; influence Included; formative Included; formative 
denied in research/ in research/ in research/ 
researcher. researcher. researcher. 
Voice Disinterested scientist as Transformative Passionate participant 
informer of decision- intellectual as advocate as facilitator of 
makers, policymakers, and and activist. multivoice construction. 
change agents. 
SOURCE: Guba, E.G. & Lincoln, Y.S. (1994 ). Competing paradigms in qualitative research . .!n 
Handbook of Qualitative Research. Denzin, N.K., & Lincoln, Y.S., eds . Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications, p. 112. 
The textual style of this study reflects the pluralistic framework that characterizes some 
interpretive and critical texts. Each case study reports the perspectives of a number of 
stakeholders. The pluralism of interpretative texts suggests the irreducible quality of complex 
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experience, which cannot be disintegrated into randomized variations. Traditional evaluative texts 
have been criticized for imposing a single voice or set of values on these topics. These case 
studies present the perspectives of stakeholders close to the project: USAID program and project 
officers, contractors, and the limited scholarsh ip available on the problems associated with the 
projects . The historical background on the cases is presented primarily through the perspectives 
of the contractors in each of the cases: Abt Associates, The American International Health 
Alliance, and Selentec, Inc. 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) note that the powerful incentives to prediction and control of 
natural and social phenomena have led to the high status of the medical model of verification . 
Experimental design, including such strategies as double blind, experimental versus control , 
equ ivalency sampling driven by the quest to test a hypothesis or theory empirically. Guba and 
Lincoln ( 1985, 1994) note the problems with this model. Such studies strip the context out of 
studies through controls and randomization techniques, often study behavior to the exclusion of 
meaning and purpose or vice versa , favor statistical meanings for broad populations to the 
exclusion of individual perspective, and remove discovery from inquiry in the pursuit of verifying 
hypotheses. To offset the limitations of the classical medical model , researchers have adapted a 
variety of alternative approaches. One approach, typically termed postpositivism , acknowledges 
that reality can be only imperfectly understood and therefore inquiry must include a wide array of 
approaches to best approximate topics of study. Discovery is re-introduced into scientific inquiry 
by the use of multiple methods that enhance or offset each other. 
Guba and Lincoln (1994) suggest that inquiry based on critical theory is primarily 
historical, acknowledging the shaping of beliefs and structures on the basis of social, cultural , 
political, economic, ethnic and gender factors . These beliefs and structures are dynamic and 
changing, but they are real in the sense that they become the framework around which persons, 
organizations, and nations base their thought and action . The role of the researcher in such 
inquiry is to elucidate the historical nature of beliefs and structures and to create a dialogue 
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between the researched and the researcher, frequently to work toward more informed 
consciousness of the impacts of these historical factors. 
Guba and Lincoln's (1994) evaluative studies are based on a third approach or paradigm, 
termed constructionism, based on the constructivist tradition in scholarship. Constructionism is 
typically linked to the interpretivist stream in social science and shares many of the general 
tenets, though individual scholars and researchers promote distinct aspects of these approaches. 
Rather than assume an incomplete reality to be apprehended or a historical reality to become 
manifest, the constructivist thinks of knowledge as changeable constructions about which there is 
more or less consensus. Multiple constructions typically exist for any given situation or context, 
since the form and content of constructions are mediated by the individuals or groups creating 
and sustaining them. The work of the researcher in such studies is to reconstruct, through 
dialogue and interaction, the multiple voices in any inquiry. Of equal importance is the notion that 
the act of research is an act of interpretation . To understand the world of meaning, the 
researcher must interpret and the researched must be interpreted . 
An in-depth discussion of each of these approaches is beyond the scope of this study, 
but Guba and Lincoln 's (1994) discussion is suggestive of the dialogue underway in scholarship 
today on evaluation as an applied field, distinctions which often disappear in the day-to-day 
practice of research and evaluation . The growing popularity of qualitative approaches in all areas 
of social science research , including evaluation, has created a rich opportunity to explore the 
limits of understanding and knowledge. This study is in some sense a product of this growing 
complexity in research . The methodological framework as outlined in Chapter 1 draws from 
Guba and Lincoln's (1989) constructionist approach . This approach suggests that no single, 
correct construction of a program's goals exists . Adding to Guba and Lincoln's (1989) conceptual 
approach to evaluation, Yanow (1990) adds that multiple meanings and interpretations can 
coexist. The policy decision-maker's role is to attend to the many interpretive elements of a 
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policy process or program. Conflict among the stakeholders in such a model of policy planning is 
understood to be a part of the process. 
Another scholar who has attempted to categorize the various genres emerging in 
evaluation as a field is Greene (1994). Green's topology of approaches shown below attempts to 
categorize alternative philosophical approaches according to audience and preferred 
methodology, but closely resembles the approaches described by Guba and Lincoln (1994}. 
Postpositivism, the dominant approach to evaluation today, typically depends on statistical tools, 
in particular experimental design, to pose questions of effectiveness. Pragmatic evaluation, a 
genre that developed out of frustration over the constraints of experimental evaluation, employs 
varied or multiple methods to match the research problem at hand . The term "pragmatic" has 
been used to describe this approach because the pragmatic evaluator sometimes mixes 
methodologies that might not be typically found together. 
Greene (1994) suggests that qualitative methodologies tend to dominate in the 
interpretive approach to evaluation, since studies employing this approach acknowledge the 
pluralistic goals of the stakeholders. The intent of the evaluation is to understand the 
perspectives of stakeholders close to the programs and how they make meaning of their 
environment. Interpretive studies are in this way often local studies, embedded in the context of a 
given site or setting. A fourth approached identified by Greene (1994) is critical evaluation, or 
openly ideological research . Researchers in this genre explore the values, explicit and implicit, of 
social phenomena and openly acknowledge the conflicts of interest embedded in multiple 
stakeholder claims. As Greene's (1994} useful topology suggests, however, each of the 
frameworks addresses somewhat different research questions, often aimed at different types of 
stakeholders. 
It should be noted that Greene (1994) does not account for the extraordinary variety of 
qualitative approaches used in research today. Many applied researchers utilize qualitative 
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Postpositivism Systems High-level Quantitative: Are desired 
theory, policy and experiments and outcomes 
efficiency, decision quasi-experiments, attained and 
accountability, makers. systems analysis , attributable 
theoretical causal modeling, to the program? Is 
causal cost-benefit analysis . this program the 
knowledge. most efficient 
alternative? 
Pragmatism Management/ Mid-level Eclectic; mixed; Which parts of the 
practicality, program structured and program work well 
quality control, managers, unstructured and which need 
utility. administrators, surveys, improvement? How 
and other questionnaires, effective is the 
decision- interviews, program with 
makers observations. respect to the 
organization's 
goals? With respect 
to beneficiaries' 
needs? 
/nterpretivism Pluralism/ Program Qualitative: case How is the program 
understanding, directors, studies, interviews, experienced by 
diversity, staff, and observations, various 
solidarity. beneficiaries. document review. stakeholders? 
Critical, Emancipation/ Program Participatory: In what ways are the 
Normative empowerment, beneficiaries, stakeholder premises, goals, or 
Science social their participation in activities of the 
change. communities , varied structured and program serving to 
other unstructured, maintain power and 
"powerless quantitative and resource inequities 
groups" qualitative designs in the society? 
and methods; 
historical analysis , 
social criticism . 
SOURCE: Greene, J.C. (1994). Qualitative program evaluation : Practice and promise. Denzin, 
N.K. & Lincoln, Y.S., eds. Handbook of Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications, p. 532. 
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techniques that closely resemble descriptive statistical surveys and promote the goals of 
postpositivist science. The interpretivist study, however, must develop a textual style consistent 
with the epistemological basis of the approach . lnterpretivists are subject to the validity checking 
and verifying process which must take place in all research and which distinguishes research 
from such activities as journalism or essay writing. Yet, the goals of interpretivist research in 
general and of this study in particular reaffirm the act of reading such research as the 
construction of many voices, each with somewhat different perspectives and interests. 
The text of this study, then, is to provide for the reader, whether student or decision-
maker, an opportunity to delve into the rich understandings of the US foreign assistance program 
in the former Soviet Union . The evaluative component of the study is designed to show the 
challenges of three approaches to delivery of US foreign assistance-classical technical 
assistance, partnership and experimental technology. Recommendations at the end of the study 
suggest a new direction for US foreign assistance in the region in the future . 
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CHAPTER 1: 
Overview 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 remains one of the most extraordinary events 
of the twentieth century. While changes in Eastern and Central Europe contributed to major 
political and economic shifts in the surrounding region and Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms were 
widely supported in Western industrialized countries, the actual collapse of the USSR was 
unexpected. The political balance of power following World War II, polarized for decades in the 
name of the Cold War, suddenly appeared to vanish in the final months of 1991 . Because of the 
lack of reliable information on the region, Western economists are just beginning to consider how 
reform deteriorated into economic collapse and to study the aftermath (Easterly & Fischer, 1995; 
Mroz & Popkin, 1995; Gaddy, 1996; Smith, 1995; Williamson, 1993). 
Foreign assistance to the Former Soviet Union 
Government documents show that the United States and other industrialized countries 
actually began to offer limited assistance to show support for Mikhail Gorbachev's reform efforts 
by 1990. Concerned that their offers of assistance would not lead to substantive change, 
Western leaders insisted that reform must precede the commitment of assistance (General 
Accounting Office, 1992). For that reason Gorbachev returned from a Group of Seven (G-7) 
meeting in London in July, 1991, with little commitment of financial support for his reform efforts. 
An attempted coup in August, though defeated, did not engender the confidence of Western 
leaders that aid could precede reform. Thus, foreign assistance for Gorbachev's reform efforts, 
given the magnitude of the changes he was undertaking, had little impact (Light, 1992). 
Pledges for assistance increased dramatically with the formal dissolution of the Soviet 
Union in December 1991. It became apparent to Western leaders that massive amounts of 
international assistance would be needed to help the successor states restructure and stabilize 
into a market economy. Department of State records indicate that an estimated $91 billion in 
pledges flowed into the region between 1990 and 1992, 90 percent of which came from the G-7 
industrial nations and the European Community (EC) Commission . Roughly 81 percent of the 
pledges were offers of loans linked to reforms; 19 percent were in the form of technical or 
humanitarian grants. Germany offered $54 billion in pledges, or 67 percent of the total G-7 and 
EC pledges (General Accounting Office, 1992). 
A report to the Trilateral Commission in 1995 describes the early donor response to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union as "overpromised and underdelivered" (Biackwill , Braithwaite & 
Tanaka, 1995, p. 15). Much fanfare accompanied the offers. Public announcements were made 
at G-7 summits of the vast sums to be made available. But concerned that many billions would 
be lost until the region actually developed market reforms, donors such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the G-7 placed strict conditions on access to loans, 
conditions that frequently were not or could not be met. As a result , about $40 billion in 
assistance was actually disbursed by the end of 1992 (General Accounting Office, 1992). The 
ratio of pledges to actual disbursements was similar in 1993. Of $28 billion pledged by the G-7, 
about $8 billion was actually disbursed (Biackwill , Braithwaite & Tanaka, 1995). 
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A General Accounting Office (1995) study on foreign assistance in the 1990s indicates 
that the pledges of assistance to the former Soviet Union led to disagreements in the donor 
commun ity. Some supporters of traditional assistance programs were concerned that supporting 
this new region would lead to less attention to areas of greater need , such as Sub-Saharan 
Africa, at a time when foreign affairs budgets were diminishing. Others questioned whether the 
funds pledged to the former Soviet Union should even be defined as development assistance, but 
rather be designated as reconstruction or concessional aid to avoid an encroachment on the 
guidel ines established in donor countries for formal development assistance. 
The United States and foreign assistance to the NIS 
United States policymakers have taken the position that all assistance that meets the 
formal criteria of "concessionality and development motivation," regardless of the area, can be 
counted as bilateral assistance (General Accounting Office, 1995, p. 13). The definition of 
development assistance is important because recipient countries must meet eligibility criteria to 
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be considered for foreign assistance. In turn , donor governments must decide on how to 
categorize and report outflows of assistance, whether in the form of loans or grants. Thus, the 
very definitions for such critical terms as foreign or development assistance are being challenged 
within the donor community. In spite of the US position on assistance to the region, many donors 
continued to maintain that assistance to the successor states of the Soviet Union was not 
development assistance, but reconstruction (General Accounting Office, 1995). 
The groundwork for a formal US bilateral assistance program for the former Soviet Union 
was laid out in the FREEDOM Support Act (PL 102-511 ), passed by Congress and signed by 
President George Bush in October 1992. The legal framework for this act continues to define 
policy-making in the region to this day. The FREEDOM Support Act authorized activities and 
funding for bilateral assistance in a wide variety of areas, including business and commercial 
development, democracy building, nonproliferation and disarmament, space trade and 
cooperation , and multilateral fund ing. This new law authorized an additional $410 million in 
bilateral assistance in 1992, a $12 billion increase in the US quota to the International Monetary 
Fund to enable additional lending to the former Soviet Union, and $3 billion in stabilization funds 
to Russia and other republics . 
Expected to be a short-term initiative, the FREEDOM Support framework was similar in 
scope to the program already in place for building democracy and market-oriented economies in 
Central and Eastern Europe. The framework for this region had been set forth in the Support for 
East European Democracy (SEED) Act of 1989, and the lessons learned from SEED activities 
helped to shape the aid program in the former Soviet Union (General Accounting Office, 1992; 
Schuerch, 1992). 
One important provision in both laws was the appointment of a coordinator designated by 
the President of the United States from within the Department of State to oversee all aspects of 
the law. This included coordination of the overall strategy, management, and implementation or 
assistance and economic cooperation of many US interests involved in the area as well as with 
other countries and international organizations (PL 102-511 , Sec. 1 02) . Thus, the New 
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Independent States (NIS) region , like the Central and Eastern European region, functions under a 
reporting structure unlike that found in any other region of the world . While this special structural 
realignment has been controversial , most other major Western donors also set up special offices 
to handle the broad coordination functions in the region, including commitments that fall outside 
the area of development. 
In the United States, the Office of the Coordinator continues to oversee all foreign 
assistance activities underway in the former Soviet Union . Though operating with a staff of 
twelve in the State Department, the authority of the Coordinator has increased in the 1990s, after 
Inspector General reports and other government reviews showed continuing problems in 
managing the complex strategies of multiple donors in the field (General Accounting Office, 1992, 
1995). The Coordinator's office spearheaded the Partnership for Freedom initiative in 1995, a 
proposal to expand funding and partnership activities in the region into the twenty-first century. 
This placed an emphasis on partnership as a delivery tool for foreign assistance after 1995 in the 
region, with an increasing focus on small republics and outlying areas of the NIS. 
USAID's role in post-Cold War foreign assistance 
Operating under this structural umbrella for development assistance in the NIS is the main 
federal agency for US bilateral assistance, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID). With headquarters in Washington, DC, and over 100 missions located 
throughout the world , USAID manages an annual budget of over $6 billion, approved each year 
as part of the foreign affairs budget. USAID manages the lion's share of US foreign assistance 
programs in the NIS region, though the agency also serves as a conduit for fund transfers to 
recipient countries and for projects awarded to other federal departments, agencies and 
programs. As an agency at the center of many competing demands and agendas, USAID 
continues to serve as a mirror for the struggles taking place in foreign assistance in the post-Cold 
War era. 
The 1990s have been a turbulent decade for the agency. While weathering rapidly 
changing tides in foreign affairs, USAID itself faces severe criticism from stakeholders 
domestically, both within and outside of government. The post-Cold War onslaught in Congress 
began in 1989 with the Hamilton Report form the US House of Representatives, recommending 
new foreign assistance legislation and an overhaul of the administrative structure for 
development. The same year, USAID's own Woods Report (1989) reviewed the economic and 
social conditions of the developing world and raised questions about the appropriate response. 
Authorization bills in 1991 and 1994, both intended to define a new foreign affairs agenda, failed 
passage in Congress. More damaging to the agency itself were the reports from the Ferris 
Commission on the Management of A.I.D . Programs, which raised many issues concerning the 
role of the agency and the execution of its mandate. In a no-confidence vote in the agency, the 
Commission recommended that USAID be merged into the State Department (Ferris , 1992, 
1993). 
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In response to continuing external pressure, USAID began in 1993 under the leadership of 
J . Brian Atwood to promote a more cohesive mission of sustainable development, joined the 
President's National Review Board, and staged successive re-engineerings, all intended to make 
the agency more responsive to the emerging foreign affairs environment (General Accounting 
Office, 1992a, 1992b; USAID, March 1994). 
In May 1995, Republican House Representative Gilman and Senator Helms proposed 
legislation (HR 1561 and S 908) to abolish USAID and merge its functions into the State 
Department. Despite Atwood's strong opposition, the House and Senate in HR 1561 in March 
1996 incorporated this consolidation plan. But in April 1997, the President presented to Congress 
his own foreign affairs restructuring proposal for the agency. USAID under this plan remained a 
separate and unique agency with its own appropriations and program authority, but with the 
Administrator under the foreign policy guidance of the Secretary of State. The Administrator of 
USAID no longer reported directly to the President. The plan also integrated USAID's Press 
Office and some administrative functions with the State Department. This was intended to 
preserve the integrity of USAID's development mission (Engman, 2000). 
In June 1997, the Senate led by Senator Helms again passed legislation to consolidate 
foreign affairs agencies. The Clinton Administration believed the bill (S 903) would result in loss 
of direct control by USAID of bilateral development assistance budgets and programs, putting 
long-term development interests at risk of short-term political needs. USAID's work with 
Congress led to agreement in early 1998 on language for HR 1757 that incorporated the 
President's reorganization plan, language that was incorporated into the FY 1999 Omnibus 
Appropriations Act (Engman, 2000). 
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Following the election of George W. Bush in January 2001, Republication Senator Helms, 
longstanding critic of foreign aid and continuing head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
announced on January 11, 2001 , his proposal to disband USAID in favor of delegating foreign aid 
funds for disbursement by selected private foundations and religious groups. Senator Helms' 
proposal called for the development of a quasi-governmental foundation that would deliver grants 
to private relief groups (Schmitt, 2001 ). Though the Helms' proposal was discussed on Capital 
Hill in the midst of media fanfare, no action was taken to set it into law. USAID's legal role in 
foreign assistance remained intact without further challenges in 2001 and 2002 . 
Description of the Study 
The preliminary chapters in the study attempt to describe the complex context for foreign 
assistance in the post-Cold War era, but the major part of the study examines through policy 
analysis and qualitative case study the developmental intent and strategies of three exemplar 
programs now managed under the aegis of USAID, each of which employ different objectives and 
implementation strategies. Through comparison of these distinct approaches to development 
assistance, it is possible to explore the boundaries and constraints on the evolving policy 
framework in this region . Documentation for the study is based on review of historical , evaluative 
and policy reports available from various sources, interviews with decision-makers in the United 
States and in the New Independent States involved in the activities described in th is cases , and 
7 
limited observation of activities at the various sites. The conceptual and methodological contexts 
of the study are described in the following sections. 
US Foreign assistance in the post-Cold War 
Often regarded as the official end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union led 
to a shift in many aspects of foreign policy, including foreign assistance, the nonmilitary allocation 
of resources in the form of grants, trade credits, and loans. The search for a post-Cold War 
consensus on a policy framework for foreign assistance, both for the United States and other 
major industrialized countries, has been a major challenge in the 1990s for decision-makers in 
foreign affairs . 
The network of departments, agencies and organizations, both governmental and 
nongovernmental, designed to manage the foreign assistance mandated by the donor community 
also was jolted by the shift toward independent states in the region. The international 
development industry, no less than governments, had built up a policy-making framework, 
carefully nurtured over decades, dedicated to balance of power allocations directly or indirectly 
connected to the Cold War. In the first rush of euphoria following the end of the Cold War, many 
supporting foreign assistance believed the opportunity had finally come to shift away from aid 
designed to contain communism to aid to the most deserving countries . Cold War geopolitics no 
longer provided the motivation for distributing foreign aid, leaving uncertainty as to what should 
replace this motivation (General Accounting Office, 1995). But one of the immediate shocks to 
the donor community was the need for massive amounts of foreign assistance to the very region 
that had previously been part of that donor community. 
As the Clinton Administration settled into Washington in 1992, independent groups deeply 
concerned about the direction of US foreign policy issued position papers and made 
recommendations on the future of foreign aid. The theme of a white paper written by the 
Independent Group on the Future of US Development Cooperation (1992) hailed the possibility of 
global peace in the post-Cold War and prosperity through democratic and market reforms 
throughout the world. Another widely circulated paper published by the Overseas Development 
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Council (1993) called for massive changes in the way foreign assistance was allocated and 
administered. Both reports recommended the dissolution of USAID, and agency bogged down by 
too many competing agendas and a Cold War perspective (Ferris, 1992, 1993; Sewell & Storm, 
1992; Independent Group on the Future of US Development Cooperation , 1992; GAO, 1992). 
The move toward a new mandate in foreign assistance seemed in evidence in 1993 with 
the passing of legislation to mandate foreign assistance to the NIS. The passing of this 
legislation is chronicled in Rosner's book, The New Tug-of-War: Congress, the Executive Branch, 
and National Security (1995). Clinton campaigned in 1992 for a bolder plan of assistance for 
Russia, and within weeks after taking office, the new administration began working on Russia/NIS 
aid legislation. A senior team including Clinton himself met regularly for three months starting in 
February 1993 to craft a strategy. Support for the NIS package was given first priority. 
According to Rosner (1995), Clinton began selling his proposed aid package for the NIS 
on March 25 and 26 by holding two parties, one for representatives and one for senators. At 
each of the dinners, Clinton made a strong case for his reform package for Russia and the NIS. 
Democratic members were supportive, but to the surprise of many, conservative Republicans 
were equally or more supportive. Clinton brought his case to the public in April 1 in a speech to 
newspaper editors, warning against the outcome if Russia's reform turned sour. 
Congress's efforts intensified with a bipartisan delegation to the N IS in April 1993, which 
returned with a new sense of urgency upon seeing the magnitude of the changes required in 
Russia . Rosner tracks the legislative process in the House and Senate until the passage of the 
Act in September 1993. Congress passed legislation approving $2.5 billion in assistance to 
Russia and the other New Independent States, more than President Clinton had actually 
requested . At the time, many observers found the unilateral effort to support NIS reform 
remarkable and the foreign assistance package to support it generous (Rosner, 1995). 
The Clinton Administration's effort to redefine foreign assistance followed in early 1994 
with a foreign affairs legislation bill intended to provide a policy-making framework for bilateral, 
multilateral and people-to-people partnerships. Called the Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy Act 
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of 1994 (HR 3765), the proposed legislation failed to make it to House vote . The 1 041h Congress, 
newly elected in November 1994, turned out to be the first Congress since 1953-1954 to have a 
Republican majority in both the House and the Senate and to be the first time since 194 7-1948 to 
have a Democratic President and a Republican Congress (Coll ier, 1994). The Conservative 
Coalition, spearheaded by Jesse Helms, appointed head of the Foreign Relations Committee in 
1995, continued to pressure the Clinton Administration on a host of issues, from limiting or 
eliminating foreign aid altogether to merging USAID fully into the State Department. Thus, two 
years of post-Cold War discussion about the new opportunities for foreign assistance translated 
into discussions about budget cuts, re-engineering, and downsizing. 
In April 1997, in what was widely seen as a compromise solution, President Clinton 
supported legislation for three federal agencies whose missions are international in scope, giving 
increased responsibility or authority to the State Department. The legislation, announced in major 
newspapers throughout the United States, proposed to absorb the Unity States information 
Agency and the Trade and Development Program into the Department of State. USAID, the third 
agency affected, would maintain its independent status, but the Chief Administrator of the agency 
would now report to the Secretary of State rather than to the President of the United States. In 
response to the announcement of the possible new reporting relationship, J. Brian Atwood, then 
Chief Administrator of USAID, and Madeleine Albright, then Secretary of the Department of State, 
reaffirmed their effort to work together toward "the twin goals of development and diplomacy" 
(USAID, 1997). But this legislation never made it to vote in Congress. 
Despite these efforts, the legal policy-making framework for foreign assistance for the 
Cold War remained intact throughout the Clinton Administration . Post-Cold War euphoria was 
quickly replaced with scandals, fears and crises domestically and internationally. Personal 
scandals in the White House required the Clinton Administration to focus increasingly on 
defending its own existence after 1997. 
A similar trend developed in US relations with the NIS. Stories of economic collapse, 
capital flight and money laundering, massive governmental and nongovernmental corruption , and 
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deteriorating health conditions plagued the region in general, but Russia in particular. At the end 
of 2000, in the weeks before the election of a new president and administration, three Republican 
Congressmen published Russia's Road to Corruption (2000), presenting in lurid terms the failure 
of American foreign aid in the largest country of the NIS under the Clinton Admin istration. The 
context for foreign assistance under the Clinton Administration is described in more detail in 
Chapter Ill. 
The new Bush Administration suggested greater conditionality for future aid in the NIS 
region soon after settling into Washington in 2001 . But following the terrorist attacks on 
September 11 , 2001 , in the United States and selected republics in the NIS, including the 
Russian Federation, showed strong support for the war on terrorism and the war against 
Afghanistan . In March 2002, President B~h discussed his plans to increase the foreign aid 
budget beginning in 2004. The increases are largely expected to support the war on terrorism on 
a worldwide scale. 
Analysis of three approaches to policy implementation 
The policy process is typically described in three stages: formulation , implementation , 
and accountability (Rist, 1994 ). This study focuses on the implementation stage of the pol icy 
process for foreign assistance in the NIS, the efforts that the key organizational stakeholders-
USAID and its contractors-made to respond to the US policy initiative in the NIS with specific 
policy instruments. Through qualitative case study methods, the implementation strategy of three 
USAID-funded projects in the NIS is described and analyzed. These projects include: 1) the Abt 
Associates health reform project; 2) the American International Health Alliance (AIHA) 
Partnership project; and 3) the Selentec, Inc., project. 
Selection of the projects for study was made to highlight different types of delivery 
instruments in the foreign assistance initiative in the NIS. Each project represents a distinct 
approach to implementing foreign assistance in the region . The ZdravReform project, awarded to 
Abt Associates, was a technical assistance approach intended to reform the financing of health 
care in five regions in the NIS. The original budget was estimated to be $44 million, with renewed 
funding expected in some regions. ZdravReform contracts to Abt Associates ended early in 
Russia, but continued until 1998 in Ukraine and are still underway in Kazakhstan and Krygystan 
in 2002 .The second approach, formal site partnership, is represented by the AIHA Medical 
Partnership project. Initiated in 1992 with a $2 .5 million budget, the newly formed AIHA 
established ten formal hospital partnerships in Russia, but eventually expanded its mission and 
scope to promote formal partnerships in community/primary care health throughout the NIS. 
Funding for AIHA partnerships continues throughout the NISin 2002. The AIHA serves as a 
conduit for health and medical organizations to develop formal , legal partnerships with like 
organizations in the NIS, often building on existing Sister City relationships. 
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The third approach, represented in this study by Selentec, Inc., is experimental 
technology. The Selentec project focused on the development of an experimental technology 
designed to remove radioactive cesium out of the milk present in residue amounts in the area 
surrounding Chernobyl. A specially designed machine employing a magnetic separation 
technology was installed in a dairy in Ovruch, Ukraine, and experimental tests were run showing 
the system to work . Testing ended in 1998 as magnetic separation materials ran out and funding 
was not renewed. 
Each policy case study is divided into four sections. In section one, the nature of the 
problem in the NIS that the project is intended to address is discussed . This is followed in section 
two by a description of the project through the point of view of the main contractor. Two of these 
contracts , the ZdravReform Project and the AIHA Partnersh ip Project, have been implemented in 
various parts of the NIS region . Because of the breadth and longevity of these large projects 
extending throughout the NIS, it is impossible to describe the implementation strategies of each 
illustration of the project. Rather, some of the most successful , long-term efforts of these projects 
are highlighted. Section three describes stakeholder viewpoints on the strategic intent and 
implementation of the project. 
In the final section of each case study, section four, the project is analyzed in terms of 
categories based on the work of policy theorists Linder and Peters (1989) and Salamon (1989). 
As summarized by Rist ( 1994 ), these four categories are as follows: 
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1. Resource intensiveness: This area refers to the relative complexity of operations 
required for the project and its costliness . Sometimes referred to as administrative 
burden, this category focuses the demands on organizations to implement a project, 
including the demand for technical expertise. 
2. Targeting: This category refers to the capacity of a policy tool to be aimed at 
particular populations, problems or institutions for which it is intended. Projects may 
be either highly specific in the targeting or diffused in intent. This category refers 
more to the precision in identifying the intended population suited for the tool and 
sometimes in its amenability to fine-tuning . 
3. Institutional capacity: This category refers to the ability of the organizations and/or 
contractors to deliver on the tasks assigned or delegated to them . Many constraints , 
expected or unexpected, may be faced as organizations implement their projects . 
4. Political risk: Closely related to institutional capacity, this category refers to 
environmental conditions associated with policy tools . This includes concerns about 
unanticipated risk, chances of failure, and timing. Sustainabil ity of the project is also 
considered a criterion of risk. 
The assumption is that policymakers in any given context will be faced with a number of concerns 
and decisions regarding each of these categories. Conclusions are drawn and recommendations 
made based on the analysis of these attributes in the context of the problem statement described 
for each case. 
While the case studies form the basis for this evaluative study, no less attention must be 
paid to the broader policy context in which the projects were approved and implemented. The 
projects in this study developed out of an existing, but evolving foreign assistance context in the 
1990s in the United States. In Chapters II and Ill of the study, this important context is described . 
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This includes the policymaking context for foreign assistance in the United States and the 
objectives of foreign assistance in the NIS. After discussing each of the projects in Chapters IV, V 
and VI, a final chapter (VII) analyzes the implementation strategies of each of the projects in 
terms of the broader policy context in the United States. 
The discussion of the policy context in the initial chapters provides an opportunity to 
explore the context for US bilateral foreign assistance in the 1990s in the NIS. While no new 
consensus has been reached in the form of a formal legislative mandate for foreign assistance, 
policies and program activities approved during this period suggest the direction of post-Cold War 
policy. The unique characteristics of US foreign assistance in this transitional region highlight 
important trends in the 1990s: 1) the broadening scope of foreign assistance; 2) the evolving 
roles for the providers and recipients of assistance; 3) the changing attitudes toward the role of 
foreign assistance; and 4) a growing emphasis on coordination of foreign assistance activities as 
the number of US departments, agencies, and programs involved in such activities increases. 
Discussion of the policy context also provides an opportunity to consider broader 
conceptual issues in US foreign assistance, and these are discussed along with 
recommendations in the final part chapter of the study, Chapter VII. The coordination of foreign 
assistance efforts in the NIS within the Department of State has brought the diplomatic mission of 
State, with its emphasis on maintaining or building peaceful relationships with foreign countries, 
into a direct coordinating relationship with the developmental mission of USAID, with its traditional 
emphasis on implementing developmental and humanitarian programs intended to improve 
economic/humanitarian conditions in foreign countries . To be sure, with Foreign Service 
missions and development missions located throughout the world , the State Department and 
USAID have worked closely together in many countries of the world for decades. But the unique 
framework for the NIS region, mandated by the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992, provides an 
opportunity to explore a more formalized relationship between these two organizations. The 
implications of this relationship are discussed in terms of evolving definitions of economic 
development and public diplomacy. 
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Conceptual Framework 
This study is not a theory-driven evaluation of US foreign assistance, in which theory is 
defined as a systematic framework of social and behavioral assumptions that underlie a particular 
public policy (Leeuw, 1995). However, several important assumptions frame the approach to the 
study, and these are linked into a coherent set of conceptual associations that may be regarded 
as the framework for the policy analysis. Each of these assumptions is described below briefly. 
Institutional analysis : One important assumption is that the stakeholders are viewed as 
representatives of institutions with particular roles and interests, so that the main unit of study is 
the organization rather than the individual. To be sure, personal characteristics such as 
leadership style are an important element in all aspects of policy-making and program 
implementation. However, for the purposes of this study, personal qualities are addressed only 
within the broader context of the political and strategic interests of the stakeholders. 
Institutions as cognitive systems. A second important assumption that must be addressed 
is the approach to institutional analysis taken in the study. The delivery of foreign assistance in 
the NIS typically involves several cooperating organizations, with overlapping, but distinct 
missions, delivery approaches, and norms. While institutional theory carries with it widely varied 
assumptions and arguments, th is study focuses primarily on organizations as cognitive systems 
that are actively engaged in socially constructing meaning or bel ief systems. As Scott (1995) 
suggests, researchers (DiMaggio & Powell , 1983; Meyer & Scott, 1983) who study institutions as 
cognitive systems "regard institutions as primarily carried by cultural systems, whether at the level 
of the world system, the society, the organizational field , or a particular organization (corporate 
culture)" (p . xviii) . In this study, it is assumed that organizations actively create meaning from the 
broader cultural systems of which they are a part. In turn , the belief systems that organizations 
develop-missions, strategies, norms and regulations-serve as important markers to the 
broader cultural systems around them . Researchers who focus on such aspects of organizations 
frequently study organizations as communication networks and describe institutions as cultures 
comprised of distinctive beliefs systems (Pettigrew, 1979; Pepper, 1995; Bantz, 1993; Reilly & 
DiAngelo, 1990; Morey & Luthans, 1985). The recent trend toward encouraging learning 
organizations assumes that reflection on these beliefs systems is becoming a critical part of 
participation in organizations. 
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Lant and Baum (1995) note that the linking of research on institutional theory (Amburgey & 
Lippert, 1989; Burns & Wholey, 1993; Oliver, 1991 ; Tolbert, 1988) to the research on cognitive 
theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Pfeffer, 1981) provides a vehicle for 
exploring how institutionalized beliefs and activities surface and change over time. They state 
that the institutional literature provides perspectives on the evolution of institutionalization 
processes, such as the adoption of similar practices and structures. Lant and Baum (1995) add: 
"Even industrial economics suggests that firms in competitive industries recognize their mutual 
interdependence and develop 'rules of the game' that guide and constrain firms ' strategic 
choices" (p. 16). Thus, attention to the role of cognition , or meaning-making, both individual and 
collective, in organizations complements the institutional approach with its focus on shared 
bel iefs, practices, strategies, and networks of relations among individuals within firms and among 
groups of firms. Lant and Baum (1995) suggest that a reciprocal process of cognition and 
enactment, creation and response, is involved in institutional patterns. In attending to the 
meaning-making dimensions of this dynamic process, it is possible to relate what is commonly 
referred to as the micro-level processes within and between organizations to macro-level 
outcomes in the broader context of which they are a part. 
Conceptual policy analyses drawing on political or bureaucratic theory contribute important 
perspectives on the multiple constituencies involved in foreign affairs . But this study is directed 
primarily toward exploring the meaning the decision-makers give to their own efforts in the 
projects described in Chapters IV, V and VI of this study, and from this dialogue, suggest how 
these particular cases may relate to the broader foreign assistance framework. Bureaucratic 
constraints within the organizations included and the political stresses on the system will be noted 
to the extent that the participants identify them as "rules of the game." 
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Thus, though individual decisions clearly play an important role in the development and 
execution of projects described, the main focus of this analysis is organizational. Stakeholders 
act on behalf of selected organizations or political interests, donor or recipient. The framework for 
this study draws from a branch of institutional theory that focuses primarily on organizations as 
cognitive systems engaged in socially constructing meaning or belief systems (Scott, 1995). 
Scholars who work from this perspective often view institutions as cultural systems, and the belief 
systems, either explicit or implicit, in organizations serve as important indicators of the broader 
systems around them. Restated from the perspective of institutional theory, the objective of the 
study is to explore how organizational decision-makers involved in the implementation of three 
distinct approaches to foreign assistance implementation understood and described their own 
objectives. Attention is paid to how their objectives related to the US strategy for foreign 
assistance in the NIS region. 
Conflict and consensus in decision-making in multi-organizational foreign assistance 
projects. A third critical assumption that frames this study concerns the level of consensus and/or 
conflict present in the strategic intent and in the implementation of these projects. Because of the 
complicated context for the delivery of foreign assistance, the need for consensus and the 
opportunity for differences loom large. For this reason, some provision must be made to account 
for the inevitable conflicts that emerge in all phases of the policy-making process. 
A modified version of Guess's bureaucratic role conflict model for foreign assistance is 
used to inform this study. The author's premise is that foreign policy-making is driven by "conflicts 
over resource allocation among multiple specialized hierarchies" (p . 81) . Departing in approach 
from models that focus on environmental considerations, domestic or foreign, Guess proposes a 
bureaucratic role conflict model in which "constrained actors trying to achieve different objectives 
assume roles attached to the positions they occupy in their respective institutions" (p . 83). In this 
model, conflicts that arise over resource allocation produce different incentives, in turn changing 
the actors' perceptions of constraints and goals. Resource allocation in foreign affairs is a year-
to-year "power play'' (p . 82) among the spenders, namely, the departments involved in foreign 
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assistance (State, Treasury, Defense), the Office of Management and Budget, and USAID, 
among others. Much of the acting in the year-to-year allocations is defined by pre-existing rules 
in the budget process. Guess does not criticize foreign aid policy because of the conflicts; in fact, 
conflict can provide checks and balances to the system. His critique of the US foreign aid 
bureaucracy is that it frequently focuses on winning bureaucratic conflicts rather than on finding 
an effective policy framework for foreign aid. 
Guess defines three outputs-goals, constraints, actors (X1, X2, X3)-that largely define 
the results (Y) of foreign aid . (See Figure 1-1 below.) He suggests that the goals (X 1) of foreign 
aid have been prioritized first as security-defense, second as profitability (cosVbenefits to donor), 
and third, developmental, defined as improving the health, education and welfare needs of 
recipient nations. The second variable, constraints (X2), refers to the rules and regulations 
existing in the donor country as mediated by local recipient cultures . The third variable is the 
actors (X3}, who in their respective roles engage in foreign assistance policy-making activities in 
selected project subject to the priorities, constraints and repertoires establ ished by their 
bureaucracies and donor/spender interests. Guess ( 1987) explains that foreign aid in the United 
States lacks a clear domestic constituency (guardian). 
In the face of multiple interests, various spenders (government bureaucracies and their 
contractors) struggle among themselves for allocation of scarce resources . The outcome or 
results of foreign assistance should be sustainable long-term improvements and short-term 
humanitarian delivery of benefits. More frequently, however, projects result in dependency 
(continuance of improvements only until funding ends) and unexpected outcomes and become 
bogged down in staggering complexities. The factors in bold (humanitarian response, 
sustainable improvements, and humanitarian benefits) have been added to Guess's model to 
balance the positive and negative attributes of the conflict model, since conflict does not by 
definition always lead to negative results. 
Though a number of agencies, both governmental and nongovernmental, are involved in 
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FIGURE 1-1 
Bureaucratic Role Conflict Model (Guess, 1987) 
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in US and Recipient Country 
(Y) Results 
Sustainable 
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Humanitarian 
Response 
Dependency 
Unexpected 
Outcomes 
Complexity 
SOURCE: Guess, G.M. (1987) . The politics of United States foreign aid . New York : St. Martin's 
Press, p. 86. 
assistance efforts in the region, USAID continues to remain the focus of delivery of US bilateral 
assistance, since the agency approves and manages most of the programs broadly considered 
development in the NIS (USAID, 1997). The mission of the agency has been streamlined, but the 
task of consolidating the multiple agendas of foreign policy remains as complex and elusive as 
ever. USAID's struggle to define a new foreign assistance mission is a window into the rethinking 
and restructuring taking place throughout the international donor community. This is yet another 
perspective offered in this study. 
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Methodological Framework 
Constructionist approach. In analyzing policy evaluation, the framework for this study is 
most informed by what is termed the construction ist paradigm in policy evaluation (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1989). Traditional policy evaluation assumes a consensus about what goals should guide 
a project or about how well it is being implemented. In the constructionist approach, the 
assumption is made that a number of different constructions or interpretations exist concerning 
the nature and goals of a selected project and on how well it is being implemented. 
The constructionist approach suggests that there is not a single, correct construction of 
any program's goals, implementation, or impact. Yanow (1990) describes the logic of such as 
approach as follows : 
Using interpretative logic, implementation analysis is no longer the search for a 
factual essence of the implementation problem .... Multiple meanings, multiple 
interpretations coexist, like the many facets of a cubist portrait. The role of the 
analyst is to investigate implementer's and other relevant publics' interpretations 
of the policy culture and to analyze the effects of these interpretations and 
meanings on implementation efforts .... Since interpretations are not facts, they 
cannot be handled by a fact-oriented research methodology and require an 
interpretive logic, rather than an ontological one. (p . 221) 
By interpretative rather than ontological logic, Yanow (1990) means that the forms of "reality" that 
do exist are socially constructed and that no single "reality'' exists. Those who put forth claims or 
constructions do so for a variety of reasons, whether for private gain, to advance a particular 
ideology, or to reflect their professional or social training (Palumbo, 1989). 
The constructionist approach is particularly appropriate for analyzing multi-organizational 
projects such as those in foreign assistance. The recognition that multiple interpretations coexist 
in a given project assumes that differences, or conflicting interests and perspectives, will exist by 
necessity in these projects . A typical summative evaluation assumes that there are specific goals 
that all stakeholders agree upon and that these should be used as the criteria against which 
program activities should be assessed. A conflict model of evaluation assumes no such 
consensus. The effectiveness of the implementation of the project in the constructionist approach 
is to decide how effectively these differences and conflicts were addressed in the policy process. 
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The constructionist approach must pay close attention to the context of the policy process, 
since many of the differences in goals arise out of that process. Therefore, Chapters II and Ill are 
devoted to attention to clarifying this context. Qualitative research methodology supplies 
appropriate techniques for exploring competing organizational beliefs systems in the case studies 
that follow in Chapters IV, V and VI. The focus on meaning is central to the interpretative 
approach to social science explored by theorists and researchers from a number of disciplines 
(Geertz, 1973; Denzin, 1992; Hammersley, 1989; Bruner, 1990). The interpretive stream in social 
science is, like the institutional approach, subject to many definitions and applications (Schwandt, 
1994 ). But central to this approach is the emphasis on understanding the perspectives of the 
participants in the study. 
The interpretative approach assumes that human behavior, including social action, is 
purposive. Social agents construct and interpret their own behavior as well as that of their fellow 
agents. To understand the social meaning of a particular context requires the researcher to 
understand the participants' perspectives . As Maxwell (1996) writes, 'The perspectives on 
events and actions held by the people involved in them is not simply their account of these events 
and actions, to be assessed in terms of its truth or falsity; it is pari of the reality that you are trying 
to understand" (p. 17). Hence, participant perspectives remain central to the research process in 
the case studies. Because the present study focuses on the meanings that the participants give 
to the objectives of and strategies used in their projects, the case studies include interpretative 
(Merriam, 1988) and explanatory (Yin, 1984) perspectives on the projects , rather than simple 
description . In interpretative approaches, description is by definition a selective process. 
An equally important tenet of qualitative approaches is the need to describe meaning in 
context. Small samples are typically selected in qualitative research studies for design purposes 
to understand how context influences participant meanings and actions (Patton, 1990; Bogdan & 
Biklen , 1998; Denzin & Lincoln , 1994; Maxwell , 1996). Maxwell (1996) suggests that this 
methodological strategy enables qualitative researchers to "understand how events, actions, and 
meanings are shaped by the unique circumstances in which these occur" (p . 19). In Chapter VII, 
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some attempt is made to relate the find ings from the case studies to the broader policy context 
presented in the early chapters . However, because qualitative case analysis is intended to be 
suggestive rather than generalizable, no attempt is made to extrapolate from these studies a 
general view of the effectiveness of the policy framework for foreign assistance in the N IS region 
as a whole. Rather, the evaluation will restrict itself to certain lessons in the implementation of 
these programs. 
The present study relies heavily on document analysis for framing the broad topical 
domains in the research as well as the more focused analysis in the case studies. Interviews with 
decision-makers, and to a lesser extent, observation provided triangulation of data sources for the 
case analysis . Visual data such as still pictures and maps have been included to aid in clarifying 
the context of the analysis . Details of each of these data sources are described in more detail in 
each of the case studies. 
It should be noted that during interviews participants in the case studies were encouraged 
to reflect on their objectives and actions. Participants in the interviews were made aware of the 
underlying issues of the study, such as the reporting relationship between USAID and the State 
Department at the project level and the possible changing policy instruments for foreign 
assistance that might evolve out of this unique reporting relationship. In this sense, the study 
extends beyond traditional case study into reflective practitioner research (Bogdan & Biklen, 
1997; Maxwell , 1996; Patton, 1990). In this tradition , the act of conducting research engages the 
participants in reflective dialogue about the evolving delivery system, which they are at the same 
time constructing . In this sense, the data gathering techniques employed in this study extended 
beyond naturalistic qualitative techniques insofar as the participants were encouraged to treat the 
research process as a collaborative dialogue (Mischler, 1996). Some of the informants also were 
able to provide guidance in formulating the design of the study, but the proposed work cannot be 
classified as a collaborative research project because the breadth of the topic and multiple data 
sources used in the analysis prevented continuing dialogue with the many informants who 
contributed to the effort. 
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To insure accuracy in the interviews and to increase validity of the study, all informants 
were asked to have their interviews tape recorded , and in some cases, videotaped . The 
informants representing the main contractors in the study-Abt Associates, AIHA, and Selentec, 
Inc.-were helpful and forthcoming in the research process. 
However, many problems surfaced in collecting data from USAID, both in assisting in 
document collection and in retaining taped versions of interviews. Freedom of Information Act 
(FIA) Requests were issued to USAID in 1998 and 1999 for each of the projects . A legal 
determination was made in the case of the Selentec, Inc., cooperative agreement that no 
documents would be released by USAID. There was some difficulty in targeting the correct 
documentation on the two larger projects . Because the cooperative agreements for AIHA and 
Abt Associates involved multiple contracts spread throughout the NIS region, it was difficult to 
target the appropriate information for retrieval for the office at USAID that handled FIA Requests . 
This led to significant delays in requesting information. The relevant program offices at USAID in 
Washington were not forthcoming in assisting in release of any documentation. Important 
documentation on the cases, in particular the financial agreements and conditions of these cases , 
was not accessible to public review even with the FIA, since the information was considered 
proprietary. As a result of these obstacles, the contractors themselves rather than any office at 
USAID generally supplied nearly all documentation used for the study. The types of 
documentation are noted in each case analysis in the study. 
The interviewing protocols required of USAID representatives also proved to be a major 
obstacle in collecting data for this study. Employees in federal bureaucracies such as USAID are 
not allowed to give public statements on the programs without the permission of the Public Affairs 
departments of the respective agencies. This protocol, of course, makes sense for a number of 
reasons, but at the same time, makes it quite difficult for an outside researcher to study the 
strategic intent and the implementation process of bilateral foreign assistance projects . A number 
of USAID representatives, both in Washington and in the field, agreed to be interviewed in the 
study, but most refused to have their interviews tape-recorded . A number of informants noted 
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that they had unfortunate incidents in the past in which comments they made in interviews were 
misrepresented in print. To protect those USAID representatives who did agree to be tape-
recorded in their interviews, their names have been designated simply as "a USAID official" or 
"USAID officials ." To guard against misinterpretation of data, only statements that were 
documented in taped interviews appear as direct quotations in the study. However, this created a 
bias toward more detailed reporting of contractor perceptions because of the lack of verifiable 
documentation on the perspectives of USAID officials . Indeed, USAID contractors were 
refreshingly forthcoming in granting time for interviews, discussion and observation in the course 
of this study. The contractors interviewed for the study in many respects became the central 
stakeholders in the projects under review. 
Major research questions. In keeping with the construction ist paradigm, the multiple 
perspectives of stakeholders are important to establish in each of the cases. In large projects, 
the number of stakeholders can number in the thousands. Just as qualitative case study cannot 
presume generalizability of the findings to all programs in the NIS foreign assistance program, the 
methodology employed in this study does not assume that all stakeholder views have been 
expressed. The most specific research questions asked in this policy evaluation are as follows : 
1. Did the stakeholders questioned in these projects share a common understanding 
of the strategic objectives of the projects in which they were involved? 
2. What process, if any, was involved in the implementation phase of the project to 
seek a common consensus among the key stakeholders charged with 
implementation of each of the projects? 
3. What was the outcome of this process? Did the different approaches to delivery of 
foreign assistance involve different implementation processes? 
4. How are the developmental mission of USAID and the diplomatic mission of the US 
State Department reflected in the foreign assistance effort in the NIS? How do the 
efforts of the contractors reflect their own missions? 
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Seen from the perspective of these research questions, the objective of the research was to pay 
close attention to the consensus-building or conflicts that arose among the stakeholders as they 
implemented these projects . 
Definition of key terms 
Many definitions of the terms economic development, or development, exist in the 
literature. For purposes of this study, the term developmental is associated with formal economic 
assistance designed primarily to benefit a recipient country's economy. The open process of 
development and intention to develop are recogn ized as deep and complex notions. The broad 
definition proposed by Zimmerman (1993) is used throughout this study, in which development 
refers to the maximization of a society's potential regardless of any limits currently set by a 
society's goals or basic structure. The phrase developmental objectives here refers to the 
specific intent to develop embedded in the program, the goals to be attained . The strategies for 
development refer to the programmatic steps taken to translate objectives into actions. 
For purposes of documenting the activities involved in formal development, monitoring 
agencies such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have 
established criteria and subcategories for different kinds of economic assistance. Since such 
assistance may come in many forms and from many sources, both governmental and non-
governmental , the result is a bewildering array of definitions, standards and guidelines. Some of 
these terms have been used interchangeably, so clarification of some of the official categories as 
they are employed in the United States is useful. 
The term foreign assistance, often used interchangeably with foreign aid, refers to the 
official economic commitment to support a wide range of governmentally-mandated policy 
interests overseas, excluding direct military intervention . Foreign assistance funds and activities 
can range from international military education and training, to the Peace Corps , to refugee 
assistance, to the African Development Bank. The main agencies active in foreign assistance 
include the Defense, State, Agriculture, and Treasury Departments, USAID, and a few 
independent agencies (Nowels, 1993). The Treasury Department is responsible for commitments 
to multilateral assistance for such institutions as the World Bank, and USAID is responsible for 
mandated bilateral assistance, technically considered aid from one government to another, 
though distributed through increasingly broad distribution channels such as nongovernmental 
organizations and private companies. 
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The term development can sometimes be confusing, because it denotes both a theoretical 
orientation and a specific subcategory of assistance. Hundreds of definitions of the term can be 
found in the literature on foreign aid and on economic development. As Krueger (1993) suggests, 
development assistance is theoretically provided by donor countries to permit greater 
expenditures on economic development than otherwise would be possible . For this reason , 
disaster relief is not technically a development activity. In the foreign affairs budget for 1998, for 
instance, spending for famine and disaster relief and aid to refugees is categorized as 
humanitarian assistance. In the United States, military assistance is not considered development 
assistance. The foreign affairs budget categorizes such activity as security assistance (Talbott, 
1997). According to Krueger (1993), however, development assistance is often called what a 
donor country says it is providing in the name of development in the international community. 
With only a few exceptions, the assistance usually takes the form of project or program aid rather 
than outright grants. In the United States, more than 50 percent of such aid comes in the form of 
tied aid, which requires the recipient country to spend the allocated funds on goods and services 
from the donor country. 
The phrase diplomatic objectives refers to the aims of diplomats, whose main mission is, 
according to Hamilton and Langhorne (1995), "the peaceful conduct of relations amongst political 
entities (p . 1 ). The work of diplomats, as Freeman (1997} suggests , "is the nonviolent 
advancement of the political, economic, cultural and military interests of their state and people" 
(p . 4). But as Dembinski (1998) notes, the term has different meanings depending on who is 
using it. Within the realm of established international laws and treaties, diplomacy becomes the 
"institutional body of specialized organs governed by specific rules and of activities entrusted to 
them with the aim of establishing, maintaining and developing pacific relations of a State with 
other subjects of international law'' (p . 4). Thus, diplomacy can be viewed from many 
perspectives, both formal and informal. 
Researcher's Framework 
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In qualitative case study and evaluation, the main instrument in the research process 
remains the researcher. Increasing recognition is given today to the problematic nature of the 
"researcher self," the person or persons who engage in defining and making sense of a research 
problem. Qualitative researchers acknowledge and explain the value choices they make in the 
conceptual and methodological approaches they employ in their research . Qualitative 
researchers by and large accept the fact that research is ideologically driven . Most qualitative 
research conducted today is not explicitly theory-driven, in the sense that a single construct 
encompasses or explains the actions and behaviors under study. However, theoretical or 
conceptual approaches to the topic as well as to the methodology are important components of 
defining the researcher self. The academic approaches that best describe the present study 
have been described in the conceptual and methodological framework in this chapter. 
A third component of defining the researcher self revolves around more personal 
attributes, such as professional background and previous experience in the topical area of the 
study. The researcher self defines the framework of a study in ways that are just as important as 
the conceptual and methodological components of the study, though all of these components 
relate to one another in framing a study. 
The formal reason for conducting this study is to serve as a dissertation in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements of an EdD in the Administration , Training and Policy Studies 
Department at Boston University School of Education . My interest in the definitions of 
development emerging in the post-Cold War era arose while taking coursework and writing 
research projects in international education development and policy analysis. It was at that time 
that I became aware of the serious lack of in-depth research studies on US bilateral assistance 
projects to review for students in international education development and related fields . Based 
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on previous graduate study in such areas as intellectual history, organizational development and 
social science research methods, I determined that the best approach to describing such trends 
was to combine qualitative case studies with policy analysis that concretely analyzed diverse 
project approaches to US foreign assistance in a particular context. 
As a scholar involved in research in the area of international development, I was deeply 
interested in the changes occurring in the US foreign policy-making framework in the 1990s. I 
have followed closely the transformation of USAID, the main bilateral agency for development 
assistance in the United States, through a tumultuous decade. Particularly fascinating has been 
the evolution of foreign assistance policy directed toward the former Soviet Union, a region that 
continues to be of great national security concern to the United States. Yet, to date, little 
scholarly work has been published to explore the US foreign assistance projects in the region, 
though such efforts embody important assumptions about the vision and direction of the US 
policy-making framework. This study is intended to redress this limitation in the scholarship and 
provide a vehicle for reflection on future possibilities for US foreign assistance in the NIS 
elsewhere. 
The policy framework evolving in the region also provides an opportunity to study several 
unique aspects of economic development. Since the region is not considered an area targeted for 
traditional development assistance, it has in effect forced an expanded definition of what might be 
considered development assistance, a process not without controversy. Descriptions of 
examples of these expanded versions of developmental intent take us to the very boundaries of 
what the term may define. 
The Eastern Europe and NIS regions also are the only regions in the world in which 
special coordination within the State Department of all US bilateral foreign assistance has been 
legislatively mandated. One of the major issues facing USAID today is its new reporting 
relationship to the State Department, and this study provides a unique opportunity to glimpse a 
unique reporting arrangement in process. The security and economic development assistance 
mandated by the FREEDOM Support Act were intended to be short-term efforts . But the 
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assistance in this region has continued beyond the original intention of the legislation because of 
continued concerns about political and economic stability in the region . During this time, the 
State Department Coordinator's role has grown rather than diminished, and attention to this 
unique decision-making umbrella as it defines the direction of policy is important to clarify. 
As I began to conduct interviews on the policy-making process and foreign assistance 
efforts at USAID in 1996, I began to realize the many players and competing stakeholders in the 
policy-making process. I decided to explore these competing voices in the delivery of concrete 
projects in an area uncharted by the organizations, which deliver foreign assistance: the new 
Soviet republics. I was warned in interviews with USAID officials as early as 1996 that the focus 
of my interest-the Europe and NIS Regional Bureau-was not a good example of the core mission 
because this bureau was "doing its own thing ." I was also warned that I would not be able to 
develop a balanced perspective from the many competing political interests that I would 
encounter as a result of my inquiry. The dialogue that I sought would turn out to be no more than 
the self-interests of the voices . I came to understand those warnings in the ensuing months as I 
collected data and interviewed participants in the study. I continue to believe, however, that a 
better understanding of foreign assistance will be reached only with a better understanding of the 
often-conflicting views of the stakeholders. 
I came into this study as a student rather than an expert on the delivery of foreign 
assistance. It made sense under these circumstances to select a research design that was 
exploratory and inductive rather than driven by a particular organizational, political or policy 
theory. The best way to explore the evolving policy-making framework is not through a policy 
analysis that imposes a carefully defined theoretical approach, such as political or bureaucratic 
theory. These years of exploration have given me the opportunity to reflect on the fore ign 
assistance program in the NIS and on the scholarship on foreign aid in general. A few last 
thoughts on the rationale for this study also are in order. 
Significance of and rationale for the study 
Strobe Talbott, former US Deputy Secretary of State, recalled in his article, "Globalization 
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and diplomacy: A practitioner's view'' publ ished in Foreign Policy (1997}, the 1993 standoff in the 
Russian White House located on the banks of the Moscow River. In defiance of President Boris 
Yeltsin's request to dissolve the legislature and hold new elections, deputies of the Supreme 
Soviet instead chose to sequester themselves. Soon tanks surrounded the building and Russian 
commandos stormed in, retaking the building and arresting those inside. Talbott and his 
diplomatic counterpart located in Smolensk Square, Moscow, discussed the unfolding drama by 
phone as it was being broadcast live on CNN. 
The incident was symptomatic for Talbott of a transformation in communications that 
"brought together the economic, political, and cultural lives of nations, making borders more 
permeable to the movement of people, products, and ideas" (Talbott, 1997, p. 70) . The 
communications revolution was but one facet of a vast global network unfolding into the twenty-
first century, the movement toward globalization. Talbott suggested that with such 
transformations must come changes in the way that nations relate to and communicate with each 
other. No longer controlled, largely secret endeavors, diplomatic efforts were being redefined by 
this revolution , sometimes driven by the media, sometimes becoming mass media events. 
The coming of the era of instant diplomacy, however, did not translate into swift 
transformation of the NIS region . In fact, US foreign assistance decision-makers now believe that 
the developmental changes in the institutions of the region will take generations. The euphoria 
over the end of the Cold War wore off quickly in the early 1990s, replaced with concerns over 
continuing international crises. In the post-Cold War era, United States decision-makers in 
Washington continued to be challenged to understand the country's responsibility in the affairs of 
other nations and how best to act on that responsibility. One important channel by wh ich the 
United States and other Western industrialized nations have traditionally demonstrated 
involvement is through foreign assistance. USAID and the departments of State, Defense, 
Treasury, and Agriculture, among others, have had to undergo a careful and sometimes painful 
rethinking of their missions in the 1990s (Talbott, 1997; General Accounting Office, 1992, 1995, 
1996). As challenging as this process has been, it pales before the new challenges of facing a 
post-September 11 world in which the war on terrorism is the guiding force. 
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The present study focuses on selected projects of USAID, the agency that manages most 
of the nonmilitary bilateral assistance approved each year in the federal foreign affairs budget 
process. Through USAID has offered economic assistance programs throughout the world since 
1961 , much of the documentation about its activities remained shrouded in Cold War secrecy. 
The consolidation of USAID-Washington offices into the new Ronald Reagan building in the fall of 
1997 is also requiring the destruction of decades of institutional documentation for lack of space. 
The post-Cold War USAID is offering a more public approach to information about its programs 
and strategies. J. Brian Atwood, Chief Administrator of USAID from 1993-1999, played a high 
profile role in public forums and in the media to explore the challenges of foreign assistance in the 
post-Cold War, though the bureaucracy that designs and implements the strategies and projects 
receives little public exposure. His successors at USAID, however, have not continued that 
legacy. 
In spite of these and other efforts to increase public knowledge, foreign aid continues to be 
a controversial topic in the post-Cold War era. A survey conducted in 1995 by the Program on 
International Policy Attitudes to find out the attitudes of the American public toward foreign aid 
showed serious misperceptions about the role and function of assistance (Kull, 1995). While the 
vast majority of those surveyed believed that the United States should give aid to help people in 
foreign countries who are in genuine need, most also believed that the United States is spend ing 
typically five times more on foreign aid than actually is the case. Aware of the public lack of 
perspective on foreign aid, even the State Department has begun to offer public awareness 
seminars (Talbott, 1997). 
In the interest of increasing public knowledge of US development assistance efforts in the 
NIS, the present study is intended to be broadly educative in scope. Reminiscent of The 
Education of Henry Adams (1907), Gutek (1988) defines education in the most general sense as 
"the total social processes that bring a person into cultural life ... a recipient of and a participant in 
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a culture" (p. 4). More developmental is Dewey's (1916) definition of education as a process of 
forming intellectual and emotional dispositions, or effective habits of mind. In keeping with the 
spirit of these broad definitions, the primary task of this policy research is to educate or to instruct. 
The study is intended to encourage reflection on the concepts, policies and activities described 
and the underlying questions posed in the belief that such reflection will lead to more informed 
participation in the cultural and institutional systems in which they are embedded . In addition, the 
study will add to the limited scholarship ava ilable to students of international development in such 
applied fields as education, health , management, and international relations that seek to 
understand the dimensions and directions of US foreign assistance efforts in the NIS. 
Successive chapters of the study will contribute varied perspectives on the foreign pol icy 
framework in the region . An overview of the trends in and context for foreign assistance is 
intended to increase understanding of the core issues involved in foreign assistance. The case 
studies of selected projects underway in the former Soviet republics are intended to provide 
concrete documentation of the struggles of such programs in a region that presents unique 
challenges for foreign assistance. Descriptions of these programs will , it is hoped, translate 
abstract trends and policies into concrete programs in an area of the world that remains a major 
security concern for the United States. Yet, little information to date on these efforts is publicly 
available, and no previous studies have been found of USAID development activities in the 
former Soviet Union other than internal reports and evaluations. 
It is also hoped that this policy case study of USAID projects will be especially appropriate 
at a time when USAID has made considerable strides in reinventing itself in a tumultuous post-
Cold War world . As part of its strategic work, some USAID documents, such as the New 
Partnerships Initiative (NPI), have placed considerable emphasis on the importance of community 
agencies to serve as learning organizations. It is hoped that th is study will serve as another 
learning tool for reflection and dialogue about a variety of issues surrounding foreign assistance 
and the policy tools used for its del ivery. The methodological approach for the study was chosen 
with particular care to further th is purpose. 
CHAPTER II 
Policy Context: 
Foreign Assistance Strategies and Trends in the NIS 
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One crucial element to understanding the policy context of a study on the NIS is the 
bilateral and multilateral flow of funds to the former Soviet republics. The Organization of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) compiled surveys year to year on the aid flows 
to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Some time lags occurred in the reporting 
because of complex coordinating problems in obtaining data from donors. So data are currently 
available only on the years 1990-1995 from OECD. However, these data give some perspective 
on the actual support and its terms provided to Central and Eastern Europe and the New 
Independent States during the first half of the 1990s. 
According to OECD, in the six years from 1990 to 1995, the ten countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe and the twelve former Soviet republics received net receipts from external 
resources amounting to $134 billion . Of this amount, nearly $98 billion came from bilateral 
sources and $36 billion from multilateral sources. Of the total amount of aid , nearly one third ($41 
billion) was in the form of concessional aid, though this form of aid declined after 1995 as special 
German payments came to an end and debt relief for Poland diminished . Table 2-1 summarizes 
the total net flows to CEEC/NIS regions between 1990 and 1995. It is important to remember that 
these totals are net amounts: repayment of loans in part or whole was subtracted from the total 
reported . 
OECD (1998) analysts found that in this six-year period , most countries of Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union were "making their transitions without a massive transfer of 
resources from OECD countries and multilateral financial institutions" (p . 9). They noted that 
announced levels of support were not always implemented . Since most repayments were on 
nonconcessional terms, large repayments were made in the same period. By 1995, some net 
disbursements were becoming negative as large repayments were made. A large share of 
TABLE 2-1 
Main sources of finance for CEECs/NIS, 1990-1995 
Bilateral net flows $thousands $per Share of 
(000) capita total 
Germany 64,441,000 797 59.2 
United States 14,272,000 55 13.1 
Austria 4,489,000 568 4.1 
France 4,464,000 78 4.1 
United Kingdom 3,764,000 65 3.4 
Japan 2,428,000 19 2.2 
Netherlands 2,378,000 156 2.2 
TOTAL: 96,236,000 88.4* 
(above countries) 
Multilateral net flows 
d . . 14 756 000 40 8 
European Commission 10,350,000 28.6 
World Bank/IDA 7,573,000 21 .0 
European Bank for Reconstruction & Development 2,518,000 7.0 
TOTAL: 35,197,000 97.4* 
(above agencies) 
The balance of bilateral and multilateral aid was 
supplied by unlisted donors in smaller amounts. 
SOURCE: OECD (1998). Aid and other resource flows to the Central and Eastern European 
countries and the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (1990-1995). Paris : 
OECD, p. 9. 
concessional aid consisted of debt relief, in particular for Poland and for repayment for German 
unification to the former Soviet Union. 
In addition to the modest sums reported, the OECD (1998) analysts noted that resource 
flows varied significantly from year to year. Donors also chose to position their funding in 
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different ways . Many donors directed their aid primarily toward Russia. Australia directed 88 
percent of its official aid to Russia; Korea, 61 percent; Norway, 54 percent; and Spain, 33 
percent. Japan directed the bulk of its flows to Hungary, while Belgium directed half of its aid to 
the Czech Republic and Hungary. Other European countries distributed their resources far more 
evenly. 
At the end of six years of transition aid in the CEEC/NIS, Germany was the largest donor 
country of bilateral aid at 39 percent of the total ; the United States was the second largest at 21 
percent. OECD analysts noted that major fluctuations occurred in aid that affected the year-to-
year aid flow from most countries . OECD analysis noted that only a few donors appeared to have 
developed medium- or long-range policy strateg ies for aid flows. After five years of transitioning, 
most donor countries carried out their aid planning on "an ad hoc basis" (p . 20). The authors also 
noted that the poorest, or least developed countries, in the CEEC/NIS received less aid than 
more developed countries . 
US bilateral aid to the NIS 
Many international observers regarded the infusion of foreign assistance to the former 
Soviet republics to be modest in spite of the fanfare that accompanied each new announcement 
of G-7 assistance. But the contribution from the United States in 1993 and 1994 was nonetheless 
a shock to the agencies delegated the task of disbursing and managing the assistance. A report 
issued by the Congressional Research Service in January 1995 (Tarnoff, 1995) affirms what 
many would later forget: the Former Soviet Union became the second largest recipient of US 
foreign assistance from all sources by FY 1994, just three years into the aid program to the 
region . By this time, the report noted, both political parties "have criticized the program for its 
slowness, misplaced priorities, and administrative disarray, and have raised concerns regarding 
possible corruption and waste" (p. 1 ). Requests for 1995 were cut by 12 percent as a result of 
these concerns . 
A summary of the highlights of this CRS report, issued after the first three years of US 
assistance efforts in the NIS, can shed light on the challenges the foreign assistance community 
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faced in getting on the ground in the region . The report does not carefully document all of the 
sources for its commentary, but it is intended to be sufficiently detailed to keep Congress 
informed on a variety of issues surround ing the NIS assistance program. In this sense, the report 
serves as a historical document summarizing the state of the program after the first three years . 
For this reason, attention to its contents adds useful historical context to the debate on foreign 
assistance to the region at the time. 
The CRS report (Tarnoff, January 1995) highlights the two most important components of 
the foreign assistance effort to the NIS: First, the assistance program was more closely tied to 
US foreign policy objectives than much aid in other regions of the world . This foreign policy tie 
was reinforced by the appointment of the State Department to coordinate the program. Second, 
the "unique and distinct-'historic'-foreign policy purpose" of assistance to the region also was 
slated to be short-term (p. 2). According to the report, most of the Russia program was expected 
to end in 1998, with assistance programs to the other republics to follow shortly thereafter. These 
characteristics of the program-the emphasis on foreign policy objectives within a short-term 
plann ing framework-heavily characterized the kind of assistance del ivered to the region . 
According to the report (Tarnoff, January 1995), early assistance to the NIS was 
designed to meet four general objectives: 
o The establishment of democratic societies; 
o The promotion of free market economies; 
o The meeting of humanitarian needs; and 
o Control and dismantlement of nuclear weapons. (p . 2) 
The Cl inton Administration added the environment as a crosscutting theme in a January 1994 
strategy paper. US private investment was considered from the onset by many to be key to 
economic and political transition in the region. In this sense, the rise and fall of US private 
investment over the decade became a key indicator of reform in the NIS. The objective to control 
and dismantle nuclear weapons was the primary responsib ility of the US Defense Department, 
subsidized by the Nunn-Lugar program. Funding for this reduction was aimed at the nuclear 
republics of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine and absorbed close to 50 percent of all 
assistance throughout the 1990s. 
By way of comparison , the annual report for 1999 prepared by the Office of the 
Coordinator of US Assistance to the NIS (January 2000), lists four areas of assistance: 
o Promoting democratic institution-building, the rule of law and 
the establishment of civil society; 
o Helping promote market reform; 
o Enhancing US security through cooperative threat reduction 
and nonproliferation efforts; and 
o Addressing humanitarian needs. (p. 1) 
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The similarities between these objectives in 1995 and 1999 are striking and leave the impression 
that the US aid program has been relatively consistent in its intent and allocations. These 
objectives also indicate how broad-based the strategic objectives for the region were . But in the 
intervening years, the conditions surrounding assistance, including US diplomatic relations with 
republics in the former Soviet Union, have weathered a number of changes . 
Reporting of US foreign assistance to the NIS 
One of the criticisms of the early aid to the former Soviet Union was that it was 
"overpromised and underdelivered" (Biackwill, Braithwaite & Tanaka, 1995, p. 15). In the United 
States, questions also were raised as to what should be included as aid . The CRS report notes 
that as of January 1994, the State Department claimed that $17.6 billion had been allocated to 
the region . Included in that sum were commercial programs that did not typically count as foreign 
assistance, such as agriculture credit guarantees to insure repayment of market rate loans used 
to purchase US food commodities as well as loans on Eximbank designed to benefit US 
exporters. A further discrepancy in reporting occurred because of delays in obligating and 
disbursing funds . Still other aid was "lost" if it was not obligated in the fiscal year in which it was 
authorized . As examples, the report notes that $212 million was lost in 1992 and $117 million in . 
1993 when the funds were not obligated in the year approved . Breaking down the allocations 
more carefully, the CRS report (January 1995) estimated that , as of the end of 1994, the United 
37 
States provided $6.7 billion in grants, $669 million in concessional food loans and $5.5 billion in a 
variety of commercial credit guarantee programs. 
The report notes that many observers of the events unfolding following the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union viewed the opportunity to transform the region "as a rare and perhaps fleeting 
window of opportunity'' (p. 16). Many members of Congress apparently were critical of the failure 
of the Bush Administration to react to change quickly enough following the attempted coup in 
August 1991. 
But members of Congress were by no means the only critics of G-7 handling of the 
"fleeting window of opportunity'' (p. 16). In January 1993, the World Economy Group, an 
independent group of leading economists, published their position on reforms in the Former 
Soviet Union. The group criticized the "wait-and-see attitude" toward Russia in particular. Initially 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) gave Russia the same criteria as other potential creditors 
in extending loan assistance. The economists described a "chicken-and-egg" problem that 
subsequently unfolded (p . 32). The IMF position was that Russia needed to stabilize its inflation 
before receiving IMF funding. But the country could not stabilize without a massive influx of 
foreign assistance. Even then, the infusion of money carried no certainty that it would lead to 
stability. This was in part a result of a confusing constitutional tangle in the country at the time of 
the dissolution. According to the report, 87 percent of the members of the Congress in Russia 
elected in 1990 were from the Communist party. For the next few years , the Congress was busy 
slowing down the pace of reform on such issues as private ownership of land while the general 
population clamored for more rapid reform. The World Economy Group (January 1993) 
concluded that Western countries could not change the constitutional tangle, but they could direct 
assistance to Yeltsin to help Russian industries modify production to capture new markets, not 
unlike the Marshall Plan before it. Arguments such as those put forth by the World Economy 
Group were relatively common at the time. 
According to the CRS report (January 1995), the slow pace of implementation continued 
to draw criticism even following the passing of the FREEDOM Support Act in October 1992. 
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According to the report, the Clinton Administration early in 1993 moved deliberately to speed up 
implementation in the face of this criticism . Yet by mid 1994, only $694 million of $2.1 billion in 
FY 1994 funds were obligated. However, the pace for implementation increased rapidly from this 
point onward. 
Beyond the lag in obligating funds, a gap existed between contract signing and project 
implementation for sizable amounts of the foreign assistance allocations. In a break from typical 
program planning policies, USAID attempted to eliminate paperwork and accelerate a variety of 
procedures. Still , many contractors reportedly complained of long delays in having their work 
plans approved . In spite of these extraordinary efforts, the CRS report (January 1995) suggests 
that US ignorance of the "conditions, players, and problems" working in "uncertain and 
fluctuating" conditions in the region created serious barriers to rapid implementation (p. 17). 
Yet another criticism launched at the US assistance program in the region focused on the 
large amount of early aid that was used to pay US consultants, keeping the assistance, in effect, 
in the United States. The CRS report (January 1995) noted the disgruntlement of Russians who 
disliked the "fly-in and fly-out" methods of many US consultants (p . 28). The majority of technical 
experts stayed in the NIS for a few months or less. This approach not only limited knowledge of 
local situations, but also prevented the development of personal relationships in a culture that 
placed high emphasis on friendship as a basis of acceptance. The high hourly rates of 
consultants and the payoff of NIS assistance for US business were noted in early news stories 
critical of the assistance effort that appeared in the Wall Street Journal in 1993 and 1994. 
The strategic intent of the foreign assistance effort in the NIS also drew much attention 
and criticism . Questions arose as to whether the aid reached the ordinary citizen in the republics 
and whether it was being used for corrupt purposes. Others questioned whether the program 
was "sufficiently utilizing and helping US business" (p. 15). Decision-makers concerned about all 
these issues were to find fuel fof all their concerns in the next few years . 
Increasing evidence of corruptness at all levels throughout the region had surfaced even 
early in the 1990s. Like other aspects of foreign assistance, high profile stories of corruption 
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were reported in the press during this early period. Hersh 's (June 1994) discussion in the Atlantic 
Monthly suggested that some US assistance was being used for corrupt purposes. However, 
noting that so much bilateral assistance was provided by and for American citizens, the CRS 
report (January 1995) suggested that it was not particularly vulnerable to fraud or corruption . 
Undercover tracking of food aid revealed Russian officials seeking bribes and payoffs, and the 
results were reported in Forbes (16 August 1993) and in the US News and World Report (23 
August 1993). An early report (September 1994) issued by the Inspector General for USAID on 
ten projects underway in the NIS found no criminal misuse of funds . But multilateral allocations of 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were not discussed in the CRS report (January 
1995), in part because the level of such aid increased rapidly only after 1994. 
The CRS report (January 1995) concluded that the aid program to the former Soviet 
Union was still at an early stage, too early to make definitive judgments about its effectiveness. 
By January 1995, the date of the report, the US aid program was less than three years old and 
most projects on the ground were much less than two years old . Debate raged on about virtually 
all aspects of the policy tools and strategies needed in the region . 
The report noted, finally, that early program funding trends showed the United States to be 
"doing a little of everything, diluting the effect of executive branch strategy statements" (p . 37), an 
eclectic approach that continued throughout the 1990s. This "little of everything" approach was 
bel ieved to be the result of pressure from both the State Department and the Congress to 
implement quickly. Early in the process, most if not all decisions were made in Washington . 
Those delivering foreign assistance had little experience in the region : "information was still 
scanty on who supported reform, who was corrupt, and who was worth helping in local 
government" (p . 38). The push to implement a variety of strategies at once, seemingly without a 
coherent overall strategy, led to ill-timed and ill-placed projects . Training was given to bankers 
when there was no reformed banking system; business advisement was offered to entrepreneurs 
with no credit programs available to start businesses. The CRS report (January 1995) finally 
cited a disturbing possibility that the citizens of the NIS were getting lost in the shuffle: 
Further lost in the play between different interests, some suggest, has been the 
presumed target of this foreign policy, the citizens of the FSU. The periodic US-
led pronouncements promising G-7 aid and then not appearing to deliver, the 
stream of technical assessment teams to FSU government and private sector 
officials that appeared to lead nowhere, the apparent failure to cut through US 
cultural and political ignorance regard ing the region by hiring sufficient numbers 
of FSU specialists and requiring more grassroots programming despite the 
administrative obstacles, may all have contributed to the reportedly disillusioned 
FSU public. If the conduct of the assistance program is leading to the alienation 
of its targets , one US foreign policy objective is well on its way to being lost. (p . 
39) 
US assistance trends in the late 1990s 
According to the FY 2000 annual report issued from the Office of the Coordinator of the 
NIS (January 2000), the United States has appropriated cumulatively about $17.61 billion from 
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the FREEDOM Support Act, Cooperative Threat Reduction and a variety of others assistance and 
cooperative programs. Approvals and distributions are made through a variety of channels . In 
addition to allocations made to USAID, there were transfers issued to such organizations as the 
US Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, State, Justice, Agriculture and a variety of 
other governmental organizations. Table 2-2 gives an indication of the complexity of the types of 
programs maintained from year to year using FY 1999 data. Many of these allocations are 
grants-in-aid, but some are also concessional loans. For example, the Department of Agriculture 
provided $4.276 billion cumulatively in food aid in 1999, but much of this assistance was in the 
form of loans and credits . Details of programs are described in a variety of documents, including 
the annual reports of the Coordinator of the NIS, the annual USAID Presentations to Congress, 
and the US budget requests submitted by the Department of State for Foreign Affairs . 
Table 2-3 is a breakdown of cumulative expenditures by republic. As the table indicates, 
Russia, with a population of 147 million people, has been the recipient of more than 48 percent of 
bilateral aid from all sources through 1999. Ukraine, the second largest republic at 47 million, has 
received 15 percent of these loans. Other republics have been allocated rather modest sums 
since 1992. The allocation of funding by republic has been a matter of some contention in 
Congress in the yearly budget review process. Some have believed that Russia should be given 
TABLE 2-2 
Major US Bilateral Assistance Programs in the NIS 
Cumulative Obligated Funds as of September 30, 1999 
FREEDOM Support Act Funds: 
USAID/ENI -Bureau for Europe and the NIS 
NIS Special Initiatives 
Energy Efficiency and Market Reform 
Environmental Policy and Technology 
Health-Care Improvement 
Private-Sector Initiatives 
Food-Systems Restructuring 
Democratic Reform 
Housing-Sector Reform 
Economic Restructuring and Financial Reform 
Eurasia Foundation (Economic Reform) 
Enterprise Funds 
Exchanges and Training 
Russia Energy & Environmental Commodity Import program 
Administrative Expenses 
Subtotal USAID 
Other USAID Programs 
Subtotal other programs 
Transfers to Other US Agencies 
Department of Commerce 
USIA FREEDOM Support Act Exchanges 
Department of Energy 
Department of State 
Department of Justice 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
US Trade & Development Agency 
Peace Corps 
Environmental Protection Agency 
NSF/Civilian Research & Development 
US Customs Service 
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
US Department of Agriculture 
Department of Treasury 
Congressional Research Service 
Cumulative FREEDOM Support Act Funds 
Non-FREEDOM Support Act Funds 
Department of Defense 
Department of Agriculture 
Department of Energy 
NSF/Civilian R&D Foundation 
NSF/Cooperative Research Projects 
Department of Commerce 
US Export-Import Bank 
US Trade and Development Agency 
US Information Agency 
Department of State 
Peace Corps 
Total Non-FREEDOM Support Act Funds 
Total Cumulative Obligations as of 9/30/99: $ 
$ (in millions) 
589.41 
456.59 
164.42 
283.79 
1,081 .49 
113.57 
393.83 
248.69 
393.06 
131.9 
501 
193.62 
59.5 
25.3 
4636.17 
128.01 
62.70 
440.61 
413.11 
178.27 
4.78 
54.43 
76.51 
51 .35 
19.66 
3 .09 
16.56 
25 .06 
36.27 
47.29 
4.69 
6,477.84 
2,202.71 
4,282.68 
798.03 
19.87 
10.80 
1.50 
300.00 
11 .19 
250.65 
100.32 
60.98 
8,038.74 
14,516,580,000 
SOURCE: Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to the NIS (January 2000). US government 
assistance to and cooperative activities with the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union. 
Washington , DC: US Department of State. 
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TABLE 2-3 
Major US Bilateral Assistance Programs in the NIS 
Obligated Funds bl£ Re~ublic (in millions of dollars} 
Cumulative as of Se~tember 30, 1999 
FREEDOM Non-FREEDOM 
Support Support Percentage 
Act Funds Act Funds of Total 
NIS Regional 553.73 551 .92 7.62% 
Armenia 620.87 378.34 6.88% 
Azerbaijan 106.77 66.02 1.19% 
Belarus 55.61 306.49 2.49% 
Georgia 287.44 387.81 4.65% 
Kazakhstan 349.5 251.68 4.14% 
Kyrgyzstan 183.62 254.18 3.02% 
Moldova 186.38 188.12 2.58% 
Russia 2445.19 4537.83 48.10% 
Tajikistan 66.86 183.47 1.72% 
Turkmenistan 58.8 111 .57 1.17% 
Ukraine 1436.01 774.93 15.23% 
Uzbekistan 127.07 46.39 1.19% 
Subtotal 6477.85 8038.75 
SOURCE: Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to the NIS (January 2000). 
US government assistance to and cooperative activities with the New Independent 
States of the Former Soviet Union. Washington , DC: US Department of State. 
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the lion's share of aid because of its size and critical strategic position. Others have pushed for 
earmarks in smaller republics to insure that special needs were not lost in efforts to reform 
Russia . 
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Much of the funding for USAID programs is appropriated through the legal mandates of 
the FREEDOM Support Act. Despite the participation of many federal departments and 
agencies, USAID continues to take most responsibility for obligating and expending assistance 
programs from this public law. As the graph on Figure 2-1 shows, funding from FREEDOM 
Support Act allocations remains relatively modest. Total budgeted funds for the FREEDOM 
Support Act since it was passed through September 30, 2000, has been $7.6 billion . As the 
annual reports from the Coordinator's Office (1999, 2000) suggest, funding for US government 
assistance reached its lowest level in FY 1997, but increased from FY 1998 through FY 2001 . 
The largest outlay in funding occurred in FY 1994, at $2 .5 billion . In FY 1995, funding dropped to 
$856 million, to $641 million in FY 1996, and then down to $625 million in FY 1997. 
As a result of the passing of the Partnership for Freedom Initiative, the Congress 
approved a larger budget of $770 million in 1998. This was followed by another $847 mill ion in FY 
1999, $839 million in FY 2000, and $810 million for FY 2001. It should be noted that a number of 
other sources beyond the FREEDOM Support Act funding from year-to-year contribute to foreign 
aid in the region, such as in Cooperative Threat Reduction . Changes may be ahead in future 
years as the Bush Administration reviews the progress and intent of ongoing programs. 
Though the largest share of funding is allocated to Russia , it should be noted that the 
Federation is a vast area, geographically nearly twice the size of the United States, with a 
population of about 147 million . A brief look at US government assistance directed to this 
particular republic is worth exploring. US government assistance in FY 2000, for instance, totaled 
about $1 .113 billion to the Federation alone. However, large sums were appropriated to a variety 
of programs in nuclear threat reduction with the Department of Defense ($425 million) and the 
Department of Energy ($231.35 million). An estimated $240 million was in food aid (often in the 
FIGURE 2-1 
$10 b Cumulative FREEDOM Support Act Funds 
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*NOTE: 9/30/97 cumulative expenditures do not include USAID expenditures. 
SOURCE: Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to the NIS. (January 2001 ). US government assistance to and 
cooperative activities with the New Independent States of the Former Soviet Union: FY 2000 annual report. Washington, 
DC: US Department of State. 
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form of loans) from the Department of Agriculture. Just under $48 million was appropriated for 
other kinds of assistance, including privately donated humanitarian commodities and Department 
of Defense excess. 
FREEDOM Support Act funds appropriated for Russia in FY 2000 amounted to $168.06 
million. Of this amount, $56 million was directed toward threat reduction programs, $61 million for 
USAID programs, and $25 million for State Department public diplomacy programs. Sums for 
social sector reform in Russia were actually quite modest: $11 million for health, $4 million for 
environmental programs, $14 million for private-sector development and economic restructuring, 
$3 million for urban socio-economic programs, $3 million for exchanges, and $7 million for 
Eurasia Foundation and its economic reform activities. Thus, though the desire may continue to 
be high for social sector reform in Russia, with its lion's share of appropriations, and other 
republics of the NIS, the actual sums allocated to this effort are extremely limited. 
Another way to understand assistance allocations to the NIS as a whole is by strategic 
goal. The US annual foreign affairs budget lists a number of strategic goals constant across 
regions of the world. In this sense, the allocations to the NIS are consistent with those of 
programs in different regions of the world. Table 2-4 lists the allocations by strategic goal for FY 
1998 (actual), FY 1999 (estimated), and FY 2000 (requested). The largest allocations of funding 
are designated for economic development (25.6 percent) and democracy (20 percent). These 
breakdowns are for bilateral assistance only; multilateral assistance is not designated by goal. 
Continuing funding strategies in the NIS 
Much bilateral and multilateral funding in the NIS continues to be based on the ever-
changing political and economic tides in the region . The annual report for 1999 notes that policy 
tools for the region are intended to "strike a balance between programs that promote lasting 
generational change and those that address immediate threats" (p . 1 ). Assistance to central 
governments in the republics is predicated in part on willingness to reform . The long-term 
republics for reform have come to support increasingly grassroots programs, such as training and 
exchange programs, nongovernmental organizations, an independent media, Internet access and 
TABLE 2-4 
International Affairs Budget • New lnde~endent States {NIS} 
A~~ro~riations Accounts by Strategic Goal 
FY 2000 
Actual Estimate Request 
FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 
Regional Stability 51,564 46,040 94,500 
Weapons of Mass Destruction 19,622 37,897 193,465 17.76% 
Open Markets 26,954 13,000 14,000 1.29% 
U.S.Exports 29,448 19,885 20,802 1.91% 
Global Economic Growth 1,230 21,600 23,000 2.11% 
Economic Development 255,652 261,500 279,000 25.62% 
International Crime 22,450 26,705 31 '100 2.86% 
Illegal Drugs 1,580 2,315 2,400 0.22% 
Counter-Terrorism 6,000 6,200 0.57% 
Democracy 194,740 214 ,1 90 218,000 20.02% 
Humanitarian Assistance 100,496 104,730 79,100 7.26% 
Environment 74,189 81 ,610 79,500 7.30% 
Population 1,640 1,865 1,950 0.18% 
Health 32,917 44,875 46,050 4.23% 
Diplomatic Activities 70 0 0 0.00% 
TOTAL $812,551 $882,212 $1,089,067 
SOURCE: Office of the Secretary of State (1999). Congressional presentation for foreign 
operations. Fiscal year 2000. Washington , DC: U.S. Department of Commerce National 
Technical Information Service, pp. 596-597. 
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small business. More assistance programs are targeted for outlying regions, away from capital 
cities. The early language of short-term transitional assistance has been replaced by the 
recognition of reform as a "long-term, generational process" (p . 2). 
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Short-term aid continues to be focused on security issues and survival problems. The 
1999 annual report projected increased support for the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative 
(ETRI). The report noted the increased risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as 
former Soviet weapons scientists were targeted for employment once again in the NIS and in 
other countries seeking enhancements of their nuclear arsenals. ETRI programs were designed 
to redirect the talents of such scientists into other professional areas. Finally, humanitarian aid 
was extended to those most severely affected by short-term and long-term economic problems. 
Food distribution, anti-tuberculosis efforts, hospital equipment, and support for orphans all are 
considered humanitarian activities. 
Assistance to the central governments in the republics continued to a limited extent in 
1999 and beyond . The US bilateral program provided technical assistance to governments that 
supported reform and cut back aid to those, which did not. In th is regard , Muldova received 
increased funding, as did financial-sector reform in Kyrgyzstan . In contrast, the US government 
withdrew support for the agricultural and energy sectors in Russia , neither of which were moving 
toward reform . Support for the central election commissions in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan was 
withdrawn after these governments failed to uphold free and fair elections . Aid to Belarus and 
Turkmenistan continued to diminish, in part a reflection of the resistance of the central 
governments of these republics to support reform. The allocation of funding year-to-year thus is 
dependent on a number offactors. 
Response to the US assistance program since the mid-1990s 
The seeming consistency of aid from year-to-year to the NIS should not be construed as 
a sign that a consensus was building on the terms and conditions of aid to the region . Far from it. 
Foreign aid, both bilateral and multilateral, around the world remains one of the most 
controversial activities of Western governments, and the efficacy of the aid program directed 
toward the NIS began to be questioned increasingly heading toward the 21 51 century. 
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The relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation, the largest and 
most visible of republics, became increasingly problematic in 1998 and 1999 for a variety of 
reasons . In August 1998, the already turbulent Russian political and economic climate became 
increasingly fragile as emergency measures were taken to defend the stability of the country's 
currency, the ruble. By the end of September, the value of the ruble had plunged from 6.2 to 18 
rubles to the dollar, and Russia's commercial banking and payments systems temporarily shut 
down. The crisis was believed to be the result of persistent budget deficits and insufficient 
reforms, falling oil prices, and global economic instability. 
On September 11 , 1998, Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov was installed as Prime 
Minister to head a new government faced with daunting structural issues : defaults on foreign 
loans; continued slide of the rube; persistent budget deficits; inadequate legal and tax systems; 
wage payments in arrears to government employees; rampant crime and corruption (Taylor, 
January, 1999). Seven months later, on May 12, 1999, citing his unhappiness with Primakov's 
emphasis on political caution and consensus, President Boris Yeltsin fired Primakov and offered 
Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin as a compromise candidate for Prime Minister, the fifth Prime 
Minister in 14 months (Bohlen, 1999; Wines, 1999). By June 1999, Russia's currency had fallen 
to 25 rubles to the dollar. In yet another shake-up on August 9, 1999, Yeltsin dismissed 
Stephashin and chose Vladimir Putin as his new Prime Minister (Bohlen, 1999). It was in the 
context of developments such as these that international observers and policy-makers began to 
wonder about the status of post-Cold War transformation in Russia and the other republics. 
Perhaps the report that most dramatically illustrates the continuing polarities over aid to 
the former Soviet republics is the one issued by the Speaker's Advisory Group on Russia in 
September 2000, just two months before the presidential elections. The timing of the report and 
the strong criticism launched against President Cl inton and Vice President AI Gore throughout the 
analysis gave the report a strong partisan flavor. Still , the report remains the most extensive study 
of the foreign assistance effort in the NIS, though it was specifically targeted at developments in 
Russia. 
49 
As Russia prepared for presidential elections in March 2000, the Speaker of the House 
requested six committees in the US House of Representatives to assess the results of US policy 
toward Russia during the Yeltsin years . The responsibility for the task fell to the chairmen of the 
Committees on Armed Services, Appropriations, Banking, Intelligence, and International 
Relations. Added to the group was the House Vice Chairman of the Joint Economic Committee 
and additional members of the House leadership and the committees of jurisdiction . The group 
and its staff met several times each week for five months with key Clinton administration policy 
makers, leaders of Russia 's executive and legislative branches, and leading academic and 
private sector experts on Russia and US-Russian relations from both countries . The Advisory 
Group also reviewed committee work and official reports and a wide range of primary and 
secondary sources. In addition , the Chairman of the Advisory Group, Christopher Cox, members 
of the advisory group and their staff traveled to Russia on several occasions after March 2000 to 
meet with Russian counterparts. 
The report that emerged in September 2000, Russia's Road to Corruption, was widely 
regarded as politically motivated. Leading Republicans served on the Speaker's Advisory Group, 
including Cox himself. Copies of the report ran out of print within a short time, but the manuscript 
became available for downloading on the Internet on the House Policy Committee website. 
Though highly critical of virtually all aspects of the Clinton Administration 's efforts in Russia , the 
Advisory Group nonetheless explores in more detail than any other government document the 
history of the dissolution of the Soviet Union . More important, it gives a sense of the changing 
tides of sentiment toward the region as highlighted in the largest and most populated republic, 
Russia . While it is not possible to consider the variety of issues raised in the 300-page report, 
some viewpoints discussed in this lengthy and carefully documented report can provide a glimpse 
into present and future relations with the largest republic in the NIS region . 
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The Cox (2000) report suggested that the Russian-American foreign policy was 
retrogressing toward the pre-perestroika Cold War period. The report pointed to several trends 
indicating increasingly strained diplomatic relations. President Vladimir Putin's Foreign Policy 
Concept, approved in June 2000, noted that a threat to Russia was "a growing trend towards the 
establishment of a unipolar structure of the world with the economic and power domination of the 
United States" (as cited in Cox, 2000, p. 18). 
In pursuit of a policy of "strengthening multipolarity," the authors suggested that the 
avowed purpose of the Russian consensus was to "increase the strength of global forces arrayed 
against the United States" (p .131 ). This consensus helped allay any concerns that Russian 
officials, scientists, and businessmen might have about transferring weapons or military 
technology to countries such as Iran , Iraq, North Korea , Libya, and the People's Republic of 
China. The national interest in Russia was increasingly understood as weakening the United 
States. Russians have turned increasingly to the sale of advanced weapons systems to raise 
hard capital. Since 1998, foreign sales of arms have increased by an estimated 58 percent, from 
$2.8 to $4.8 billion . A number of the weapons have been designed specifically to destroy 
American systems. 
The report accused the Clinton Administration of creating self-serving "spin" from the 
increasingly problematic economic and political news coming out the region to prop up a series of 
poor decisions. The Advisory Group (September 2000) criticized President Clinton for delegating 
major responsibility for Russia to Vice President AI Gore, a move that made the relationship with 
Russia appear to be secondary to other presidential concerns . Further, Gore's close association 
with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin during his five years in office aligned the United States 
government with one of the most notorious oligarchs, since Chernomyrdin allegedly gained 
billions from participating in the "privatization" process in the energy sector. The Gore-
Chernomyrdin Commission became one of the major policy tools of the foreign assistance effort. 
Many panels promoting reform and reform policies were held year-to-year. According to the Cox 
report (2000), the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission and ongoing working sessions produced 
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reams of paper and created minor successes in policy, but largely served to divert attention to the 
major failures looming on the horizon. This was suitably symbolized in the leadership of 
Chernomyrdin himself, who was believed to have made billions in privatization schemes while 
Prime Minister of Russia . 
The report attacked the free-flowing loans emanating out of the IMF in particular after 
initial delays in the early 1990s. Former President Bush, far from being too conservative, was in 
fact wise for withholding support for large infusions of cash following Gorbachev's request from 
1989 onwards. While Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs, whose views on the NIS were popular 
with US government policymakers at the time, was advocating for a $150 billion plan over five 
years , President Bush was advocating for business-to-business dealings between private 
individuals and firms. Bush is reported to have said in 1992, "A shortage of foreign capital is not 
what plunged your economy into crisis, nor can your economic ills be cured by an infusion of 
cash" (p . 29). 
The report was especially critical of IMF lending in 1996 and after. Russia's first loan from 
the IMF was granted in April 1992 for $1 billion, followed by another for $1 .5 billion in 1993. By 
the end of 1995, loans totaled more than $10 billion . In March 1996, apparently to the surprise of 
many, the IMF and the Russian central government agreed to another loan of $10.2 billion . The 
Cox (2000) report stated: 
For its part, the Russian government lacked the facility to turn these massive aid 
flows into real economic reform . Instead, the aid had the opposite effect: It 
made possible the subsidies to the Soviet enterprise network that allowed it to 
continue operating. Effectively unconditional large-scale international assistance 
simply contributed to Russia 's problems by killing incentives to reform and 
propping up a government whose policies were bankrupting the Russian people. 
(p . 9) 
The infusion of large loans did not work, according to the report (Cox, 2000), because the 
US government did not support sufficient grassroots democratic reform . The authors of the report 
suggested that the Clinton Administration largely supported a transition from state-owned 
monopolies to private monopolies. The focus on a few Russian partners such as President Boris 
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Yeltsin , Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and Finance Minister Anatoly Chubais, with relative 
disregard for the legislative branch, further encouraged continued authoritarian practices in 
Russia . Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin, and Chubais all came to be popularly regarded in Russia as 
some of its most notorious oligarchs. Large amounts of lending and aid used to prop up the 
operating economy of the relatively unreformed Russian central government became vulnerable 
to theft and fraud . 
The difficulties in the large loans surfaced in the months leading up to and following the 
August 17, 1998, economic crash in Russia . The magnitude of the crash should not be 
underestimated: the Russian stock market lost 90 percent of its value in 1998. Within six months 
after the crash, the ruble lost 75 percent of its value. Worst of all for millions of Russian citizens 
was the loss of all their deposits in banks, as dozens of financial institutions became insolvent. 
What relationships were building in the financial sector and banking industry now disintegrated. 
The pension payments that millions of senior citizens expected, already late or delayed, were 
now cut off entirely. Following the crash, many foreign investors, whose investments were 
considered a leading indicator of the reform, pulled out. The report estimated a drop from $4 
billion in 1997 to $1 .7 billion in 1998. 
According to the report, the Russian stock market by mid-1997 was the world 's "leading 
developing country stock market, as speculators chased stratospheric investment returns" (p . 
123). But by the fall of 1997, the economic momentum dropped. Investment once again 
declined . Capital flight continued to drain foreign currency reserves. Russian business debts and 
liabilities outweighed assets, and back wages increased steadily. An inadequate tax system, 
coupled with corruption at all levels, veered the country's economic path once again toward 
insolvency. 
An IMF rescue package of $4.8 billion in July 1998 was intended to prop up the falling 
ruble . The total infusion of cash from the IMF, joined by World Bank and Japan, actually 
amounted to $17.1 billion. The market response was initially euphoric, but within a few weeks, 
the market resumed its plunge in response to the new level of debt taken on by the Russian 
government. On August 17, 1989, the government announced a devaluation of the ruble and a 
90-day moratorium on repayment of $40 billion in corporate and bank debt to foreign creditors 
and restructuring of domestic debt slated to mature in 1999. 
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The default became a particularly devastating experience for regular citizens in Russia as 
rumors spread that insiders, for foreign and domestic, had evaded the worst consequences by 
converting their rubles into hard currency prior to the default. Implicated in the action was the 
$4.8 billion IMF loan to Russia issued in the summer of 1998, which was believed to be "siphoned 
off improperly" (p. 128). Dimitri Vasiliev, former chairman of Russia's Federal Security 
Commission, confirmed that IMF loans were used to bail out insiders: "The money is all spent," 
he related in a story in the Los Angeles Times a month after the devaluation. "It went to foreigners 
and Russian speculators, including the Central Bank. They got payments for their GKOs, 
converted the rubles into cheap dollars, and took the money out of the country'' (as cited in Cox, 
2000, p. 128). The report concluded that the IMF money not only supported Yelstin's re-election 
campaign and the War in Chechnya, it also provided the liquid ity for Russia's notorious money 
laundering and capital flight problems. 
Concurrent with reports of economic instability and pol itical oligarchy and graft issuing out 
of Russia on an increasing basis came reports of the rapid spread of organ ized crime. According 
to the report, Russia's own Ministry of Internal Affairs estimated in 1997 that organ ized crim inals 
owned or controlled about 40 percent of Russia's private businesses, 60 percent of state 
enterprises, and 50 to 85 percent of banks. The intricate connection between banks and 
organized crime crippled the banking industry. Regular citizens would not trust leaving their 
money with organized crime any more than with the government. Russian companies were 
reputed to pay 10 percent or more of their revenues in protection money to criminal organizations 
and bribes to corrupt officials . What may have been decentral ized underground efforts eventually 
organized into networks. The Interior Ministry reported that eleven large organ ized criminal 
groups, 95 so-called "criminal commun ities" and 1 ,000 "organized crim inal groups" operated in 
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Russia. These groups were estimated to total about 50,000 people with connections to some 60 
to 65 nations . 
The report (Cox, 2000) tracked the growing number of grisly murders, gangland style, 
occurring to enforce a wide variety of activities, from business disagreements with associates to 
outspoken journalists. Organized crime also enforced contracts and court judgments, provided 
personal security, and even allocated scare resources, such as executing bribes with corrupt 
officials . The report suggested that organized crime syndicates were the main beneficiaries of 
privatization to date. Though organized crime obstructed law enforcement, criminal networks 
also developed a symbiotic relationship with corrupt officials. Thus, the corruption network was 
not an incidental part of the Russian economy. 
The study also suggested a steady, steep decline in favorable attitudes among Russians 
toward the United States. A poll taken in 1993 showing 70 percent favorable attitudes to the 
United States, decreased to 54 percent in 1997, and to 37 percent in February 2000. Another 
poll showed that 85 percent of Russians now believed that the United States sought world 
domination. Always wary of US intentions, 81 percent of Russians polled in February 2000 
believed that the US was using Russia's current weakness to reduce it to a second-rate power 
and a producer of raw materials for export. This was up from 59 percent in August 1995. The 18 
to 35 age group-the group least affected by Soviet era thinking-was polled in April1999. Only 
18 percent had a positive view of the United States, while 67 percent viewed the United States 
negatively. 
The question of who must bear responsibility for the lagging pace of reform in the NIS is 
pressing on the minds of many. As Russia drifted farther away from economic and democratic 
reforms, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made the case for the Clinton Administration: 'The 
suggestion made by some that Russia is ours to lose is arrogant; the suggestion that Russia is 
lost is simply wrong" (p. 147). But growing evidence of diplomatic drift between the United States 
and Russia also was apparent entering into the twenty-first century. The Advisory Group's 
(January 2000) response was one of grave concern , locked in partisan invective: "If Russia is not 
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yet 'lost,' it is indisputably more unstable, more corrupt, more lawless, and vastly more hostile to 
the United States than it was when President Clinton and Vice President Gore took office" (p. 
147). 
Though the Cox (2000) report was widely viewed as a political hatchet job when it was 
issued, it was symptomatic of a growing number of writers and analysts in the late 1990s who 
recognized the growing rift between the United States and a number of former Soviet republics, 
including the Russian Federation. It also should be noted that criticism of the foreign assistance 
program extended well beyond the vitriolic partisanship apparent in the Cox (2000) report. 
In his highly critical study of foreign assistance and policy initiatives in Russia over the 
last ten years, Cohen (2000) in Failed Crusade attacked US government policymakers, economic 
and financial advisers, journalists and regional scholars alike. Specialists in all of these 
occupations, according to Cohen (2000), "professed to know the cure for what ailed their subject" 
(p . 5) and engaged in a "virtual crusade" to turn post-Communist Russia into a facsimile of 
American democracy and capitalism, the "Russia we want" (p . 7) . Without recognition of the 
failed efforts of the 1990s, Cohen did not believe that the current drift between Russia and the 
United States would be reversed . 
As the Bush Administration took office in 2001 after a prolonged election struggle, the 
increasingly problematic relationship between the US and Russia as well as some of the other 
republics was noted. But this relationship once again changed on the morning of September 11 , 
2001, as television screens the world over showed details of the burning and collapse of the twin 
towers of the World Trade Center in New York and a partially destroyed Pentagon. The largest 
terrorist attack ever launched against the United States opened another chapter in international 
relations . 
CHAPTER Ill 
Policy Context: 
The United States Foreign Policy-Making Framework 
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The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), a federal agency 
whose primary responsibility is to administer bilateral aid appropriations, has been in existence 
since 1961 . USAID administers foreign aid projects through a highly decentralized organizational 
structure, with its headquarters in Washington, DC, and missions spread around the world . The 
agency administers a broad range of foreign assistance objectives, from business privatization 
programs and army and police training , to health, environmental and basic education programs. 
The agency's budget is approved each year by Congress following a complex strategic planning 
process. In 2000, USAID's budget was about $7.45 billion, roughly 0.5% of the federal budget. 
The level of funding obligated by USAID in 1992 was at approximately the same level. 
Accounting for inflation and growth, this means that increments to USAID steadily decreased in 
the 1990s. 
While the agency's budget appears large, USAID does not control all the funds 
appropriated to it. Over half the funds are allocated through legislative directives and by the 
Department of State, though USAID is responsible for administering all appropriated funds (GAO, 
June 1993). In part because of the agency's mandate and in part because of the methods by 
which foreign assistance funds are appropriated, USAID is involved heavily in the policy-making 
of the major federal foreign affairs stakeholders. Politically and financially, USAID has its hands in 
some of the most sensitive and controversial aspects of United States foreign policy. 
Given USAID's mandate, it should come as no surprise that the work of the agency 
frequently was both secretive and controversial , particularly during the Cold War period from 
1961 to 1987. However, USAID in the 1990s attempted to reinvent itself in the post-Cold War 
foreign affairs environment and renamed its new primary mission as sustainable development. 
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Sustainable development, a term popular in the economic development literature, was defined by 
USAID as economic and social growth that promotes the following goals and values: 
0 It does not exhaust an area's resources; 
0 It does not damage the economic, cultural or natural environment; 
0 It creates incomes and enterprises; 
0 It builds indigenous institutions that involve and empower the citizenry. 
The measure of success of economic assistance under this standard was the point in which such 
programs were no longer necessary (USAID, February 1994, p. 9) . 
Though many of USAID's projects and the documentation on them continue to be 
shrouded in secrecy, the organization itself came under close public scrutiny in the early 1990s 
following the official disintegration of the Soviet Union and amid the proclamations of the end of 
the Cold War. Thus, ironically, the problems of the organization were documented by the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) and the President's Commission for the Management of 
Foreign Aid. What these reviews depicted was an organization struggling with many competing 
agendas that appeared to satisfy no one in particular. A 1992 GAO report is blunt in its analysis: 
Throughout much of its history, AID has had to address the sometimes 
competing concerns of a wide range of groups that are concerned with its 
mission or have a stake in AID's services and resources ... . Attempting to 
respond to a number of groups, AID's program has grown too large and 
unfocused for its operating expense budget and staff levels. (GAO, March 1992, 
p. 3) 
A GAO follow-up report in June 1993 re-emphasized the lack of consensus among internal and 
external stakeholders, stating, "AID's organization has become so diffused that it often appears to 
operate as a loose affiliation of independent mini-agencies, each with its own agenda" (GAO, 
June 1993, p. 3). 
The evolution of USAID's reputation is linked closely to its mission . According to the 
agency's strategic document, Strategies for Sustainable Development (1994 }, the main goal of 
the agency when it was created in 1961 was twofold: 1) to respond to the threat of communism 
and 2) to help poorer nations develop and progress. These objectives were grounded in the 
belief that the United States could promote its national values while defending its national 
interests (USAID, 1994). These were not perceived as independent objectives ; in fact, many 
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development projects for poorer nations were implemented because growing economies were 
believed to be less vulnerable to communist influence (GAO, June 1993). Indeed, this was the 
great unifying principle of United States foreign assistance policy during the Cold War, but it was 
a political principle. 
Because of its critical role in Cold War politics, USAID was the subject of much 
controversy through the 33 years of its existence. USAID's official Congressional Presentation 
for 1994 openly acknowledged the conflicts this caused and the window of opportunity that 
existed for the post-Cold War agency: 
The Cold War, the driving force for international economic assistance, is over 
and the operating rules governing the provision of assistance have changed . 
The Cold War created an environment for A.I.D. in which it had to deal with 
conflicting priorities , often times priorities in conflict with the need to focus upon 
long-term participatory development. Expansion of local efforts and performance 
requirements often became secondary considerations . The end of the Cold War 
provides the United States and other donor nations with an existing opportunity 
to change that working environment. (USAID, June 1993, pp. 1-2) 
What the Congressional Presentation did not say was that the end of the Cold War in the 
late 1980s almost brought an end to the agency itself because of widespread dissatisfaction with 
its operations. But it survived the Conservative mood toward foreign aid by taking aggressive 
action to "right-size" the agency. In a buoyant 1993 speech following his appointment as Chief 
Administrator of USAID, Brian Atwood stated : "We no longer have a need to use our aid 
programs to purchase influence. Instead our purpose is to achieve results by pursu ing objectives 
that simultaneously contribute to international peace, prosperity and stability while at the same 
time serving America 's vital domestic interests" (November, 1993). 
Re-inventing old conflicts in goals and values 
A broad consensus existed among policy-makers that the end of the Cold War required a 
new policy framework for foreign affairs. Though the new mission of the agency in the 1990s was 
intended to go a long way toward creating a new foreign policy consensus, it did not simply 
banish potential conflicts in values and goals from the foreign assistance scene. Indeed, the end 
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of the Cold War strategies called attention once again to more fundamental differences and 
conflicts in goals and values in the US foreign assistance program. 
One potential area of conflict concerned what might be termed a certain double-
mindedness in promoting development internationally. The agency's Congressional Presentation 
for 1994 acknowledged that its work was "both altruistic and self-interested ." The altruistic USAID 
poured many billions of US dollars into humanitarian short-term relief and into longer-term 
programs intended to improve the basic quality of life. But development abroad could be and 
often had been good for America . The Presentation stated : "Successfu l. development creates 
new markets for our exports and promotes economic growth in the United States" (USAID, 1994, 
p. 2). USAID brochures-"USAID: In the National Interest" and "Foreign Aid : An Investment in 
America's Future"-further explored this theme. In sum, very little bilateral foreign assistance could 
be said to promote one objective. 
A second area of potential conflict could be described as the diplomatic vs . 
development debate. Rossiter (1985) argues that a potential conflict exists in foreign 
affairs between any two governments over two interdependent, but potentially conflicting 
goals: 
Diplomatic/strategic goals: the advancement of donors' short-term political and 
long-term strategic goals. 
Developmental/humanitarian goals: the long-term promotion of economic growth 
and political stability, and the short-term alleviation of suffering. (p . 9) 
The conduct of foreign affairs in the federal government brings together agencies that promote a 
variety of goals in the national interest. United States' national security interests are driven by 
long-term strategic relationships with other nation states, subject to short-term political 
exigencies. The peaceful conduct of such relationships is usually referred to as diplomacy 
(Hamilton & Langhorne, 1995). The promotion of long-term strategies of economic growth and 
political stability is typically considered a developmental goal , and the short-term alleviation of 
suffering can be seen as a complementary humanitarian goal of economic development. 
However, it should be noted that short-term alleviation of suffering may also serve as a diplomatic 
objective to maintain strategic relationships with other nation states. This tangled overlapping of 
motivations and objectives is a major reason for the controversy over foreign aid. Different 
stakeholders can pursue the same actions for different reasons and expect different outcomes. 
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The foreign affairs bureaucracy in Washington, DC, and in the field is charged with the 
carrying out of diplomatic and developmental objectives of the United States. The major federal 
departments involved in the execution of these objectives in the field are the Department of State 
and USAID. The missions of the Department of State are primarily charged with the execution of 
diplomatic objectives, while those of USAID promote developmental objectives. Conflicts arise 
between these different objectives, and between the bureaucracies that promote them, for three 
reasons . One, diplomatic, strategic, developmental , and humanitarian objectives may overlap in 
any given project or action and change in time. Multiple objectives in foreign assistance often 
work in tandem, but they may also be perceived as conflicts of interest in given contexts . A 
dramatic example of this can be seen in the changing relationships with the former Soviet 
republics throughout the 1990s. 
Reinventing USAID in the Post-Cold War 
By 1993, the year USAID was charged with managing large sums directed to foreign 
assistance efforts in the former Soviet Union . By that time, USAID was regarded as the primary 
bilateral agency delivering close to $200 billion in US foreign economic assistance to over 150 
countries. The foreign aid program has attempted to meet a wide range of national objectives-
political, educational , economic, commercial, security, and humanitarian-with the emphasis on 
each objective shifting in time (GAO, June 1993). The policies of the agency have had enormous 
repercussions throughout the world . With the end of the Cold War, USAID had the opportun ity to 
divest itself of its reputation as an agency in the main working for the containment of Communism 
on foreign soil. 
A distinction must be made between the reorganization efforts that USAID has 
undergone in the 1990s and post-Cold War foreign assistance strategies. In response to 
pressure from major decision-makers in foreign affairs in both the legislature and executive 
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branches, USAID made major changes in its management structure and strategic goals. Effects 
of the reorganization have been felt in a number of areas. For instance, the agency announced in 
1993 the closing of a number of missions (Horne, 1993) with the expectation that the number 
would eventually be reduced by half of its current level. 
In the Congressional Presentation-Fiscal Year 1994, USAID policy-makers defined 
sustainable development by the six characteristics identified in the second column on Table 4. 
Development was considered "sustainable" when it permanently enhanced the capacity of a 
society to improve its quality of life. The process was acknowledged to be long-term and 
integrated; these characteristics formed an interrelated web and therefore must be addressed 
concurrently for sustainable results (USAID, June 1994; USAID, March 1994). 
As a point of comparison , the legal standards that have guided the agency are the 
directives established in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and its amendments. The Act with 
amendments evolved into a list of 30 separate directives covering a wide assortment of 
assistance objectives, a list described by the GAO (March 1992) in its review of USAID as "a 
compl icated and incoherent set of objectives with no clear priorities" (p . 1 0) . In recommending 
that USAID streamline its objectives, the GAO (March 1992) reported that the old directives: 
o Create confusion in assessing congressional intent regarding the 
direction of foreign assistance program. 
o Contribute to the lack of consensus between the Congress and the 
executive branch on program priorities; and 
o Reduce the possib ility of AID being held accountable for ach ieving any 
particular objective. (p. 1 0) 
The assumption made at the time of this report was that the lack of political consensus largely 
emanated from the lack of unified standards for the agency. Thus, a major emphasis of the 
reorganization of USAID was not simply more responsive management systems, but a coherent 
vision of development for the agency. 
The reinvention of USAID was intended to integrate the agency both strategically and 
organizationally under the new sustainable development imperative. Sustainable development 
represented USAID's self-defined standards for development in the 1990s. The agency's 
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Congressional Presentation for 1994 likened this strategic imperative to the phrase "human 
development" used by the United Nations, defined as "a participatory process aimed at enlarging 
the range of choices available to people-increasing their opportunities for education, health 
care, income, employment, and the full range of human choices, from a sound physical 
environment to economic and political freedom" (USAID, June 1994, p. 4 ). 
In Strategies for Sustainable Development (March 1994 ), the agency's most in-
depth statement on the new core mission, focused on the new "global threats to peace, 
stability, and the well-being of Americans and people throughout the world" (p . 1 ). These 
new threats were identified as follows: 
o The continuing poverty of a quarter of the world's people, leading to the 
hunger and malnutrition of millions and their desperate search for jobs 
and economic security. 
o Population growth and rapid urbanization that outstrip the ability of 
nations to provide jobs, education, and other services to millions of new 
citizens. 
o The widespread inability to read, to write, and to acquire the technical 
skills necessary to participate in modern society. 
o New diseases and endemic ailments that overwhelm the health facilities 
of developing countries , disrupt societies, rob economies of their growth 
potential , and absorb scarce resources. 
o Environmental damage, often arising from population pressure, that 
destroys land, sickens population, blocks growth, and manifests itself on 
a regional and global scale. 
o And finally, the threat comes from the absence of democracy, from 
anarchy, from the persistence of autocracy and oppression, from human 
rights abuses, and from the failure of new and fragile democracies to 
take hold and endure. (USAID, March 1994, pp. 1-2) 
These conditions were not only important to face because they occurred in the United States, but 
because Americans could protect themselves from these threats from without. Nor could these 
conditions be addressed simply within the borders of the United States. The agency's main 
implementation strategy for sustainable development was to forge partnerships with nations, 
organizations, and individuals to address these pressing concerns . With limited resources , the 
agency sought to "employ methods that promise the greatest impact" (USAID, March 1994, p. 2). 
USAID publications in the early 1990s accentuated the dramatic shift in foreign policy 
resulting from the end of the Cold War, a shift in US diplomatic relations of global proportions. 
The agency was certainly not alone in making such pronouncements. The President's 
Commission on the Management of AID Programs (Ferris Commission) stated this perceived 
paradigm shift explicitly and eloquently in its report to Congress in 1992: 
Today, as the United States redefines its role as the major power in the radically 
changed post-cold war world, it needs to reexamine the objectives and 
management of foreign assistance. If a new consensus on mission and strategic 
objectives can be reached, these programs can help the United States to achieve 
its political and economic objectives in a fundamentally different world. Forging 
such a consensus would constitute a giant step forward in resolving the 
management problems inherent in the foreign assistance program. (President's 
Commission, April1992 , p. 4) 
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The Ferris Commission's task was to provide Congress with recommendations for administrative 
and legislative actions to improve the agency's program management, personnel management 
and accountability systems. But the report acknowledged that USAID's problems would not be 
solved without a new consensus in the external policy framework (President's Commission, April 
1992). 
USAID and the Foreign Affairs budget process 
A major defining factor for USAID is the annual budget process. In this process is writ 
large the reasons for concern over the conflicting agendas to which the agency must answer. 
The approval of the annual USAID budget is a 15-month process that technically begins in the 
Office of Management and Budget and ends in the Congress. In spite of the length of the budget 
negotiation process required of USAID by its external policy-making decision-makers, the agency 
has been criticized for being unable to respond in a timely fashion to the rapidly changing tides of 
foreign diplomacy. Thus, a closer look at this process and the contribution of external policy-
makers to the agency's annual budget adds perspective on the difficulties faced by USAID 
management. 
The agency's budget is submitted to Congress as part of the Foreign Affairs budget, not 
as an agency specific budget. The foreign affairs budget covers allocations to a variety of other 
sources, including the State, Defense, Treasury, and Agriculture Departments. USAID 
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administers bilateral foreign assistance allocations in the budget, while the Treasury Department 
has responsibility for the multilateral allocations. 
With the exception of some special funds, the Office of Management and Budget and the 
Congress each year oversee and define foreign assistance levels targeted as USAID projects on 
a country-by-country basis. The Ferris Commission recommended that the lengthy Congressional 
Presentation, a document containing USAID's proposed funding levels and rationales , not specify 
proposed levels for individual countries. The Commission acknowledged that the year-to-year 
process raised country level expectations and reduced the agency's abil ity to negotiate with 
recipients . USAID agreed in principle with this recommendation of the Ferris Commission to end 
country-by-country allocations, but the same budgetary approval policy continues in 2002 
(President's Commission , September 1992). 
Though the Foreign Affairs budget process has not been changed by legislative actions, 
the budget for 1995 appears to contain a number of revisions following nearly five years of 
program review. However, closer analysis shows that these changes in the main represent a 
relabeling of previous categories in the foreign affairs budget rather than a change in pol icy 
framework. The categories in the foreign affairs budget in 1990 as compared to 1995 are shown 
in Table 3-1 below. Categories used in 1990 on the left are matched in content with those shown 
in 1995 on the right. 
By comparing budget figures from these two years, it is possible to see what has 
changed in the allocations between 1990 and 1995, critical years of change in the agency. In the 
$18.8 foreign affairs budget of 1990, USAID received $7.5 billion, or 37 .5 percent, of the budget 
for its bilateral assistance programs (Economic Assistance Funds, Development Assistance, and 
Food Aid categories). 
Of the three categories in which USAID was allocated fund ing, the Economic Support 
Fund has been and continues to be the largest and most controversial category. This fund, which 
was approved for $4 billion in 1990, includes payments to countries in wh ich the US has a 
TABLE 3-1 
Foreign Affairs Budget Categories 
($ in billions, rounded) 
1990 Obligated ($) 1995 (Title) Obligated ($) 
Economic Support Fund* $ 4.0 Promoting Peace (Ill) 6.4 
Military Assistance 4.9 
Development Assistance 2.6 Promoting Sustainable Development (I) 5.0 
Multilateral Assistance 1.7 
Information Exchange 1 .3 
Food Aid 1.0 Providing Humanitarian Assistance (IV) 1.6 
State Department 2.9 Advancing Diplomacy (VI) 4.2 
Export/Import Bank 0.6 Promoting US Prosperity (V) 1.0 
NEW: Building Democracy (II) 2.9 
TOTAL: ** $ 18.8 $ 20.9 
*Categories of funding in italics are allocated to USAID in part or in whole. 
**Differences in totals from columns due to rounding differences. 
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SOURCES: US General Accounting Office (April 1992). Foreign assistance: A profile of the 
Agency for International Development. NSIAD-92-148. Wash ington, DC: GAO, p. 19. US 
Agency for International Development (February 1991 ). Congressional presentation-Fiscal year 
1992. Washington , DC: USAID, pp. 17-18. US Agency for International Development (February 
1994 ). Congressional presentation-Fiscal year 2000. Washington, DC: USAID, pp. 56. 
special national security interest. In 1990, the 10 countries that received 86 percent of Economic 
Support Funds were Israel (30%), Egypt (22%), Panama (10%), Nicaragua (6%), Pakistan (6%), 
El Salvador (3%), Philippines (3%), Honduras (3%), Costa Rica (2%), and Guatemala (1 %) 
(GAO, April 1992). 
USAID's second largest category of funding in 1990-at $2 .6 billion-was Development 
Assistance. This category is the one most closely associated with the popular notion of third 
world development, or underdeveloped country economic assistance, the goal of which is to raise 
the standard of living in the country. Finally, the third category of USAID funding in 1990 was 
Food Assistance, allocated at just under $1 billion. This form of aid largely consists of grain and 
other commodities (primarily fats and oils) that are sold to developing countries. USAID and the 
Agriculture Department share disbursement of this form of aid. 
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However, it is important to remember that USAID did not have total control over these 
funds . Of the $3.96 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF), over 90 percent had been 
designated by Congress for specific countries . Sixty-seven percent of ESF that year was simply 
cash transfers, $1 .2 billion of which went to Israel. Congress also defined other limits on how 
USAID could allocate its funds. For instance, a foreign assistance appropriation act the same 
year required that $68 .2 mill ion of USAID's appropriations be used to finance the projects and 
programs of other organizations such as the World Health Organization and international 
agricultural research centers (GAO, April 1992). 
Five years later, approaching 1995, the Foreign Affairs budget request was $20.9 billion, 
with USAID's share at $7.45 billion, or 34.5 percent of the total budget. A breakdown of USAID's 
share of the total foreign affairs budget requested in 1995 by category is depicted in Table 3-1 . 
The old Economic Support Fund has decreased in the post-Cold War years, but survives as a 
$2.3 billion allocation under Title Ill : Promoting Peace. Of this allocation, $1 .2 billion continues to 
go to Israel and $816 million has been allocated to Egypt, accounting for over $2 bill ion , or 26 .8 
percent, of the total USAID budget. The Development Assistance category has been renamed 
Sustainable Development. The agency requested $2.23 billion for this category in 1995, as 
compared to $2.68 billion in 1990. The third major category, food assistance, has been renamed 
Providing Humanitarian Assistance, and roughly the same amount of aid in wh ich USAID 
administers is allocated in this category for 1995 as in 1990. The $567 million requested for 
Advancing Diplomacy simply represents operational costs for the agency rather than any new 
foreign channel for aid . 
The one new category in the foreign affairs budget was Title II , Building Democracy. This 
category allocation of just under $1.4 billion was designated for Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) and the NIS, has continued at a more modest pace since 1991 . Congress originally 
authorized economic assistance to the CEE states in the East European Democracy Act of 1989, 
and startup of the NIS program in the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992. In part because these 
countries were not considered "underdeveloped" in the traditional sense, funding to these areas 
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was allocated under a separate category called "special initiatives" between 1991 and 1994. 
These special categories have remained in the Foreign Affairs budget, even though some funding 
allocated for these regions is not listed under these rubrics. 
The Foreign Affairs Budget request for FY 2000, shown on Table 3-2, closely 
resembles that of 1995. The budget for FY 1998 listed is actual, while that for FY 1999 is 
estimated, and FY 2000 requested . The total for all of foreign affairs in each of these years 
ranged from $19 to $21 billion. USAID's "share" is disbursed among a number of different 
categories, which are highlighted in italics in the table. The US commitment to foreign affairs is 
negotiated each year in the Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, the result of a 
yearlong strategic planning process. Versions of the foreign affairs budgets are also available in 
the annual report for the Coordinator for the NIS and in the Congressional Presentation for 
USAID. 
The Presentation issued by the State Department in 2000, the responsibility of then-
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, contains the most comprehensive information on all 
matters related to international affairs . The international affairs goals of the United States 
government are listed as follows in the presentation : 
• Protect vital interests, secure peace, deter aggression , prevent and defuse crises, 
halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and advance arms control and 
disarmament. 
• Expand exports, open markets, maintain global growth and stability, and promote 
economic development. 
• Protect American citizens abroad, manage the entry of visitors and immigrants, and 
safeguard the orders of the United States. 
• Combat international terrorism, crime, and narcotics trafficking. 
• Support the establishment and consolidation of democracies, and uphold human 
rights . 
• Provide humanitarian assistance to victims of crisis and disaster. 
• Improve the global environment, stabilize world population, and protect human 
health . (Department of State, 1999, p. xii) 
The President's budget for fiscal year 2000 requested $21.311 billion for international affairs, a 
6.6 percent increase over 1999. While an increase over the previous year, Albright stated in the 
document that the investment in international affairs proposed for fiscal year 2000 represented 
TABLE 3-2 
International Foreign Affairs Budget · 2000 Request by Appropriation Account 
($thousands) 
FY 1998 FY 1999 FY 2000 
Actual Estimate Re uest 
Grand Total $19,069,672 $22,456,382 $21,311,444 
Foreign Operations: 
Multilateral Assistance 
Agency for International Development 
Other Bilateral Assistance 
FREEDOM Support Act for NIS 
SEED - Support for Eastern Europe 
and Democracy 
International Security Assistance 
Peacekeeping Operations 
Economic Support Fund 
International Military Education 
Foreign Mi litary Financing - GranUAdmin 
Foreign Military Financing - Loan 
Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, 
demining and related programs 
Export and Investment Assistance 
Other Assistance 
(Peace Corps, Migration and Refugee 
Assistance, African Development 
Foundation , etc.) 
Commerce, Justice, State and Related Agencies: 
Department of State 
Broadcasting Board of Governors 
Other Programs 
Department of Agriculture 
Labor, HHS, Education 
1,780,440 
2,433, 890 
770,798 
485,218 
6,041 ,168 
77,500 
2,419,600 
50,000 
3,348,728 
12,340 
133,000 
561 '114 
1 '191 ,965 
4,504 ,733 
431 ,510 
42,676 
867,000 
11 '1 60 
1,802,762 
2,520,900 
847,000 
430,000 
6,127,331 
76,500 
2,432,831 
50,000 
3,330,000 
20,000 
218,000 
726 ,000 
1,436,006 
6,413 ,716 
397 ,705 
46 ,800 
862,000 
12,160 
*Categories in italics denote categories included in the USAID annual budget. 
SOURCE: Office of the Secretary of State (1999). Congressional presentation for foreign 
operations. Fiscal year 2000. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Commerce National 
Technical Information Service , pp. xv-xviii. 
1,816,031 
2,611 ,000 
1,032,000 
393,000 
6,232 ,000 
130,000 
2,389,000 
52,000 
3,430,000 
0 
231,000 
725,000 
1,291,700 
5,408 ,321 
452,590 
49 ,802 
787,000 
13,000 
only half of what the United States invested in 1985, assuming inflation-adjusted dollars. It is 
important to note that the $21 .311 listed for international affairs includes not only bilateral 
assistance, but also US government contributions to multilateral banks such as World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund . 
USAID and its legislative mandate in the NIS 
Initial funding approved by Congress to CEE and the NIS created serious problems for 
USAID in the early 1990s. In the midst of its annual review of the proposed Foreign Affairs 
budget, Congress in 1991 approved new funding for Central and Eastern Europe without 
additional operational funding to USAID, an action that nearly crippled the agency. Equally 
important, the Deputy Secretary of State was designated as Coordinator for both programs. 
Within USAID, the Bureau for Europe, Regional Mission for Europe, was given responsibility for 
administering the CEE program and the New Independent States Task Force for the NIS 
program. USAID was perceived by many foreign affairs policy-makers in Washington as too 
weakened and decentralized to take on the charge of foreign assistance in the CEE and NIS 
regions. 
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Internal and external reviews of USAID's efforts in the CEE and NIS regions noted a 
continuing lack of clarity over USAID's role both in the field and in Wash ington . Competing 
agendas continued to characterize USAID's strategic efforts in large part because the fund ing for 
these regions was budgeted under Title II: Building Democracy. Funding by Congress was 
considered to be short-term, and so types of programs were not integrated with the rest of the 
USAID budget process. With the passing of legislation for assistance to the CEE and NIS 
regions, Congress essentially added more competing agendas onto USAID's mandate. 
Documented in the literature of there-engineered USAID was the promise to al ign USAID 
with US national political interests. This specifically meant closer coordination with the 
Department of State. The agency's Sustainable Development document (March 1994) states this 
as a priority throughout the various divisions of USAID: 
Integration begins with policy. USAID conducts its programs under the direction 
and guidance of the Secretary of State and attaches the highest priority to 
coordinating its work with the needs and objectives of the Department of State 
and the US Ambassador and the country team, wherever its missions operate. 
(USAID, March 1994, p. 4) 
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Such integration became an operational necessity with the passing of legislation for the CEE and 
NIS regions, since overall coordination for foreign assistance now rested with special bodies of 
the State Department. Yet, USAID was charged with the management and delivery of most of 
the funding allocated to these regions, and reports issued by the Inspector General of USAID and 
the GAO documented the same proliferating interests and competing agendas for which USAID 
was criticized prior to the reorganization . One USAID official in the field (May 1998) reported that 
the Chief Administrator of USAID often did not attend meetings held by the Coordinator for the 
NIS in the State Department. 
The Inspector General of USAID completed an audit in February 1993 of activities 
underway in the Bureau of Europe and the Newly Independent States Task Force. As of 
September 30, 1992, the auditors determined that USAID had transferred $451 million to 18 other 
US government agencies under 112 interagency agreements to carry out assistance activities. 
This amount represented 38 percent of the CEE funds and 49 percent of NIS funds . The report 
concluded that, as a result of different legislative language, a lack of clarity existed in both 
programs with respect to the role that the Department of State expected USAID to carry out 
(USAID, February 1993). In addition, the Inspector General reported inconsistencies between the 
programs in the legislative mandate given to USAID. Table 3-3 provides a comparison of the 
oversight problems occurring in the CEE and NIS programs, as indicated in the audit. 
Administration of these funds was complicated because many US government agencies 
were involved in assistance in these areas, some of which funded their own activities using 
supplemental sources from USAID and some of which relied entirely on USAID appropriations. 
Table 3-4 indicates the US agencies that were actually appropriated part of the $451 million in 
funding allocated to USAID in 1992. It is also important to note once again that, while USAID was 
responsible for administering agreements and disbursing appropriations, the two programs were 
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TABLE 3-3 
Comparison of USAID's Oversight Role Under CEE and NIS Programs 
CEE P rogram NIS Program 
Legislation 
Authorizing Legislation Silent on USAID's oversight Silent on USAID's monitoring 
role. role for NIS funds transferred 
to other agencies. However, 
legislation contained a specific 
section indicating agencies 
receiving funds from USAID 
are accountable for such 
funds. 
Appropriations Legislation USAID is responsible for Silent on USAID's oversight 
coordinating field activities of role. 
all US government agencies. 
State Department Assigned USAID broad Similar guidance issued . 
Coordinator responsibility for the program 
portfolio, including "residual 
oversight responsibility'' for 
funds transferred to other US 
government agencies. 
Coordinator's Office officials Coordinator's Office officials 
viewed USAID as the lead acknowledged that USAID's 
implementing agency for the precise oversight role had not 
program and expected USAID been established and that 
to play a leading and major USAID offices inNIS countries 
role with respect to other are not currently expected to 
participating agencies, play the monitoring role 
required of USAID offices in 
CEE countries . 
USAID's Washington level No internal guidance issued. No internal guidance issued. 
oversight role Monitoring role defined as Task Force officials believe 
"proactive." Bureau officials that they are carrying out 
maintain that if they identify monitoring activities, similar to 
problems with other agencies' the European Bureau, at the 
programs, they try and resolve Washington level. 
problems before elevating the 
problem to the Coordinator's 
level for resolution . 
USAID's field level Internal guidance issued . No internal guidance issued . 
oversight role Field offices responsible for in- USAID field personnel in NIS 
country oversight and countries are currently not 
monitoring of all activities. proactively monitoring other 
US government agencies' 
activities. 
SOURCE: United States Agency for International Development (February 1993). A.I.D .'s role for 
interagency agreements under the Central and East Europe and New Independent States 
programs needs clarification . Report No. 8-00-93-02. Washington , DC: USAID, pp. 29-30. 
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overseen by an interdepartmental team. The Deputy Secretary of State initially acted as 
coordinator for both programs and played the lead role in coordinating assistance activities in all 
US government agencies, including USAID, though the agency was responsible for program 
m<jnagement of all programs. 
For the CEE program, the Coordinator was assisted by the Deputy Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, and the Administrator of USAID. A 
spycial advisor to the Deputy Secretary of State for East European Assistance assisted the 
C~ordinator and Deputy Coordinator in formulating policy. For the NIS program, the Coordinator 
TABLE 3-4: 
Summary of Interagency Agreements 
By Program and Agency 
As of September 30, 1992 
CEE Agreements NIS Agreements 
No. Amount No. Amount 
Treasury Department 13 225,740,000 1 4,0000,000 
USAID 30 45,825,371 2 5,400,000 
Energy Department 6 23,186,000 1 21,900,000 
USDA 7 11 ,975,000 2 15,036,000 
Energy Protection Agen9' 6 21,498,776 -- --
Library of Congress 3 14,008,000 -- --
Labor Department 4 13,075,000 -- --
TOP 4 7,220,000 2 6,000,000 
Commerce Department 6 7,244,693 3 3,608,000 
OPIC 1 3,000,000 2 4,000,000 
State Department 4 6,243,017 2 750,000 
National Research Council 1 900,000 1 3,100,000 
Federal Trade Commission 2 1 ,832 ,371 -- --
Justice Department 2 1,832,371 -- --
Peace Corps 4 1,544,986 -- --
Securities Exchange Commission 1 900,000 -- --
HHS/CDC -- -- 1 535,711 
Interior Department 1 160,000 -- --
TOTALS 95 $386,785,585 17 $64,329,711 
SOURCE: US Agency for International Development. (February 1993). A.I.D .'s oversight role 
for interagency agreements under the Central and East Europe and New Independent States 
programs needs clarification . Report NO. 8-000-93-02 . Washington, DC: USAID, Appendix II , 
n.p. 
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was assisted by five Deputy Coordinators, including the Deputy Defense Secretary, the Chairman 
of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Deputy Treasury Secretary, the Deputy Agriculture 
Secretary, and the USAID Administrator. A Deputy also assisted the Coordinator and Deputy 
Coordinators in formulating and implementing policy (USAID, February 1994 ). 
At the onset of funding for the CEE and NIS programs, all oversight occurred in 
Washington . As short-term assistance extended to longer-term programs, USAID established 
missions in the different geographic regions . At the time of its report, the Inspector General 
(1994) indicated that conflict had arisen in the CEE and NIS programs concerning the oversight 
and reporting roles of USAID. The report stated that conflicts developed because USAID officials 
expected to be involved in other agencies' project design process, to review and approve the final 
project design, and to receive regular reports on implementation since these officials believed the 
Congress held them responsible and accountable for the foreign assistance funds (USAID, 
February 1995). 
An early report (GAO, February 1991) on development efforts in the CEE program 
suggested that interdepartmental responses were neither integrated nor coordinated : 
AID officials are aware that other agencies are critical of AID's attempt to exercise 
management authority over projects that it is not implementing. However, they 
believe that AID is dealing with a number of agencies that have little or no 
experience in programming overseas and thus their project proposals 
inadequately describe objectives, accountability, and control. Officials in agencies 
dealing with AID maintain , however, that AID has never issued formal instructions 
on what it expects in a project design . (GAO, February 1991 , p. 24) 
Comments made by unnamed USAID officials in the GAO report (February 1991) 
indicated that at least some elements within the agency were not pleased with the short-term 
political objectives of the CEE program. 
AID officials stated that many of the decisions taken concerning the East 
European program are essentially political. The US government emphasis on 
rapidly obligating funds, getting projects under way, and visib ility reflect the 
political nature of the program. AID officials add that the Agency normally 
undertakes up to three years of research and planning before it launches a new 
program. In contrast, the programs for Poland and Hungary began obligating 
funds roughly seven months after the decision to provide assistance was made. 
(GAO, February 1991, p. 23) 
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The patterns of implementation followed in the CEE were eventually duplicated in the NIS foreign 
assistance program. 
Another perspective was provided on the characteristics of the early implementation 
efforts in the CEE and NIS in a two-part series published in The Wall Street Journal in February 
1994. The main focus of the series was the large number of American consulting companies and 
businesses that were reaping the benefits of the foreign assistance funds designated for these 
regions . The article catalogued major funding for American corporations, ranging from Boston 
Consulting Group to Land O'Lakes, as they delivered "capitalist expertise" to a country with little 
indigenous understanding of free enterprise. The unsettling conclusion of the reports was that the 
CEE and NIS programs to date had made little effort to tap into the indigenous capabilities of these 
countries (Newman , February 23, 1994; Fialka, February 24, 1994 ). 
One of the difficulties for administrators for the CEE and NIS programs was that the initial 
Congressional legislation passed allocating assistance to these regions was intended only for 
short-term assistance. Program planning initially was centralized in Washington because USAID 
previously had no presence in these regions . In part because of the short-term approach to 
planning for these programs, little coordination apparently occurred at the international and 
multilateral level. In yet another GAO report (December 1992}, donor officials for the former Soviet 
republics criticized multinational donor support as inadequate because no donor had been willing 
to take the lead in coordinating activities. The report added : "One reason for this is that donors 
link foreign aid with their own national interests; thus, the donors are in a sense competing with 
one another. In addition, donors believe that taking the lead role would result in a greater financial 
burden because of the example they would be expected to set for other donors (GAO, December 
1992, p. 8). 
Though USAID was criticized for its lack of leadership in economic assistance in the 
region, close analysis indicates that at least some of the responsibility for this problem rests firmly 
in the hands of those who mandated what USAID could or could not do. In some cases , the 
agency acted simply as a fund transfer agency, in other cases as a broker, and in still others as 
an administrative unit without a clear mandate. This complicated, interlocking network has 
survived to this day in planning, approving and executing foreign assistance in the region. 
Changes in foreign assistance in the late 1990s 
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A major change in USAID's role in foreign affairs in general and in the NISin particular 
occurred in 1997 when, in a compromise decision, President Clinton helped pass into law the 
changing of formal reporting in USAID. USAID's Administrator now reported directly to the 
Secretary of State rather than to the President of the United States. In 1993, USAID had been 
listed equally among other agencies reporting to the President in the execution of foreign affairs . 
The shift in reporting is noted in Table 3-5 on the following page. Though the agency has retained 
its own offices, USAID is no longer an equal among other organs of foreign assistance. By 
definition, the goals and objectives of USAID have veered toward those of the diplomatic mission 
of the US Department of State. 
But USAID is not the only organ involved in international affairs that has become more 
directly connected to the day-to-day constraints and demands of the diplomatic mission of the 
United States. The international affairs budget for the NIS involves the activities and 
commitments of many organizations and interests. But the organizations responsible for foreign 
affairs disbursements, from the Justice Department to USAID, are increasingly expected to align 
their activities with goals of American foreign policy, as set forth in the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961 and as updated by the US Congress and President. Presentation documents written by 
USAID, the Coordinator's Office, and the Department of State have been streamlined to promote 
a set of common objectives. These goals and interests, including those outlined for the NIS in the 
budget request for 2000, are listed below in Table 3-6. 
In light of these developments, the execution of foreign assistance in the future may well 
be more closely aligned to the goals and mission of the Department of State than to the 
independent objectives of sustainable development or of broader notions of economic 
development. Many of the new developmental goals promoted by USAID under Chief 
Administrator J. Brian Atwood, who resigned in 1999 out of concern for the future of USAID, have 
Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) 
(Shared with State 
Department) 
International 
Military 
Education/Training 
(I MET) 
Special Defense 
Acquisition Fund 
(SDAF) 
TABLE 3-5: Overview of US Aid Agencies and Programs 
Economic Support 
Fund (Shared with 
AID) 
FMF program 
(Shared with DOD) 
Anti-terrorism 
Aid 
International 
Narcotics Control 
Program 
International 
Organizations 
Refugee Assistance 
Peacekeeping 
Development Fund 
Africa Fund 
Special Assistance 
Initiatives 
Economic Support 
Fund (Shared with 
State Department) 
Disaster Assistance 
American Schools 
and Hospitals 
Private Sector Fund 
Housing Guarantees 
PL 480 Titles II/III 
PL 480 Title I 
Loans 
Section 416 
donations 
Peace C01ps 
Inter-American 
Foundation 
African 
Development 
Foundation 
Trade and 
Development 
Program 
OPIC 
(Manages U.S. 
Participation in 
MDBs) 
World Bank Group 
(IBRD, IDA, IFC, 
MIGA) 
Inter-American 
Development Bank 
African 
Development Bank 
African 
Development Fund 
Asian Development 
Bank 
European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development 
SOURCE: Adapted from Nowels, L.Q. (1993). Foreign assistance: An overview of US aid agencies and programs. CRS Report for 
Congress. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, pp. CRS-2. 
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TABLE 3-6 
Foreign Affairs Strategic Goals, NIS Regional Goals, and the National Interest 
-
Strategic Goal NIS Regional Goal US National Interest 
Regional Stability: Ensure 
that local and regional 
instabilities do not threaten the 
security and well-being of the 
United States or its all ies. 
Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: Eliminate the 
threat to the US posed by 
weapons of mass destruction . 
Open Markets: Open 
markets to the free flow of 
goods, services and capital. 
Exports: Expand US exports. 
Global Economic Growth: 
Increase global economic 
growth . 
Ensure that the NIS countries 
are secure, stable and 
coherent nation states, at 
peace within and outside their 
borders. 
Achieve continued, verifiable 
bilateral reduction of nuclear 
weapons held by Russians 
and the US and collaborate 
with the NIS governments to 
half the proliferation of weapon 
of mass destruction and 
related technologies . 
Encourage the NIS to 
normalize and liberalize 
investment regimes, to enter 
the World Trade Organization 
on commercially viable terms 
as soon as possible, and to 
pursue only those regional 
trade agreements that are 
voluntary, WTO-consistent, 
and outward looking, and that 
do not undermine national 
sovereignty. 
To double US exports to the 
NIS from the 1996 level of 
$4.76 bill ion by promoting 
effective economic policies 
and through advocacy for US 
exporters on major project and 
trade disputes. 
To promote sustainable, not 
inflationary economic growth 
National Security. Peaceful 
cooperation among the NIS 
will reduce any tendency 
towards arms development, 
the maintenance of the old 
Soviet military-industrial 
complex, and therefore 
opportun ities for proliferation 
of weapons of mass 
destruction and their delivery 
systems. 
National Security: Weapons 
of mass destruction, 
especially the former Soviet 
Union's strategic nuclear 
arms, chemical and biological 
weapons and modern missile 
del ivery systems pose a direct 
and credible threat to the 
security of the United States 
and our allies. 
Economic Prosperity: 
Increased trade and 
investment opportunities for 
US firms. 
Economic Prosperity: 
Increased US exports are key 
to ensuring jobs and economic 
prosperity for Americans . 
National Security: Economic 
growth will insure that 
opportunities exist for US 
trade and investment in the 
NIS. 
I 
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Strategic Goal NIS Regional Goal US National Interest 
Economic Development. 
American Citizens: Enhance 
the ability of American citizens 
to travel and live abroad 
securely. 
Travel and Immigration: 
Control how immigrants and 
foreign visitors enter and 
remain in the United States. 
International Crime: 
Minimize the impact of 
international crime on the 
United States and its citizens. 
Illegal Drugs: Reduce 
significantly from past levels 
the entry of illegal drugs into 
the United States. 
To promote growth and 
expansion of the economies of 
the NIS in ways that assure 
that the benefits are shared 
widely among people of all 
income levels throughout the 
region . 
Protect and promote the 
interests of American citizens 
traveling and living in the NIS. 
Control the conditions under 
which NIS immigrants and 
nonimmigrants enter and 
remain in the United States. 
Improve consular readiness at 
embassies and consulates . 
Enhance the ability of the 
governments of the NIS to 
combat international crime. 
Improve cooperation of those 
governments with US 
authorities and build capability 
to enforce laws and administer 
justice. 
Prevent the NIS from 
becoming major suppliers or 
transit routes of illegal drugs 
and curb narcotics trade in 
areas where it exists . 
Economic Prosperity: 
Broad-based growth will 
provide for increased 
standards of living for the bulk 
of the population, reinforcing 
support for market reform and 
consolidating the transition to 
democratic institutions. 
American Citizens Abroad: 
Protection of American 
citizens traveling and living in 
the countries of the NIS will 
contribute to the overarching 
interest of the United States in 
assuring the welfare of all 
citizens overseas. 
American Citizens and US 
Borders: American jobs and 
our way of life depend on our 
ability to control US borders, 
of which our consular 
operations overseas are one 
essential element. 
Law Enforcement: NIS 
governments that are willing 
and able to effectively 
investigate, prosecute and 
enforce their own laws will be 
able to reduce activity such as 
cyber security violations, 
bankruptcy fraud, insurance 
fraud, health care fraud, 
extortion and trafficking in 
women and protect American 
as well as their own citizens. 
Law Enforcement: 
Collaboration with the host 
governments of the NIS 
countries will contribute to 
protecting US citizens from 
drugs. Avoiding 
establishment of an active 
drug trade will help to assure 
NIS democracy, sound 
economies and political 
stability. 
79 
Strategic Goal NIS Regional Goal US National Interest 
International Terrorism: 
Reduce international attacks, 
especially in the United States 
and its citizens. 
Democracy and Human 
Rights: Increase adherence 
of foreign governments to 
democratic practices and 
respect for human rights. 
Humanitarian Assistance. 
Population. 
Health: Protect human health 
and reduce the spread of 
infectious disease. 
Improve counter-terrorism 
cooperation with the NIS. 
Strengthen durable civil, legal, 
economic and political 
institutions that follow 
democratic principles and 
practices in the NIS states. 
Prevent or minimize the 
human costs of conflict and 
natural disasters in the NIS. 
Promote stability by easing the 
suffering of those in most 
need. 
Introduce safe and effective 
family planning services and 
increase the availability and 
use of modern contraceptives. 
To reduce disease and the 
impact of disease in the NIS. 
Law Enforcement: 
Collaboration by NIS 
governments will contribute to 
protecting US citizens from 
acts of terrorism . 
National Security: The 
consolidation of democratic 
institutions and values in the 
NIS over the long-term is 
critical to ensuring our security 
and advancing a broad range 
of other interests. 
Humanitarian Response: 
Americans are a generous 
people, and we can and must 
respond to people in 
humanitarian crisis in the NIS. 
Population Control: Helping 
people to determine freely and 
responsibly the number and 
spacing of their children, and 
reducing the use of abortion 
as a primary method of family 
planning will enhance the 
health and well-being of the 
population, which, in turn, will 
help build the foundation 
necessary for sustainable 
development. 
Health: Improved health is 
key to sustainable 
development, regional 
sustainability and broad based 
economic growth, and national 
security interests in the NIS. 
SOURCE: Office of the Secretary of State (1999). Congressional presentation for foreign 
operations. Fiscal year 2000. Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce National Technical 
Information Service, pp. xv-xviii. 
been subsumed under the conditionality of reform . Discussions continued in early 2001, led by 
Conservative Senator Helms, over whether USAID should be dismantled . The business of 
development would be the responsibility of religious groups who could vigilantly carry out 
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humanitarian goals, both long-term and short-term. Helms' intentions were not simply an attack 
on USAID. But the nature of formal bilateral assistance, or direct government-to-government aid, 
was by its very nature subject first and foremost to national security concerns and then to the 
national interest. Private religious groups could presumably bypass some of the problems and 
conflicts of interest that arose out of this formal relationship. Religious groups also tended to 
pursue their humanitarian goals for altruistic reasons, while governments, both donor and 
recipient, by and large did so much less frequently. After a decade of struggle with post-Cold 
War possibilities, the foreign affairs policy-making framework in place in the early 1990s remained 
very much intact, with a greatly weakened mandate for the ephemeral concept called 
development. And the war on terrorism launched following the September 11 , 2001 , tragedies in 
the United States promised to put national security at the forefront of foreign affairs to an extent 
not seen since the height of the Cold War. 
CHAPTER IV: 
Abt Associates and Systemic Health Reform in the NIS: 
The ZdravReform Project 
Approach: Classical Technical Assistance 
Abstract: Part I of this case study focuses on the efforts of World 
Health Organization (WHO) to identify effective health systems, 
the purpose of the ZdravReform project in the NIS. Part II of the 
case study describes the technical assistance approach of Abt 
Associates to implement systemic health reform as contracted in 
the regional ZdravReform Project. ZdravReform ended in 1996 in 
Russia and in 1998 in Ukraine, so brief descriptions of activities 
in these republics are presented. Particular attention is focused 
on ZdravReform in the Central Asian area of the NIS, where 
ZdravReform Plus activities continue in 2002. In Part Ill, 
stakeholder perspectives from selected scholars and 
representatives of Abt Associates are presented. In the final 
section, Part IV, the ZdravReform project is evaluated in terms of 
the four categories developed by Linder and Peters (1989) and 
Salamon (1989). 
I. Introduction 
Statement of the problem 
World Health Organization (WHO) (1999, 2000), an international organization that has 
played a leadership role in defining and monitoring global health standards, estimates that the 
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health sector accounts for 8 to 9 percent of the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the world 
today. Given this immense impact, the effort to identify the factors that contribute to optimal 
health and health care delivery is a task with profound implications. The health care industry as it 
is defined today is a new phenomenon in the twentieth century. Hospitals, the main repository of 
tertiary care, were used in only a few countries at the turn of the century. One of the reasons for 
this is that the world population, now standing at 6 billion, has quadrupled in the last 100 years . 
The professionalizing of the health care industry in the last 50 years in particular has required 
increasingly complicated methods of stewardship for ever-larger populations, particularly with the 
advancement of medicine as a science and of technological solutions to diagnosis and care. 
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Since 1998, WHO as an international organization has directed much of its resources 
toward the task of refining the concept of health care systems. WHO (2000) defines health care 
systems as "all the organizations, institutions and resources that are devoted to producing health 
actions. A health action is defined as any effort, whether in personal health care, public health 
services or through intersectoral initiatives, whose primary purpose is to improve health" (p . xi) . 
The purpose of the health system is to "promote, restore or maintain health" (p . 5) . Analysis of 
health care systems must take account of the role of providers , consumers, financial contributors, 
and health administrators. A comprehensive analysis of health systems takes account of many 
different types of services and service workers. 
As part of their efforts to study health care delivery globally, WHO (2000) policy-makers 
have developed complicated measures based on two key principles of quality health care 
systems: "goodness" and "fairness." The "goodness" of a health system indicates that the 
system responds well to what people expect of it, and "fairness" means that it responds equally 
well to everyone. They note that many countries currently fall short of applying these standards in 
their health systems and that many are not making satisfactory progress as responsive and fair 
systems. In some countries, health policy simply does not exist. In others, policy and strategy 
are widely separated . In still others, strategic planning is not aligned with economic constraints. 
An analysis of health care systems involves comparisons between many different 
approaches to health care and health care delivery as they have evolved over time. The 
fascinating history of health care and health care delivery is beyond the scope of this study, but a 
few major trends clarify the evolution of health care system reforms. According to WHO (2000), 
the first example of a state-mandated social insurance model was believed to be instituted in 
1883 by Otto von Bismark, Chancellor of Germany, who enacted a law requiring employer 
contributions to health coverage for low wage employees. The popularity of this law led to similar 
legislation in Belgium in 1894, Norway in 1909, and Britain in 1911 . The influence of the German 
model spread after World War I to Japan, Chile, and Denmark. 
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But the earliest example of a completely centralized and state-controlled model was 
developed in Russia. In the late 1800s, a huge network of provincial medical stations and 
hospitals where treatment was free and supported by tax funds was implemented in Russia . After 
the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, it was decreed that free medical care should be provided for the 
entire population, and the resulting system was largely maintained for almost eight decades. 
Thus, the model for health care delivery in Russia and the other Soviet republics as it is found 
today is based on a long history of a centralized welfare state, and this model actually existed 
prior to the Soviet era (WHO, 2000). 
In the immediate period after World War II , the Soviet Union and Japan extended their 
limited national system to cover most or all of the population, as did Norway and Sweden, 
Hungary and other communist states in Europe and Chile. Britain's National Health Service, 
developed during World War II, became the most influential health care system following the war. 
The system advocated free and comprehensive health services for everyone, and these services 
were expected to promote health in addition to treat disease. This led to a time of "classical 
universalism" among many nations, where the goal of access to free health care of all kinds for 
everyone took root (WHO, 2000, p. 12). 
According to WHO (2000), health care systems today are modeled on the basic designs 
that emerged out of the late nineteenth century and are usually one or a combination of three 
types: 
1) coverage for most or all citizens through mandated employer and employee 
payments to insurance or sickness funds , while providing care through public 
and private providers; 
2) coverage through tax revenues and public provision, with centralized 
planning and financing; or 
3) coverage only for certain population groups, with the rest of the population 
relegated to largely private finance, provision and ownership of facilities . 
State involvement is still substantial , but more limited . 
Only high-income countries tend to follow one type of system, while middle-income countries, 
especially Latin America, mix two or even all three types in their health care. 
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In part because of this mix, the legal and policy structures combined with the 
management and financing strategies required for maintaining health care systems have become 
mystifying topics for much of the world's population. Yet, understanding the implications of health 
systems is important because of the potentially catastrophic costs of health care for individuals, 
families and countries . Even within the health care industry, decision-makers are confused about 
the outcomes of policies and implementation strategies. No "one best system" exists in health 
care reform and delivery. 
According to WHO (1999, 2000), the basic systems were complicated by successive 
generations of health reforms. One wave of reform can be traced in the 1940s and 1950s with the 
founding of national health care systems and with the implementation of social insurance systems 
in some middle-income countries . By the 1960s, these systems were under severe stress from 
rising costs, in part from the increase in hospital-based services. A second reform , which has 
spanned several decades, has focused on primary care as a route to more cost-effective and 
affordable universal coverage. Though a number of models of primary care developed over the 
decades, the emphasis of this reform tended to emphasize public health measures relative to 
clinical care; prevention relative to cure; essential drugs; and education of the public by 
community health workers . The term "primary'' was associated with a number of medical 
approaches: first contact within the health system; first level of care; simple treatments that could 
be delivered by relatively untrained providers; or interventions acting on primary causes of 
diseases. Primary care was sometimes also associated with political interventions, requiring 
multisectoral action or community involvement. 
According to WHO reports (1999, 2000) primary care approaches became the impetus 
for many low-cost improvements in health management. These types of approaches became 
especially popular in international development efforts in the last 30 years . They were part of the 
trend toward prevention through immunization and self-help strategies that improved survival 
rates in many impoverished areas. But in undeveloped countries, according to WHO (2000), 
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"primary" sometimes translated into "primitive" care-limited only to the simplest services. In 
addition, in many countries primary care services were not well developed or utilized, and many 
patients continued to bypass the primary care system in favor of hospital care . In developed 
countries, primary care by and large has been associated with general and family medical 
practice, and with lower-level providers such as nurse practitioners and physician assistants. 
WHO (2000) policy-makers, while acknowledging the important role primary care reform has 
played and continues to play in health care delivery, faulted such approaches with placing too 
little emphasis on the client's demand for health. 
WHO (1999, 2000) policy writers believe that a third generation of reform surfaced in the 
last decade of the twentieth century. Simply put, it is characterized by a shift from supply side 
(providers) to the demand side (clients) of health care delivery. The financing of care follows the 
patient rather than specific providers. The technical basis of primary care approaches, if they are 
utilized well, continues to provide a foundation for this new model. WHO (2000) analysts 
characterize the standard behind this impetus as a "new universalism" (p. 1 ). Interpreted broadly, 
this standard does not establish the goal of all possible care for everyone (classical universalism), 
or basic care for the poor. Rather, the goal is the del ivery of high-quality essential care for 
everyone, limited by such criteria as effectiveness, cost and social acceptability. The notion of 
rationing services in a zero sum world has become an accepted standard , but not to the exclusion 
of whole groups of the population . WHO (2000) analysts point to a concurrent trend in delivering 
health and nutrition interventions that can make a big difference in large populations at low cost. 
Certain "clusters of interventions" have been developed and refined and training in them 
improved, particularly in the area of childhood illness, which can modify the health status of large 
populations (p. 16). 
Another major shift noted in WHO's (2000) annual world health report is the emphasis on 
public or publicly guaranteed and regulated finance, but not necessarily public delivery of 
services. Government funding of services did not necessarily translate into equal access for the 
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poor; in fact, research suggests that government health care services were weighted more toward 
the rich . Increased interest has been shown in a number of countries in explicit insurance 
mechanisms to replace government-based health services. WHO (2000) notes universal health 
care insurance has been introduced in a number of Asian countries, such as Malaysia, 
Singapore, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan . Other countries such as Argentina, Chile, 
Colombia, and Mexico have moved to consolidate, extend or merge insurance coverage. 
A mixture of out-of-pocket and insurance strategies has replaced much of the system in 
former communist countries . WHO (2000) analysts suggest that the transformation of communist 
countries to market-oriented economies underway in China and in the former Soviet Union has 
played a role in the evolution of the third generation of reforms. In all but a few cases in the NIS, 
central governments divested of their control over health care services, though reluctantly and 
sometimes inconsistently. In many cases, the constitutions of the NIS republics continued to 
uphold the right of citizens to free health care without implementing that right (WHO, 2000). But a 
number of factors have contributed to slow progress in the transition . In 1989, a survey taken in 
Russia found that 20 percent of hospitals did not have piped hot water and 3 percent did not have 
piped cold water. About 17 percent lacked adequate sanitation facilities and close to the same 
percentage needed basic reconstruction . Yet, the Russian system relied heavily on a highly 
specialized tertiary care and hospital system, with little primary care in evidence. 
In China, the change was deliberate and dramatic. China dismantled its Rural 
Cooperative Medical System in the 1980s, a system that had been built up over thirty years to 
provide health insurance protection for the great majority of Chinese citizens. In 1981, under the 
old system, 71 percent of the Chinese population was insured through various mechanisms. In 
1993, under the new system, 79 percent of the population was left uninsured (WHO, 1999). 
In developed countries that have advocated for universal coverage, fewer changes have 
taken place in the last decade. But changes have occurred in who determines how resources are 
used. General practitioners and primary care workers have in many instances become the new 
87 
gatekeepers of the system, as practiced in what is called "funding holding" in the United Kingdom 
and Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) in the United States (WHO, 2000, p. 17). 
In the United States, a major shift in power has occurred from providers to insurers, who 
now control patient/doctor access. The United States is somewhat unique among Western 
industrialized countries in the number of its citizens under the age of 65 who do not have health 
insurance. In 1996, nearly 18 percent of American citizens under the age of 65 had no public or 
private health insurance, up from 15 percent in 1987(Hoffman, 1998; WHO, 2000). A breakout of 
coverage patterns is shown in Table 4.1 below, which show the heavy influence of private 
insurance companies in defining the system. 
TABLE 4.1 
Funding, Risk Pooling and Coverage Patterns (WHO, 2000) 
Source of Funds Private ~ =============!============= ~ Public 
Form of payment Out-of-pocket 
Locus of cost burden Individual 
Coverage Poorest 
excluded 
Current examples Most low 
income countries 
Private 
Insurance 
Social 
Insurance 
Increasingly pooled risk 
=======================~ 
Increasingly equitable 
=======================~ 
General 
Revenues 
Whole 
population 
Universal 
USA Middle income Other 
and some OECD 
OECD countries countries 
SOURCE: World Health Organization (1999) . The world health report 1999: Making a difference. 
Geneva: WHO, p. 41 . 
According to WHO (1999), universal coverage means that, irrespective of the source of 
funds, the health care system functions like a national health insurance system, prepaid either 
through tax revenues or through employment-based social insurance, to ensure the largest 
possible "pool" of risks . A national health insurance system (in the social insurance column in 
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Table 4.1) entails a merging of risk protection responsibilities into the largest pool, or coordination 
of the benefit packages financed from different funding sources, with the aim of funding a 
comprehensive set of covered services from the resources of a single fund . 
The US predominantly promotes a user system based on private insurance, though 
social programs are available to cover some costs . Inequity of access is created between the 
insured and the uninsured, since the insured receive preferential treatment for better care. WHO 
(1999) policy writers also suggest that commercial health insurance markets "are both unstable 
and difficult to regulate, with each insurer constantly adjusting the risk profile of the beneficiary 
group in order to ensure that revenues are greater than expenditures" (p . 41 ). In OECD countries 
like France and Sweden, more than 90 percent of all health costs are covered through social 
insurance or public financing . In the US and Switzerland, health care coverage is split almost 
evenly between private voluntary insurance and social insurance or public financing, with the 
remainder out-of-pocket (15-20 percent). 
In its effort to call attention to health system performance worldwide, WHO (2000) ranked 
its member states by the level of attainment of their health systems according to eight measures 
described below. Table 4-2 provides the ranking of the NIS republics as compared to the 
following selected countries : China, Mexico, Malaysia, Bangladesh, Kenya, France and the 
United States. Each measure is a relative order ranking from 1 (highest) to 191 (lowest), the 
number of member states participating in WHO. Rankings are achieved through estimated 
distribution formulas based on available data, which WHO analysts admit may be less than 
accurate in quite a number of cases . 
Measurement 1: Health level is measured by a popular system called disability-
adjusted life expectancy (DALE). A long life expectancy is considered to be a sign of a healthy life 
style. DALE factors in life expectancy, but weight is assigned to types of disabilities that shorten 
the healthy life span. So survival at each age is adjusted downward by the sum of disability 
effects. The net effect is to give the average number of equivalent healthy years that a newborn 
TABLE 4.2 
Health System Attainment and Performance in Selected Member States (1997) 
ATTAINMENT OF GOALS: Health PERFORMANCE: 
Fairness in Overall expend- On level Overall 
WHO Member: Health: Res~onsiveness : financial goal iture of system 
N/S: Level Distribution Level Distribution contribution attainment health erformance 
Armenia 41 63 92 111-112 181 81 56 104 
Azerbaijan 65 99 130-131 125 116-120 103 60 109 
Belarus 83 46 76-79 45-47 84-86 53 74 116 72 
Estonia 69 43 66 69 145 48 60 115 77 
Kazakhstan 122 52 90-91 60-61 167 62 112 135 64 
Kyrgyzstan 123 122 124 96 171 135 146 134 151 
Russia 91 69 69-72 86-87 185 100 75 127 130 
Tajikistan 120 124 125 136 112-113 127 126 145 154 
Turkmenistan 128 131 88-89 113 121 130 128 152 153 
Ukraine 70 47 96 63-64 140-141 60 111 101 79 
Uzbekistan 100 144 105-107 71 131-133 109 120 112 117 
Other: 
China 81 101 88-89 105-106 188 132 139 61 144 
Mexico 55 65 53-54 108-109 144 51 55 63 61 
Malaysia 89 49 31 62 122-123 55 93 86 49 
Bangladesh 140 125 178 181 51 -52 131 144 103 88 
Kenya 162 135 144 142 79-81 142 152 178 140 
France 3 12 16-17 3-38 26-29 6 4 4 1 
United States 24 32 1 3-38 54-55 15 1 72 37 
SCALE: Each country is rated on a scale of 1 (highest) to 191 (lowest) relative to other WHO member states. 
SOURCE: World Health Organization (2000). The world health report 2000: Health systems: lmprovinq performance. Geneva: 
WHO, pp. 152-155. 
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can expect to live. The top five member states on the DALE measurement in rank order are 
Japan (1 ), Australia (2), France (3), Sweden (4) and Spain (5). Measurement 2: Distribution of 
health in this report refers to how equally distributed child survival rates are within a country and 
then compared across countries . If child survival rates in a country vary greatly from region to 
region, it may be a sign that certain populations do not receive equal health care. 
Measurement 3: Level of responsiveness was based on a survey of 2,000 key 
informants in selected countries to rate performance of their health system according to seven 
qualities: dignity, autonomy, prompt attention, quality of basic amenities, access to social support 
networks during care, and choice of care provider. Measurement 4: Distribution of 
responsiveness refers to how equally groups within a system are treated, with a special 
emphasis on such vulnerable groups as the poor, women, senior citizens and racially 
disadvantaged. 
Measurement 5: Fairness of financial contribution refers to the household's 
contribution to the financing of the health system as compared to income above subsistence. 
Measurement 6: Overall goal attainment is a composite measure of achievement in the level 
of health, the distribution of health, the level of responsiveness, the distribution of responsiveness 
and fairness of financial contribution . Measurement 7: Health expenditure per capita refers to 
the amount of money spent for each person in a member state relative to other states. 
Measurement 8: Level of health performance is defined as the ratio between achieved levels 
of health and the levels that could be achieved by the most efficient health system using DALE 
calculations. The final indicator, overall system performance, was measured using overall 
health system achievement compared to health system expenditures. The top ten overall health 
system performers in WHO's scale of "goodness" and "fairness" were France (1 ), Italy (2), San 
Marino (3), Andorra (4), Malta (5), Singapore (6), Spain (7), Oman (8), Austria (9), and Japan 
(1 0). Further study of these systems might show important information about the health status of 
these countries and how health care systems effectively support their populations. 
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Health care system ratings in the NISin the 1990s. 
In contrast, NIS countries targeted for ZdravReform were listed as some of the worst 
performers in health care systems. The reasons for these ratings not only relate to the low quality 
of hospital construction that existed even during the Soviet era and to the low emphasis on 
primary care solutions. WHO (2000) found from detailed household surveys that more than 1 
percent of households in the Russian Federation and Kyrgyzstan rated on par with households in 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Jamaica, Mexico, Nepal, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Vietnam and Zambia in 
spending half or more of their full monthly capacity to pay on health care. This was an indication 
of high risk for impoverishment and catastrophic loss, a reflection of how the health system was 
financed . The level of fairness of the system-not distinguishing poor from rich households-was 
listed as regressive in the Russian Federation and Kyrgyzstan, as well as in such countries as 
India and Pakistan, Nepal and Peru. Several years into the transition, most NIS states continued 
to rate with low and middle income countries in responsiveness, a measure of how well the 
system met the expectations of clients. According to WHO (2000), the health system in the 
Soviet health system also was known to be unresponsive, as "highly impersonal and inhumane in 
the way it processed people," a common complaint of clients about public sector health workers 
(WHO, 2000, p. 31). WHO's measurements suggest that the overall health system performance 
in Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan in particular ranked among 
the world's worst in 1997. 
Description of the case study 
This case study focuses on the systemic health reform efforts of the ZdravReform project 
contracted to Abt Associates (CCN-0004-C-00-4023-00) beginning in 1994. Abt Associates, a 
well-known consulting firm that specializes in domestic and international consulting in health 
financing and management, has corporate offices in Bethesda, Maryland (international 
consulting) and in Cambridge, Massachusetts (domestic consulting). Documentation for this case 
study was gathered from interviews with Abt Associates ZdravReform project participants in 
Bethesda, Maryland, in 1998 and 2001 ; Kiev and L'viv, Ukraine, in 1998; and Almaty, 
Kazakhstan, in 1998 and 2001. The research process also included limited observations of 
activity at demonstration sites in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 1998. 
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Abt Associates representatives were forthcoming in their efforts to describe their project 
work and the strategic intent of ZdravReform . Abt Associates also provided most of the official 
documentation for this study. The information and perspectives supplied in reports, evaluations, 
observations and interviews were consistent with each other and served to validate the 
perspectives that emerged from researching the project. USAID representatives in Washington 
and in the missions were reluctant to participate in reflective discussions on the ZdravReform 
project for a variety of reasons . Therefore, documentation of this case study is based largely on 
the perspectives of the contractors, an evaluation of the first phase of ZdravReform , and the 
limited scholarship published on the project. 
II. ZdravReform in the NIS: Overview 
ZdravReform was one of the most ambitious and widely-publicized contracts that USAID 
awarded in the early 1990s. The goal of the project was to help reform health financing and 
service delivery in the NIS region as a whole . Abt Associates was awarded a contract for $44 
million for phase one, to last for three years, starting December 31, 1993. Of the initial award, $26 
million was slated for Russia . At the time of the initial award, an option also was extended for an 
additional two years for $30.5 million, if all parties found the preliminary work completed in the 
first three years satisfactory. Health reform was believed to be an important factor in the success 
of the transition after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Informants for the study consistently 
pointed to justification for the project as the result of discussions between President Bill Cl inton 
and President Boris Yeltsin in spring 1993, in which Yeltsin requested market-based health 
reform for the Russian Federation . 
According to the final evaluation of phase one of ZdravReform (April 1997), an early 
version of the project was "to assist the new republics in applying the latest technology to health 
care financing as a means of bolstering the social safety net while economic transition 
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proceeded" (p. viii). One early version of the project was to put health care financing experts in 
the United States to work on developing a plan to be modified as needed in the different regions 
of the NIS. A somewhat different early conception of the project was to test new models of health 
care financing at selected sites in the NIS, with an emphasis on privatization of the health care 
sector. But the precise objectives of the reform package and how it was to be del ivered 
continued to change for a number of reasons . In time the ZdravReform shifted into a greater 
emphasis on health care service delivery, when it was discovered that financing reform would not 
take place without changes in the health delivery system. In addition , over time it became clear 
that the health care delivery in the region would not soon shift from public to private sector, even 
though the original project assumed that it would . After prolonged negotiations with USAID before 
and during the early months of the project, Abt Associates agreed to establish five to seven 
demonstration sites in different republics to be used as model sites for testing reform models, 
which in turn could be replicated in the republ ics in the region. A small grants program was to be 
instituted within the NIS regions to test different interventions. Medical practitioners and health 
industry leaders in the NIS could apply for and obtain limited funding to experiment with specific 
pilot projects or to research specific policy issues. 
Another major area of discussion in the early phases of the project concerned not only 
the level of involvement of Ministers of Health in specific republics in the project, but the extent to 
which activities would focus on national reform rather than on model building at local 
demonstration sites. Project decision-makers at USAID and Abt Associates eventually decided 
that setting up models or demonstration sites at the local or oblast level would be more productive 
than the attempt to reform national health policies. Some of the common points noted about the 
project in all three regions were that management and policy conflicts developed over such 
issues as the basic approaches to health care to be promoted in the regions; the role of health 
care in the USAID policy agenda; the role of ZdravReform representatives in negotiating at the 
national government level in the republics; appropriate staffing for managing the project; and 
speed of implementation of the programs. 
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After intensive negotiations in the early months of the project to establish an acceptable 
workplan for all parties, ZdravReform became associated with several health care system 
characteristics: decentralizing management authority; devolving decision-making in health care 
settings; fostering human resource capacity; building health care management expertise; and 
introducing US-based concepts of incentive payments and quality assurance (p. 4 ). In terms of 
structural changes, the project promoted an array of primary care approaches, with attending 
increase in outpatient services and decrease in hospital-based medical delivery. 
The phase one project started up in Russia and Kazakhstan in mid-1994, with expansion 
into the Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine late in the same year. By December 1994, ZdravReform 
regional offices were open in Moscow, Russia; Kiev, Ukraine; and Almaty, Kazakhstan . By the 
time phase one was fully implemented, demonstration sites were establ ished in Novosibirsk, Altai 
Krai , Tomsk, and Kemerovo in Siberia; Tver and Lauga in Central Russia; Lviv and Odessa, 
Ukraine; Dzhezhasgan, Semipalatinsk, and Shymkent, Kazakhstan; and lssyk-kul, Kyrgyzstan . 
Of the three major regions, the ZdravReform project in Russia was the most controversial and 
lasted only through Phase I, which ended on December 31, 1996. ZdravReform continued 
through the end of 1998 in Ukraine, when the full five years of the two-tier project had ended . In 
the third region, in particular the Central Asian republics of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan, the ZdravReform project continues to be active in 2002. 
Interviews with ZdravReform participants (1998) and historical documentation on the 
project suggest that it faced a number of obstacles from the onset of the project. Because of the 
lack of adequate central government funds available with the breakup of the Soviet Union, the 
new NIS republics were forced to decentralize a variety of services, including health care. But the 
decentralizing of health care, in many ways holding the potential for health reform, did not lead to 
the restructuring of the health care system . Instead, what followed were even greater decl ines in 
health budgets. A national health insurance system was attempted in most republics using a 
limited tax base for assessment of health taxes to finance the health care system . But adequate 
taxes were not collected for a variety of reasons. Some companies were not able to pay their 
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employees, much less pay the taxes. Others refused to pay taxes out of mistrust for the central 
and regional governments. Still others existed as pawns and patrons of the growing corruption 
throughout the region . At the same time, fee-for-services was not legalized in most republics as 
an alternative method until late in the 1990s, and in some cases not at all. Throughout the 
transition, the health delivery system has continued to place emphasis on central bureaucratic 
control over customer-oriented services. 
As of late 1996, the evaluation team (April 1997) for phase one of the ZdravReform 
project found that in 1996 the old Soviet prekazy (medical standards or norms) and medical 
economic standards systems that dictated care interventions for specific diagnoses continued to 
prevail in all regions of the NIS. These standards determined typical length of hospital stay and 
clinical procedures in patient care. For a diagnosis of myocardial infarction, for instance, the 
medical economic standard required a hospital stay of 25 to 30 days of hospital treatment. 
Hospital providers would not receive full payment if they discharged a patient early unless they 
received an exception from the insurance company. Like protocols set up in other areas of Soviet 
society, the medical standards were developed for strict adherence. Thus, the incentives in the 
system even in the later reform efforts continued to base incentive systems on full hospitals and 
all that it implied. Hospitals and health workers who worked at demonstration sites had to gain 
exemptions from such protocols in order to avoid losing the small amount of funding still provided 
to the health system. 
ZdravReform efforts in the Russian Federation. Ukraine. and Central Asia 
ZdravReform in the Russian Federation. ZdravReform in the Russian Federation ended 
in December 31 , 1996, so the project today largely exists as institutional memory. A summary of 
the activities of the project is based on solely on historical documentation provided by Abt 
Associates . 
According to USAID and Abt Associates' reports (April 1997), the reform effort there 
initiated over 80 pilot projects , awarded 38 small grants to test reform approaches, and 
contracted with at least 100 Russian technical experts for technical assistance on subprojects. An 
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overview of the multi-pronged efforts in the Russian Federation is highlighted in Figure 4-3 on the 
following page. Because the project lasted only three years, project evaluators viewed the project 
in the Federation as an incentive for lc;>cal Russian health reformers to refine ideas they had 
begun and to explore new ones. However, the evaluation team (April 1997) acknowledged that 
the managed care models, new methods of financing, quality assurance practices and total 
quality management practices promoted by ZdravReform could not be "effectively implemented in 
less than a generation (20 years)" (p . D-8) . 
Documentation on the project (Vladimir et al., 1996; Laudato, April 1997) noted that 
Russia began experimenting with health care reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s under 
Gorbachev prior to the breakup of the Soviet Union. Under the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) 
and later with the 1991 Russian Law of Mandatory Health Insurance (MHIF) system, Russia 
attempted to address system inefficiencies under the previous command-control system. Pilot 
sites in central Russia and Siberia had begun to experiment with local-level payment and 
oversight programs and to expand family practice, among a host of other activities. 
Some of these same leaders in health reform under NEM later worked with ZdravReform. 
The evaluators noted that many of the grants the Russians reformers received from the small 
grants program were completed in advance of the scheduled timetable . Another important finding 
of the evaluation team (April 1997) was that the Russian counterparts in the project stated "they 
did not differentiate among technical assistance, training, grant help, or even study tours ... all of 
these inputs were helping them see things differently to make the changes necessary so that they 
could continue to provide health care services to the public" (p. 14). 
While many reformers were supportive of the early efforts at health reform in Russia, 
many believed the reforms came too quickly and without sufficient central government guidance. 
But the Russian reformers found the process difficult for the same reasons as international 
organizations did when they arrived during the transition: the deterioration of Russia's economy 
hindered implementation of an insurance law based on collections from employers ; funding 
allocated to health slipped from an already low percentage of GOP; salaries of medical and health 
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workers , already extremely low, were in arrears; and health care organizations were unable to 
pay energy costs and were operating in arrears. 
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According to interviews conducted in July 1996 on the project in Russia (Laudato, April 
1997), debates between USAID-Moscow and Abt Associates-Moscow on the appropriate 
conceptual approach for the project "consumed a great deal of project time" (p . 1-19). Abt 
Associates in Bethesda and USAID in Washington initially envisioned the project as a nationally-
based project in which a national financing system model would be developed by using technical 
consultants in the United States. In addition to a health financing model , the project would focus 
on developing a legislative and regulatory approach to support the financial model. About 70 
percent of the effort would be directed nationally and 30 percent at local demonstration sites. 
USAID-Moscow believed that a health care delivery approach was needed to complement the 
proposed financial approach . Thus, an initial conflict developed since Abt project management 
envisioned the project primarily as a health-financing project while USAID-Moscow favored a 
medical delivery systems approach . 
Other legal and policy factors created problems in instituting a new national-level health 
policy in Russia as originally envisioned for ZdravReform, and these were noted in the final 
evaluation for the first three years of the project (April 1997). One was that decision-making in the 
health care system was relegated to the oblast (state) level in a law passed in 1991 . Another law 
was passed that prevented the formation of health management organizations (HMOs). But 
perhaps the most critical obstacle to reform occurred within the ministry itself. During most of the 
contract period, the federal Minister of Health Nechayev was advocating for re-centralizing health 
care decision-making . Nechayev was removed at Minister of Health in the beginn ing of 1996, in 
the last year of the ZdravReform project in Russia. Nechayev, reputed to be "an old-guard 
communist," alleged in public that foreign assistance personnel were intelligence agents. 
Nechayev was reported to have been fired in disgrace when an association of physicians 
described his lies on television . According to the evaluation report (April 1997), Nechayev's 
successor was not viewed to be much different from his predecessor. In addition, many of the 
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national-level ministry personnel working during the period of the project were previously with the 
Soviet national health care system, thus making reform at the national level unlikely. Thus, the 
leadership responsible for creating health care reform was in flux and not necessarily supporting 
changes in the system in the mid-1990s, the time frame for the project. 
The evaluation (April 1997) at the closing of ZdravReform in the Russian Federation cited 
other environmental obstacles in the project. The geographic size of the Federation made it 
difficult to conceptualize a single project, since great differences in the levels and kinds of health 
care provided were in evidence. Results anticipated from the project would be beyond Russia's 
legal and regulatory framework for health care service delivery and financing. Project champions 
in Russia therefore had to be risk-takers. In one case ZdravReform subcontractors were 
removed from office and accused of misusing health system money. 
The initial concept of ZdravReform evolved into a locally based project because local 
sites cooperated with the regional Duma and local sites would be central in effecting permanent 
change. Different experiments in health care areas were needed to test the efficacy of an 
approach before it could be advanced to the national level. In the meantime, the project would 
work outside of the standard regulatory framework still in existence from the Soviet era. Other 
issues arose between USAID and Abt Associates over the number of demonstration sites that 
ultimately were to be set up. The question was raised as to whether the number of sites was too 
ambitious. Selected groups within Abt believed that a smaller number of sites involving more 
institutions within given communities would be better, since the number of sites taxed the ability 
of the Abt Associates regional office in Moscow to support the effort and spread the financing of 
the project among too many sources . 
Yet another aspect of the project that changed dramatically after the contract was 
awarded was the use of Russian technical specialists and management of the small grants 
process. The initial scope of the project had been to employ primarily technical advisors from the 
United States, but local officials in Russia found th is problematic. As a result, 90 Russian 
technical specialists were trained in the approaches of the project. The Russian counterparts who 
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became part of ZdravReform eventually became a strong component of the project, but this 
created a number of unexpected management issues for Abt Associates. The contractor now had 
the major task of training Russian special ists in the reform approaches to be used, approaches 
that were under negotiation throughout the project. 
The four oblasts in Siberia used as the prime project sites for Russia also were 
questioned in the final evaluation . Even though these sites had been working on health reform for 
several years under the NEM, they did not represent a cross-section of the Russian Federation. 
In retrospect, some stakeholders believed that more benefit might have been garnered from the 
use of a single site in each of Russia's main population areas. All of these issues were the 
subject of debates within Abt Associates, between ZdravReform representatives and Abt 
Associates , between USAID-Moscow and USAID-Washington, and in particular between 
ZdravReform participants and USAID, both in Moscow and in Washington. 
As a result, a series of formal modifications were set into the original Abt Associates 
contract during two out of the three years of the project: Six months into the contract, USAID and 
Abt staff conducted a detailed assessment in the field . One month later, USAID submitted a 
country work plan that did not adequately reflect the assessment. Abt Associates in Bethesda 
was not willing to modify its approach. Leadership issues surfaced between USAID-Washington 
and Abt Associates, Bethesda. USAID-Moscow requested more direct control of the country work 
plan, which it did not find satisfactory. By December 1994, Abt Associates was informed that 
ZdravReform was no longer attempting to direct its efforts primarily at the national level. By 
February 1995, just over one year into the project, USAID-Washington shifted major responsibility 
for the project over to USAID-Moscow. Funding was reduced from $26 million to just over $19 
million out of concern for a variety of issues. A new country director for the regional office in 
Moscow was hired after the initial director was found to lack the credentials needed to carry out 
his activities. USAID became involved in the hiring process for the second director. Last but not 
least, another major problem arose with the list of computer equipment and procurement for the 
project. Computers were a critical part of the project, since the financing reform systems were 
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slated to be computerized and networked. An order was submitted in October 1994 to Abt 
Associates, Bethesda, for about $600,000 worth of equipment. USAID did not receive the request 
until June 1995, and the computers did not arrive until May 1996, seven months before the end of 
the project. According to the evaluation (April 1997), "communication and technical issues 
impeded the fulfillment of the order'' (p . 1-27). 
From February 1995 onward, with a new country director in place, progress on the 
project was viewed as satisfactory, though relationships remained "strained" (July 1996, p. 1-30). 
USAID personnel perceived that Abt's management resisted USAID guidance, especially in the 
shift in focus from health financing to health care service delivery, and that "successes in Russia 
occurred in spite of, not because of, AbUBethesda" (p. 1-31 ). The evaluation noted that the 
approval of the country workplan and the delay in delivery of the computers deferred several 
projects and processes. ZdravReform ended in the Russian Federation on December 31, 1996. 
ZdravReform in Ukraine. As in Russia, the economic environment in the Republic 
Ukraine defined ZdravReform efforts during the transition. Though the Ukraine was operating 
under "catastrophically low budget levels" for health care, the government nonetheless passed a 
series of laws upholding the belief that health care should be free of charge for all citizens within 
the existing networks. A Basic Health Insurance Law passed in 1992 outlined a policy 
guaranteeing health care for its citizens and outlining the delivery structures. The Law on Social 
Insurance passed in 1993 developed a general policy on supplemental safety net programs. A 
new constitution for Ukraine was passed in 1996, stating in Article 49 the continuing commitment 
to universal free care for all citizens. Drafts of health reform policies such as mandatory health 
insurance were discussed in the parliament of Ukraine, but were not passed . In spite of these 
intentions, the government of Ukraine was not able to support a comprehensive health care plan. 
Five years into the transition (1991 to 1996), the Gross Domestic Product of Ukraine was 
estimated to have decreased by 50 percent. 
With the government's continued commitment to universal free care under the new 
constitution , local leaders who attempted to adopt market-oriented user fees and to decrease 
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facility capacity to decrease costs became concerned and their activities stopped for months until 
the Cabinet ministers clarified acceptable standards. Health reformers were not allowed to close 
beds or facilities, even in the face of sharp declines in financing and the overabundance of 
hospital facilities. This did not allow local health administrators to reduce operating costs through 
reductions in personnel or lower utility costs . However, in spite of the intent of pol icies 
guaranteeing free medical care, the Ukrainians were used to a system of additional cash or gifts 
for preferred treatment in the medical system. This policy continued in the transition . New 
policies on how to finance the health care system were not forthcoming during the time of the 
ZdravReform contract. 
As in the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Health proved to be a difficult challenge in 
negotiating reform . Over the first few years of the ZdravReform project (1994-1996), six different 
health ministers were appointed and subsequently dismissed . The health minister appointed in 
mid-1996, Dr. Andrei Serdyuk, showed some signs of support for health reform . Discussion of a 
mandatory insurance fund was raised among officials, but such leaders also believed that the 
decentralizing of Russia's health care financing was a mistake. In September 1996, Ukraine's 
Cabinet of Ministers decreed that user fees for certain health care services could be charged. 
Resistance to reform, however, continued to characterize the government's efforts into 1998, the 
last year of ZdravReform in Ukraine. 
Though ZdravReform lobbied for health care reform at the national level in Ukraine, the 
evaluators (April 1997) noted that ZdravReform focused largely on two intensive demonstration 
sites, one in L'viv and one in Odessa. At each demonstration site, ZdravReform activities focused 
on somewhat different approaches. In Odessa, activities emphasized new financing approaches 
and included technical assistance for business planning, marketing, and financial management 
consistent with market reforms for the health sector. In L'viv, activities focused on improving 
efficiency, quality, and access of existing systems, including a refocus on primary care and 
upgraded financial and management tools. At each site, ZdravReform representatives worked out 
in great detail aspects of these approaches . Flow charts of the activities prepared by 
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ZdravReform in Ukraine at the two Intensive Demonstration Sites (IDS) are shown in Figure 4.4 
(Odessa) and Figure 4.5 (L'viv). ZdravReform representatives worked with local sites in these 
cities to develop incentive payment concepts, new organization for service delivery, and 
information systems. ZdravReform models in L'viv and Odessa were designed to increase 
efficiencies in the local polyclinics and decrease costs and to collect funds from fee-for-service. At 
the national level , ZdravReform representatives worked on such broader activities as promoting 
reform with national leaders in Ukraine and in developing instructional and course materials for 
the School of Public Health Administration in Kiev on such topics as health economics, payment 
methods, health insurance, financial management, and resource management. 
The evaluation team (April 1997) at the end of phase one found considerable interaction 
between the contract team and the USAID mission in Kiev, and USAID leadership in Kiev 
demonstrated a clear interest in the demonstration sites at L'viv and Odessa. The evaluators 
also found that Ukrainian counterparts "welcomed the proactive role assumed by ZdravReform 
within legislative circles, within boards and committees involved in medical curricular changes, 
and within the administrative structure at the rayon, oblast, and central levels" (p . C-19). 
Nonetheless, ZdravReform came to an end in Ukraine at the end of 1998, after the extension for 
the project contract ended. 
ZdravReform in Central Asia 
Overview: Stakeholders at USAID and at Abt Associates suggested that, for a variety of 
reasons, ZdravReform as a project was most successful in the Central Asian republics. According 
to project documents (April 1997), since the Soviet health care system extended throughout the 
vast empire, the Central Asian states, such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and 
Turkmenistan actually were net beneficiaries of that system, since they were aided with capital 
investment, budgetary support, and commodities and skills. After the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, these republics were hit especially hard as supply channels closed down and centralized 
budgets disappeared. At the beginning of the project, Abt Associates set up a regional office in 
Almaty, Kazakhstan , and located intensive demonstration sites in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan . 
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According to project documents, Abt Associates sought and obtained approval from the 
Ministry of Health in Kazakhstan to focus on two major areas in phase one of the project: 1) 
privatization of the state-owned pharmaceutical distribution and retail system (Farmatsiya) and 
development of supportive parallel systems (drug information systems, essential drug lists, 
facility-based formularies, and targeted assistance to newly privatized retail pharmacies); and 2) 
technical assistance for oblast-level reform of financing, delivery, and quality control of health 
care. Pharmaceutical activity was based in Almaty but extended to several oblasts . 
Demonstration site activity was focused on small sites in Semipalatinsk and Dzherzhasgan 
oblasts, after the original site in Shymkent City closed. 
During phase one in Kyrgyzstan, ZdravReform representatives focused on demonstration 
site activities located at Karakol in the lssyk-kul oblast, which the Ministry of Health had 
designated as a pilot oblast for health reform activities. The Ministry had introduced a mandatory 
health insurance program to pay for health care services by the time ZdravReform activities 
began . ZdravReform activities initially focused on Karakol City and two rayons (oblast 
subdivisions), but eventually extended into the entire oblast. Reform representatives from Abt 
and Kyrgyzstan worked together to establish family group practices that could provide primary 
health care to patients who enrolled. The family group practices were reimbursed under a per 
capita payment system, which rewarded physicians based on the number of patients enrolled and 
treated and the quality of care provided. Th is model was rolled out throughout Kyrgyzstan with 
the assistance of a World Bank loan . By 1998, ZdravReform representatives were coordinating 
with national health care reformers from the Kyrgyzstan the design of a family medicine 
curriculum and program for universities. 
In both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan , ZdravReform provided the following multi-pronged 
approach to health reform through local and US consultants : 
o Advice on legislation and health policy at the national and oblast levels; 
o Advice on health insurance and pooling of funds; 
o Development of alternative provider payment methods; 
o Promotion of facility restructuring through creation of family group practices, 
emphasizing outpatient care and rationalizing unneeded facilities; 
o Introduction of quality and management information systems to support payment 
of services and patient tracking; 
o Emphasis on consumer choice and consumer responsibility for health care; 
o Strengthening of family medicine as a specialty and improvement of the 
clinical and counseling skills of physicians; and 
o Advice on issues of medical effectiveness of treatments. 
o Support for small grants program to enhance family group practices through 
minor renovations and purchase of medical equipment. (Laudato, April 1997) 
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Delivering technical assistance in Central Asia : Michael Borowitz, Director, and Sheila 
O'Dougherty, Deputy Director, of ZdravReform in Central Asia in October 1998 reflected on their 
activities in a joint interview and on the process of reform . Both directors joined the ZdravReform 
in 1994 as phase one was activated and both continued to provide leadership in the region 
through the full five years of the original contract. O'Dougherty remains as director of 
ZdravReform Plus, a supplemental contract awarded by USAID following the termination of the 
first five years of the original project. Borowitz is a physician who earned a PhD in health pol icy 
from the University of Chicago. O'Dougherty, an accountant and a health policy expert, earned 
her PhD from Johns Hopkins University. Prior to joining ZdravReform , the two directors worked 
together in the US Department of Health and Human Services on the restructuring of payment 
systems in domestic health reform activities. 
Borowitz and O'Dougherty (October 1998) noted that the Central Asian republics were 
not democracies as many in the West understood them-they were authoritarian regimes . No 
real opposition parties existed, though there were political factions within the republics and local 
conflicts . O'Dougherty added, 'They are not democracies now and will not be for some time to 
come." Both believed that this qualified greatly what could be done in ZdravReform and should 
be understood as the context for change in the Central Asian region. 
Both directors noted that a major responsibility of ZdravReform had been to investigate 
the economic and health systems in the region in order to implement effective change. They 
noted that American physicians were "tied to the HMO system" and often used that limited 
context in discussing reform with counterparts in Central Asia . 
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Borowitz (October 1998) described the state of the health care delivery system on his 
arrival in the Central Asian republics. He emphasized that the Soviet Union had a carefully 
structured health system that was more defined than the system in the United States. He 
suggested that the British health care del ivery system was perhaps the closest analog to the 
Soviet system. But the system was generally underfunded and inefficient, in part because it was 
considered a nonproductive part of the economy. He estimated that salaries were lower for 
physicians than for many manual workers . Doctors in the Soviet Union also practiced under a 
different kind of social contract with patients than in most countries in the West. In medical 
practice there, the relationship was between the patient and the state. The physician was the 
bureaucrat who followed all the detailed clin ical protocols . 
The state of the already underfunded system grew worse when the Soviet Union 
dissolved. It was dominated by a large number of hospitals that used over 75 percent of the 
health resources. In addition, the hospital system was labyrinthine. Hospitals were built to be 
areas of specialization, and separate systems were developed for adults and for children and for 
a variety of medical areas. And within this highly complex vertical health structure, incentives 
were placed into the system that supported the continuation of the system . A well-known and 
often-repeated fact about hospitals in the Soviet Union is that they were compensated by the 
number of beds they had and on the number of occupied bed days. This created an incentive to 
inflate the number of beds by having high occupancy rates . The more limited primary care system 
was paid on capacity measures, usually generated by the number of visits. Neither primary nor 
tertiary caregivers had an incentive to increase the range of their clinical services or to decrease 
hospital rates . Within the bureaucratic, centrally-controlled system, patients also had no choice in 
selecting their caregivers. They were assigned to a specific polyclinic based on where they lived . 
Borowitz (October 1998) admitted that by and large counterparts in the NIS believed that 
the principal problem with the system in the 1990s was underfunding. If funding could be returned 
to the Soviet era levels of about 6 percent of GDP, or even to the 8 percent level typical of OECD 
countries, then the Soviet system could be restored . The early message was clear: "Don't 
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change our health sector at all-just give us more money." When ZdravReform consultants 
began working with their counterparts in selected localities, they used the depressed health 
system as the lever to establish greater efficiencies, especially in helping the local health systems 
shift resources to the lower-cost primary care system and to invigorate that area with new 
approaches. Many of these interventions were preventive: health education in diet, smoking, 
and alcohol consumption, and early detection of cancers . Primary care preventative measures 
such as these also gave clients more responsibility for their own health . 
Borowitz (October 1998) stated that the ZdravReform project set out to create a unified 
system of primary care that included adult, pediatric and obstetrical care. Each of these areas 
had been separated in the Soviet system and patients seeking treatment in these areas were 
referred to different hospital locations in the highly specialized vertical system. In their core 
activities in Kyrgyzstan, ZdravReform restructured a small number of urban polyclinics into family 
group practices, combining adult physicians, pediatricians and obstetricians into a single unit. 
The project provided them with clinical training and equipment and restructured the payment 
system, based on free choice of physicians. This competitive element in the system increased 
consumer involvement, a key component of reform. The group introduced a case-based payment 
system in which hospitals were paid per case to increase economic incentives and to decrease 
length of stay. The restructuring of the polyclinics also introduced management autonomy into the 
system, because the physicians and associated hospitals had the ability to restructure their 
department to suit the new system. 
O'Dougherty (October 1998) emphasized that the implementation of a new hospital 
system was a complicated and time-consuming process: 
To implement a new hospital payment system we don't just drop a manual on 
somebody and say, "Do this." It's a much longer process. The first step is to 
develop the process itself. You need joint working groups. You need to work 
with counterparts to buy into the process, so you develop joint working groups for 
policy and legal issues. Then the intervention is staged .... Traditional technical 
assistance might stop there, but that is our start. Now when it's defined, how can 
you operationally implement it? Now it's an information system to support it. 
Then there's a training and operational phase. It's not training in isolation, it's 
training on the system: training on filling out the form and going into the hospital 
system and getting a payment back. You start with a small step. We think in 
some ways, this type of assistance combines all different things : technical, 
operational, managerial, and organizational. It's extremely broad-based on the 
contract: comprehensive-everything affects everything else-and integrated-
pieces must fit together. 
According to O'Dougherty ( 1998), the challenge in working with the former Soviet system was 
that it already was an integrated system, so reform had to be comprehensive rather than 
piecemeal. Partial systems were not likely to last because they conflicted with the carefully 
constructed system of protocols and norms that all physicians were expected to follow. In 
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addition, individual hospitals had no management autonomy to restructure or to develop unique 
treatment protocols. Planning and policy functions tended to be weak because the local areas 
did not engage in meaningful reform prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Plans were 
developed, but the bureaucratic culture in health care did not emphasize follow-through . She 
noted that a long tradition of developing plans existed, but the hospitals "don't actually do them." 
O'Dougherty (October 1998) mentioned that WHO worked extensively in the Former Soviet Union 
with counterparts to change treatment protocols in selected areas. So reform required a number 
of different, but related changes in restructuring and health care service delivery-in health 
financing, in primary care, and in payment systems. 
O'Dougherty estimated that it took about four years of ZdravReform before counterparts 
began working as a partnership. By "partnership," she meant a kind of synergistic information 
sharing: "They're no longer your ideas or my ideas. It's a part of a process .... You're feeding 
each other. You're learning all the time; we're learning from them. We combine our expertise. 
It's not an 'us' or a 'them,' it's a 'we'. But you have to set up a program to do that; you need an 
operational program ." 
She stated that USAID also served an important role in providing leadership to 
encourage and facilitate the process. In time, all counterparts in the project mutually agreed upon 
the model and results framework, and everyone ended up "waving this flag ." In addition, USAID 
counterparts were helpful in developing a roll ing framework for the project, which enabled major 
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changes in the project over time. Even intensive demonstration sites were moved to different 
localities in the process of the project. She added that the partnership with USAID only 
developed over time. More tensions existed when USAID-Washington, USAID-Central Asia, Abt 
Associates-Bethesda and ZdravReform-Aimaty were interacting on a regular basis . In time, the 
shift toward more autonomy in USAID missions and toward ZdravReform-Aimaty decreased 
those tensions because the lines of communication were clarified and the leadership identified. 
Borowitz and O'Dougherty (October 1998) stated that they were "forced" into a kind of 
direction by the very nature of the contract with USAID. For instance, by the time ZdravReform 
was launched, the demonstration sites had already been picked. The role and importance of the 
demonstration sites were actually a source of conflict and a subject of debate in the project in all 
the regions . But Borowitz (October 1998) suggested that the idea of demonstration sites turned 
out to be a good one because their counterparts in the Former Soviet Union were not strong in 
experimenting with and operationalizing new ideas, a function of the history of centralized 
planning in Moscow that left no place for autonomy. Though the initial vision for the ZdravReform 
project had been directed toward national policies and system, Borowitz believed in retrospect 
that the local level was "the best place to start." 
Local demonstration sites required permission from the national Ministry to experiment 
with different approaches, and the link with the national level needed to be sustained or local 
experiments would not be entrenched. In time, ZdravReform in Central Asia became highly 
focused on the demonstration states. Borowitz (October 1998) estimated that 95 percent of 
project resources went into the demonstration site in Kyrgyzstan and 5 percent into activities at 
the national level. To institute reform at the local level, however, it was necessary to experiment 
with approaches that were not technically legal and to make compromises with existing systems 
where necessary to allow for incremental health reform . At some point, the reformers worked 
with the national government to make the necessary regulatory changes to legalize the family 
group practices that were the focus of the early demonstration work in Kyrgyzstan. 
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Success factors in system health reform . O'Dougherty (October 1998) noted that the 
area of health reform in international health was not well understood . Until the mid-1990s, health 
reform "consisted of running around and setting up user fee structures." She noted that major 
efforts were underway in international technical assistance to target and research the 
characteristics of health systems that make them most effective. She said that health field 
workers from country to country varied in their knowledge of health systems. On occasion, the 
ZdravReform project would send local counterparts on study tours to the United States to explore 
the health care system, but she stated that it was "difficult to find providers in America who can do 
anything but discuss HMOs." Both Borowitz and O'Dougherty agreed that HMOs as they were 
implemented and understood in the United States were not useful models for reform in the post-
Soviet system. Neither believed that ZdravReform was specifically "American" in approach : they 
used approaches and techniques that were developed for health systems in many parts of the 
world . 
Borowitz and O'Dougherty (October 1998) attributed the success of the local 
ZdravReform project to the fact that they had a technical vision of what they wanted to 
accomplish in the project and then adapted that vision as they implemented at the demonstration 
sites. That vision included substantial previous experience in health reform activities in the US. 
They stated that the original scope of the project was to centralize the technical assistance in 
Washington and then to have the regional ZdravReform projects operationalize the technical 
models developed at Abt Associates in Bethesda. They also trained a core group of technical 
assistants drawn from such technical fields as laser physics, mathematics, and physical 
chemistry into the framework of the project. Eventually this highly competent group took over 
most of the momentum of the technical improvements in the model. Though ZdravReform was a 
region-wide project, Borowitz indicated that he had little contact with the ZdravReform groups in 
Ukraine and Moscow. 
Borowitz (October 1998) stated that a critical factor in the success of the project was to 
sort through the existing institutional structure of the post-Soviet republics to find the best areas of 
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intervention. The Former Soviet Union did not fall into traditional domains of development, since 
basic modernization had taken place throughout the empire in the Stalinist era. The Soviet 
government had brought modern industrialization to the far reaches of the USSR. But the 
institutional approach to development in the region was appropriate. It was important to begin 
with whatever institutional system they had. The mistake in American technical assistance was in 
the belief that new institutions could be created quickly. In fact, the pathway to reform was 
constrained heavily by the kinds of institutional structure that already existed in the region. 
Institutional reform as a result would take place slowly. "You 're not going to get a multi-payer 
insurance system here in the next ten years," Borowitz (October 1998) said, "because there 's no 
institutional structure developed." He also added that he and other project members had 
investigated hospitals as possible sites for reform and decided that tertiary care institutions were 
not the best place to start reform 
Beyond the long-term strategy of technical assistance to change the institutions of health 
care delivery in the former Soviet republics , Borowitz (October 1998) suggested the need to 
better understand the beliefs of Soviet-based medicine. He stated that much of Soviet medicine 
would be considered "unproven" by Western standards of evidence-based medicine, standards 
based on randomized double-blind clinical trials . By such standards, much of Soviet research 
would not be publishable in Western journals, and the research domain in biolog ical medicine in 
particular was underdeveloped . Though Western physicians found many medical practices in the 
republics "odd ," Borowitz (October 1998) stated that Soviet medicine cultural norms toward 
knowledge convinced them that such therapies worked . He cited such practices as injecting ATP 
or Vitamin C into patients who have had heart attacks. Thus, many of the labels and technical 
terms appeared to be the same, but the deeper one delved into the system, "radical differences 
could be found." Borowitz suggested that the role of the hospital partnership program should be 
to explore clinical practices and differences, where closer analysis of the reason for following 
certain protocols could be discussed. Such interaction was beyond the scope of ZdravReform 
and would need to be a long-term process. 
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ZdravReform in Central Asia: Concept and impact 
In a followup interview in February 2001 , O'Dougherty described the distinctive 
characteristics and impact of ZdravReform in some of the Central Asian republics . By that time 
O'Dougherty had become Regional Director of ZdravReform Plus, an extension of the original 
project, and Borowitz was no longer working on the project. 
O'Dougherty stated that the concept of ZdravReform was unique in that it was intended 
to be systemic, comprehensive , integrated and sustainable. ZdravReform representatives 
analyzed the overall structure of the health system when they set up the project in 1994. What 
they found was an inverted pyramid, with 75 percent of resources directed toward the hospital 
sector and a very weak primary care sector. Rather than focus on hospitals as the basis for these 
efforts, Zdrav reformers positioned their model sites at the oblast level, where demonstration sites 
were developed . O'Dougherty stated that the Soviet system consisted of about 25 different 
vertical medical tracks or programs, with little overlap between them . This system was particularly 
vulnerable after the collapse of the Soviet Union because the centralized funds required to 
sustain the system all but disappeared . What was left of the system within a few years after the 
collapse was but a shell , an unsustainable structure that probably could not return to its former 
stature. 
The objective of ZdravReform was to strengthen the primary health care sector and to 
integrate the vertical programs within that expanded sector, the direction of much of Western 
health reform in the past 30 years . By 1998, the end of the first phase of ZdravReform , project 
reformers facilitated the introduction of about 400 new primary health care entities in Kyrgyzstan , 
500 or 600 in Kazakhstan , and about 50 in Uzbekistan, where work began much later than the 
other two republics . The long-term impact of ZdravReform in Central Asia was embedded in 
these new primary health care practices, since their creation expanded the primary health care 
sector and their existence meant that primary health care was built into the legal and policy 
structure of these republics . In addition to these structural efforts , Zdrav reformers also provided 
extensive clinical training for health professionals in the region and, to a limited extent, upgraded 
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equipment. O'Dougherty noted that medicine in the Former Soviet Union looked like Western 
medicine because of the large number of common specializations, but that clinical standards and 
practices actually were quite different. A third element of the model was to work on the 
restructuring of health care financing for these new entities, and a fourth was to put in place 
database systems for better analysis of patient care and integrated financial management. 
ZdravReform worked closely with USAID, together with counterparts in the government of 
some of the republics in Central Asia, to implement the pilot sites and to develop a commitment to 
the restructuring. Advances in Kyrgyzstan were most dramatic, since the government had 
decided to roll out the ZdravReform pilot project there and institute the model for the entire 
republic. O'Dougherty stated that Kyrgyzstan had fundamentally changed its health system in the 
years of ZdravReform . ZdravReform also had an impact on the system in Kazakhstan , though the 
greater decentralization in this republic made national change more difficult. She noted that all of 
the results of the project would not be felt immediately in the system, but that the intervention of 
ZdravReform in these two republics in particular would result in a different system in ten years . 
Ill. Stakeholder Perspectives 
In this section of the case study, viewpoints are presented of selected stakeholders in 
ZdravReform, specifically the reflections of the project director of phase one of ZdravReform, 
Nancy Pielemeier of Abt Associates in Bethesda, Maryland, and selected viewpoints of scholars 
on the project. Unfortunately, USAID officers involved in decision-making on this project chose 
not to add their perspectives on this project for a variety of reasons. 
Scholars discuss ZdravReform and foreign assistance in the N IS 
Burger (2001 ), currently Director of the Institute for Health Pol icy Analys is in Washington , 
DC, and formerly a faculty member at the Harvard University School of Publ ic Health , discussed 
the ZdravReform project in a published assessment of the foreign assistance program in Russia . 
He noted that the most ambitious and expensive USAID-sponsored project in health was 
ZdravReform , a project designed to shape the organization and financing of medical care in up to 
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five regions of the former Soviet Union. He writes "The reshaping was to hew to the fashions 
currently of interest in the United States-competition, market forces , and privatization. The 
orientation was entirely an economic and organizational one. Clinical medicine and its practice 
were actively excluded" (p . 292). Burger noted that the prime contractor, Abt Associates , enlisted 
a series of subcontractors to carry out the activities. 
In assessing the intent of the project in Russia , Burger (2001) suggested that 
ZdravReform was "clearly out of phase with the political and economic realities of the time in 
Russia" (p . 292). He noted that GOP was declining in the country, where health expenditures 
reached no more than 3 percent of total expend itures, a level well under typical Western 
countries . The health reform issues in the United States at the time were not lost on the 
Russians, who questioned whether American principles of health reform were the appropriate 
standards to follow. He also noted that ZdravReform threatened a large number of traditional 
arrangements and personnel in Russia, so that many health workers would not necessarily 
welcome the "reforms" that were being suggested . For these and other reasons, the program 
was "truncated" in Russia, to no little embarrassment to the American operatives involved. 
Burger's (2001) greater criticism of the US foreign assistance program was that the 
efforts in the NIS in general and for Russia in particular have lacked a "clearly articulated set of 
foreign policy goals toward the former Soviet republics" (p. 299). The health sector has not been 
able to serve as instruments to further these goals, but the goals also have been unclear. He 
suggested that health sector in the republics did receive varying support on a humanitarian basis 
in 1991 . In part because of the "ambivalent support" for health initiatives in the region , 
philanthropic communities have not provided much financial support for activities and institutions 
in Russia . Some argued that the challenges were too great to make a commitment to support 
reform , since there might be little measurable effect. Yet the predictions of those who supported 
massive infusions of program aid into the region were that many negative consequences would 
ensue if a support network were not extended. Unfortunately, many of the direst early pred ictions 
came to pass in the Russian Federation and elsewhere in the NIS. 
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Noted in Burger's assessment was another published analysis of ZdravReform in the 
Russian journal Demokratizatsiya. In the article, Stavrakis (1996) describes USAID's attempts to 
bring foreign assistance to the post-Soviet republics . In referring to ZdravReform, the author 
supported the potential benefits of reform ing Russia's health care system. The problem with the 
project, in the author's estimation, was that the consultants brought into the project were 
"medically and culturally ignorant of the conditions they confronted" (p . 262). Stavrakis (1996) 
suggested that Abt Associates was "slowed and ultimately stymied by the interference of USAID 
personnel in program administration," to the point where the project eventually was prematurely 
shut down. Using examples from a number of sectors in US foreign assistance in the NIS, 
Stavrakis charged that the USAID bureaucracy itself destroyed the potential of many interesting 
projects and that "the existing procedures are so overbearing and time-consuming, both in 
selection and subsequent administration , that USAID often substantially degrades the potential of 
promising programs" (p . 293). 
Abt Associates project director reflects on early issues with ZdravReform 
In an interview at Abt Associates in Bethesda, Maryland, on April 1998, Pielemeier, 
project director of ZdravReform through the first three years of the project, discussed some of the 
issues from the perspective of Abt Associates in Bethesda, Maryland . Nancy Pielemeier herself 
was formerly at USAID as a project officer. Pielemeier (April 1998) stated that a number of points 
of view came to play in international consu lting. The company philosophy was to "provide good 
research and analysis as input into decision-making" for their clients, both domestic and 
international. Pielemeier acknowledged that foreign assistance agencies such as USAID often 
presented a point of view. The role of Abt Associates as a consulting firm was to validate that 
point of view, which may or may not be consistent with the point of view of the recip ient. 
Pielemeier stated that the role of consultants was to act as "honest brokers in trying to help 
people understand the issues and the problems and what the solutions could be." For example, 
in ZdravReform in the NIS, Pielemeier stated that there were strong points of view on how to go 
about reform . Abt Associates could not go in with any specific solution and assume that it was 
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the best solution . The company needed to look at the issues and help tailor options for decision-
makers. 
Pielemeier (March 1998) acknowledged in the early days of the ZdravReform project that 
she believed that work in the former Soviet Union would be like consulting on other health projects 
in the United States or in a developing country. But Pielemeier (March 1998) stated that the 
overwhelming consensus at USAID and in the State Department was that the region needed to be 
treated differently: 
. . . there was a very strong assumption, I think, on the part of the State 
Department and USAID people that we probably were bringing in a bias and that 
we were judging the countries of the Former Soviet Union as being in a 
developmental stage. We were told repeatedly that this was not development, 
that the solutions and the problems and so forth that we might be used to in the 
developing world do not apply in this region because this region was highly 
developed . People were very well educated, and therefore we should not make 
that assumption. It was assumed that we were making the assumption, which 
was an interesting perspective. 
Pielemeier added that there were differences in working in Latin America, or Africa , or Asia, but 
she believed that it was a difference of degree rather than of kind. She noted that people in the 
Former Soviet Union were well educated , but they did not have "practical experience or a reality 
base or understanding of market forces or of how the rest of the world worked-at least not in 
those early days." So Abt Associates had the task of finding out what they did understand and 
believe. She believes Abt was seen as a traditional USAID contractor promoting a point of view 
in health reform. Though she admitted that Abt Associates did support certain types of 
approaches to health financing and health care delivery, especially in domestic projects, she 
believed that the view that the former Soviet Union was fundamentally different from the rest of 
the developing world was faulty. 
She stated that her colleagues in ZdravReform referred to the early work of the project 
as "warm-up exercises." The Abt Associates team-who later became known primarily as 
ZdravReform project representatives since so many of them were subcontractors-introduced to 
their clients who they were , what the capabilities of the consulting firm were, and how the firm 
could be helpful to the host country cl ients. The ZdravReform group in the early months of the 
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project needed to understand the health pol icy environment better so as to better tailor a reform 
program to that environment. Thus, the project did not go in and immediately start presenting 
solutions, but spent a great deal of time understanding the intricacies of a complex and internally 
consistent environment in health. 
Pielemeier (March1998) stated that it did not take long to discover the "astounding lack of 
understanding on the part of highly educated people as to how the world really works ." The Abt 
Associates group found that the idea of market principles and incentives was missing from the 
early discussions with clients in each of the regions of the NIS in which ZdravReform operations 
were set up. Yet, she recalled that the assumption of the Coord inator's Office for the NIS in the 
State Department was that this was an industrial society with a highly educated population and 
that the lessons would be quickly absorbed. Early thinking on the assistance program was that 
the program could be administered from Washington through the Coordinator's Office, without the 
addition of USAID missions. The original technical assistance activities were deliberately 
formulated as regional activities that could be offered to various republics . But, Pielemeier 
added, "that assumption flew out the window fairly quickly .. . but it took a while for people to 
adjust to it." Even as late as 1998, Pielemeier suggested that the activities in the region retained 
a "fairly heavy and centralized focus .. . from the Washington base of the Coordinator's Office." 
From her perspective of the regional ZdravReform project director from 1994 to 1996, 
Pielemeier recalled that the USAID missions began to request more local decision-making power. 
This added complexity to the situation because the initial contracts were highly focused on 
Wash ington, but within a few years , the Coordinator's Office and USAID-Washington all moved 
more decision-making authority into the missions. Th is created a kind of tension not found in 
regions with highly established reporting routines, since the regional missions at USAID were 
developing and changing just as much as the environment in the NIS. 
Accord ing to Pielemeier (March 1998), USAID had to make adjustments in addressing 
some of the issues in the NIS, which led to more tensions in Washington and in the field . She 
stated that a "good deal of shifting" occurred in the Coordinator's Office as to whether marginal 
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sectoral aid (such as environment, health, education) was actually needed in the former Soviet 
republics, since some believed that the assistance should be directed toward such big issues as 
macroeconomic adjustment and political development. Sectoral funding budgets started to shrink 
by 1995 or 1996, in part as a reflection of this questioning process. 
In addition, she said that USAID did not usually deal with reform issues in health because 
the agency was more focused on health care service delivery. Some of the systemic components 
of the ZdravReform model , such as in financing and incentives, were not typical of international 
development projects. This led to discussions as to the best approaches, or best mix of 
approaches, for reform . She stated that the early funding awards tended to be large awards to a 
few organizations, and this was resented in the international development community among 
certain nonprofit organizations and other traditional international development organizations who 
had not won the awards. These groups took the opportunity to criticize the efforts and the 
procedures of the granting process. All of these aspects of the foreign assistance program 
created tensions among the stakeholders . 
The ZdravReform project in Russia, according to Pielemeier (April 1998), drew the most 
attention and criticism because Russia was the focus of attention of the Coordinator's Office in 
the State Department. Yet the ZdravReform project in the Central Asian republics, with its 
regional office in Almaty, Kazakhstan, started at the same time, and the regional office in Kiev 
was set up a short time later. She stated that the characteristics of ZdravReform in each of the 
regions increasingly was defined in terms of the interests of the local ZdravReform staff, the 
USAID missions, and the local clients . ZdravReform throughout the NIS thus promoted a number 
of common systemic changes, but the project developed unique characteristics in each of the 
three main regions . 
Pielemeier (March 1998) admitted that ZdravReform in Russia was "a bit of a flash in the 
pan." She stated that USAID did not want Abt Associates involved in the policy dialogue at the 
national level on health system reform and health financing. The project was "sort of confined to 
working in selected areas in Siberia ." Pielemeier believed that the project's ability to affect policy 
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change was limited from the beginning, in part because the project's channels to policy authority 
in Moscow were cut off. She (March 1998) stated : 
[M)ost of the action that we were involved in was in Western Siberia, and yet the 
USAID mission insisted that we maintain a presence in Moscow. What we ended 
up with was sort of an office-say, a Washington-based office that was working 
in San Francisco in terms of distance. So we had a lot of technical people who 
spent a lot of time flying back and forth to four areas in Western Siberia. And we 
weren 't able to use that experience to build it up to the pol icy level , wh ich is the 
ideal. If you can have that kind of local-level experience-pilot or demonstration 
type of activity-and then take the lessons learned from that and channel it up 
the policy chain and demonstrate what is going on, this is what tends to happen . 
How does th is relate to the kinds of legislation and policy that are being 
developed at the national level? So that was kind of cut off very early in Russia . 
Typically in a project of this kind, the project team would work with the Ministry of Health, but she 
acknowledged that the Minister of Health at the time was "very difficult" and that the ministry was 
"pretty much in a shambles." 
In contrast, ZdravReform project was able to work simultaneously at both the national 
and the local levels in the other reg ions. Pielemeier cited ZdravReform work in Central Asia as 
the most outstand ing work of the project. The work in Kyrgyzstan in particular was "one of those 
serendipitous experiences where the country was open and ready to receive the kind of 
assistance that we happened to be contracted to supply. And they just said, 'Bring it on.' So it 
was a terrific fit; the demand and the supply met perfectly in that case." 
In Ukraine, project consultants were able to work concurrently with demonstration sites 
and with the local Ministry. She noted that change in health reform had been very slow in 
Ukraine, but the project continued to maintain contact with the national level , even though many 
leaders in the national government were not supporting reform . She stated that many decision-
makers in the Health Committee of the Rada (the Duma in Ukraine) or colleagues in the School of 
Public Health could recognize ZdravReform and offer some perspectives on its efforts . In 
Ukraine, through the two demonstrates sites in L'viv and Odessa, the project was able to take a 
more developmental approach , when the need for training was discovered . ZdravReform 
participants subsequently offered courses in health financing, health management, payment 
systems, and a variety of other topics . By the term "developmental," Pielemeier (March 1998) 
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meant that the participants in the program needed to acquire a common understanding of the 
very definitions and terms that were being used in discussions. She stated: "People will discuss 
things using the same words but the understanding of those words is so different that you really 
have to go backwards to say, 'Okay, how do you understand what these words mean?' And that 
is what the training is all about." She mentioned such key terms as "incentive-based payments," 
"quality of care," and "customer satisfaction ," among others. 
Pielemeier (March 1998) acknowledged that Abt Associates was not a grassroots 
organization, but she stated that the strength of the organization was that it attempted to 
understand the context in which it was working and to interact in as much of a culturally-
appropriate manner as possible to achieve project objectives. The goal of the project was to work 
with people who could influence the policy process in health, to provide them with as much 
understanding and as many options as possible to enable them to influence the political process. 
The bias of health economics in this dialogue was not to provide an answer as to what mix of 
solutions should be used in any context, but to develop a system of health care that would 
provide "quality services and the best and most complete services to the largest number of 
people." Abt Associates as an organization, however, did not promote one particular school of 
health economics, a field that had been growing in popularity in the 1990s. Pielemeier believed 
that there were general principles shared in the field and that common standards were theorized 
and practiced in health economics. These common standards were in turn promoted in 
ZdravReform . 
Pielemeier (March 1998) stated that she believed the Russians themselves gave the 
message to the US State Department that they were a highly industrialized nation and did not 
want to be treated like "inferior beings" in the offer of technical assistance. But she stated that the 
experience of the consultants in the regions suggested a somewhat different perspective: 
Because we are development practitioners, we know the realities and we are the 
ones that are on the ground .. .. It doesn 't matter what somebody is telling you 
that these people know everything and all you have to do is just hand them the 
book. When you're dealing with the people, you realize that they have huge 
gaps in their understanding and it's going to take a lot longer. And you 're going 
to have to find some very clever ways to bring them along and help them 
understand the things they need to know in order to be able to move from here. 
So we tried to kind of hedge and say, "Okay, sure, we'll bring in top notch US 
practitioners who may or may not understand how to transfer technology in 
another cultural setting. And we'll try to match them with some people who have 
that ability and proven competence in making that kind of transfer, and do the 
best we can to try to satisfy all of these competing interests." And it worked more 
or less well depending on the situation and what we had to deal with . 
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Pielemeier believed that one surprise to the Russians was that the technical packages at the very 
least were going to be brokered by American firms . She believed that the Russians thought they 
were going to have an influx of cash in hand to work on reform . 
Pielemeier (March 1998) stated that the very idea of a consultant was a Western 
concept. ZdravReform consultants discussed what a consulting firm did as part of their technical 
assistance. Russian counterparts in the project were told that consulting firms provided them with 
"an outside point of view so that they can make their decisions based on better information ." Abt 
Associates was there to help them with this decision-making and to provide a specific kind of 
expertise. 
Pielemeier (1998) added that Abt Associates' consultants had to explain at great length 
and repeatedly what an American firm in health reform had to offer them when the United States 
had not reformed its own health system, since the Clinton plan had collapsed at about the same 
time. Project representatives explained that the system in the United States had been through a 
series of incremental reforms. Although there was no centralized approach, the United States 
had learned a great deal from the huge range of practices available. Because the US system had 
so many concurrent experiments and approaches in the system, it had a great deal to offer in the 
form of expertise. 
When Pielemeier (March 1998) was asked to compare the partnership approach to the 
technical assistance approach that Abt Associates provided , she answered that an unfortunate 
dichotomy had arisen between the two approaches. She acknowledged that Abt Associates left 
as soon as funding vanished, but that the ZdravReform project served as a broker for a number 
of different types of partnerships between such funding and service organizations as World Bank, 
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World Health Organizations, and private voluntary groups who were seeking to improve health 
care in the region . And as for the sustainability of partnerships, Pielemeier (March 1998) noted 
limitations in this approach as well : "What they are hoping they can do is to throw some funding 
at organizations who can be partners and then they will continue to be partners. We don't know if 
there can -be lasting partnerships once the government funding goes away." She stated that 
partners tended to provide strong support for the partnership in the early stages, but then support 
decreased dramatically over time. She also suggested that the kind of interaction promoted in 
partnerships was "an interpersonal kind of exchange, but not development." 
Pielemeier (March 1998) was troubled that the AIHA partnership program focused on 
hospitals, particularly in the early stages of the project. She said: 
Part of the reform is to close hospitals, to get rid of them, to downsize them , to 
transform them, to do major things to these big, unresponsive institutions that 
gobble up a lot of money mainly for heating . ... In any case, on one hand, 
you 're paying for technical assistance to work on health reform, which should be 
and probably is advocating for closing hospitals, transforming them in some way. 
On the other side, you 're paying to develop partnerships, which validate the 
continuation of the hospital tradition . Now I'm not saying you should not have 
any hospitals. Clearly you have to have some hospitals. Some of the hospitals 
that you want to maintain need to be restructured and improved in a major way in 
order to be able to provide high quality services and produce good health 
outcomes . So that's where the hospital partnerships should come in . But there 
is no ... strategy to this . It's a bit random and sometimes there are sort of 
competing objectives just between these two activities. 
IV. Conclusions 
The ZdravReform Project was a large technical assistance project awarded to Abt 
Associates, a well-known health-consulting firm in Bethesda, Maryland . The initial contract, 
awarded for the period December 31, 1993, to December 31 , 1996, was to cover technical 
assistance efforts in a variety of related health reform areas. The initial contract, though later 
reduced , was awarded for $44 million, with the option of another $30.5 million contract for an 
additional two years , should all parties find progress satisfactory. ZdravReform activities were 
initiated in 1994 in the Russian Federation and in some of the Central Asian republics first and 
later in the same year in Ukraine, with the highest profile activities focused in Russia . Though the 
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project was intended to be region-wide in the NIS, most stakeholders agreed that the activities in 
Central Asia showed the most promising combination of activities and relationships . By and 
large, the regional offices of ZdravReform did not co-sponsor or share in their activities. 
The contract was not awarded as a cooperative agreement, an important distinction 
made in USAID's regulatory framework. A direct contract with USAID implied that USAID would 
carefully monitor all aspects of the project work . In many cases , USAID became an equal partner 
in the every phase of the project. In contrast, many cooperative agreements were awarded as 
grants in which USAID was given a collaborative or even "hands-off' role in the execution of the 
contract. The technical assistance contract has been the most typical policy tool used by USAID 
throughout its 40 years as a bilateral development agency for the U.S. government. USAID 
stakeholders at the beginning of this study recommended the ZdravReform project as the most 
typical tool of foreign assistance of the agency. 
Analys is of the project's effectiveness can be considered in terms of the four categories 
(resource intensiveness, targeting , institutional capacity, and political risk) developed by Linder 
and Peters (1989) and Salamon (1989) as follows : 
Resource Intensiveness: Rating: High. This category refers to the complexity of the operations 
required for the project, including the level of techn ical assistance required and its costliness 
relative to the proposed solution. 
Evaluative comments for ZdravReform in this section are based on 
documentation analysis only on the project in Russia, since the program had been 
terminated at the end of 1996. Comments made about the project in Ukraine are based 
on limited observations and interviews conducted in L'viv and Kiev in 1998, near the end 
of the ZdravReform contract, in add ition to written documentation available. Discussion of 
ZdravReform in Central Asia is based on limited observations, interviews with 
ZdravReform personnel in 1998 and 2001 , and documentation analysis . All comments 
made about USAID's role in the project are based on documentation suppl ied by Abt 
Associates-Bethesda, since key USAID decision-makers did not cooperate with this 
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component of the study. These important limitations should be noted in interpreting the 
evaluative commentary on the following pages. 
The solution proposed by ZdravReform for the NIS changed over time 
strategically and operationally, though all proposed solutions for different reasons were 
highly complex and costly. Preliminary planning at Abt Associates-Bethesda envisioned 
ZdravReform as a technical assistance project based in the United States, in which 
consultants hired for the project would develop health-financing models for the region . 
This tended to be the focus of the health management work of Abt Associates-Bethesda 
in the early 1990s. But as strategic planning and negotiations with USAID continued 
before and in particular in the first year after the awarding of the contract, ZdravReform 
evolved as a multi-pronged approach that included five components : national policy 
development, quality improvement, financing, information systems development, and 
dissemination . 
Project management at Abt Associates-Bethesda, staff hired for ZdravReform in 
each of the republics, USAID-Washington, and USAID personnel at the missions 
struggled to identify the locus of the reform efforts throughout the project. In all of the 
regional efforts (Russia, Ukraine and Central Asia), it became apparent that the national 
Health Ministries would not be able to finance a sustained, integrated reform . In fact, the 
national governments in these areas were seeking to divest of the responsibility for 
financing health care in the face of massively shrinking budgets, while at the same time 
offering free health care in principle in their national transition legislation . In Russia and 
Ukraine, ZdravReform stakeholders found that the federal Min istry of Health in each of 
these republics was not willing for a variety of reasons to provide leadership for a national 
reform effort. A major reason was that Ministers tended to come and go at a frequent rate 
during the period of the grant. In addition, documentation suggests that federal Health 
Min isters in these republics were not receptive to the goals and objectives of 
ZdravReform , above all , privatization of health care. However, the Ministers in these 
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republics were not acting in isolation . The parliaments in each of these republics (the 
Russian Duma and the Ukrainian Rada) took under consideration , but did not pass, 
legislation in health care that would be regarded as reform-based within the objectives of 
ZdravReform. 
These factors shifted the effort increasingly to the local demonstration sites, 
limiting the possibility of high national impact in the legal and regulatory context for health 
care in the NIS. In Russia in particular, ZdravReform management was asked to 
disengage from the national ministry through the short life of the project (three years) . 
And though the ZdravReform group in Central Asia was most successful in aligning local 
efforts with the interests and desires of the national Ministry of Health, this group also 
found itself shifting to different intensive demonstration sites over time as initial efforts 
were closed down for undisclosed reasons . The complexity of the ZdravReform project 
stemmed from two factors: the multi-pronged approach to systemic reform and the 
complex institution-building that was required once it was determined that the project was 
not primarily a health-financing project based in Washington . These determinations 
before and during the projects made the ZdravReform project highly complex in each of 
the regions . 
Though the governments in each of the republics involved in ZdravReform 
continued to uphold the principle of free health care for citizens, economic stresses 
throughout the period of the project made it impossible for these same governments to 
uphold that policy. The economic instability of the 1990s placed great strain on the health 
care system, not only for clients of the system but for the providers as well. Citizens 
found themselves paying for services on an informal basis because fee-for-service was 
not legally mandated throughout much of the period of the grant. Only in 1996 was 
Ukraine authorizing fee-for-service under limited conditions. Within this highly unstable 
political and crisis-ridden econom ic environment, ZdravReform project management was 
faced with the task of finding efficient solutions for enhancing the quality of care and for 
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financing the flow of funds with upgraded information systems. In this sense, the major 
challenge became for ZdravReform to build efficiencies into health care policy and 
delivery in the face of profound constraints and deteriorating infrastructure for health 
care . This was a dramatically different set of tasks from the financing program originally 
proposed for ZdravReform at the beginning of the project. 
At USAID's request, ZdravReform was asked to place more emphasis on the 
health care delivery system and less on financing . Though a more balanced approach to 
reform, this created major complications in the tasks of the project. In the end, the major 
reform activities in each of the locations of the project became strategies for replacing the 
high emphasis on tertiary care and the complicated hospital system in favor of primary 
care approaches . Primary care approaches are critical in health system responsiveness 
throughout the world because such approaches are known to enhance care at relatively 
low cost. But the project was not able to address tertiary care reform (for instance, the 
management and financing of hospitals) extensively because the health care system 
could not support such changes. Stated another way, because of the continuing financial 
crises reverberating throughout the NIS in the 1990s, ZdravReform moved to issues of 
primary care because the system as a whole could not support major changes in other 
areas of health care policy and delivery. This left unattended many aspects of medical 
care in the specializations, which were regarded as beyond the scope of the project. 
Another major lag on improved care also included the hospital infrastructure in 
the NIS. Though the health care system in the former Soviet Union was touted as one of 
the great achievements of socialism , an estimated 10 to 20 percent of hospitals 
throughout the system in 1990 did not even have running water. Capital improvements on 
the infrastructure of the tertiary care system were all but impossible during this period, 
and what equipment did exist was falling into disrepair. All of these factors limited the 
possibilities for reform. 
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In part because of the short timetable for the project in Ukraine and Russia, 
ZdravReform management was required to undertake many simultaneous activities, all of 
which required considerable expertise in the multi-pronged areas targeted for reform . In 
Russia, where the bulk of the financial resources of the project were allocated, serious 
implementation problems (decid ing on the focus of the project; selecting appropriate 
personnel , including the country director; lack of availability of computer resources for 
project activities) greatly reduced the functioning capacity of the already highly 
complicated technical activities. 
Targeting: Rating: Low. This category refers to the specificity of the project in terms of 
the intended population . A high or low rating does not immediately translate into "good" 
or "bad" strategic objectives, since tools may be more or less specific in strategic intent. 
This category also refers to how precisely the target population could be identified and 
how amenable to change the tool or intended solution could be. 
In the midst of this tumultuous and rapidly-changing environment, USAID-
Wash ington, USAID-Moscow, Abt Associates-Bethesda and ZdravReform 
representatives in the reg ional offices spent considerable time in the first year of the 
project attempting to identify the target areas for the project. Issues of targeting arguably 
became the biggest area of conflict among stakeholders in the project. Abt Associates-
Bethesda project management originally conceived project objectives as highly specified 
in content: to provide cost-effective health financing models for the NIS. In time, the 
project grew to involve health care delivery, information systems, and national legal and 
regulatory reform in addition to financing strategies. This integrated approach was 
intended to be a systemic intervention into the health system of the NIS. This by 
definition lowered the targeting for the project because of the large number of different 
activities in these areas. The strategic objective was to improve the effectiveness of the 
health care system, so the ultimate target for the reform was the citizens of the former 
Soviet Union . However, the intermed iate target was the decision-makers and workers 
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involved in health care that needed to enable the reform . The broad-based approach of 
the project thus made it necessary to target a number of levels within the health system. 
In addition , the project was launched in three different areas of the NIS. 
According to reports of ZdravReform management, project objectives were pursued 
relatively independently from one another in each of the regions of the NIS. In fact, 
activities and approaches evolved in a somewhat distinct manner in each of the regions, 
with little contact acknowledged among the different ZdravReform groups. All of these 
characteristics in turn lowered the targeting, or specificity, of ZdravReform activities. 
In terms of the timetable for reform, major errors in judgment occurred as to the 
how long the process of health reform would take place, where to direct the reform 
activities, and how receptive the former Soviet system would be to reform . Informants in 
the study acknowledged that the dominant view among their NIS counterparts was that 
the existing health care delivery system and centralized policies mostly needed more 
funding . As continued financial crises made it obvious that the central and local 
governments could not support the health sector adequately, reformers used this crisis as 
a lever to infuse more efficient approaches into the system, mainly through low-cost 
primary care approaches. The financial constraints and instability of the Ministry greatly 
reduced the scope of the project. 
Institutional capacity: Rating: Low (Russia}, Intermediate (Ukraine), High (Central Asian 
region) . This category refers to the abil ity of USAID and the contractors to deliver on the 
product. 
Based on the analysis presented in the categories of resource intensiveness and 
targeting, it would be difficult to find any organization able to implement a health reform 
project, however targeted , within the environmental and institutional constraints existing 
in the NIS during the most critical years of ZdravReform (1994-1998). Interviews with Abt 
Associates ' and ZdravReform representatives in Washington, Ukraine and Kazakhstan 
suggest that such stakeholders expected to take time to analyze the NIS environment at 
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the startup of the project rather than to plunge into reform interventions immediately upon 
arrival. It is not clear whether USAID-Washington and USAID in the missions expected 
such a long planning and adjustment time, nor whether there was any consensus prior to 
the actual awarding of the grant to Abt Associates as to what directions the contract and 
ZdravReform could take . Given the shift toward more emphasis on decentralized 
decision-making in the USAID missions at the same time as the project was activated 
(December 31 , 1993, in Russia), it appeared that USAID was undergoing a major 
institutional transformation itself. Preliminary discussions held in Washington with Abt 
Associates may not have reflected the assumptions of the missions. There is some 
suggestion that the conflicts over workplans with USAID-Washington, USAID-Russia, Abt 
Associates-Bethesda, and ZdravReform project personnel may have emanated from 
different assumptions about the scope and implementation strategies of the project. 
Though conflicts of this kind were less evident in Ukraine and Central Asia, ZdravReform 
representatives in these regions noted such conflicts existed in the early stages of the 
project in those regions as well, in part because so many parties were involved in the 
decision-making . 
This is not to suggest that institutional change projects should not experience 
differences in views and assumptions. The problem arises over how well these conflicts 
were resolved in order to facilitate the changes desired in the targeted population . Based 
on the limited research conducted on this project, it appears that the decision-making 
stakeholders for ZdravReform in Russia showed a low institutional capacity in completing 
tasks and the stakeholders in Ukraine demonstrated an intermediate capacity. In the 
Central Asian region, joint stakeholders demonstrated high institutional capacity to 
complete the tasks, even though the very nature and definition of the tasks changed over 
time. 
Political risk: Rating: High . The political risk for the project, both in the United States 
and in the NIS, was high for a number of reasons. In the United States, the ZdravReform 
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contract received widespread media attention at the time of approval. The projected sum 
allocated to the project ($70 million over five years) was one of the largest grants 
awarded in the social sector in the whole of the NIS technical assistance program in the 
1990s. The fact that so much of the assistance in the health sector was allocated to the 
ZdravReform project and to one Beltway contractor in particular drew severe criticism 
from other contractors . Abt Associates project management was aware that the events 
unfolding in Russia, the most high profile of the regional programs, were being closely 
watched not only by Russians, but also by US contractors critical of placing so much 
emphasis on one project. Other major stakeholders in the techn ical assistance program, 
including the Coord inator's Office for the NIS, became increasingly critical of the aims 
and performance of the project over time. One key USAID decision-maker refused to be 
interviewed for the study in 1998 in the belief that any publicity whatsoever for the project 
would draw unwelcome attention . 
Pol itical risk in the project was high in the NIS for obvious reasons . One big 
reason was the strategic intent of the project to implement policies and regulations to 
change the very foundation of health care in the NIS, an internationally consistent 
approach that was perceived within the NIS to have succeeded for eight decades 
heading into the transition . ZdravReform attempted from the beginning to instigate reform 
at the national level through legal and regulatory interventions and model building . 
Project management found that the Ministries of Health in Russia and Ukraine to be 
either unstable or unreceptive to the aims of reform . ZdravReform in Central Asia moved 
forward with the consent of the Ministry in Kyrgyzstan in particular, but the project 
activities in that region were more limited and targeted than in Russia and Ukraine. 
Directors of ZdravReform also acknowledged that the republ ics in Central Asia were not 
democracies and adjusted their project aims to work within that more limiting set of 
constraints. 
CHAPTERV: 
The American International Health Alliance CAlHA) in Russia: 
Forging Health Partnerships 
Approach: Formal Site Partnership 
Abstract: Part I of this case study on the AIHA describes the 
problem of health and health care delivery in the NIS with 
emphasis on the largest of the republics, Russia. Part II 
describes AIHA's partnership approach to delivery of foreign 
assistance. Highlights of two of the earliest and best-known 
partnerships are included. In Part Ill, stakeholder perspectives 
from AIHA, USAID, selected scholars, and individual AIHA 
partners are presented. In the final section, Part IV, the AIHA 
partnership project is evaluated in terms of the four categories 
developed by Linder and Peters (1989) and Salamon (1989). 
I. Introduction 
Statement of the Problem 
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Because of restrictive reporting practices during much of the Soviet era, much remains to 
be understood about health and health delivery in the NIS region since World War II . The drastic 
economic, political and social changes that occurred since perestroika are today also little 
understood. International foreign assistance decision-makers have had to work within a rapidly 
changing environment in Russia and the NIS region as a whole in the 1990s, coupled with limited 
understanding of a health care delivery system unlike that found in most Western democracies. 
Lack of information along with a different orientation of the health system under Soviet times has 
posed a formidable challenge in subsequent attempts to "improve" or "reform" health care in the 
region . 
An important collection of research articles edited by Field and Twigg (2000) is the first 
attempt to take stock of health trends in the largest of the republics , Russia . Field and Twigg 
(2000) suggest in their introductory essay that the transition period of the last decade produced "a 
series of unintended consequences," which exacerbated problems from the previous era and 
created new ones (p . 2). Though worrisome health trends have surfaced in Russia in the last 
decade, such as the dramatic rise in the rate of infectious diseases and AIDS, other related 
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trends pre-existed in the Soviet era. Highlights from this research thus provide perspective on the 
problem of health and health care delivery for foreign assistance. 
Field and Twigg (2000) point out in their analysis of health and social welfare in post-
Soviet republics that little attention was devoted to the quality of life in Soviet times, even in the 
few decades leading up to the transition . A sharp contrast existed between "the bombast of the 
propaganda and the shabbiness of existence" (p . 2). Many, if not most, Soviet citizens lived in 
crowded communal living conditions . In many of the one- and two-bedroom communal 
apartments in urban areas could be found generations living together in tight quarters. Shortages 
of supplies and lines at stores to collect even basic goods were a part of every day life. Quality of 
building construction , even in the high-rise apartments dotting urban areas, was frequently low by 
western standards. Government control of housing, water and sewer systems did not translate 
into quality maintenance. The citizens of Russia and of other NIS republics have had to face the 
imbalances and inadequacies left from the Soviet system as they veered into uncharted waters 
as post-Soviet republics . 
Twigg (2000) writes that the system of health care in most areas of the Soviet Union was 
considered to be one of the most notable accomplishments of the system. Soviet citizens came to 
rely on the safety net of virtual universal access to free medical care. Both workplace and 
neighborhood clinics were available, and basic primary care extended even to the sparsely 
populated rural areas of the vast Soviet territory. Health care spending remained at a modest 5 
to 6 percent of the Soviet budget from the early 1960s to the early 1980s, a remarkable 
achievement given the magnitude of services provided . Even at this time, however, access to 
some specialists required gifts or additional payments. 
Though universal access to health care was widely regarded as one of the great benefits 
of the Soviet system, some demographic trends suggest that there were limits to its effectiveness. 
One of these was an unexpected rise in infant mortality in the 1970s. According to Field (2000), 
the infant mortality rate, expressed as a rate of deaths per 1 ,000 live births, stood at 22 .9 percent. 
By 1974, the rate climbed to 27.4 percent, when publication of rates ceased . Two other related 
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trends were notable starting in the 1960s: an unexpected decline in life expectancy and an 
unusually wide disparity in life expectancy between men and women . Table 5-1 depicts life 
expectancy trend data from Demografischeskii ezhegodnik 1998 (1999) in Russia for men and 
women between 1979-1997. Field (2000) notes that the expected gap in mortality between men 
and women globally was about six years . In the United States, the average difference was 5.5 
years for the white population and 7.8 years for the African-American population . 
TABLE 5-1 
Life Expectancy at Birth, Men and Women in Russia, 1979-1997 
Year Men Women 
1979-80 61 .5 73.0 
1980-81 61 .5 73.1 
1981-82 62.0 73.5 
1982-83 62.3 73.6 
1983-84 62.0 73.3 
1984-85 62.3 73.3 
1985-86 63.8 74.0 
1986-87 64.9 74.6 
1988 64.8 74.4 
1989 64.2 74.5 
1990 63.8 74.3 
1991 63.5 74.3 
1992 62.0 73.8 
1993 58.9 71.9 
1994 57.6 71.2 
1995 58.3 71.7 
1996 59.8 72 .5 
1997 60.8 72.9 
SOURCE: Data taken from Demograficheskii ezhegodnik 1998 (Moscow: Goskomstat, 1999). 
As published in Field , M. (2000). The health and demographic crisis in post-Soviet Russia. In 
Russia's Torn Safety Nets. Field , M.G. & Twigg, J.L., (Eds.) New York : St. Martin's Press, p. 22. 
As Field (2000) notes, the rise in mortal ity in Russia starting as early as the late 1960s 
was surprising, because trends toward longevity were increasing elsewhere in the West. WHO 
(1998) reports that life expectancy for both sexes worldwide increased by 17 years, from 48 years 
in 1955 to 65 in 1995. In Least Developed Countries (LDCs )-so called because they are the 
poorest in the world-the life expectancy increased by 15 years, from 37 in 1955 to 52 in 1995. 
136 
Field (2000) writes that one possible explanation was that, as people lived longer in Russia, they 
became more vulnerable to conditions such as heart disease, cancer and diabetes, and the 
Soviet health delivery system may not have adjusted to these population-specific health 
measures. An alternative explanation is that the paternalistic health system did not promote 
individual life-style changes for emerging health conditions. Russia is known to have one of the 
highest alcohol consumption rates in the world and is among the top in the number who smoke. 
In addition to worsening trends in mortality shown in Table 5-1, the post-Soviet decade 
has seen a decline in the annual birth rate, an increase in the number of deaths per year, and an 
increase in such infectious diseases as tuberculosis, including drug-resistant strains, and 
diphtheria. A poll conducted among residents of Russia found that more than two-thirds of the 
sample believed that physical extinction threatened the Russian people (Kramer, 2000). 
The financial shocks of the transition in turn have created many obstacles for health care 
financing and structural reform, which in turn indirectly contributed to lower health status. 
Stories of the collapse of the social safety net throughout the Soviet republics are often 
poignant, if not tragic. The New York Times reported in December 2000 in a series on health 
care in Russia that the NIS region may become an epidemiological pump for some of the worst 
medical conditions, from incurable tuberculosis strains to rampant increases in AIDS. The report 
suggested that 10 percent of Russia's million prisoners now have active tuberculosis . More than 
half of those cases are believed to be resistant to at least one anti-TB drug, and 20 to 30 percent 
are resistant to several. The prisons in turn have become a pump for the rest of the population . 
Several international organizations have become involved in attempting to limit tuberculosis, but 
have only reached a limited number of the federation's 70 provinces. An epidemic of diphtheria 
swept through in the mid-1990s, with smaller outbreaks of encephalitis, typhoid fever, malaria, 
polio, pneumonia and influenza reported (Zuger, 5 December 2000). In addition to these 
worrisome trends, rates of hepatitis and syphilis have increased dramatically. Powell (2000) 
reported that rates of syphilis, gonorrhea and herpes were well above those of Western Europe 
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and the United States. The rate of syphilis officially reported rose by 40 times between 1989 and 
1997, but the actual numbers were expected to be much higher. 
But the picture that emerges from the extremely limited body of research on the health 
status of citizens in Russia and the health delivery system suggests a complex web of beliefs, 
behaviors and medical practices contributing to the health status of Russians and to the health 
care delivery system. Discussed below are a limited number of empirical health studies on Russia 
and its faltering social safety net to clarify some of the outlines of that picture. 
Health and health care in St. Petersburg. Brown and Rusinova (2000) conducted two 
mass surveys of residents in the St. Petersburg area, one in the spring of 1992 (N=1,500) and 
one in the spring of 1998 (N=1,198). The researchers noted that St. Petersburg, as the former 
imperial capital of Russia , was known to have well-trained medical experts and to be well 
supplied with medical institutions. Thus, the conditions reported in the surveys were probably 
different from rural areas and medically underserved regions. The data from these timely surveys 
can provide some important insight into health care and the health delivery system. 
In contrast to the Soviet era of free universal access to medical care, only one in ten of the 
St. Petersburg respondents who had sought medical attention within the month prior to answering 
the survey reported that all aspects of their treatment had been free of charge. By the late 1990s, 
48.9 percent who were treated at local polyclin ics paid for visits to physicians, 44.4 percent paid 
for medical tests, and/or 43 percent for medical procedures. The adults who responded to the 
survey stated that 69.5 percent who went to their workplace polyclinic had to pay to see a 
physicran . All of the Peterburgtsy who went to a physician friend during this period also paid for a 
visit. On the last visit, 24.2 percent of respondents stated that they paid more than 100 rubles for 
their most recent encounter with a physician, where the median monthly income for this survey 
group was reported to be 430 rubles a month . More than 50 percent of respondents also paid at 
least that amount for dental care, and on ly 22.5 percent paid nothing on their last trip to the 
dentist. Given the high influence of the informal economy in Russia, however, accurate data on 
monthly incomes may be difficult to obtain. 
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Cost of and access to medications also have become pressing health issues in Russia. 
Of the respondents who needed medications within the month prior to completing the survey, 
21 .8 percent reported that they paid more than 100 rubles for their drugs alone. According to 
Brown and Rusinova (2000), Soviet citizens commonly paid for prescription medications, though 
certain categories of drugs were free. Large groups, such as pensioners, also were given 
medications at low cost or free of charge. In 1992, the date of the first survey, this urban 
population was finding it difficult to get certain medications. By 1998, the major problem became 
cost: the medications many patients needed had become too expensive. Those most seriously 
affected by the high cost of medications were the poor and chronically ill. A total of 46.5 percent 
of the unhealthy group in the survey issued in 1998 stated that they paid at least 1 00 rubles for 
medications prescribed at their last visit. Only one in ten of this group obtained needed drugs 
cost-free. The authors concluded that major health problems often went untreated because of 
excess cost of medications or insufficient access to selected medications. 
Intensive interviews conducted with local physicians (N=80) between 1993 and 1995 
suggested that a two-class approach to health care was emerging. Most physicians interviewed 
indicated that it was important to familiarize themselves with the economic and material 
circumstances of their clients . As one physician stated, "It is imperative now to determine 
[patients'] material situation . Some medications are very expensive. You have to choose: there 's 
medicine for the wealthy and there's medicine for the poor'' (pp. 74). Brown and Rusinova (2000) 
suggest that the quality as well as the quantity of medical care depended on the financial 
circumstances of the patients. Complicating the physician/patient relationship in St. Petersburg 
was that only 32.3 percent of Peterburgtsy surveyed indicated that they had a "regular'' physician . 
This trend might be related to the highly specialized training of many physicians and to the lack of 
a primary care delivery system. 
Respondents were not enthusiastic about the medical care they received. About one half 
were convinced the medical treatment they received made their conditions worse rather than 
better. More than one third of the respondents stated that the treatment received by one 
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physician was criticized by another. Yet only 28.8 percent stated that their most recent visit to a 
polyclinic had been unpleasant. The researchers noted that it was common in health care 
research to find that clients were more critical of the medical system in abstract than of their own 
personal care . However, if a dual class system of health care is emerging, these findings could 
be difficult to interpret. Health care for those able to pay may be different from health care for 
those with very limited resources . 
Brown and Rusinova (2000) also found that poor health was closely associated with 
poverty. Of the respondents who scored in the lowest quartile of health in the survey, the 
researchers found that almost half were over the age of 60 and more than two-thirds were 
women. Their incomes were significantly lower than the official median income in the area. In 
this grouping of respondents with the poorest health, the researchers also found the strong 
suggestion of nutritional deprivation. Three-fourths of this group reported that they were unable to 
purchase meat and fish on a regular basis , and more than half stated they could not purchase 
fruit and dairy products on a regular basis . A limited number (8 .8 percent) reported that there 
were times when they could not afford to buy bread . 
The researchers found that one in ten Peterburgtsy in the survey reported that they 
needed help to perform daily routines and chores, and more than one quarter of the households 
(27.1 percent) included a person who required continual assistance because of health-related 
limitations. The researchers noted that the responsibility for disability traditionally fell on the family 
in the Soviet system, but in the past it was easier for physicians to send patients to hospitals for 
extended stays. However, Brown and Rusinova (2000) noted in 1998 that almost half the people 
needing continual care sometimes received help from social workers and other medical 
assistants, and more than one third received such help regularly. 
The researchers cautioned against drawing conclusions about the dramatic effects of 
economic transition on the Peterburgtsy. Brown and Rusinova (2000) found that more than one 
fourth of respondents in their 1992 survey attributed personal health problems to earlier 
deprivation. Of these early contributing factors, 32 percent mentioned inadequate diet, 42 
140 
percent listed low income, and 33 percent indicated poor living conditions. The researchers noted 
that significant numbers stated that the economic well being in their families of origin was not 
qualitatively different from that of 1998. More than one in five respondents who were in poor 
health stated that their childhoods were economically deprived and that they suffered through 
food shortages. Respondents stated that nearly 60 percent of their parents chronically faced the 
same basic needs dilemmas that they currently experienced. In addition, the researchers found 
that people in the Soviet system commonly paid for prescription medications. However, under the 
former system certain categories of drugs were free and large segments within the population 
were given medications at greatly reduced prices or at no charge. 
Brown and Rusinova (2000) write that the commitment to provide free essential medical 
care was included in the constitution of the post-Soviet Russian Federation . The intent of post-
Soviet Russian leaders was not a massive restructuring of the old system. But post-Soviet health 
leaders were challenged to figure out how to rehabilitate the troubled system inherited from 
Soviet times. Current trends in health and health care delivery thus are not so much the result of 
a national effort to embrace reform through deliberate, massive privatization schemes or other 
approaches, but of the government's inability to continue to subsidize the fundamental right of 
Russian citizens to free essential medical care. 
Brown and Rusinova's (2000) study documents the outcome of the devolvement of health 
care away from a centralized system by default. Their commentary on health care delivery in the 
last decade in Russia is supported in a New York Times (Zuber, 5 December 2000) report: 
"Since 1990, Russia has decentralized its Soviet health bureaucracy, then tried to recentralize it; 
thrown the door open to private health insurers, then moved to close it; guaranteed free medicine 
to those who needed it, then limited free medicine to the neediest (p. AB)." Coupled with these 
erratic trends in health care policy, and possibly directly related to it, has been a rapid succession 
of federal health ministers. The New York Times reported that eight different federal health 
ministers have tried to run the system in the past ten years. According to another Times article 
(Zuber, 31 December 2000) in the same series on health care reform in Russia, the Kremlin 
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published a statement on health care in September 2000 that advocated for a greater reliance on 
market incentives and a new emphasis on prevention. 
Hospitals in Russia . The New York Times (December 2000) series on the health crisis in 
Russia highlighted, among other th ings, the state of hospitals in Russia . The picture that emerged 
at the end of the decade was not more edifying than at the beginning of the decade, as Western 
countries scrambled to provide emergency medicine and equipment to the region. According to 
the article, Russia 's hospitals and health care in general continue to be in a perilous state. 
According to one report in the series, one in five hospitals in Russia today had no running water. 
Russia's tertiary care delivery system included about 12,000 hospitals and 20,000 clinics. Drugs 
continued to be in short supply; if available, they were often too costly for the average citizen to 
afford. At least 20,000 cancer patients were estimated to die annually because they could not 
afford medicine. Some 200,000 diabetics were unable to get insulin, even though the 
government guaranteed a free supply, because local and regional governments could not afford 
to buy it. 
A reporter's tour of the intensive care unit at Hospital No. 1 in Moscow showed some 
modern equipment that was apparently often in disrepair. Vital-signs monitors, ventilators and 
blood-gas analyzers were noted, but much of the equipment was not working fully or frequently 
broken. A doctor interviewed for the report stated that the hospital had not purchased any new 
equipment in five years . Even simple necessities such as disposable syringes and latex gloves 
were in short supply. 
These observations on the status of the health care delivery system are supported in the 
research. Twigg (2000) suggests that some health reform proposals have been directed to 
change the marked tendency in the Soviet period to direct patients for treatment in hospitals 
under the care of a highly specialized physician. In spite of some reform efforts, even as of 1998, 
an estimated 60 to 70 percent of treatment resources were currently spent on hospitals and 
another 10 to 12 percent on emergency ambulance calls . Outpatient physicians continued to act 
more as dispatchers than caregivers. Twigg (2000) estimated that clinic physicians only rendered 
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care for about 40 to 42 percent of clients and referred the rest to hospital-based specialists . In 
contrast, in a country such as Great Britain, more than 80 percent of patients seeking medical 
attention were cared for directly at the primary care clinic. The result was that patients in Russia 
continued to suffer from long waiting lists for testing and surgical procedures in hospitals. Some 
patients were admitted first and then tested , leaving them with long hospital stays and exposure 
to hospital infections as well. As a result of these systematized procedures, a well-documented 
fact of the Russian health system was that the average hospitalized citizen typically could expect 
to enjoy one of the longest stays anywhere in the world . But given the deteriorated condition of 
many, if not most hospitals, this did not necessarily mean a pleasant stay. 
This system also required a large number of inpatient beds throughout the system to 
accommodate the duration of stay. According to Twigg (2000), health decision-makers have 
indicated that progress has been made nationwide in lowering the number of inpatient hospital 
beds (from 13.8 per 1 ,000 population in 1990 to 11 .9 in 1998). However, this still resulted in little 
cost savings to the system since most hospital resources were directed to payments for staff and 
communal services. However, the systemic reduction in the number of hospital beds and all that 
implied has been the major focus of attention of the Russian health ministry and especially of 
international efforts . 
Depictions in the New York Times (Wines, 22 December 2000) supported findings in the 
research (Brown & Rusinova, 2000) that the quality of health care was highly related to the 
patient's ability to pay in Russia . For the small minority who could afford it, private fee-charging 
clinics and hospitals were the best alternative. A small number of clinics have opened that 
contain most, if not all, of the amenities that modern medicine can provide; the vast majority of 
hospitals and clinics have fallen into increasing disrepair because no structural system of reforms 
has been put in place to improve them and to provide them with consistent support (Wines, 22 
December 2000). 
Physicians in Russia. Another factor in the health care predicament focuses on the 
education and status of and opportunities for physicians. Schechter (2000) notes that, although 
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the health care system was one of the most touted elements of the Soviet system, the status of 
medical professionals was not given equal merit with some other areas, such as engineering. 
And unlike many in the legal profession who have benefited from the transition , medical 
professionals have been faced largely with disrupted payments, diminished supplies of 
medications, equipment failures, and the deteriorating health status of the population . 
Schechter (2000) writes that about 80 percent of all physicians in Russia today are 
women . As early as the first decade of the century, the number of women physicians in Russia 
outnumbered those in any European country. The author makes the case that health care in 
Russia became an occupational sector that was largely feminized and marginalized. She also 
suggests that the neglect of women and children in Russian society and the dismissive attitude 
toward health care may be interrelated. Yet Schechter (2000) found that the twelve women 
physicians she interviewed in the spring of 1997 "declined to discuss the issues of women or 
women's health separately from the general issues facing Russia and the health care system" (p . 
90). Schechter added that, in one interview, a woman gynecologist even refused to discuss 
women's health issues, " insisting that there were no problems with sexually transmitted diseases 
{STDs), teenage pregnancy, or lack of birth control. For many, includ ing physicians, these are 
still shameful taboo subjects even though they are clearly widespread social crises" (p . 90). 
Schechter (2000) believes that the medical profession has not mounted a reform 
movement in health for a variety of reasons . One reason is that the medical profession continued 
to be treated as an occupation rather than as a profession in Russia . Physicians by and large 
could not venture into privatization efforts because they had no money to invest and were not 
trained in entrepreneurial business techniques. Physicians also were well aware that most 
citizens were unable to pay for services. Medical professionals seeking to open private practice 
might also be caught in the web of requiring protection money to pay criminal groups. Schechter 
(2000) writes: "The majority of Russia's physicians are low-paid women who are unlikely to 
become private entrepreneurs. They are immersed in their state-sponsored positions and despite 
months of unpaid wages, they cannot envision leaving the system. Instead, many physicians 
work part time in the shadow economy or moonlight in order to survive" (p. 12). Twelve 
physicians that Schechter (2000) interviewed for her research all admitted to working in the 
shadow market, but they were reluctant to discuss what they did. 
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To support the hospital-intensive focus of the Russian medical system, medical training in 
the Soviet era and beyond was highly specialized and bureaucratic. Physicians by and large did 
not have the training of general practitioners. Schechter (2000) also suggested that inadequate 
medical training combined with the isolation of medical professionals from one another left the 
profession in a state of neglect. These characteristics disabled physicians as a constituency from 
providing leadership in reform . 
Estimating the incidence of AIDS 
Powell (2000) is one health researcher who believes that AIDS in Russia is a problem of 
manageable proportions that will soon be out of control. According to Powell, data issued by the 
State Committee on Statistics (Goskomstat) probably has greatly underestimated the actual 
number of infections, in part because of confusion over testing positive for HIV and incidence of 
full blown AIDS, poor equipment and lack of training in detection among the medical community. 
In addition, members of high-risk groups avoid being tested. Based on these limiting factors, the 
actual numbers of infections may be ten times that reported . 
The head of the Public Health and Epidemic Monitoring Department in June 1997 
expected that 800,000 to one million Russians would be HIV positive by the year 2000. As of 
June 1999, however, only 15,819 had been detected. Powell believes that Russia is at high risk 
for epidemic increases in HIV infection because of increased drug use and prostitution, 
commercialization of the blood donor system, lack of diagnostic equipment to test for the virus, 
and ignorance about the disease within the medical community. 
Powell's (2000) research into the history of HIV in Russia suggests that early government 
literature on the virus in the mid-1980s described it as the creation of the US military and CIA as 
part of a bacteriological warfare program that was being tested on such vulnerable groups as 
drug addicts and homosexuals. But some medical leaders recognized that Russia could be 
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vulnerable to the disease because of contacts with foreign countries and tourist flows and warned 
against sexual relations with foreigners . Some early outbreaks of AIDS occurred in hospitals 
among children as nurses used the same syringes or needles when immunizing children or 
during other procedures. Use of the same syringe or needle for multiple patients was routine 
during Soviet times. By 1996, with the sudden increase in drug use in Russia, the rapid 
expansion of AIDS was attributed to drug use practices. Concurrent with increased drug use was 
the increase in prostitution. The Moscow AIDS Center estimated that at least 10 percent of the 
50,000 prostitutes operating in downtown Moscow were HIV positive. 
Powell (2000) suggests that the possibility for rapid expansion of AIDS into the general 
population is high because of the relatively low use of contraceptives in Russia. One survey 
conducted in 1996 found that only 23.5 percent of Russian women said they or their partners 
used contraceptives . Another survey taken of 300 prostitutes found that 10 percent never used 
condoms and the rest used them only occasionally. It should be noted that low use of 
contraceptives is not a new practice in the last decade. According to Field (2000), the birth 
control of choice even in the last few decades of the Soviet era has been abortion . Almost 
without exception since 1970, official data from Russia reported that the number of officially 
registered abortions was two times the number of births. If unofficial terminations are taken into 
account, this number could be three or four times the number of births. 
Though not much is known about the status of HIV among the homosexual population in 
Russia, Powell (2000) notes that surveys taken found gays as aware as their counterparts in the 
West of the dangers of contracting AIDS. Another alarming source of diseases, prisons in Russia 
were expected to serve as an incubator for HIV in addition to other infectious diseases. 
Drug use and infectious disease in Russia 
Health and public officials have grown increasingly concerned about the increase in drug 
use and links between some infectious diseases. Kramer's (2000) research on drug abuse in 
Russia cited data from the Russian Federation Ministry of Health and other official health 
sources. Drug trafficking and drug use are believed to have increased dramatically in the past ten 
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years in the NIS for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the growing influence of the 
criminal element. Kramer (2000) cautions against drawing hard and fast conclusions about 
usage because of the illicit nature of the drug trade. One official report in Russia suggested that 
23 percent of reported cases of hepatitis B and 34 percent of hepatitis C involved intravenous 
drug abusers who were believed to have contracted their disease through shared syringes. More 
troublesome was the reported strong link between HIV, the precursor to AIDS, and drug use. 
Russian health officials have apparently reported that drug-related behavior accounted for more 
than 90 percent of all newly registered cases testing positive in 1997 and 1998. However, 
Kramer (2000) warned against drawing conclusions about sudden and sharp increases in 
infectious diseases among drug users. He noted official data between 1987 and 1995 that 
reported no registered drug addicts testing positive for HIV, while in 1996 two thirds of persons 
registered as drug addicts were also positive for HIV. Thus, some of the reported sharp increases 
in infectious diseases and drug use may be the result of new testing . 
Kramer (2000} also notes the difficulty of knowing the extent of drug abuse in Russia . 
Drug addicts are subject to compulsory treatment in prison-like facilities. This policy no doubt 
served as a disincentive for reporting drug addiction officially or informally in Russia. Moreover, 
all drugs were often listed as "narcotics" and all users "addicts," so the difficult process of sorting 
out comparisons between "hard" and "soft" drug use and "addiction" versus "dependency" did not 
exist in the official reports. As a result of the strong position against drugs in Soviet Russia , no 
comprehensive data on abuse that could provide a baseline for comparing current trends are 
available. 
Some data are suggestive for understanding the concern that the drug abuse problem is 
increasing in Russia. The Russian Ministry of Health reported that the number of individuals 
registered with medical institutions as drug add icts increased 400 percent between 1991 and 
1997, with considerable variation by region . At the beginning of 1998, the official number of 
addicts reached 82.4 per 100,000 population. Kramer (2000) states that medical institutions in 
1997 registered another 49 .5 persons per 100,000 population as abusing but not addicted to 
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narcotics. Health officials openly acknowledged that these data probably greatly underestimated 
the actual numbers of addicts and abusers. The federal ministry estimated that 500,000 to 
700,000 actual addicts existed in Russia in 1997, though the number who abused drugs was 
substantially higher. At the other extreme, one research study that appeared in lnformatsionnyi 
sbornik "bezopasmost" (December 1998) suggested that there were up to 11 million drug addicts 
in Russia at the beginning of 1998, or 7 percent of the total population. Surveys conducted on 
the subject suggest that widespread use of the black market was made to purchase narcotics. 
Kramer (2000) concludes that health authorities in Russia actually know little about the actual 
incidence of drug addiction and its relationship to infectious diseases such as hepatitis and AIDS 
and recommends caution in interpreting trend data. 
Kramer (2000) writes that limited data available on youth and illicit drug use in Russia 
suggest that the level of experimentation with narcotics has become substantially higher than in 
the United States. One survey among secondary and vocational students in Moscow reported 
that 44 percent of male students and 25 percent of female students used drugs or other 
psychoactive substances at least once. About 36 percent of this group did so more than 10 
times. Another Russian survey reported that possibly 9 percent of youth aged 10-18 in Russia 
could be drug addicted. Though this percentage may seem extreme, Kramer (2000) notes that 
reports of youths apprehended for drug-related crimes increased 12 times since 1996, and 25 
percent of teenagers apprehended were either intoxicated from alcohol or narcotics. 
World Bank risk factors described 
These trends in health care and health care delivery point to some of the reasons for the 
health crisis in Russia . However, other factors may be cited that also serve as indicators of the 
quality of life and health status of citizens in the Russia and in the rest of the NIS. World Bank 
(2000) data on some key risk factors are shown in Table 5-2 and are compared to those in the 
United States, Mexico, Indonesia, Kenya, France, China and Bangladesh. World Bank 
researchers suggest that a few key indicators are highly predictive of health risk, but they warn 
health data often are unreliable and incomplete even in countries with well-documented health 
Table 5.2 
World Bank Indicators 2000: Health Risk Factors 
N/S: 
Kazakhstan 
Russia 
Tajikistan 
Ukraine 
Other: 
Bangladesh 
China 
France 
Kenya 
Indonesia 
Mexico 
United States 
Prevalence Low Prevalence of child 
of anemia birthweight malnutrition 
babies 
Indicator 1 Indicator 2 Indicator 3 
%of 
pregnant 
women 
1985-99 
Weight for age Height for age 
' ""'""" ......... 
27 
30 
50 
.. 
53 
52 
35 
64 
41 
%of births 
1992-98 
9 
8 
8 
50 
6 
6 
16 
11 
8 
8 
% of children % of children 
under 5 under 5 
1992-98 1992-98 
5 8 
3 13 
56 55 
16 31 
.. 
23 34 
34 42 
.. 
1 2 
.. means data not collected or not available. 
Iodized salt Prevalence 
consumption of smoking 
Indicator 4 
%of 
households 
1992-98 
95 
30 
20 
4 
78 
83 
100 
62 
99 
.. 
indicator 5 
Males 
% of 
adults 
1985-98 
. --- --
67 
57 
60 
.. 
40 
38 
28 
Females 
% of 
adults 
1985-98 
. --- --
30 
22 
15 
27 
14 
23 
Cigarette Tuberculosis 
consumption 
Indicator 6 Indicator 7 
per smoker 
per year 
1988-98 
2256 
2471 
351 
3088 
1940 
4938 
Incidence 
per 100.000 
people 
1997 
11 
106 
87 
61 
246 
113 
19 
297 
285 
41 
7 
HIV 
Prevalence 
Indicator 8 
Prevalence 
thousands % of 
of cases adults 
1997 1997 
1 0.02 
241 0.05 
9 0.01 
49 0.43 
620 0.03 
2721 0.06 
11 0.37 
106 11 .64 
1606 0.05 
60 0.35 
15 0.76 
Number 
infected 
1997 .. 
40,000 
<100 
110,000 
21,000 
400,000 
110,000 
1.600,000 
52,000 
180,000 
820,000 
SOURCE: The World Bank (2000). World Development Indicators 2000. Washington, DC, World Bank. 
-.j:>. 
00 
149 
conditions with potentially serious implications for the health status of the population. 
Comparisons with highly developed countries and least developed countries serve as a point of 
reference for documented indicators in Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Ukraine, the selected 
republics listed in Table 5.2. 
Prevalence of anemia (Indicator 1) suggests deficiency in iron, the most common 
micronutrient deficiency globally, especially among women of reproductive age. Accurate data on 
anemia, however, are limited because only those who seek care are reported, and statistics from 
private clinics may not be included. Low birth weight babies (Indicator 2) suggest maternal 
malnutrition. Limits in reporting this indicator are that home births are seldom recorded in many 
developing countries. Prevalence of child malnutrition (Indicator 3) is measured by weight and 
height per age. Children who are underweight are at increased risk for death and adequate 
cognitive development. Stunted growth suggests the long-term, cumulative effects of inadequate 
health, diet or care. 
Iodine deficiency (Indicator 4) is the most important cause of mental retardation 
worldwide and contributes to stillbirth and miscarriage. Prevalence of smoking (Indicator 5) 
suggests the percentage of persons who smoke over the age of 15. Worldwide, one in three 
adults are smokers. Smoking is now known to be the cause of heart and other vascular diseases 
and cancers of the lung and organs. A long delay usually occurs between onset of smoking and 
disease. One in three persons who smokes is expected to develop medical conditions directly 
attributable to smoking. Related to prevalence is the number of cigarettes consumed per year 
(Indicator 6). Prevalence and level of consumption should be interpreted with caution since most 
data were obtained through surveys. Tuberculosis (Indicator 7) continues to be the single 
greatest cause of death in developing countries from a single infectious agent. Tuberculosis has 
surfaced in developed countries largely as a result of the cases that have developed among 
immigrants. Incidence is reported based on a ratio of case notifications. HIV prevalence 
(Indicator 8) refers to the rate of HIV infection in each country. Estimates of rates are based on 
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extrapolations from surveys of small, nonrepresentative samples and should also be treated with 
caution. 
In noting these statistics, nearly two thirds of males in Russia and Ukraine, the two 
republics that together comprise four fifths of the population of the NIS, smoke cigarettes, placing 
these populations at high risk for smoking related illnesses. Both republics continue to consume 
some of the lowest levels of iodized salt. The region does not appear to have high levels of child 
malnutrition, but this may in part be due to the continued high numbers of abortions conducted 
every year and to the extremely low birth rate. Prevalence of HIV infection in Ukraine (11 0,000) 
is listed as more than double that of Russia (40,000) in this study. As Powell (2000) has 
indicated, however, the federal Ministry of Health in Russia has estimated that actual HIV 
infection may be ten times that reported . Even magnifying these data by a factor of ten in Russia 
leaves the HIV prevalence rate in that republic well under that of the United States. The great 
cause for concern is that increased drug use using shared needles and even hospital practices 
such as lack of infection control on multiple-use syringes may create the conditions for 
exponential growth in HIV infection in the next few years. 
The trends in health care and health care delivery described in these pages suggest 
serious threats to the quality of life and well being of the Russian people. Russian citizens are 
now forced to pay for basic services that they expected would continue to be free even following 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Payment for services comes at a time when most citizens are 
hard pressed to pay for basic necessities, and inordinate amounts of the income of typical 
Russian citizens are being poured into basic medical care. A two-tier system has developed that 
caters to the very small minority of rich Russians who receive all the conveniences of modern 
medicine, and the much larger majority who are struggling for the most basic of services. Lack of 
capital investment in building, equipment and supplies has resulted in deteriorating conditions for 
the vast majority of hospitals. Some deterioration in the health system had already set in during 
the final years of the Soviet Union, and the struggle to redefine Russia in the last ten years 
exaggerated deficiencies in the old system. Stated another way, though one in five hospitals in 
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Russia today does not have running water, it is not clear how many of those hospitals had 
running water ten years ago. Thus, foreign assistance organizations intending to improve or 
reform the health care system in Russia have had to address the weaknesses of the old system 
as well as navigate through the rough seas of transition in the 1990s. 
Description of the Case Study 
The following section (Part II) describes the partnership approach of AIHA in the NIS, with 
particular emphasis on Russia, followed by selected stakeholder perspectives on the partnership 
approach to addressing health care change in Russia (Part Ill). The final section of the case 
study presents an evaluation of the AIHA partnership program as a policy tool in foreign 
assistance efforts in Russia (Part IV). Documentation on AIHA and its approach to foreign 
assistance has been drawn from AIHA's public documents, including evaluations; limited 
observations at selected AIHA partnership sites and interviews with key partnersh ip participants; 
and interviews with AIHA representatives in Washington, Russia and Ukraine between 1998 and 
2001 . USAID contributions to the research resulted from interviews with USAID personnel in 
Russia, Ukraine and Washington in 1998 and 1999. Stakeholder perspectives were limited to 
comments of AIHA and USAID personnel directly concerned with the specific partnerships 
highlighted in this study. 
II. AIHA and the Health Partnership Approach. 
The founding of AIHA. With headquarters in Washington , DC, the American International 
Health Alliance (AIHA) was established in 1992 as a not-for-profit corporation with the explicit 
purpose of providing technical assistance throughout the NIS and Central and Eastern Europe 
Countries (CEEC). Through a series of cooperative agreements with USAID, the AIHA has 
supported over 80 health partnerships between American and NIS and CEEC counterparts . 
According to AIHA documentation, over the last decade these partnerships have involved more 
than 100 U.S. hospitals and health systems and 40 medical and health professional schools in 25 
states. The partnerships are based on a voluntary model featuring peer-to-peer interactions, 
training and exchanges of health care professionals. 
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In entering into AIHA agreements, the counterparts agree to volunteer professional time 
to meet the specific objectives of any specific partnership. Equipment and supplies also may be 
donated as in-kind contributions to the partnerships. AIHA estimated that American partners had 
contributed about $140 million in time and effort and donated more than $25 million in supplies 
and equipment by July 2000. Partnerships not only included key professionals at each site, but 
also community leaders and educators. AIHA's (2000) public information briefs on partnerships 
noted that such exchanges allowed partners to be "exposed to practical, real-world problems and 
viable solutions applicable to the local environment, and not simply to theoretical approaches 
developed by visiting consultants" (p . ii). Such outreaches were intended to improve the quality 
of healthcare delivery and community-based services . 
Starting in 1992, USAID awarded successive contracts to AIHA to facilitate and manage 
these hospital partnerships. The partnerships program was managed exclusively out of AIHA 
headquarters in Washington, DC, until1996, when regional offices were established in Russia , 
Kazakhstan, Georgia and Ukraine to help in coord inating activity in the regions . AIHA offices in 
Washington and in the regions maintained close contact with USAID offices in Washington and in 
the republics , but were given relative freedom to execute the successive cooperative agreements, 
once funding was approved . USAID in Washington and in the regional missions could make 
suggestions to AIHA, but AIHA could choose whether to follow the advice of USAID officers. As 
one USAID representative stated it (August 1998), the AIHA cooperative agreement was known 
as a "hands-off' agreement. 
According to AIHA's (2000) public documents, typical partnerships begin with orientation 
meetings and assessment visits. US and NIS partners travel to each other's sites so that both 
parties understand each other's resources and potentially relevant programs. These trips enable 
partners to develop workplans , which are then submitted to AIHA for review and approval. 
Workplans include expected travel and training expenses, the mainstay of AIHA expenditures in 
the field . 
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A major expense of all partnerships is travel. In addition to its coordinating role in 
establishing partnerships, AIHA's central staff now approves travel plans and makes 
arrangements on behalf pf partners. Individual partnerships negotiate contributions from AIHA on 
an annual basis, based on expected travel and training workplans . A typical grant will range from 
$40,000 to $60,000 per year. Typical partnerships in 2001 were expected to last for three years, 
when the partners were expected to "graduate" from the intervention. Some American partners 
from previous years received multiple AIHA grants by establishing new partnerships at different 
locations. 
Year-to-year activity in the past has varied considerably from partnership to partnership. A 
single year's activity could mean as little as two or three exchanges, following completion of a 
needs assessment and development of a workplan, to several exchanges with additional training 
workshops, targeted surveys, and locally-sponsored community conferences. An example of a 
highly time-intensive one is the community-based primary health care partnership between the 
Milwaukee International Health Training Center and the Mtskheta-Mtianeti Regional Health 
Administration in the Republic of Georgia. According to AIHA (2000), the Milwaukee partners 
spent a total of 249 person days in Mtskheta, and the Mtskheta partners spent a total of 230 
person days on partnership exchanges in Milwaukee in 1999 and 2000. 
Focus of the partnerships 
Early partnerships largely focused on improving hospital-based health care delivery in the 
NIS and CEE, but the AIHA expanded its scope by the mid-1990s to health delivery organizations 
of various kinds as well as to educational institutions. Since October 1998, the partnerships have 
focused increasingly on community-based primary care, with some attention to education in 
health management and to infection control systems and policies. The partnerships since 1998 
were intended to promote such health reform measures as the reorientation toward primary care 
and improved coordination with other community-based social services. 
Many partnerships began as basic technical training and assessment exchanges, but site 
partnerships were encouraged to serve as exemplars in their communities and beyond . USAID 
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and AIHA representatives in the study often referred to the partnerships as "models" and "centers 
of excellence" deliberately formulated for possible replication in other local communities . 
Sometimes the partnerships themselves sponsored trainings that invited community-wide 
participation or that involved other health organizations. To enhance regional cooperation and 
exchange among the individual partnerships, AIHA sponsored a variety of cross-partnership 
activities, including supplemental tra ining programs, conferences, both large and small , and study 
tours . AIHA's effort to replicate and cross-fertilize successful programs increased from 1996 
onward, in part a response to criticism that the results of the program were too local. 
AIHA (2000) program descriptions noted five areas for funding in 2000 as follows : 1) 
Primary Health Care: Most partnerships participating in the AIHA project in 2000 were designed 
to enhance primary care services in a local area. The approach to primary care in a location, 
whether a health care center, a women's wellness center, or an emergency obstetrics center, was 
jointly decided following a preliminary needs assessment. 2) Health Management Education: 
These programs linked university programs in health administration at selected sites in the region 
to improve health care management training . Such partnerships currently existed in Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan . 3) Healthy Communities: This type of partnership tapped into the 
existing global Healthy Communities movement, the objective of which was to empower 
individuals and communities to take responsibility for their own health. One partnership 
established in Romania followed this approach, though many of the partnerships contained 
aspects of Health Communities objectives. 4) Emergency Medicine: One partnership in 
Uzbekistan in 2000 focused on a model regional urgent care system for possible national 
replication . 5) Infection Control: Two partnersh ips in 2000 focused on establishing infection 
control training centers, conducting research , working with database software, and improving 
laboratory standards. 
Figure 5-3 below shows the number of partnership programs in NIS republics in the year 
2000. In four republics, AIHA showed a regional presence with four to six sites in Russia, 
Ukraine and Armenia. In the remaining eight republ ics, AIHA had but one model site. A 
TABLE 5.3 
American International Health Alliance 
Partnerships 2000: New Independent States 
Type of Partnership 
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Number of Community Management Healthy Emergency Infection 
Republic Partnerships Primary Care Education Communities Medicine Control 
Armenia 5 4 1 
Azerbaijan 3 2 1 
Belarus 1 1 
Georgia 4 1 1 1 1 
Kazakhstan 2 1 1 
Kyrgyzstan 1 1 
Moldova 1 1 
Russia 7 6 1 
Tajikistan 1 1 
Turkmenistan 1 1 
Uzbekistan 1 1 
Ukraine 6 6 
TOTAL 33 25 3 1 2 2 
SOURCE: Compiled from American International Health Alliance (2000) . AIHA partnership briefs. 
Washington, DC: AIHA. 
breakdown by the kind of partner institution is shown in Table 5-4A (American partners) and 
Table 5-48 (NIS partners). These data show a marked trend away from hospitals as the sole 
focus of the partnerships. The US partners tended toward consortium or collaborative groups 
often linked with local medical schools. The NIS partnerships often linked health administration 
with ministries or national centers in working with polyclinics. It should be noted that a number of 
the partnerships involved more than one type of organization or agency that cooperated in the 
effort. The organizational complexity of the collaboration at times was quite high, especially in the 
numbers and kinds of cooperating partners in the United States. For instance, the partnership 
between Sarov, Russia, and Los Alamos, New Mexico, included a number of collaborating 
bodies. On the American side, the consortium of institutions involved 
Republic 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Moldova 
Russia 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan 
Ukraine 
Total : 
p artnerships 
5 
3 
1 
4 
2 
1 
1 
7 
1 
1 
1 
6 
33 
TABLE 5-4(A) 
American International Health Alliance 
Partnerships 2000 -Type of US Partner 
Type of US Partner: Collaborative/ 
College/ Consortium/ State/ Training Nonprofit 
University Med Center Hospital Groups County Center Organizatio 
2 1 2 1 
3 
1 
1 2 1 
1 1 
1 
1 
2 3 2 
1 
1 1 
1 
1 1 1 2 2 
13 2 2 12 3 3 
*US Partnerships that involve more than one independent unit other than a collaborative 
SOURCE: American International Health Alliance (2000). AIHA Partnership Briefs. Washington, DC: 
AIHA. 
Republic 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Moldova 
Russia 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Uzbekistan 
Ukraine 
Total : 
Partnerships 
5 
3 
1 
4 
2 
1 
1 
7 
1 
1 
1 
6 
33 
TABLE 5-4(B) 
American International Health Alliance 
Partnerships 2000 -Type of NIS Partner 
Type of NIS Partner: Collaborative/ Ministry/ 
School/ Health Polyclinic/ Community/ National Health City 
University Admin Hospital Groups Center Center Governmen 
1 3 1 
2 1 
1 1 1 
2 2 
1 1 
1 
1 
1 4 5 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 5 5 
5 18 12 6 
* Partnerships involving more than one type of health unit, such as a health department and a hospital. 
SOURCE: American International Health Alliance (2000). AIHA Partnership Briefs. Washington, DC: 
AIHA. 
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included the Los Alamos Medical Center, Los Alamos National Laboratory, State of New Mexico 
Department of Health, University of New Mexico School of Medicine, Los Alamos School District, 
and a variety of community-based nongovernmental organizations. One of the ten closed 
"nuclear cities" of Russia, Sarov partners included the Sarov City Duma, the Office of the Mayor, 
and the Medical-Sanitary Unit No. 50. Both cities also participated in the US Department of 
Energy-sponsored Nuclear Cities Initiative. Since Sarov was a closed city, access was gained 
only after careful bureaucratic permissions were provided. In 1999 and 2000, the partners 
reported four exchange visits, a three-day conference on Substance Abuse Prevention, and 
development of a youth risk assessment. 
The evolving concept of health partnerships in the NIS 
James Smith, the Executive Director of AIHA and one of its founders, reflected on the 
history of the alliance and on the health partnersh ip program in an interview in August 1998. He 
said that the idea of health partnerships was not new. Several partnerships were established 
through USAID funding in the early 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe as the United States 
launched the SEED program in that region . These health-based partnerships were individually 
administered by a single USAID project manager and each functioned independently from one 
another. Smith (August 1998) stated that partnersh ip at that time involved an institution in the 
United States-largely hospitals or medical schools-working with a like institution in that region. 
Each partnership targeted highly specific medical outcomes, such as reducing hypertension or 
lowering morbidity rates. 
As funding for the NIS was approved in 1992 and 1993, USAID decision-makers decided 
that they wanted to continue institution-to-institution relationships in the NIS region , but they 
looked for more cost-efficient and effective methods of delivering such programs. According to 
Smith (August 1998), USAID program leadership indicated that they wanted to start more 
programs, more quickly than had taken place in the Central and Eastern Europe region , where 
partnerships sometimes took two years to institute. USAID administrators also found the granting 
process to be cumbersome. They wanted to find a centralized vehicle to administer the 
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partnerships and some delivery mechanisms to provide opportunities for cooperation and 
exchange among partners. A new approach to partnerships in the region also appeared 
appropriate, since the region shared a common system. 
But Smith (August 1998) cautioned against viewing the implementation process of 
technical assistance in the NIS as a formalistic and highly strategic process. The AIHA position, 
articulated over time, was that policy development in any nation by and large evolved out of 
grassroots programs that were proven to be successful and then were adopted for broader use. 
Policy formulation and adoption thus was an informal process. This was dramatically illustrated in 
the NIS, where American foreign assistance policy-makers and program officers faced a highly 
ambiguous environment. As Smith noted, embassies were operating out of hotel rooms in many 
of the new republics . Steeped in recession in the early 1990s, the United States was not ready 
for the drastic change in the Soviet Union . USAID had evolved an expected way of doing things 
and of understanding client relationships, but the lessons of the past did not extend into this 
region . Smith (August 1998) stated : 
All of a sudden you're in half the world that didn't exist before, and you're there. 
It's a very different kind of half the world and your lessons don 't take you very far. 
Even association is baggage. You go into Russia and say, "Oh , I did this in 
Africa." Click off. Russians don 't want to hear that. They were doing 
development work in Africa as well .. .. You're going through an implosion of 
empire over there. It was a very tough, different kind of time for everybody-and 
people not even knowing what it was they were seeing. None of us knew what 
we were even looking at. 
Smith (August 1998) recalled that the beginning of the AIHA was inauspicious. USAID 
approached the American Hospital Association, hospitals and HMOs to participate in programs in 
the NIS, but found no one interested in taking responsibility in the region . The initiative for the 
partnership program actually started as an informal conversation among colleagues in health 
policy and government affairs . Smith (August 1998) recalled a five-minute conversation with a 
group of colleagues in 1992 that sat around and said, "Let's set up an organization and just do it. 
If everybody agrees to sit on the board, maybe we can work it out with USAID." Some of the 
initial group ended up dropping out of the board of the new organization, but this was the 
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beginning of the AIHA. Today the board consists of senior representatives of major hospital 
associations and health care alliances with ties to hospitals, health care systems, academic 
medical centers and physician group practices throughout the United States. Included on the 
board are representatives of Voluntary Hospitals of America (VHA), the National Association of 
Public Hospitals (NAPH), the American Medical Group Association, the National Public Health 
and Hospital Institute (NPHHI), the Association of Academic Health Centers (AHC), the 
Association of University Programs in Health Administration (AUPHA), the American Hospital 
Association (AHA), and Premier, Inc. 
Perhaps the key concept driving the mission of AIHA is volunteerism, the offer of technical 
assistance without compensation. Smith (1998) noted that volunteerism was an important 
component of the Central and Eastern Europe program as well. VHA, an association of 1 ,500 
hospitals, was involved in assistance to Hungary, and The Catholic Hospital Association was 
involved with orphanages in Romania. Such efforts were an integral part of the assistance efforts 
in Central and Eastern Europe, and they were largely voluntary efforts. The voluntary efforts of 
these trade associations and other medically-based groups were part of a growing interest in 
health trade organization in providing international assistance. The newly-formed AIHA board 
suggested to USAID that the main component of the new partnership program in the NIS should 
be volunteerism. 
Smith (August 1998) stated that USAID was at first skeptical of a program based on 
volunteerism, but that he believed the voluntary basis of the commitments in the partnerships was 
the secret of success of the program. Following discussions in 1992, USAID agreed to fund the 
new organization with a grant of $2 million of launch the partnership program in the NIS. Within 
two months, AIHA was up and running as an organization, and in the first year of the program, 
ten partnerships were established. 
But the need for grassroots development became the hallmark of the AIHA position on 
policy-evolution . In a response to an external evaluation of the AIHA partnership program, AIHA 
(May 1997) pointed out that systemic change required local change first to be successful. Few 
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assumptions operating in the American health care system could be "exported wholesale, without 
significant adaptation and adjustment to local social, cultural and economic environments" (p. J-
4). AIHA criticized the idea that top-down pol icy initiatives should receive funding priority in the 
future. Future change would come only through health care workers in the NIS who were able to 
think differently and create the kinds of changes the United States would like to see in health care 
systems more oriented toward "patients, markets, services, and results" (p. J-4) AIHA (May 1997) 
crystallized its position as an organization in this argument to the evaluators against the use of 
top-down policy approaches: 
While important components of the US government's assistance strategy, these 
approaches alone have proven to be ineffective in creating meaningful change. 
In our own country the policy process is, with very rare exceptions, incremental 
and evolutionary, reacting to specific problems and exposed deficiencies and 
building upon successful changes and adaptations at the local level. Rather than 
leading change, national policy almost always follows change: codifying, 
legitimizing, and promoting it. While it is true that the state of crisis in the NIS 
and CEE may require more rapid and radical reforms, to assume that the 
process of change will be fundamentally different in the NIS or CEE is at best 
wishful thinking. (p. J-4). 
Focusing on the health care delivery system 
Smith reflected on the focus on hospital delivery in the early phases of the AIHA Hospital 
Partnership Program. He noted the growing emphasis on community-based primary health care 
as the focus on increasing amounts of development aid throughout the world. He (August 1998) 
said, 'The idea was that if you did enough prevention and promotion and basic health care that 
somehow you didn't have a health care problem anymore, and the lack of recognition that once 
you solved that problem you just simply moved downstream to another problem and another 
problem." While the growing emphasis on community-based primary care was a legitimate effort 
in the international community, he noted a growing recognition in World Bank and others in the 
health community that focus on the tertiary side of health delivery-in particular hospitals-also 
needed attention . He added, "USAID by and large ignored that problem, as did the international 
community. The idea was really if you did anyth ing with a hospital, you were dealing with the 
devil." So in recognition of the importance of tertiary care in the stream of health care delivery 
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services, the AIHA launched its program with funding directed specifically toward hospital-based 
services. 
By necessity, AIHA also focused on low-technology solutions that would improve 
productivity and care . The partnership program was not established as an equipment-based 
agreement, and the sums provided to AIHA for training were relatively modest. The first 
cooperative agreement was slated for a mere $12 million. Thus, the alliance has provided very 
little support for equipment and supplies throughout its tenure in the NIS. American partners on 
occasion donated or purchased new or used equipment on behalf of the partnership. On rare 
occasions, NIS partners purchased equipment to enhance partnership activities. Given the 
continuing financial limitations of the health care system in the NIS, this greatly limited the kinds 
of activities possible to exchange since US health care delivery, particularly in hospitals, was 
heavily technology-dependent. Smith (August 2000) noted the "intuitive diagnostic skills" of NIS 
physicians that have been lost in American medical practice because technology has been 
interposed between the physician and the treatment. 
In selecting partners to participate in the project, Smith (August 1998) stated that AIHA 
looked for specific criteria from the partners. One criterion was that funding from AIHA to the 
partners "would be the last dollar," in other words, that the partners offered and agreed to conduct 
focused professional activities without compensation, in particular, peer-to-peer exchanges. 
These activities amounted to contributions in-kind from the partners. AIHA then would provide 
reimbursement, for the most part, for the travel associated with these contributions. AIHA looked 
for hospitals already committed to international service and rewarded them with additional 
funding . Close attention was paid to the kinds of activities that would be most suited to 
enhancing health delivery at the NIS sites which could be addressed through focused exchanges 
and training on a low-technology basis . AIHA's role, according to Smith (August 1998), was to 
figure out what supportive structures could be provided to enable partners "to do what they 
wanted to do." However, activities were limited by what was possible to do within the AIHA 
framework. 
162 
Smith (August 1998) acknowledged that most of the early hospital partnerships already 
existed at the time of initial funding. As AIHA's program became more defined over time, the 
organization focused more on what USAID wanted to do in the region and what opportunities 
existed that ought to be addressed rather than on providing support for preexisting relationships. 
Smith stated that in 1992 and 1993, he listened most to what his partners believed made sense to 
support: 'The early partners had more experience than anybody in the World Bank, anybody in 
any consulting firm. There's no consultants who understood what the health care delivery system 
looked like in the former Soviet Union . We're all still trying to figure it out." 
By 1994, after some experience in the region, Smith said that AIHA began working on its 
own partnership model and on developing efficiencies within the program to best support 
increasing numbers and kinds of partnerships. But even as the numbers of partnerships 
increased, AIHA held to its original emphasis on volunteerism. Smith (August 1998) believes that 
the difference in strategic intent between consulting and volunteering is critical to the success of 
the AIHA program. A consulting model was task-oriented, while the partnership model was 
relationship oriented. Smith contends that a paid consultant working on a project made 
relationships inherently unequal. A consultant who was hired to do a service could be resented 
by peers who must work on like tasks for less salary. Worse, many health professionals 
throughout the NIS were suffering through long disruptions in salary payments following the 
dissolution of the former Soviet Union. Consultants who are brought in to "fix" things quickly could 
be resented if outcomes did not measure up to initial objectives of the task. Smith (August 1998) 
added, "A consultant doesn't have to respect anybody. You get paid to do something. You are 
expected to be the expert. That's what you do." 
In contrast, the AIHA partnership model, based heavily on volunteerism, was intended to 
counterbalance some of the problems with consultancy. The AIHA partnerships placed particular 
emphasis on peer-to-peer relationships that were voluntary. Neither NIS nor US medical 
personnel were paid directly for their interactions and training. Smith stated that the volunteer 
partnerships model was best able to generate friendsh ips and respect among peers. Partners 
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might become frustrated with one another and have differences, but that did not mean they did 
not respect each other. The AIHA partnersh ip approach best supported equality through 
uncompensated peer-to-peer interactions. Partners would not be in the program unless they 
wanted to be. Smith (August 1998) stated, "Partnersh ips are not about health care in Russia . 
They're not about only health care in Russia . Only is really important. They're about how do we 
help Russians or Ukrainians, or whoever it happens to be." Another advantage to ongoing 
partnerships was that the partners have the opportunity to change their focus or enhance their 
activities over time. In contrast, consultancy efforts most frequently were short-term, highly task-
directed relationships . These differences, in the AIHA lexicon, made all the difference. 
AIHA's relationship to USAID 
With the formation of AIHA in 1992 as a nonprofit organization, AIHA became an 
independent contractor for USAID. Accord ing to Smith (August 1998), USAID was managing 
individual grants for several partnerships in Central and Eastern Europe. USAID officials 
managing the process in that region recognized that they wanted to have a different kind of 
mechanism for managing health partnerships in the NIS. He (August 1998) added, 
Part of this is something you have to understand about USAID as an 
organization, as separate from USAID ideology. As an organization, USAID has 
had a very difficult time moving money. The ability to execute has gotten 
progressively worse, I would argue, over time. Almost anybody will tell you that-
it's not a secret. It is a very difficult, cumbersome process in which everybody is 
risk averse. And there are a lot of reasons for it ... . the system has ground 
virtually over time to a halt. 
Smith (August 1998) also noted that when an organization such as USAID was "on the hot seat 
Congressionally," it became inward looking and spent all its time trying to protect itself. 
Smith described the tenuous nature of funding in the first five years of the program. While 
USAID's first cooperative agreement with AIHA, which was granted noncompetitively in an 
unprecedented move, was to extend over five years (1992-1997), Smith indicated that the actual 
commitment of funds year to year was not so clear. In fact, there was constant funding 
uncertainty. When AIHA established partnerships, USAID would come back and say, "Here, we'll 
give you a little bit more money." Smith (August 1998) stated that the first five years of the 
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program were based on this funding approach: "Here's a little bit, here's a little bit more. Here's a 
little bit more." Smith indicated that it was very difficult in this funding climate to think about 
developing the partnership model. At the same time, AIHA could not make longer term 
commitments to existing partnerships, because the funding level to AIHA itself was uncertain year 
to year. Even worse, AIHA had difficulty in establishing new partnerships since it was not clear 
how much funding would be approved or how long funding would continue. Thus, Smith stated 
that in the first five years the AIHA tended to continue with existing partners. 
The second cooperative agreement for partnership activity was awarded under 
competitive conditions in December 1998 to AIHA following an open request for proposals issued 
by USAID. Awarded for five years (1998-2003), the second cooperative agreement permitted 
what Smith termed as an "institutionalization" of the partnership model. Partnerships could be 
negotiated for three or four years with the idea of eventually "graduating" the relationship from 
reliance on AIHA funding. Ideally, the partnership would continue on its own resources or with 
funding from other sources. 
As funding continued from year to year, AIHA became increasingly specific about what an 
AIHA grant would support. Smith (August 1998) acknowledged that some friction arose over the 
"last dollar'' concept, since the partners were requ ired to offer something in return for funding . In 
one partnership, such support might be the offer of free office space in return for funding of a 
coordinative position . In another partnership, it might entail paying for a hotel stay for the 
volunteer exchanges if home stays were not available. On rare occasions, AIHA also supported 
what Smith termed as "coordinative burden." In some complicated partnerships that involved 
many types of activities and exchanges each year, the partners required administrative support to 
expedite such activities. Coordinative burden was handled differently from partnership to 
partnership, and this occasionally led to conflicts over perceived differences in funding levels. 
Smith (August 1998) stated that AIHA was probably one of few foreign assistance 
organizations that handled all travel centrally. AIHA made the decision to handle travel for its 
partners for a few reasons. One was that travel agencies in the United States were not 
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experienced in handling arrangements to different republics in the NIS. But Smith also believed 
that benefits could be gleaned from an in-house travel group by obtaining special rates and 
commissions on millions of dollars of tickets each year. Instead of providing actual funds for 
partners, AIHA made travel arrangements and provided tickets . Centralized travel also became 
the preferred solution after AIHA found the partners on both continents buying tickets on their 
own. Reimbursement requests would then be issued, sometimes long after the travel had been 
made. The AIHA staff in Washington found the decentralized accounting streams difficult to 
manage, and as a result moved toward a highly centralized system. 
By the late 1990s, AIHA-Washington central staff was systematically reviewing workplans 
submitted by partners. Following approval of the plan, the central staff made travel arrangements 
on behalf of the partners and issued the tickets . Smith (August 1998) noted that these 
procedures were different from organizations such as the International Research and Exchanges 
Board (IREX), which has served as an administrative vehicle to handle USAID's individual 
partnerships in other areas. IREX reviewed proposals submitted by potential partners and 
awarded direct grants. Partners were left to their own devices in following their proposed 
activities. Since AIHA supported cross-partnership activities, it acted as a more centralized organ 
than I REX. In fact, with each passing year, the AIHA became more centralized in its decision-
making. 
AIHA Regional Office Activities in Russia. 
Victor Boguslavsky, MD, Regional Director of the AIHA in Russia, was trained as a public 
health physician at Johns Hopkins University and has been with the alliance since May 1996. He 
was one of the regional directors hired in 1996 to coordinate the expanding partnership program. 
AIHA's office for serving Russia is located in Moscow, where a small staff coordinated the 
partnerships in Russia. Many of the original partnerships actually were located in Russia, but the 
AIHA has tended to distribute partnerships more widely throughout the NIS region in the last five 
years to align with US foreign assistance policy. 
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Boguslavsky (August 1999) stated that a major role of the regional office was to select 
Russian sites or institutions for the program. For the most part, requests for partnerships in 
Russia and presumably in other parts of the NIS came initially from the potential NIS partners. 
AIHA-Washington then solicited partnerships among US health and medical groups. US groups in 
turn solicited proposals among their members, and AIHA-Washington selected appropriate 
groups and tasks for the partnerships. The regional offices were responsible for making sure that 
the partnerships functioned in a way that generated results and met the objectives approved 
under the partnership workplans. 
Boguslavsky (August 1999) stated that, according to AIHA policy in the second 
cooperative agreement with USAID, workplans in 1999 were submitted yearly, though 
partnerships were typically three-year commitments, pending continuation of the cooperative 
agreement. Under the provisions of the cooperative agreement, AIHA regional offices were 
responsible for providing quarterly reports, financial reports, and programmatic reports. 
Boguslavsky (August 1999) also stated that the regional office completed a number of reports 
beyond those requested by the cooperative agreement. He reported that he tried to develop 
collegial relationships with the USAID-Moscow mission so that contacts at the mission would 
understand and support the program. 
He stated that the primary purpose of the partnerships has been to link health care 
institutions in the United States and in the Former Soviet Union to improve the quality and 
efficiency of health care services through such direct collaboration as exchanges and education . 
Through this direct access, AIHA expected that health care provision would be improved . The 
priorities for the second five-year grant awarded in 1998 were primary care delivery, maternal 
health, outpatient services, and quality of care through a variety of approaches, including 
evidence-based medicine. Though the AIHA started the initiative as a hospital and clinic program, 
the partnership program now has moved to the resources targeting to prevention rather than only 
to treatment. 
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These priority areas were negotiated between AIHA and USAID with close attention to the 
priority areas identified by the Health Committee of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. 
Boguslavsky (October 1998) reported that AIHA was invited to participate in this health group and 
to provide insight from the partnership perspective as well as to implement some of the initiatives. 
Boguslavsky (August 1999) indicated that he met periodically with the federal Ministry of Health in 
Russia to keep this body informed of partnership activity and to promote dissemination or 
duplication in the regions that were not yet involved in partnerships. He stated that he tried to 
bring the changes that were occurring at the local level to the attention of the federal Ministry who 
might be interested in the results. 
Boguslavsky (October 1998) stated that the cooperative agreement in effect as of 1998 
would focus on generating new partnerships, but that the AIHA would continue to support some 
existing partnerships through sustainability grants. He added, "The role of AIHA is to try to 
manage this balance to find the demand as well as best supply sources to meet the demand by 
providing good partners on the US side. The brokering role that AIHA plays here is a key 
element in the success of the partnerships." 
He stated that the partnership programs could evolve into service delivery models that 
could be duplicated region-wide . Some examples that have worked especially well in the past 
have been the schools of diabetes, the women's wellness centers, the infection control programs, 
and emergency medical services. AIHA also provided support to NGOs to enhance their role in 
implementing quality services. Part of the role of the AIHA was not simply to match partners, but 
to try to highlight those issues the partnership should most emphasize, to show those gaps, 
needs or issues where the partnership would be the most useful tool to address those issues. He 
cautioned against thinking of partnerships as model programs from the beginning. The 
components of the partnership objectives evolved over time and might be distinguished as a 
model over the course of the partnership. He added that many US professionals did not know 
about the health care system in the Soviet Union . Once they were informed through partnership 
activities, they were in a better position to refine their ideas into working models. 
168 
In highlighting some of the most extensive efforts of the first five years of the AIHA 
program, Boguslavsky (October 1998) discussed the Savior's Hospital partnership with Magee 
Womancare International and the Dubna partnership with La Crosse. Savior's Hospital became 
well-known in the early 1990s because of the partners' efforts to address women 's health issues 
at a time when few others did and because of its convenient location in Moscow. The Family 
Planning Center, later transferred into the Women's Wellness Center, addressed issues that 
affected breast cancer, domestic violence, contraception , STDs, drug abuse, an array of issues 
that concerned the health and well-being of women. He mentioned that other centers also 
existed in the partnership network in Russia , including Dubna, Stavropol and St. Petersburg. 
The Dubna-La Crosse partnership was quite comprehensive in the variety of services that 
could be presented for replications as models: the School of Diabetes, the School of Alcoholism 
Treatment, the Women's Wellness Center, the Home Care Program, and other services related to 
clinical area, including renal dialysis and card iovascular rehabilitation . Boguslavsky (October 
1998) suggested that the integrated primary care delivery system developed out of the Dubna 
model was health care reform in Russia: health care quality was improved and delivered at lower 
cost. He would like to see the integrated health delivery model developed in Dubna replicated 
throughout the federation . He noted that the diabetes initiative in Dubna had been replicated in 
six schools in the City of Moscow and in the surrounding oblasts . 
On the subject of health reform in Russia, Boguslavsky (August 1999) reflected on 
comments made at a two-day conference on health care reform in Dubna. The participants at the 
conference agreed that the definition of reform was a matter of definition. The development of 
new services and health delivery models could be considered a part of reform, and discussion 
focused a great deal on the financing of health care at the conference. But he acknowledged that 
health care reform was not a topic of public debate in Russia : clients of the health care system 
did not experience health care as a reform platform. He stated that the federal Ministry of Health 
had developed a document supporting health care reform in the direction of primary care and 
enhanced provider services, but that private health care services had developed very little in 
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Russia to date. He stated that the Russian people continued to believe that they should not be 
charged for services . Boguslavsky (August 1999) added, 
This gets into larger issues of the social contract. I don't think there was any 
renegotiation of the social contract here in this country for health . I think we've 
been hearing this all the time. The services are not free. If you come, you will be 
asked to pay for certain things . But it's not official. Some people have problems 
with that. They just feel, "Why should we pay for services if the constitution now 
declares that the health care services in the country should be given for free?" I 
think it's a part of the problem, because the basic law, the constitution, dictates 
that the services are free, but it's not free. People don't feel that they need to 
pay for the services, or the services shouldn 't be on a fee base. The majority of 
people probably believe that, especially in situations where there are delays in 
salaries and compensation, why would you need to pay a fee for service? 
Boguslavsky (August 1999) stated that the citizens of Russia needed to take responsibility for 
health and health care delivery by themselves and not expect the government to "take care of 
them." Part of this would come from greater promotion of health lifestyle behavior changes, 
aspects of health care reform that needed to be put in place. In contrast to increased healthy 
living, the decade had seen higher levels of tobacco use and alcohol consumption and increasing 
problems with STDs, among other issues. He stated that the public needed to be educated about 
healthy behavior changes and that local organizations were trying to help the Ministry of Health in 
making those changes. 
Boguslavsky (August 1999) stated that AIHA was advocating for reform "in terms of 
delivery models that could be replicated by the system here as cost-effective models." He 
pointed to the women's wellness centers, which focused not only on reproductive issues, but 
adolescence, cancer prevention, nutrition, menopause, drug abuse, and domestic violence. The 
federal Ministry of Health supported the system . This was not something arbitrarily inserted as a 
need into the system . The infrastructure for change was in place through the replication of 
existing models of women's wellness centers, developed and implemented to provide for the 
post-Soviet health care system. Women's consultation services, the term used in Soviet health 
delivery, has been enhanced with more and better services. Though the AIHA worked with 
hospitals and clinics that performed abortions as a matter of standard practice, Boguslavsky 
noted that abortion created its own health risks and was costly for the system to support. 
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Boguslavksy (August 1999) believed that the federal Ministry of Health and local health 
officials understood enough about reform to implement it in Russia. He hoped that the steps 
toward reform would be taken soon and that those steps would be communicated to the public. 
He suggested creating public debates to involve the public in the process of health care reform 
and to increase awareness of the conditions of change. He (August 1999) added, "Before you 
implement any decision, you need to discuss it with the public." 
As for his role in maintaining the partnerships in Russia, Boguslavsky (August 1999) 
stated that he helped the local partnerships to solve issues and misunderstandings, but that such 
interventions occurred infrequently because of the voluntary nature of the partnership program. 
An example of such an intervention occurred in the partnership between Savior's Hospital and 
Magee International in October 1998, in the midst of the financial crisis in Russia. Key members 
of the partnership program in Moscow informed Boguslavsky that the head of the hospital, Dr. 
Alexander Goldberg, was going to close the Family Planning Center at Savior's Hospital. 
Boguslavsky (August 1999) acknowledged that he was shocked to hear the news, since the 
partnership had such a high profile. He noted, "For political reasons it was not possible to close." 
To better understand the situation, Boguslavsky met with Goldberg a few days later. Goldberg 
informed him that the Russian Duma had passed a new law in 1997 on family planning services. 
The result was that the budget line for family planning services should be excluded from the 
budget for 1998. Following passage of the new law, the Health Care Committee of the City of 
Moscow issued a directive to close Family Planning Centers or to reorient them to other 
institutions. Goldberg began to act on this request. 
At the meeting, Boguslavsky proposed, and Goldberg agreed, to absorb the Family 
Planning Center services into the newly opened Women's Wellness Center to retain the services 
of the original center and to continue funding of such services. Boguslavsky (August 1999) stated 
that he encouraged the Russian partners to strive for "creative" solutions to problems of this kind, 
but he acknowledged that his exposure to analyze similar situations elsewhere gave him 
perspective for proposing the solution to the problem . He noted that the regional offices did not 
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get involved in issues between leaders in hospitals, but that he wanted to make sure that those 
issues did not affect the program and the commitments of the partnerships. 
How Partnerships Work: Two Examples 
Two partnerships in Russia are probably the best known and most highly visible of all the 
collaborations established in part through the AIHA in the 1990s. Both served as a showplace for 
American health approaches in Russia, and both continue to be active today, though funding from 
AIHA has ceased. One is the Savior's Hospital for Peace and Charity, the second largest 
hospital in Moscow, paired with Magee Women's Hospital , Pittsburgh , Pennsylvania, one of the 
foremost women's hospitals in the United States. The other is the health partnership that 
emerged out of the highly active sister city re lationsh ip between Dubna, Russia, located 90 miles 
north of Moscow, and La Crosse, Wisconsin . The Savior's/Magee Partnership was intended to 
improve health care through an American-based model of obstetrics and gynecology that was 
also sensitive to Russian needs. But Magee used the hospital setting at and its relationship with 
Savior's Hospital as a springboard to launch a series of ambitious outreach programs in Moscow 
and in 24 oblasts outside the city. The Dubna/La Crosse sister city relationship extended to every 
component of their respective communities-government, arts, education, and health. Early 
efforts were largely humanitarian , but the sister cities soon focused much of their subsequent 
activity on building an integrated health system drawn from American approaches for the City of 
Dubna. 
Both the Savior's/Magee and Dubna/La Crosse relationships were established prior to the 
startup of the AIHA cooperative agreement and the Hospital Partnership Program . In both cases, 
AIHA supplied training and exchanges in the areas targeted for the partnerships in tandem with 
many other activities. In some cases, multiple sources of funding were used to sponsor single 
activities or events. Other funding and in-kind contributions, both large and small, came from a 
variety of sources described in the following pages. In both relationships, however, the broader 
partnership activities must be noted to be distinct from specific AIHA partnership activities. The 
172 
latter partnership activities were primarily directed toward improving the delivery of health and 
medical services through training , with more limited funding in establishing technology interfaces 
(such as email) with colleagues, in supporting coordinative activities, and in purchasing small 
equipment. Increasingly, AIHA also provided enhancement activities such as regional 
conferences to promote learning among partners. 
Of these two relationships, the Savior's/Magee partnership first drew widespread political 
and media interest. Attention focused on the newly established Woman and Family Education 
Center at Savior's when First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton and First Lady Naina Yeltsin toured 
through the children's wing of Savior's Hospital and the education center in January 1994. 
Pictures of that event are shown in Figure 5-1 on the following page. Another high profile visit 
occurred in July 1994 as Jane Fonda observed a prepared ch ildbirth class in the education center 
with First Lady Naina Yeltsin and Alice Pickering, wife of the US Ambassador to Russia. Articles 
streamed out of the Washington Post, Philadelphia Inquirer, Los Angeles Times, USA Today, 
Moscow Times, and Moscow Tribune on the family planning clinic and education center. A short 
CNN/Lifetime television spot aired in Moscow focused on changing child birthing techniques 
emerging from the Savior's/Magee partnersh ip. The partnership became a showplace for a 
continuing series of official government vis itors throughout the 1990s, but especially between 
1992 and 1998. A small core staff was set up at Savior's Hospital to coordinate activities of the 
partnership, and the staff along with medical and nursing staff at the hospital, hosted educational 
tours through the premises on a regular basis. 
The Dubna/La Crosse partnership enjoyed a high profile within their own cities 
throughout the 1990s as a steady stream of exchanges took place and projects were launched in 
Dubna. The health partnership drew the attention increasingly of the US international assistance 
community, and the partnership was selected for larger grants and replication activities once core 
activities were established as successful. AIHA continued to offer sustainability grants to the 
partnership through 1999-longer than any other partnership-to allow for tra ining and 
exchanges that could bring about new approaches to the health services provided in Dubna. 
FIGURE 5-1 : Above, Attending a birthing class at Savior's Hospital in Moscow in January 1994. 
Below, from left to right, Irma Goertzen, President and CEO of Magee Women's Hospital ; First 
L;:jdv Hillary Rodham Clinton; and First Lady Naina Yeltsin . 
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By the late 1990s, the partnership at Dubna drew national attention from a variety of 
sources, and AIHA promoted Dubna as the most integrated example of health reform in Russia. 
Sister Cities International honored the La Crosse/Dubna relationship as Best Overall Program in 
1999 for activities documented in the previous years. In a front-page article entitled "A fit city 
offers Russia a self-help model," The New York Times (Zuber, 31 December 2001) featured 
Dubna's health system as a possible model for Russian communities. The article noted that the 
city had eliminated nearly one third of its hospital beds, lowered medical costs and offered 
comprehensive health services, based on American approaches to health care delivery. The 
article appeared as the last in a series on health care trends in Russia. This was followed with a 
segment on CNN that aired in January 2001 in Russia, describing the community's successful 
health practices as a model for the federation. 
Example One: 
The Savior's/Magee partnership: Advancing the practice of obstetrics and gynecology 
Tanya Ozer, the first director for Magee Womancare International though no longer at 
Magee, reflected on the history of the partnersh ip in interviews in 1998 and 1999. Ozer, whose 
family is originally from the NIS and is fluent in Russia, engaged the leadership of Magee 
Women's Hospital, including Mary Zuger, Vice President of Community Affa irs and Government 
Relations, and Irma Goertzen, President and CEO, in the effort to bring Magee's comprehensive 
model of women 's health care to the NIS. With the sanction of the leaders and the board of 
Magee Women's Hospital , the outreach branch for global efforts was launched as Magee 
Womancare International in 1992. Ozer (August 1999) noted that financial support for these 
outreach activities was not drawn from revenues from the main hospital. According to Ozer, the 
first grant-writing activity of the new global outreach program was a proposal to World Learning, 
at the time under cooperative agreement with USAID to fund health initiatives of private voluntary 
organizations in the NIS. Magee subsequently was awarded a $540,000 grant to bu ild a network 
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of independent women's health education centers throughout the federation. The next step was 
an application to the newly-formed AIHA for partnership status. This began a series of training 
and sustainability grants from AIHA that lasted until 1999. Ozer indicated that AIHA accounted 
for about one fourth of partnership activity between Savior's and Magee. 
Ozer (April 1999) stated that the initial , core partnership with Savior's hospital focused on 
the advancement of an obstetrics/gynecological model. The primary function of the core 
partnership consisted of exchanges and training . President and CEO of Magee Women's 
Hospital, Irma Goertzen (1994) reported that more than 1,000 clinical hours were exchanged in 
obstetrics and gynecology in the first 21 months of the project. More than 80 Russian 
professionals were trained in the family-centered childbirthing techniques promoted at Magee 
Women's Hospital. Training sessions also were held on infection control techniques for 100 
Russian professionals . An estimated 400 hours were spent in developing an administration 
model to strengthen the system at Savior's and other Russian hospitals. Publications on 
pregnancy, conception, family planning, breast self-examination, and other women's health 
issues were developed and distributed. None of the professional trainers were compensated, 
except for travel and expenses. 
Ozer stated that the administrative component of the partnership became an important 
issue only after the partnership was formed, when Magee partners realized that Russia lacked 
models for on-site administration and structure to replace the Soviet models, whether in the clinic 
or the hospital. Without instituting concurrent management principles for reform , Ozer (April 
1999) said, "The rest of it kind of falls apart." She also noted no system of negotiation or strategic 
planning suited to developing new approaches: 'The strategic planning is these goals that are five 
year plans based on Stalin five-year plans-that are only kind of pipe dreams." With little 
decentralized planning possible in the Soviet era, hospitals did not engage in strategic planning 
as Western organizations understood it. Strategic planning was seen as nothing more than "an 
exercise, a political exercise," probably beyond the control of individual hospitals in the Soviet 
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Union . Magee participants in the partnerships worked with their Savior's colleagues to set 
concrete, outcome-based goals throughout the partnership. 
Distinguishing features of the partnership are noted in Figure 5-2 below: 
Figure 5-2: 
FOCUS ON THE SAVIOR'S/MAGEE HOSPITAL PARTNERSHIP 
Highlights: 
o Magee Women 's Hospital in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Savior's Hospital for Peace 
and Charity in Moscow, Russia, agreed to cooperate as a hospital partnership in 1992. 
Within months, Magee and Savior's became one of the first partnerships supported 
through the AIHA cooperative agreement. Magee received training funds from AIHA 
between 1992 and 1998. 
o Strategically located in the City of Moscow, the partnership 's Family Planning Center and 
Education Center became a showplace for visiting dignitaries and government officials. 
The program developed an especially visible profile in January 1994, when First Ladies 
Hillary Rodham Clinton and Naina Yeltsin visited a prepared childbirth class at the 
education center and the children 's wing of the hospital. In July 1994, Jane Fonda 
accompanied Naina Yelstin on a tour of the Family Planning Center and participated in a 
prepared childbirthing class. 
o As a condition of the initial partnership, the Russian government agreed to renovate the 
birth house attached to Savior's hospital. The initial intent of the birth house was to 
specialize in treating women with heart problems who were pregnant. Obstetrical and 
gynecological training associated with the AIHA partnership was to be directed toward 
the services offered at the birth house. Reconstruction of a more modern birth house 
began, but continuing financial problems led to long delays in the work. This led to 
tensions in the partnership that lasted for several years. The birth house was finally 
opened in the late 1990s. 
o Within two years of the partnership (1992-1994), Magee Women 's International reported 
that Savior's Hospital received a $3-mi//ion in-kind contribution in the form of medical 
equipment from the US State Department's Operation Provide Hope. Magee reported 
another $900,000 from in-kind funding and private sector donations, and $40,000 from 
individuals and corporations. By Spring 1996, Magee reported more than $5 million in 
grants and in-kind donations had been raised for the Magee/Savior's partnership. 
o To service the increasing outreach activities of the partnership, Magee Women 's 
International, a nonprofit branch of Magee Women 's Hospital, was established and 
organized with a small staff in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, at the site of the main hospital. 
Tanya Ozer, a former Carnegie Mellon business professor who was instrumental in the 
establishment of the partnership, became the first director of Magee Women 's 
International. A small office with supporting staff was set up at Magee in Pittsburgh. In 
addition, Magee established a nonprofit organization in Russia and operated out of one 
wing of Savior's Hospital in Moscow. AIHA provided limited financial support for the core 
staff at Savior's, one of the rare times that the alliance extended funding for 
administrative costs. The coordinative staff included one full-time administrator and four 
or five Russian health/medical trainers, all funded through the grants developed for the 
partnership. Savior's Hospital did not charge overhead for use of the space as part of the 
hospital's in-kind contribution to the partnership. This on-site coordinative presence 
continues into 2002. 
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o Though the Magee partnership directed many of its efforts toward the enhancement of 
Savior's services, the nonprofit organization established and staffed at Savior's soon 
began ambitious outreach projects in women 's health education and family planning 
clinics into many oblasts in Russia. These outreach efforts were funded by large grants 
from such organizations World Learning (under cooperative agreement with USA/D), 
USAID and Soros Foundation. However, in part because of Magee 's strong ties with the 
local business community, Magee Womancare International began to tap the corporate 
community for funding. Dozens of corporations and service organizations provided 
donations and contributions to the effort over the years of the partnership. Some notable 
sponsors such as Avon, UPJOHN, Johnson & Johnson either provided products and 
services for Magee Women 's Hospital or were centrally located in Pittsburgh. 
o Magee staff interviewed for the study noted the difficulty of working in the volatile 
economic and political environment in Moscow throughout much of the 1990s. Federal 
health ministers and city health officials supported different objectives and tended to 
survive only for brief periods in their positions. Differences of opinion between city and 
federal officials led to tensions and squabbles. Continuing financial difficulties in Russia, 
culminating in the financial crisis of August 1998, strained the resources of the 
federation 's health budget. Savior's Hospital and Magee Womancare International each 
suffered setbacks during this period for different reasons. 
o By spring 1999, Magee Womancare International estimated that 250,000 health 
professionals, administrators, clients, and students had been reached through 
participation in professional training, conferences, clinical services, or educational 
activities in Moscow and in 24 oblasts outside of the city. 
An informal "map" of the broader partnersh ip activities is featured in Figure 5-3 on the following 
page, depicting many of the parties and organ izations that contributed to the partnership. 
Though the core partnership consisted of the obstetrics and gynecological model , Ozer 
(April 1999) stated that there were actually three components of the partnership. One was 
women's health education, which focused on family-centered childbirth, but also branched into 
adolescent and older women's health as well. The second component focused on obstetrics, in 
training physicians and nurses in safer, more compassionate models of obstetrics care. Th is was 
considered the core partnership between the hospitals, and the area in which AIHA contributed 
most to training and exchanges. The third component focused on the philanthropic health care 
sector, or the voluntary sector, as it related to women's health care . Magee established the 
Woman and Family Foundation, believed to be the first of its kind in Russia, as a Russian-based 
nonprofit foundation whose main purpose was to ra ise funds for Savior's and other women's 
health care activities . 
Ozer (August 1999) suggested that the broader objective of these components was to 
support the process of democracy in Russia for women. Democracy in women's health care was 
FIGURE 5-3 
Partnership Between Magee Womancare International, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and Savior's Hospital 
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the ability to demand options and to demand different types of care. It was defined as "women 
wanting better things and opportunities for their health and their family's health. The process 
changed the way women felt about their bodies. Women were no longer acted upon; they could 
demand." Ozer believed in this sense that the broader partnership was helping to build 
democracy in Russia . 
Component One: Health Education. Ozer (April 1999) stated that the strongest 
component of the partnership was the education component. This component included activities 
at Savior's education center, which provided educational services for thousands of clients in the 
Moscow area, as well as major outreach programs in health education, family planning and 
community development in the oblasts outside of Moscow. Table 5-6 provides a breakdown of 
major outreach activities, all of which were obtained through grant requests independent of AIHA. 
Ozer stated that each year since 1996, without USAID funding, Magee Womancare 
International has held annual conferences from outreach activities in rural Russia to enable the 
Russian health professionals to talk about what their colleagues have done and what they have 
learned since the project was instituted in 1992, even though it has not been funded since 1996. 
USAID/ 
Cooperative 
Agreement 
with World 
Learning 
USAID 
Soros 
Foundation 
Corporate 
Donations 
United Nations 
High 
Commission on 
TABLE 5·5 
Major Outreach Activities of Magee Womancare International 
1994-1996 
1992- $540,000 Called the "Rural Outreach to Russia" project, the grant 
1996 was used to developed a network of 24 independent 
women's health education centers in throughout the 
federation. Activities included training health 
professionals in consumer education, training-the-trainer, 
education center design and management, and 
fundra ising and community involvement. 
1995 $100,000 Beginning in July 1995, Magee Womancare International 
$250,000 launched a Russian Womancare Clinic Network in July, 
1955. Nineteen of the women's health education centers 
N/A launched in the Rural Outreach to Russia project were 
selected for training in modern contraceptive technology 
and in appropriate counseling and consumer health 
education . The initiative was intended to train additional 
1995- N/A This project was intended to supply family planning 
1996 services to the refugee population living in camps outside 
of Moscow. Refugees were refused access to the 
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Refugees/ Moscow health clinics because they lacked a permanent 
Equiliber residence or a Russian passport. The Magee-Savior's 
Organization/ Family Planning Clinic allowed clients to access the 
AESOP Center clinic's service with no identification . Women received 
individual consultations, exams and free contraceptives . 
Magee was later asked to provide training in women's 
health clinical models to Russian health care providers 
who served the refugee population. By March 1996, 
Magee worked in cooperation with UNHCR to provide 
medicine and medical supplies to refugees and 
coord inated outpatient and hospital care for an estimated 
800 refugees. 
SOURCES: Magee Womancare International newsletters from 1994-1996. Also, Zahniser, M. 
(Fall1996). Medical support for refugees stresses innovation and collaboration . Surviving 
Together. pp. 46-48. 
The women and family educators formed a national NGO in Russia, the Russian 
Association of Childbirth Educators, and the association continued to meet. Magee served as a 
catalyst in helping the association find funding for women's health care across the system, 
including such topics as domestic violence. Ozer (August 1999) stated that the network of health 
educators established through the World Learning grant had been empowered through the 
outreach projects. She looked for what she called "sparks," community leaders in the health field 
who could carry out their mission even though they did not have an office to work in or even when 
they may have their jobs threatened. She added, "It is the one component that I put my 
professional reputation on the line to say that that is a realized infrastructure and a sustainable 
model." 
Component Two: Obstetrics and Gynecology. The second component, the core 
partnership based on the Magee model of safer, more compassionate obstetrics, encountered 
more obstacles. For this aspect of the partnership, Magee actually established two sites. The 
main site was at Savior's Hospital , but an additional training site was set up at birth house #8 in 
Moscow, located about 15 minutes from Savior's. Ozer stated that AIHA funds were critical in 
executing the second component of the partnersh ip. The chief physicians and midwives in both 
hospitals were trained at Magee with AIHA funding, and Magee medical and nursing staff traveled 
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regularly to Moscow to deliver training and to interact with their colleagues in Moscow. In 
addition, Magee sponsored city-wide and national conferences for safer obstetrics. Another 
significant accomplishment Ozer cited that evolved out of this component was that Magee's 
protocol for prepared childbirth, including the Lamaze Technique taught as part of clinical training, 
was documented with the help of Russian educators and included in the national medical protocol 
used by the Russian Ministry of Health. One major obstacle to meeting the objectives of the 
second component of the partnership was the long delay before the completion of the birth house 
at Savior's Hospital. The Russian government had offered to renovate the birth house at Savior's 
Hospital as a condition of the partnership in 1992, a $2 million in-kind contribution. Renovations 
were started, but long delays occurred as the health budget and one financial crisis after another 
hit the city and the federation. Delays in completing the birth house created tensions between all 
parties in the partnership. Much of the obstetrical and gynecological training which AIHA 
sponsored was initially intended to serve the new birth house. Instead, partnership participants 
adjusted to space in the gynecology department at Savior's, a hospital composed of several 
buildings. 
According to Ozer (August 1999), the birth house was completed in 1998, with about 30 
percent of the equipment supplied by the city government. Other equipment was donated by a 
variety of sources, including Magee Women's Hospital. But by the time the birth house was 
completed, the medical landscape in Moscow had changed . Ozer explained that the city was in 
dire need of an updated birth house when the plans were drawn up in the early 1990s, but that by 
the late 1990s the need was no longer urgent. The first floor of the birth house, which had been 
renovated earlier, served as the women's and family education center. The Family Planning 
Clinic also worked out of the remodeled birth house long before the renovations were completed. 
In a twist of irony, the Family Planning Clinic and Education Center started under the 
partnership were absorbed into the main structure of Savior's Hospital within the general 
gynecology department in 1998. City government in Russia did not allow Savior's to experiment 
with charging fees to clients, and family planning was taken cut of the health budget for 
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reimbursement. So Savior's Hospital administration placed these activities under the typical 
services offered through the hospital since Savior's continued to rely heavily on government 
funding to sustain its continually underfinanced clinical services. This intervention occurred with 
the help of the AIHA regional office, when the chief physician of Savior's Hospital, moved to 
dissolve the family planning clinic and education center in 1998. 
Component Three: Philanthropy. Magee Womancare International established a 
nonprofit foundation at Savior's to raise external monies for "safer, improved obstetrical practices 
at Savior's birth house." But the foundation soon branched out to include obstetrical institutions 
or schools in need of funding . Ozer acknowledged that the activities of the foundation were not 
completely understood by the medical leadership at Savior's, including Dr. Alexander Goldberg, 
MD, Chief Physician at and President of Savior's and Dr. Vadim 0. Lopukhin, Chief Obstetrician 
at Savior's, both leaders in the partnership. Given the continuing severe financial constraints of 
the hospital, they were not clear as to why the foundation raised funds to improve obstetrics in 
general rather than specifically at Savior's. They also did not understand why the foundation 
offered reimbursements to go to conferences when the hospital itself was underfunded in virtually 
all areas. Ozer maintained, however, that the growth of the model in the hospital was for the 
senior staff at Savior's to see that the hospital was "more than just the four walls in which it was 
geographically situated" and that senior physicians could be involved in community work that 
extended beyond Savior's. Small amounts of corporate funds had been raised by the foundation, 
but the financial crisis in 1998 made fundraising in any sector very difficult. 
Stress factors on partnership activities: Ozer (April 1999) and other Magee staff noted a 
number of stress factors that created obstacles for the partnership. One was the low priority 
given to improving health care delivery in both the city government and in the U.S. foreign 
assistance efforts in Russia . The fact that the Ministers of Health understood that Moscow had 
too many hospitals further decreased the emphasis given to Savior's and other hospitals in the 
health ministries. 
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Another stress factor was that Moscow's city and federal health ministers clashed over 
budgets, policies and implementation strategies. Ozer (April 1999) found city government to be 
arbitrary-"a lot more tangled, a lot more energetic, a lot more slippery, a lot more shifting" than 
the federal Ministry of Health, which she found to be "the more gentle one." Savior's hospital was 
a city-governed municipal hospital , so it came under the jurisdiction of city government, but 
outreach activities and some Savior's programs involved the federal Ministry of Health . City 
Ministers of Health and their deputies appeared to change "quarterly," leaving a very tentative 
environment, in which it very difficult to know "what side to play on." Dr. Goldberg, who served as 
president of Savior's throughout the duration of the partnership , had to survive the ebbs and flows 
of different ministerial beliefs and practices. If the city government was anti-American , Ozer said , 
Goldberg was "able to hide us well ." If the city government turned pro-American, Goldberg would 
trumpet the partnership. Ozer (April 1999) stated that the federal Ministry gave support 
infrastructurally to 70 percent of the projects at Savior's, and those projects, with or without 
funding, prospered . One such project that came under the jurisdiction of the federal Ministry of 
Health was the 25 health education centers opened in different oblasts throughout the federation. 
The financial crisis in August 1998 became another major obstacle to the partnership and 
left in its wake a number of unfortunate consequences. Ozer (April 1999) stated that many 
people expected the financial crisis because they knew that the economy in Russia had been 
artificially buoyed: 
In my personal experience, people were hopeful , but they also felt that they were 
being lied to, that the banks were lying to them . There had been little mini-crises 
. .. before it hit that kind of national , international impact level. I think most 
people realized that the infrastructure wasn't forming quickly enough, that the 
government certainly wasn't self-sustaining, that the financial system at the 
banks wasn't working , that the ruble was being held in inflation and it wasn't an 
actual economic reality. So I think that none of us were terribly surprised because 
we had had little things happen all the time. We couldn't get money out of the 
bank for a good year before the crisis hit. They didn't have enough money to 
give us dollars. They said , "Come back next week ." You had a sense that things 
weren't going well , that this is not a western model at work. I think in the 
American media, we've underplayed the seriousness of their economic 
dissolution . 
-I' 
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Ozer noted that a downshift in fund ing occurred at a number of levels that were still 
depressed nearly a year later. She believed that international fund ing organizations, including 
USAID, decreased funding levels at this point, especially to non-prime contractors like Magee, 
anp no one else had grants large enough to subcontract to Magee. Ozer said that for the first 
time since she started working on partnership activities, she did not feel as though she had 
"access to US government funding , even though for the past five years of that partnership we've 
been the tourist spot in Moscow for Senators and Congressmen and Mrs. Clinton and anyone 
visiting from assessment groups .. . . It's been very difficult." Since Magee was a non-prime 
contractor, one of the "little guys who just tried to make something last," Ozer (1999) related that 
once the funding levels decreased, Magee "kind of sat outside the table." 
As a health care institution rather than a development organization, Magee sought and 
found corporate sponsors for videos, brochures and educational materials, when such sponsors 
saw the value of keeping the consumer healthy wh ile enhancing their corporate name. That was 
what kept the partnership afloat in 1998 and 1999. But even with Magee's long-term, measurable 
successes with the partnership, Ozer found corporate sponsorship decreasing as well for a 
variety of reasons. One was that many American investment companies pulled out of Russia 
shortly before or after the crisis, and this left less corporate interest in Russia. A second reason 
was that corporate funding tended to follow government-sponsored fund ing . Ozer said, 
"American investment companies like to feel that they're on the side of the US government when 
they're working abroad, and they're part of the State Department's agenda." Even small seed 
grants from USAID enabled Magee to leverage matching grants and other contributions from a 
variety of sources, both philanthropic and corporate . Conversely, when the funding from USAID 
ar]d AIHA ended, this leveraging was no longer possible and the partnersh ip was not perceived in 
the same light without government funding. 
Political crises in the late 1990s also contributed additional stressors on the relationship. 
During the time of the Serbian War and Kosovo incidents, Ozer (April 1999) understood that it 
wa~ "all American projects out. No more visas. No more support." When a determination was 
made that Russia could not hold a stance that ran counter to NATO agreements, the city 
government in effect said , "Okay, projects don't really have to go away, but they can't be 
supported in any way, shape or form." Ozer referred to the environment in Moscow as a 
battleground . 
Stresses on the partnership at Savior's Hospital . 
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Pamela Deligianis , the American Field Administrator for the Magee-Savior's Hospital in 
Moscow in 1998, echoed some of Ozer's perceptions and concerns from her perspective as a 
field staff person for the partnership. In interviews in May and October 1998, she pointed to the 
uncertainty of the environment at Savior's. In May 1998, the time of the first interview, she stated 
that all funding for Magee Womancare International at Savior's was slated to end in September, 
four months away, though further grants were pending. She stated that she was in contact with 
AIHA Regional Director Boguslavsky at least once a week, often to arrange for visitors to the 
Savior's site. Tours through the site demanded considerable professional time from the staff, 
both administrative and medical. Dr. Lopukhin, Chief Obstetrician at Savior's and the chief 
spokesman for the project, privately complained about the number of visitors to the site. 
Deligianis (May 1998) noted that the Russian health and medical staff complained that 
they saw a lot of grants and money come through the center but never seemed to see any of the 
it. Ms. Deligianis understood that the official salary for physicians at Magee in 1998 was $100 per 
month. A midwife made an estimated $70 per month. Medical professionals were by this time 
accepting additional fees for services to supplement their official salary, but continued to earn low 
salaries. According to Deligianis (May 1998), Dr. Lopukhin wanted some partnership fund ing to 
increase medical salaries, to make the new birth house a more pleasant environment, and to 
purchase occasional equipment. Deligianis also stated that she heard complaints about the 
trainings and the travel. Frustrated with th is pattern of philanthropy with the partnership , he would 
say, "We don 't need any more trips to America . I'm sick of th is tourism . Where's my equ ipment?" 
Deligian is, who was fluent in Russian but whose background was not in health 
administration or medicine, also pointed to continued differences in practice with the medical staff 
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that were not part of the Magee model of safer, kinder obstetrics. Lopukhin and other Russian 
doctors continued to prescribe alternative medicines concurrently with standard prescription 
drugs. Deligianis (April 1998) recalled an incident in the family planning clinic a few weeks before 
in which two American women came to the family planning clinic for treatment. One of the 
Americans could not understand why the Russian doctor who treated her did not answer her 
questions, and the Russian doctor did not understand why the patient was asking so many. The 
other female American client, who spoke Russian well , requested treatment for multiple STDs. 
The doctor at the clinic prescribed antibiotics, immune drugs to boost her immunity, and allergy 
drugs, a total of six drugs. The American client later called the manufacturer of one of the drugs 
to find out information about her STDs. The manufacturer responded that the dosage had been 
six times the recommended level and in turn called the American Chamber of Commerce, who in 
turn called the Magee field office, questioning the prescription. 
Deligianis (May 1998) pointed to other environmental stresses on the partnership. She 
noted the tension between the federal Ministry of Health and the city Department of Health. Laws 
recently passed affecting the health field also seemed to be working against reform. One was a 
law passed in Russia requiring corporations to pay taxes on donations to foundations . If a 
corporation were to donate funds to the Women's and Family Foundation at Savior's, the 
foundation would be required to pay a 35-percent tax on the donation. One way the foundation 
began to raise money was to start a membership system to the clinic and the education center, 
an indirect form of payment system. Yet another issue had arisen with the United Nations-
sponsored refugee project. On April 15, 1998, according to Deligianis, a local district governor 
stopped a local polyclinic from taking more fee-for-services through an insurance company and 
closed down the refugee project at that site. The government closed it down because it was not 
legal to accept fees for services. Several other polyclinics in Moscow had been closed down for 
similar reasons and others were waiting for letters to stop their activities. 
The uncertainty in the environment continued into the fall of 1998, as the final crisis in 
Russia took a toll. Deligianis and other partnership staff appealed to Boguslavsky to stop the 
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closing of the family planning clinic, when such services were no longer included in the health 
budget. The problem was that Dr. Goldberg had failed to explain the reason for the impending 
closing to the partnership staff. Complaints among the medical staff at Savior's continued , now 
with increased financial duress to the hospital , since many people could no longer afford to pay 
for medical services and patient load had dropped dramatically. 
In spite of these tensions, Deligianis (May 1998) pointed to the continuing enthusiasm that 
Magee demonstrated even six years into the partnership. She believed the biggest success of 
the partnership was the 25 health education centers and clinics established in the rural regions of 
Russia . The health professionals for these centers came to Moscow for training for about two 
weeks, and then went back to their cities to open centers. Contact with Magee continued, despite 
the lack of funding after 1996, through faxes , em ails, occasional visits, telephone calls, yearly 
conferences and newsletters. Deligianis (May 1998) observed, 
Part of the reason that they have been successful ... is the centers, the regions 
out there, were not sort of babied and coddled and cooed over. They were given 
the information. They were given support when it was asked for. They were not 
told how you have to do it there. They were given advice . . . in how to organize 
the NGO and to sustain themselves , in administration, and somewhat in medical 
as well. 
Dr. Vadim Lopukhin . Chief Obstetrician , reflects on the Savior's/Magee partnership 
Dr. Lopukhin (May 1998) stated that the Savior's/Magee partnership took two to three 
years to reach a level of mutual understanding. He stated that the Magee partners originally 
treated the Russians as though they were "like some Africans ," and he found this unprofessional. 
He also had difficulty in dealing with nonmedical personnel who were the main negotiators for the 
partnership. He stated that he only found out later that physicians in the United States were not 
the same as those in Russia and that such efforts often were organized by nonmedical 
professionals . He acknowledged that when the medical staff at Savior's went to the United 
States to compare health systems, they found that in some cases health care delivery was much 
better organized in the United States than in Russia. Yet he noted that Russia had achieved 
some results that were quite comparable to those of the United States under far more austere 
conditions. 
Lopukhin (May 1998) reported that the partnership with Magee had grown to one of 
mutual respect and that he bel ieved it was one of the best in Russia . He (May 1998) stated : 
We consider ourselves to be one of the best partnerships. Many other 
partnerships have a creative rather than a specific and stable character. In 
contrast to those partnerships that have chosen to special ize in "tourism ," we 
have chosen a good combination of activities . We need to see some solid 
results, not just trips back and forth . Unfortunately, those partnerships that 
have made traveling their priority are not respected because their interests 
soon become very obvious. To organize tourist trips is much easier than to 
form a fam ily plann ing center. 
In Russian : 
Mhi 5IBJI5IeMc51 O.UHHM H3 nyqmHx napTHepcTB. MHome 
,npyme napTHepCTBa HOC5IT He KOHKpeTHhiH, a 
"TBopqecKH:H" xapaKTep. B OTJIHqlfe OT .upymx 
nap THepCTB, KOTOphie B OCHOBHOM 3aHHMaiOTC51 
TYPH3MOM, Mhi Bhi6panH nyTh Pa3YMHOro coqeTaHH51. 
HaM Hy)J(eH KOHKpeTHhiH pe3yJihTaT, a He TOllhKO 
B3aHMHhie noe3.UKH Ty.ua- cJO,na. K CO)J(aJieHHJO Te KTO 
3aHHMaiOTC51 TYPH3MOM He MoryT 3aCTaBHTh ce651 
yBa)J(aTh H cepbe3HO K ce6e OTHOCHThC51, TIOTOMY qTO 
,UOBOJihHO 5ICHhl B3aHMOHHTepeChi o6eHX CTOpOH . 
OpraHH3oBaTh TYPH3M ropa3.UO npome He)J(eJIH co3,naTh 
UeHTP TIJiaHHpOBaHH51 ceMhH (Ma:H, 1998). 
Lopukhin pointed with pride to a number of accomplishments of the Magee/Savior's 
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partnersh ip. He noted the creation of the Family Planning Center, one of the first in Russia in the 
early 1990s. He stated that the center was not simply a duplicate of an American model, since he 
understood that Family Plann ing Centers in the United States did not deal with diagnosis and 
treatment of diseases-their main function was to give out contraceptives . When a woman came 
to the center at Savior's, she received a ful l assessment. He also noted the contribution of the 
health education center located at Savior's, the educational programs established at several local 
schools , and the full array of health services now available for women throughout the lifespan . 
He noted that the renovations on the birth house were nearly completed . He was interested in 
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exploring further programs for prevention of STDs, resolution of infertility, and other educational 
programs. 
However, Lopukhin did not see himself as an equal decision-maker in the relationship with 
Magee. He (May 1998) said : "It is not a partnership; we are absolutely dependent [in Russian] ." 
He said that sometimes Magee gave Savior's "little pieces of the table," and they were to keep 
nodding and saying "thank you ." He found this to be unfair. He said that only two years ago did 
the staff at Savior's begin to ask questions about the partnership and demand more information. 
He also believed that Magee was earning money at Savior's expense. 
Lopukhin (May 1998) stated appreciation for the many efforts of AIHA to improve the care 
at Savior's Hospital. He noted that the partnership should be viewed as a three-way 
relationship-AIHA, Magee and Savior's-rather than simply a two-way relationship between 
Magee and Savior's. He thought that it was unfortunate that AIHA was not willing to listen to the 
Savior's staff directly. He (May 1998) added: 
Our partnership has to work under the framework of AIHA. It would be desirable 
if AIHA listened to our suggestions and wishes more when planning trips. If we 
are to call ourselves a partnership and not a dictatorship, then we assume that 
the opinions of both sides are valued equally. We had cases when we refused to 
send our people for training unless a reasonable compromise was found. For 
instance, when I think that I need to send three people to look at the work of their 
colleagues and I am told that I need to send three people for management 
training, I refuse to comply. In such situations, I believe I have the right to speak 
up and I have the right to make my own decisions. I did have the opportunity to 
look at the work of American organizations and I know that in most cases such 
managerial systems are not applicable in this country. 
Statement in Russian : 
Harne napTHepcTBO BbiHy)l{)];eHo .n:e:HcTBOBatb B paMKax 
AIHA. XoTeJIOCb 6bi qT06bi so speWI nnaHHposamui 
noe3.ZJ:OK o6MeHa AIHA 6oJihme npHcnyiiiHBaJIOCb K 
HaiiiHM no)l(eJiaHH.SIM. EcJIH Mbi HOCHM Ha3BaHHe 
napTHepCTBa, a He .ZJ:HKTaTypbi, TO TIO.ZJ:Pa3YMeBaeTC51 qTO 
BbiCKa3biBaJOTC51 MHeHH51 H TIO)I(eJiaHH51 o6eHX CTOpOH H 
KaKHM-TO o6pa30M CBO.ZJ:51TC51 BOe.ZJ:HHO. Y HaC 6biJIH 
c.rryqaH KOf.ZJ:a Mbl OTKa3biBaJIHCb TIOCbiJiaTb HaiiiHX 
cOTPY.ZJ:HHKOB .no Tex nop noKa He Haxo.n:HJIC51 pa3YMHbiH 
KOMnpoMHC. HanpHMep, Kor.n:a 5I cqHTaiO qTo MHe 
HY)I(HO TIOCJiaTb TPeX Bpaqeif TIOCMOTpeTb Ha pa6oTy 
CBOHX KOJIJier, MHe fOBOp.SIT OTllpaBHTh JIIO)J;eH, KOTOphie 
3aHHMaJOTC.SI HCKJIIO'lliTeJihHO MeHe)J;)l(MeHTOM. 5I 
C'IHTaiO 'ITO B TaKHX CHTYC!UH.SIX n p aBO Bhi6opa )J;OmKHO 
6niTh y MeH.SI. 5I HMeiO npeKpaCHYIQ B03M0)1{H0CTh 
Ha6mo,naTh aMep HKaHCKYIQ CHCTeMy opraHH3CiUHH B 
TaKHX Yl:Jepe)I{)J;eHH.SIX H 3HaJO lJTO B 60JihiiiHHCTBe 
CJIYl:JaeB oHa He n p HeMJieMa y Hac ( Mail, 1998). 
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Lopukhin (May 1998) had three recommendations for AIHA and the Magee partnership. 
One was to pay more attention to the viewpoints of Russian partners and to take their opinions 
into consideration . A second was to make sure that every partner was involved in the in itial grant 
proposal as well as in the composition of the workplans. The th ird was to pay more attention to 
the material needs of the partnership, such as medical equ ipment and educational materials . 
Though the Savior's/Magee partnership continues to th is day, AIHA sustainabi lity grants 
were discontinued in 1999. 
Example Two: 
Dubna. Russia/La Crosse. Wisconsin Partnersh ip 
Sandra McCormick, widely recognized in Dubna, Russia, and La Crosse, Wisconsin, as a 
committed leader in the sister city program between these two cities , reflected on the partnersh ip 
in an interview in April 2000. Sister cities relationships are usually established between cities that 
have characteristics in common , especially size. Dubna, Russia , situated along the Volga and 
Dubna Rivers , is a community of 65,000 people located 90 miles north of Moscow. La Crosse, 
Wisconsin , located along the Mississippi River, is a small community of 50,000 people, though 
McCormack noted that the greater metropolitan area included about 90,000. The major industry 
is La Crosse is health care. A full 7,500 people are employed in some aspect of the health care 
industry in the community. Gunderson Cl inic, where McCormick served as Vice President of 
Community Services in the early 1990s, is one of the 15 largest group practices in the United 
States, with over 350 physicians on staff. Nearly all of the Gunderson physicians practiced at 
nearby Lutheran Hospital. 
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McCormick (April 2000) recalled that the formal relationship was initiated in 1990 when a 
group of people from La Crosse, including a number of health care professionals, traveled to 
Dubna, Russia, to establish a sister city relationship. Though many activities of the blossoming 
sister city relationship focused on training and restructuring of the health system in Dubna-a 
natural course of action given the interests of the La Crosse community-the exchanges over the 
years extended far beyond the core health projects . In 1992, when food and other supplies were 
difficult to find , La Crosse churches, clubs, grocery stories, medical institutions, schools, and 
social clubs joined to ship by cargo plane 70 tons of food, medical supplies and clothing to their 
sister city. Later, the Rotary Club not only was involved in assessing public health priorities in 
Dubna in 1998, but also provided three scholarships to outstanding students of Dubna to attend 
Viterbo College in La Crosse. Eventually members of the Rotary Club and the Optimist Club in La 
Crosse helped Dubna citizens to form chapters of these organizations. Exchanges occurred 
between veterans of World War II who shared their experiences while visiting each other in 
Russia and in the United States. Dubna and La Crosse teachers, administrators, and students 
visited each other's local schools . 
The magnitude of the outreach in La Crosse toward Dubna is highlighted in the chart on 
Figure 5-4, a revised version of one developed by the La Crosse Friendship Association, the core 
community groups active in sister city activities . The volunteer Board of Directors of the 
association oversaw and coordinated activities. Increasingly, however, the health partnership 
component of the La Crosse/Dubna relationship began to take center stage, especially after initial 
funding requests proved successful. 
McCormick (April 2000) stated that she became interested in the sister city relationship in 
the spring of 1992. Rather than simply reading newspaper accounts of ongoing activities, she 
began to look for sources of funding to promote the relationship. She telephoned seven or more 
organizations one day, all of whom said , "No, not us," or "Call again , we're not in ." By the end of 
FIGURE 5-4 
La Crosse Dubna Friendship Association 
The volunteer Board of Directors is composed of 12 individuals from the LaCrosse and area community. They are elected 
by the Friendship Association membership. The Directors represent a cross section of the area and Association activities. 
Groups currently represented on the Board include: Franciscan Skemp Healthcare, Gundersen Lutheran Medical Center, 
La Crosse Public Schools, Western Wisconsin Technical College, La Crosse Lutheran Synod, Private Law Practice, 
Social Security Administration , Franciscan Sisters of Perpetual Adoration , and Financial Analyst Firm. 
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the day, McCormick had the name of Jim Smith at AIHA. She told a receptionist at AIHA that she 
was interested in working in Russia. In a telephone conversation with Smith a short time later, 
McCormick discovered to her dismay that Smith knew a great deal about the early work of La 
Crosse in Dubna and about the La Crosse health community. Following Smith's instructions, 
McCormick wrote a brief history of the early activities of the sister city relationship and forwarded 
it to AIHA in late May 1992. She received a letter back from him in June 1992, stating that La 
Crosse was on the AIHA list to contact as soon as the new alliance was incorporated and had 
secured a cooperative agreement. In July 1992, McCormick was in Washington in July 1992 
attending the International Conference of Social Workers and happened to be staying at a hotel 
near AIHA Headquarters on New York Avenue. She set up a meeting with an AIHA 
representative, who told her that AIHA had just signed a $12 million cooperative agreement with 
USAID and that a letter of application needed to be sent to AIHA if La Crosse was interested in 
developing a health partnership program with Dubna. He assured her that the AIHA would 
respond in a week with an approval. Amazed at the response, McCormack joined other health 
colleagues in a city-wide meeting of interested parties for the health partnership, and the group 
agreed to proceed with the application. Gunderson Lutheran Medical Center and Franciscan 
Healthcare System were the two main health organ izations listed for the partnership in La 
Crosse, partnering with Bolshaya Volga Hospital , Hospital No. 9, and Hospital No. 166 in Dubna. 
A proposal was on its way to AIHA in August 1992. By September, the Board of AIHA 
acted on the application and approved it. That action began a series of partnership and 
sustainability grants from year-to-year with AIHA totaling about $500,000, ending in 1997. After 
funding with AIHA ended in 1998, La Crosse leaders in the health partnership went on to receive 
a number of large grants from a variety of sources. Table 5-6 below highlights the major sources 
of funding for the project up to the year 2000. All financial arrangements in the execution and 
disbursement of funding were handled by La Crosse. 
Focus of the partnership. At the beginning of the initial AIHA granted period, La Crosse 
community leaders began to plan a more specific strategy for the health partnership program. 
A moun t 
$500,000 
$500,000 
$500,000 
$152,000 
$75,000 
$25,000 
$30,000 
$470,000 
(shared with 6 
partnerships) 
$2,000,000 
Donation 
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TABLE 5-6: 
Major Sources of External Funding: 1992-1999 
Dubna/La Crosse Health Partnership 
s ource Ob. 1ject1ve 
USAID To demonstrate how cost-effectiveness and quality of health 
care delivery services can be improved in Russia by designing 
and testing an integrated service delivery model in the City of 
Dubna (1996-1999) . 
USAID/AIHA To create the Health Partnership and to sustain activities in 
Cooperative the following areas: Women's Health, Cardiac Rehabilitation, 
Agreement Pediatrics, Alcoholism Prevention, Renal Dialysis, Infection 
Control, Emergency Medical Services, Physical Medicine, 
Diabetes, and Health Care Administration (1992-1997). 
World To initiate, implement and sustain community education and 
Learning treatment programs in the area of alcoholism (1994-1996). 
I REX To reduce the public health risks of alcoholism and smoking 
by incorporating social service delivery components of the 
social work professional preparation program at the University 
of Dubna. 
To establish a sustainable network of programs through the 
creation of regional community fieldwork training sites for 
University of Dubna social work students and area 
professionals (1998-2000) . 
Department of To provide training foreign interns from the former Soviet 
Commerce Union in card iology, dentistry, health care administration, 
emergency medicine, obstetrics/gynecology, alcoholism 
prevention, and English through the Small American Business 
Internship Training Program (SABIT) (1993-1999). 
Rotary To conduct a community assessment to determine the priority 
International health needs of the City of Dubna (1998). 
Eurasia To provide an opportunity for representatives from municipal 
Foundation government to visit La Crosse and learn about city 
management in that city (1994) . 
us To provide NIS police officers and social workers with 
Department of background information on domestic violence, to lead possibly 
State to the examination of local law. 
To encourage the establishment of domestic abuse shelters 
and other forms of therapeutic intervention . 
To establ ish permanent working groups in the NIS consisting 
of local government representatives, law enforcement officers, 
social workers and volunteers who will continue to address 
domestic violence issues (1998-2000) 
Eli Lilly Donation of insulin and diabetes supplies to support diabetes 
management programs in replication sites. 
SOURCES: Pretasky, B. (1998). Compiled from La Crosse Dubna Friendship Association : Sister 
cities application for best overall program. La Crosse, WI: La Crosse Dubna Friendship 
Association; (1999) Partnership Activity Report, 1992-1999. La Crosse, WI : La Crosse Dubna 
Friendship Association. 
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According to McCormick (April 2000), the project began with very basic goals, specifically, to 
improve basic health care and to avoid high technology solutions. The decision to avoid focusing 
on high technology was based on early observations that the Dubna community not only lacked 
equipment and supplies, but the structure to support equipment and the technical skills to 
maintain and repair equipment. The La Crosse group also noted that the Dubna community did 
not place high value on the trade skills to maintain and repair equipment. The La Crosse group 
also noted that the Dubna community did not place high value on the trade skills, whether that 
involved constructing buildings or repairing equipment. The core planning group decided to focus 
on offering Dubna new skills and ways of approaching health issues and patients that did not rely 
heavily on supplies, equipment, or technology. McCormick (April 2000) stated that the basic 
strategies that came out of this initial assessment later became the main projects for replication . 
The assessment group decided to focus on alcohol treatment, diabetes, physical rehabilitation , 
pediatrics (with a special emphasis on handicapped children), and women's health. Highlights of 
major projects that developed out of these early plans are presented in Figure 5-5 . 
FIGURE 5.5 
Health Partnership Activities Involving AIHA Funding for Exchanges 
Diabetes Education 
The Vallejo Diabetes Center and School at Dubna, located in the Bolshaya Hospital, is 
primarily designed for patients and their famil ies to learn how to best manage diabetes. Sessions 
include such topics as diet, physical exercise, insulin treatment, and physical problems of the 
diabetic. Since the opening of the center in September 1993, more than 600 patients in the 
Dubna area have participated in educational activities. According to documentation from the 
partners, the center helped to lower individual dose levels for Type I diabetes by 30 percent and 
for Type II by 24.4 percent between 1992 and 1995, resulting in a substantial cost savings to the 
community and its families (AIHA, 1998). The partnership also reported that the Dubna City 
Health Administration reported a marked decline in the number of patients hospitalized because 
of diabetic complications. 
The Diabetes Center was named after Dr. Walter Vallejo, a La Crosse physician who 
volunteered many hours to the development of the center and its educational mission . The self-
management model was based on treatment by an interdisciplinary team, including an 
endocrinologist, ophthalmologist, podiatrist, neurologist, psychologist, exercise therapist, and 
nutritionist. Vallejo was instrumental in training medical personnel, nurses, patients and their 
families in self-managing diabetes prior to his death from cancer in 1995. He also played an 
important role in coordinating shipments of medical equipment and supplies to Dubna. 
The self-management program developed at Dubna became one of the most widely 
replicated models of the AIHA partnership program in the late 1990s. The Gore Chernomyrdin 
Health Committee selected the self-management program in Dubna as a model for Russia, and 
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the program has been replicated in five Moscow oblasts. The Diabetes School at Dubna has 
become a central training center for surrounding communities, including Moscow, and hundreds 
of physicians have been trained at the school. These training activities were made possible 
through negotiations with the Russian Ministry of Health, donations of Eli Lilly, the Dubna/La 
Crosse partnership and AIHA. 
Alcohol Rehabilitation and Education 
A La Crosse/Russia Alcohol Treatment Project was initiated in 1994 between the Dubna 
Center for Education, a nongovernmental organ ization, and two nonprofit health organ izations in 
La Crosse, Gundersen Lutheran and Franciscan Skemp Healthcare. The objective of the project 
was to address the health and social concerns of alcoholism in these communities. Like the 
diabetes school , this component of the partnersh ip was replicated in five other cities (Dmitrov, 
Zaprudnia , Sergiev Posad, Taldom and Kl in) with the help of a World Learning Grant in 
cooperative agreement with USAID. 
American models for alcohol treatment were imported for this project. Alcohol 
counselors, community specialists and project administrators were hired to service the project in 
these communities . Some Dubna health professionals involved in the project admitted in an 
article in the La Crosse Tribune (Rindfleisch, 10 October 1993) that most people in Russia did not 
recognize alcoholism as a problem and that most physicians were only starting to look at 
alcoholism as a disease. 
Alcohol centers were set up in each of the localities, though coordinating services were 
handled in Dubna. Counselors were trained in the 12-step support model of Alcoholics 
Anonymous and AI-Anon, and groups were established in each community. Newspaper and TV 
ads were created to promote awareness of alcoholism and its effects. The centers also presented 
programs in schools and in the community. Two of the centers also opened detoxification centers. 
According to AIHA data (1997-1998), more than 1,600 Russians in these communities attended 
AA and AI-Anon meetings each month in 1998. In Dubna, more than 2,000 local residents 
attended community programs about alcohol ism between October and December 1996. 
Prevention efforts in schools in Dubna extended to over 3,000 students between January and 
March 1997 (Alcohol Treatment Project, 1997). 
Cardiac Rehabilitation 
AIHA contributed to training of physicians in neonatal cardiac life support and pediatric 
advanced cardiac life support in Dubna, Dmitrov and Taldom , Russia. Collaboration between La 
Crosse and Dubna medical partners on cardiac rehabilitation for uncomplicated myocardial 
infarction patients reduced the average length of stay for patients from 30 days to 14-16. 
American Heart Association brochures were translated and distributed throughout Dubna. The 
partners also sponsored community health fairs on cardiac risk factor management (AIHA, 1997-
1998; La Cross International Health Partnership, 1999). 
Home Care and Hospice Programs 
The partnership helped to bring about dramatic changes in care for the senior citizens of 
Dubna. The home care efforts of the partnership included improving the educational level of 
home care workers and reorienting home care away from hospitals to home settings. The 
reduction in hospital-based care for the elderly through this system resulted in major savings on 
the health budget for the city of Dubna. Other cities in the Moscow oblast (Kilm, Electrostal, and 
Taldom) have worked to replicate the Dubna model for home care . In August 1994, the partners 
established a hospice program in the city. With in two years, the partners helped to sponsor a 
regional hospice seminar to disseminate information on hospice care models (AIHA, 1997 -1998). 
Women's Wellness Center 
A Women's Wellness Center opened in Dubna on May 17, 1998, The ribbon cutting 
ceremony was a celebration of five years of cooperative work between the women's health work 
groups in La Crosse and Dubna . The center offers services in reproductive health, childbirth 
education , nutrition, disease prevention and health promotion, newborn infant care, and sick 
infant care. AIHA and the partners credit other educational programs sponsored by the family 
planning clinics in Dubna for lowering the abortion rate in the city. AIHA (1997-1998)) reported 
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that the number of abortions performed at Central Clinical Hospital in 1995 was 351, down from 
431 in 1994. The ratio of births to abortions was reported at the hospital to be 1:1.6 in 1995, down 
from 1 :2 the previous year. Hospital No. 9 reported even more dramatic changes. The number 
of abortions reported in 1995 was 323, down from 575 in 1994. 
Orthotics Fabrication Shop 
The La Crosse/Dubna partners collaborated to establish an Orthotics (medical braces) Center in 
Dubna. Professionals in Dubna were trained in the fabrication and fitting of braces. According to 
AIHA (1997-1998), the center has been designated a regional prosthetic center by the Moscow 
Oblast Health Administration 
Renal Dialysis Center 
As a result of the joint efforts of the partners and the Dubna City Health Administration , a two-
station Renal Dialysis Center was established in Central City Hospital in November 1996 (AIHA, 
1997-1998). 
By the spring of 1993, the core group working on the health partnership was ready to 
share with the Dubna community the plan of action for the health partnership for the city. The 
plan of action had been developed jointly with a core group in Dubna. A community meeting was 
called in Dubna to announce the AIHA grant and to explain the activities that would be sponsored 
with the funds. The Mayor of Dubna, Valery Prokh, and the Mayor of La Crosse were present for 
the meeting . McCormick was called upon to speak with the group congregated about the use of 
the funds . 
McCormick (April 2000) related that the community's response was less than 
overwhelming; in fact, members of the community, including Dubna reporters , verbally attacked 
her at the meeting. She recalled the response was something like, "You mean to say you are 
going to spend all this money on having people travel back and forth across the ocean so a few 
people get a chance to go to the United States? We have trained staff; we have good doctors. 
All we need is equipment. We don't need you." McCormick stated that she explained to the 
group gathered at the meeting that the AIHA grant was about exchanging information, not about 
buying equipment. She indicated that the core group on the partnership would try to improve 
health care in the Dubna community and that the exchanges would give Dubna health 
practitioners the opportunity to understand Western medical approaches. Such was the initial 
interest the AIHA partnership drew among some members of the broader community in Dubna in 
the first year. 
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As most of the original projects were successfully launched in Dubna, additional programs 
were spawned in the mid- and late-1990s. Core members of the partnership began working on a 
curriculum in substance abuse that they expected to present to the federal Ministry of Education 
in Russia. Domestic violence became the center of focus of a program funded by the State 
Department. A grant from IREX focused on an area close to McCormick's own educational 
interests, a social work curriculum for the University of Dubna. The program was slated to train 
counselors in related programs in substance abuse and hospice care. McCormick stated that the 
health programs at Dubna were all integrated in that they addressed health behaviors that relied 
on self-management skills, emotional development, and family integration. It should be noted 
that activities of the health partnership extended far beyond the objectives of the major grants that 
the Friendship Foundation fielded on behalf of Dubna. Such activities ranged from teaching CPR 
to physicians, nurses and selected community members, to translating critical learning manuals 
for pediatric life support, to creating a nursing leadership team to advance the nursing profession 
in Dubna. 
In part because of the continued success of the Dubna/La Crosse health partnership in 
developing programs with documented effectiveness and in raising substantial grants to support 
such developmental work, the program became increasingly well known and regarded in the 
international community as a model site for a variety of health reforms. Funding from AIHA had 
ended in 1997, but USAID-Moscow extended a $500,000 grant to the partnership in 1996 to 
experiment with integrated models of health care. 
In 1998, when the La Crosse/Dubna Friendship Association applied for Best Overall 
Program award with Sister Cities International, a number of the supporting grants for the sister 
city relationship attested to its strength. Table 5-7 below lists funding sources used to support the 
partnership that year. The sister cities of Dubna and La Crosse were honored with the Best 
Overall Program award in 1999 in a category for cities with a population of less than 100,000, and 
Sandra McCormick was named Volunteer of the Year by the same organization. The awards 
brought more local and national attention to the efforts of the two cities . This continued in 1999 
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and 2000 as AIHA promoted the Dubna/La Crosse partnership as a replication site for a variety of 
integrated services to the federal Ministry. AIHA's promotion efforts also helped to bring about an 
article on Dubna's rejuvenated health care system on the front page of the New York Times for 
Sunday, December 31, 2000, and again on CNN-Russia in January 2001 . 
TABLE 5.7 
Major Funding Sources of Dubna/La Crosse Partnership in 1998 
A moun t s ource Ob" f )jeC IVe D f ura 10n 
$500,000 USAID-Moscow To develop an integrated model of health care 3-year 
services delivery in Dubna. project: 
1996 to 
1999 
$152,000 I REX To provide social work curriculum 29-month 
development at the University of Dubna. project 
starting in 
1998 
$15,000 Rotary To assess Dubna communities health 1998 
International priorities . 
$12,000 US Department To support two Russian interns to travel 1998 
of Commerce to La Crosse to study leadership 
Development, management training, and 
community prevention of alcoholism 
$8,000 La Crosse To support administrators' exchanges with Dubna 1998 
Public Schools Schools . 
$5,000 La Crosse To support Tenth Anniversary celebration 1998 
Community of association in 1999 and 2000. 
$1,400 La Crosse Dubna Dues collected from the association to support 1998 
Friendship Friendship Association activities . 
Association 
$8,000 La Crosse Funds collected to support the La Crosse/ Dubna 1998 
Community Student Exchange Program. 
$4,000 La Crosse Funds collected in the name of the late Walter 1998 
Community Vallejo, MD, to support activities 
of the Vallejo Diabetes Center in Dubna. 
$10,000 La Crosse Estimated sum spent by La Crosse individuals in 1998 
Community travel, commun ications, hosting activities and 
association activities. 
SOURCE: Pretasky, B. (1998). La Crosse Dubna Friendship Association : Application for best 
overall program . La Crosse, WI : La Crosse Dubna Friendship Association . 
Success factors of the relationship. McCormick (April 2000) attributed the success of the 
program to a number of factors . One was Mayor Valery Prokh, whom McCormick described as a 
200 
young, progressive, risk-taking political leader of his community. McCormack has traveled to 
Dubna and outlying areas more than 30 times in her years of involvement with the sister city 
relationship, and on each visit the mayor took time out to meet with her. His questions to her 
were, 'What do you need from me to make these programs successful? Are you getting what 
you need from my people?" She stated that he surrounded himself with other people who were 
democratic reform-minded thinkers and decision-makers. 
Another important factor McCormick cited was the Small American Business Internship 
and Training program (SABIT), sponsored by the US Commerce Department. This program 
enabled interns to spend three to six months in La Crosse, hosted by La Crosse families, and to 
go through a leadership development program. These longer-term stays enabled the interns to 
learn the values of the La Crosse health community in some depth, to become familiar with 
American medical practices in specialized areas, and to learn new methods of health financing 
and management. These interns come to La Crosse for three to six months, and they are put 
through a leadership development program. The interns return to Dubna with a more in-depth 
understanding than a brief exchange could engender. Some of the interns later became 
community leaders in the Dubna health partnership. 
McCormick (April 2000) also stated that the health partnership would never have started 
without the support of AIHA. The alliance gave the Dubna/La Crosse resources to travel back 
and forth . In the early stages of the relationship, this enabled the two communities to become 
comfortable with each other. McCormick (April 2000) added that the programs were facilitated by 
the communities themselves, but the funding for the travel was "the glue that held it together. 
Money for administration, or the lack therefore, has been a detriment to the program." She 
related the enormous investment in time required to make arrangements for travel and to host 
exchanges and other activities, something that volunteers are not likely to do for themselves. 
She also noted AIHA had increased staff levels at AIHA headquarters in Washington to service 
the growing complexity and array of services provided by that organization . In this sense, AIHA 
acknowledged the importance of administrative functions and the time commitment needed to 
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service the partnerships, but did not accord that same recognition at partnership levels. 
McCormick also found AIHA increasingly micromanaging the partnerships. 
Highlights of some of the distinguishing features of the Dubna/La Crosse relationship are 
described in Figure 5-7 below: 
FIGURE 5-7 
FOCUS ON THE LA CROSSE/DUBNA PARTNERSHIP 
Highlights: 
o On August 5, 1990, Dubna and La Crosse representatives in Dubna signed documents 
linking them as sister cities. In 1992, as the AIHA hospital partnership program was 
launched, the sister cities joined forces to become one of the first hospital-based health 
partnerships in the NIS. 
o To coordinate the overall planning and direction of activities, the La Crosse Dubna 
Friendship Association, a volunteer nonprofit organization, was founded in La Crosse. 
The association 's voluntary Board of Directors represented a wide cross-section of the La 
Crosse community and met monthly to plan and approve events. Virtually all funding for 
the project was channeled through the La Crosse network rather than to Dubna projects 
directly. 
o In 1999, Sister Cities International awarded the La Crosse Dubna Friendship Association 
was awarded the Best Overall Program, following review of the association 's detailed 
application. The association also nominated Sandra McCormick for the Volunteer of the 
Year award. Sister Cities International subsequently awarded her this honor. 
McCormick, who has a master's degree in social work and another in health 
administration, spent uncounted hours on behalf of the partnership, including serving on 
the Board of Directors of the La Crosse Dubna Friendship Association and as project 
director for some of the major health initiatives. Both Sister City International honors 
were awarded in a category for sister cities with a population of less than 100,000. 
o Valery Prokh has served as Mayor of Dubna since the initial sister city agreement and the 
health partnership, and he has played a key leadership role in supporting Dubna!La 
Crosse activities. Delegations from the La Crosse Dubna Friendship Association met with 
Mr. Prokh as a matter of course to discuss their activities. The city of Dubna agreed to 
cover expenses of tasks that could be documented to be successful, a process that 
usually took about three years. This also demonstrated city commitment to project 
development. 
o Dubna and La Crosse families served as hosts for trainings and visits to promote 
personal/inks between the respective communities and to lower the cost of exchanges. 
o Unlike many partnerships, Dubna health partners often documented the effects of their 
efforts to demonstrate improved outcomes. Documentation was emphasized for three 
purposes: to demonstrate successful efforts to the city government; to provide reports 
suitable for grant reporting; and to experiment wit new approaches that met the standards 
for evidence-based medicine in Western countries. 
Relationships in the health partnership. McCormick's perception of the Russian health 
care system was that it stopped improving about 50 years ago. In that same time period, 
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advanced a great deal in the United States, especially with technological developments that in 
many instances became the main interface between the physician and the client. In addition, the 
decade of the 1990s in Russia was a difficult one, and health care lost even more buying power 
than in decades past. In partnership activity, McCormick said that their Russian colleagues were 
at the same level in the sense that health care workers from both communities sought to provide 
helpful services to their communities. And McCormick suggested that American health care 
could be considered wasteful by Russian standards. But in terms of the delivery of health care 
itself-the techniques-McCormick did not bel ieve that Americans had much to learn from the 
Russians, though she added that her professional training was not in medicine. 
FIGURE 5-8: Pictured above is Svetlana Bertash (left) from the Moscow City Ministry of Health at 
a June 24, 1998, event. Standing next to her (right) is Sandra McCormick of La Crosse, 
Wisconsin, an active leader in the La Crosse Dubna Friendship Association throughout the 
1990s. 
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In partnership activities, McCormick (April 1999) stated that a basic rule of social work was 
applied : "You begin where the client is at." La Crosse shared with Dubna the kinds of health 
delivery that La Crosse health professionals gave, and then their Dubna colleagues went home 
and developed revised standards, in terms of what they had witnessed, to fit their own situation 
and institutions. La Crosse did not set the standards for Dubna. McCormick (April 1999) added: 
"So from the standpoint of being partners and peers, we share with each other what we have and 
what we can do. And we accept the standards that they can get to, which are not necessarily our 
standards or acceptable in our country . ... We have shown them, but they have done it. From 
that standpoint we are peers." Depicted on the following page in Figure 5.9 is a map of major 
stakeholders in the project. 
As a measure of their continuing relationship with Dubna, La Crosse partnered with Dubna 
in 1998 to sponsor a partnership in Kharkiv, Ukraine, funded in part with AIHA funding . 
Mikhailovich reflects on the Dubna partnership 
McCormick (April 1999) described Dr. Ryabov Sergei Mikhailovich, Head of the Dubna 
Healthcare Committee, as the man who held it all together at Dubna. Early in the partnership, 
Mikhailovich came to La Crosse for three months as a SABIT intern and stayed with a host family 
with ties to the health community. Mikhailovich studied the health care system and its delivery 
mechanisms intensively during his stay. La Crosse partners found that they could rely on 
Mikhailovich in subsequent years to facilitate health projects in the community. 
In an interview in August 2000, Mikhailovich spoke at length of the many programs 
initiated through the partnership at Dubna. Mikhailovich stated that the work teams were one of 
the most important elements of the partnership . He stated that the teams were multidisciplinary, 
drawing from a variety of interests. Some of the team members were not specialists in the area 
they chose, but their interest and enthusiasm helped to make the teams exciting. Another key 
element of the partnership was the transfer of medical problem-solving methods. He stated the 
health professionals with whom he worked appreciated that their La Crosse partners offered them 
the best available methodologies in an environment of scarce resources . Yet another important 
FIGURE 5-9 
Health Partnership between the Sister Cities: Dubna, Russia, and La Crosse. Wisconsin 
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aspect of the partnership was the leadership support for the partnership. Partnership leaders in 
Dubna arranged for meetings with the city's mayor for every visiting delegation . Mikhailovich 
stated that the partnership would have had problems without such support. He stated that the 
partnership made an agreement that the city would implement and absorb future expenses for 
any task that proved successful. So partnership activists in Dubna set out early to prove the 
worth of their programs. Finally, he pointed to the guest arrangements of the partnership: 
Russian and American guests were hosted by families . He believed this promoted personal links 
and friendships in both communities. 
Mikhailovich stated that 70 percent of the Russian population lives in smaller towns and 
cities much like Dubna. He stated that Americans were leaving Moscow and St. Petersburg to 
conduct partnership activities because they recognized that the multi-layered bureaucracies in 
hospitals and in the city government of these large cities were difficult to penetrate. In contrast, 
personal leadership could be decisive in hospital-wide partnerships. He stated that the initial 
gesture of support from La Crosse, of medicine, food, clothing, funds, and used medical 
equipment, enhanced the relationship, because the La Crosse community made no attempt to 
profit out of this humanitarian effort. 
Ill. Stakeholder Perspectives 
In this section, some of the main stakeholders discuss the issues of AIHA partnerships 
and of partnerships as a policy tool in general. While this includes uncounted thousands who 
have been affected in some way by these partnerships in Russia, the comments are limited to the 
informants in this study and to the limited scholarship available on the topic. 
Scholars criticize the response of US foreign assistance to the transition 
Just as little literature exists that attempts to analyze the state of the health crisis in the 
NIS, even less has been devoted to the international response to the transition crisis. Though a 
growing literature has attempted to describe the difficulties of the transition, the response from the 
private sector has been as slow as the government response to understand the situation . 
206 
Schechter (2000) noted the slow response of the American Medical Association (AMA) in the 
region . Only in the fall of 1996 did the AMA express an interest in working with its Russian 
counterparts to develop leadership in Russian medicine and to establish a method for granting 
credentials and licenses to physicians. Schechter (2000) suggested that other Western medical 
groups and individual physicians have been active in the NIS, in particular Russia , but few efforts 
have had a systemic impact. She mentions as noteworthy the efforts of the AIHA, some World 
Bank loans to provide technical assistance and reform, and Soros matching grants that have tried 
to provide tuberculosis therapy to some seriously infected areas. However, Schechter also noted 
that "Western aid is not the cure for what ails the Russian health care system" (p . 86), and 
Russian physicians would have to find their own way within the limits of the Russian political and 
social system. 
Burger (2000) wrote that U.S. foreign assistance for health in the NIS "began with a 
flourish" but then diminished over time (p. 290). In the face of severe economic crisis in 1991, the 
international assistance community prepared itself to provide humanitarian assistance to the 
newly formed former Soviet republics . Early efforts focused on providing food, medicine, and 
medical supplies and equipment. In 1992, the Washington Conference on Assistance to the New 
Independent States convened, headed by Secretary of State James Baker, and set out to 
determine the best humanitarian response to the NIS region. A medical working group was 
formed, and a delegation of health care professionals from 13 countries visited medical 
institutions in ten of the republics . The delegates foresaw a decentralizing of the power of the 
federal Ministry of Health, a reduction in the resources available to the health care system, and a 
disenfranchisement of NIS citizens from access to care. 
According to Burger (2000), one of the principle outcomes of the medical working group 
became "the most notable and productive" of the initiatives supported by USAID, the Hospital 
Partnership Program. The partnerships paired hospitals in the United States and in the former 
Soviet republics. Burger (2000) noted the strengths of the partnership program: 
The Hospital Partnership Program was a perfect example of one of the things 
academic and practicing physicians can do best-impart a body of knowledge 
and experience to their professional counterparts . The program mobilized an 
eager segment of American medicine to devote voluntarily its time and expert 
knowledge. The program promised to confirm that professional exchanges bring 
with them the highest level of leverage. Those trained, in time, train others. (p. 
291) 
USAID awarded the new intermediary organization, the AIHA, the privilege of executing the 
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program. Though relatively inexpensive, drawing as it did on growing volunteerism in the medical 
sector, Burger (2000) suggested that the Hospital Partnership Program had "very ambivalent 
support at best, and at times outright hostile opposition" from the USAID bureaucracy (p. 291 ). 
Burger added, "The program had not been invented within the AID structure but rather brought in 
from the outside. Its management arrangement bypassed the classic AID-contractor apparatus, 
and it was concerned with matters of cl inical medicine-a subject generally alien to AID's interest 
or experience" (pp. 291-292). 
Burger (2000) pointed out, however, that the assistance program for Russia, and the NIS 
in general, lacked a coherent strategy. He noted that early strategic arguments to promote a kind 
of Marshall Plan in the region did not persuade decision-makers in the G-7 to move forward with 
a large-scale, unified plan . The reason most frequently cited was that key economic and legal 
institutions needed for this kind of reconstruction plan simply did not exist in the NIS. Thus, for 
the most part, reform in Russia was not reconstruction at all. As a result, Burger (2000) 
contended, the foreign assistance efforts in the NIS have been scattered and fragmented : "There 
was no overarching program of economic stabilization to accompany political reform, and there 
was no corresponding social safety net component. Assistance in the social safety net sector, 
including health, has been piecemeal and without the type of coherence and long-term political 
support needed for a truly successful effort" (p . 298). 
In her analysis of health care in Russia in the 1990s, Schechter (2000) noted that a 
number of groups, both private and governmental , from Western countries have become involved 
in helping Russians with their health care system that the AIHA program was one of the few 
Western assistance projects that has had a systemic impact. In the absence of an overarching 
assistance program for Russia and the rest of the NIS, the AIHA partnership program has 
evolved a number of strategies of its own since its inception in 1992. 
USAID's external evaluation of AIHA notes the benefits and challenges of partnership 
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USAID commissioned an external evaluation of AIHA in its fifth year of operation (1997). 
The three-member evaluation team vis ited partnerships in eight cities in the US and eight 
countries in the NIS and CEE, and about 250 people were interviewed. The results of the 
evaluation were that the program was successful in meeting its objectives of transferring 
American medical knowledge and skills to NIS and CEE partner institutions. The evaluators 
(January 1998) noted that program success was based on a "sound USAID concept combined 
with strong AIHA leadership" (p . v). They also noted that the program began as a relatively 
straightforward program of training and travel exchanges in the first years of operation, but it has 
since evolved into "a much more complex and ambitious menu of initiatives as AIHA built broader 
cross-cutting initiatives into its program and USAID used the CA (Cooperative Agreement) to 
launch additional activities" (p . xi) . The evolvement of AIHA as an organization in the 1990s 
resulted in many complex policy and management issues. 
The evaluators (January 1998) noted that the AIHA was not the only partnership program 
in the array of programs funded by USAID, but AIHA's approach to partnership had its own 
distinguishing features : the emphasis on volunteerism rather than consultancy; the focus on 
institution-to-institution development; and a structure that emphasizes collaboration and sharing 
among partners. The evaluative team was impressed with the high level of volunteerism that the 
program had been able to leverage in the NIS and CEE, noting that much of the impetus for the 
exchange was built "on mutual interest and the thirst of the NIS/CEE partners for knowledge of 
Western clinical and managerial practice" (pp. v-vi). The team also noted limitations in the model. 
The American and NIS/CEE partners from health care systems that were "radically different in 
operation and mentality'' (p . vi). The lack of international experience of many of the partners, 
coupled with cultural differences and technological gaps in the practice of the respective 
countries, sometimes resulted in slow-moving startups and limited activities. The managerial 
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differences between the systems loomed as a large constraint, and AIHA had begun to shift focus 
to include health management education as a component of some partnerships. The team 
(January 1998) credited AIHA in moving "with agility and effectiveness" beyond clinical practice 
into health management issues and beyond (p . vi) . 
The scare resources of the NIS partners, including their limited and often disrupted 
salaries, were disincentives for sharing with other partners outside of AIHA-sponsored joint 
events. The evaluators cited other challenges to the future of the program. Many of the initial 
partnerships appeared to be with privileged institutions in the NIS, and the experiences in these 
institutions might not be extended to less privileged institutions. A possible decline in 
volunteerism may occur in the future toward the NIS and CEE regions for a variety of reasons . In 
spite of these limitations, the team stated that the results of the project were impressive, both in 
the US and overseas. 
The evaluation team (January 1998) noted that the partners they interviewed were 
"uniformly positive" about the AIHA project and their experiences as partners (p . x). The partners 
also praised the innovativeness of the AIHA program, the many kinds of logistical support that the 
program provided, and the highly motivated staff. The team noted, however, that many of the 
partners perceived that the organization was highly centralized with role functions that were hard 
to understand and that some partnerships were favored over others. Possibly in part a function of 
how funding streams from USAID were issued to AIHA in the first five years of the operation, 
partners viewed the management style of the organization as closer to "continuous crisis 
management" (p. x). For a variety of reasons, partners indicated that they wanted more control 
over their resources. 
The report indicated that the program "consistently suffered from tension between and 
among USAID, AIHA, and USAID overseas offices" (p. xi). The early emphasis on tertiary rather 
than primary care clashed with USAID's health policy emphasis on primary care. The tension 
over this issue eased as partnership achievements were recognized, some of which were 
directed toward primary care approaches using the hospital setting, but other issues remained. 
210 
The report also noted tension with USAID over changes in the management of the AIHA 
cooperative agreement. The original agreement was designed for "significant and ongoing USAID 
contact," but later policies emerged out of USAID that greatly decreased the amount of 
involvement of project officers in ongoing activities. As AIHA increased its activity from relatively 
straightforward clinical exchanges to an ever-increasing array of initiatives and services, further 
tension with USAID occurred because the pressure to have AIHA's programs conform to USAID 
country objectives then increased. Still , the evaluators concluded that it was "hard to imagine a 
better vehicle for managing the basic hospital partnership process than AIHA" (p . xii) . 
USAID officers discuss the AIHA partnership and the partnership approach 
Interviews with a limited number of USAID officers in Washington and in Russia in 1998 
and 1999 supported the tenor of the evaluation of AIHA (January 1998). USAID officers 
expressed intrigue and interest in the AIHA partnership concept, if not outright enthusiasm for the 
approach . Concerns about the partnership activity focused on a number of specific issues. One 
(May 1998) was the potential inefficiency of partnerships, in which one site would receive 
donations of equipment or expertise that exceeded the actual need of the community. Another 
USAID representative (August 1998) stated that the stipulations issued on cooperative 
agreements established out of the Office of Procurement were inconsistent. USAID officers 
found this confusing in dealing with different cooperative agreements. In the case of AIHA, the 
cooperative agreement was initially approved for a centralized operation in Washington between 
USAID and AIHA, with considerable oversight extended to USAID. The cooperative agreement 
later became a "hands off' cooperative agreement, with a shift in focus toward the USAID 
missions and to AIHA regional offices, which were first established in 1996. This mid-course 
transformation was confusing for USAID officers. 
One USAID officer (May 1998) in the Moscow office with experience in institutional 
partnerships discussed a number of issues that occurred with partnerships in general, regardless 
of the distinctive differences, and with the awarding of cooperative agreements to independent 
organizations that executed them . The officer suggested that the partnership approach as a 
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policy tool actually added to the complexity of the process rather than simplified it, since 
additional management layers were created. In the case of AIHA's partnerships in Russia, for 
instance, the layers of management included USAID-Washington, AIHA-Washington, USAID-
Moscow and AIHA-Moscow. Even though the management functions of the different layers of 
USAID and AIHA differed and for the most part did not overlap, the whole still needed 
coordination. 
The USAID official (May 1998) described experiences with another Washington-based 
organization, International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), which was involved in 
institutional partnerships. 
The problem was that I REX did not want USAID involved at all. If we had dried 
up and blown away, they would have been extremely happy. They had never 
had a USAID grant before . . . . We are constantly in a position where we have to 
defend our actions and show that we have created results .. . Every year in front 
of Congress Brian Atwood [former chief administrator of USAID] has to stand 
before them and say exactly what we have done and what changes we have 
brought. So we have always had to deal differently with our grantees and 
contractors . We have to know what's happening, and we have to make sure that 
they're doing something, so that at the end of the year we can report back to 
Congress. 
An example of this added complexity occurred in the I REX university partnership program, which 
involved 16 universities and associations in the early 1990s. Unlike AIHA, I REX issued direct 
grants to the university partners. The partners set goals and objectives, and then submitted 
requests to IREX. The partners were then sent funding directly to carry out their agreed-upon 
project. The USAID official (May 1998) found these institutional partnerships "extremely difficult 
to manage." I REX management did not want USAID representatives to visit the partnerships 
unless IREX representatives accompanied them . The USAID official in Moscow stated that her 
suggestions often resulted in opposition from USAID-Washington and from IREX. IREX 
maintained offices in both Washington and Moscow at the request of USAID, but this complicated 
the discussions and negotiations. IREX relied heavily on what the partnerships said that they 
were doing. The official found this reliance on self-report problematic: "They don't necessarily lie. 
They don't even mean to misrepresent, but it's not the same thing to go out and see what's going 
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on as to hear what they say is going on." As a result, according to the official (May 1998), I REX 
was "putting up a brick wall. Regardless of what they said, I went out and visited projects. A 
couple of times I went out without an I REX person because that was my job." I REX apparently 
expressed surprise that USAID intended to monitor the partnerships. 
The USAID official explained that other difficulties occurred with the NGO partnership 
project under World Learning. An audit conducted by the Inspector General (IG) on the project 
found World Learning was supposedly funding a project that no longer existed. The auditors 
found that some of the activities the partners stated that they would do did not occur and the 
money was reallocated for other purposes. The officer (May 1998) stated : 
There is a reason why we have to be involved. You just can't take someone 
else's word for something. Not when you're USAID. Not when you're being 
monitored by Inspector General 's offices and the General Accounting Office and 
Congress and everybody else in the world . You have to know what's going on, 
and you have to make sure that the money is being spent appropriately because 
you're going to be held accountable if it's not. And I don't care whether it says 
cooperative agreement, grant or contract on the top of that piece of paper. If 
you 're not showing appropriate controls, they're going to hold you accountable. 
I've seen it happen . 
The officer described an experience with an Inspector General audit in another country, in which 
USAID was deemed too lax even though the projects were all awarded as grants. 
The USAID official also expressed concerns about the way I REX representatives basically 
searched in Russia to find partner organizations for American counterparts . The American 
counterparts with I REX would offer to "do everything" and ask the Russian partners to sign off, 
sometimes leaving the Russian partners with unclear expectations. When Russian partners 
would find out the partnership was awarded, they might come back and ask for equipment. The 
American partners, in control of the funds , would respond: "No, you don't need equipment. What 
you need is technical assistance, and we're coming over to visit you . Your part of the project is 
receiving our technical assistance." In th is way, partnerships could resemble closely the 
problems associated with external consultants. The officer stated that problems also would occur 
when one partner was designated with authority over the money, since this made the relationship 
unequal. 
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The officer (May 1998) believed that it was important for both Russian and American 
partners to be involved in establishing the rules and the financial arrangements-and the rules 
finally were those of USAID, even though the cooperative agreement established its own 
regulations . In participating in early institutional partnerships in Russia, the USAID officer 
requested that conferences be held to enable the Russian partners to understand the policies and 
procedures for cooperative agreements. Both sides needed to clearly understand what they were 
going to do and what each was going to contribute. The USAID officer (May 1998) advocated for 
these controls in the institutional partnerships programs, but added: 
These were good management tools, but it took a lot to get anybody to do 
anything about them and for them to accept them . It was never anything that 
was easy. Sometimes I was able to get USAID-Washington on my side, but I 
wasn't always able to . They would say, "This is a cooperative agreement and 
you can't do this ." IREX did not want USAID to do anything. Some American 
partners told the official that "IREX had told them not to contact us ." They will 
deny it. IREX always did . At the very beginning, there were a lot of partners 
doing things. There were so many layers in between. And I see this regardless 
of the partnership. You always have an umbrella organization that runs the 
partnerships. 
The USAID officer stated that the AIHA partnership was, like the typical partnership 
program, a "hands-off project." USAID could make a suggestion, but the partners do not have to 
follow up on the suggestion . The problem was that USAID had its own strategic objectives as a 
development organization with long experience in the work of international foreign assistance. 
Over the past decades, USAID has worked with the US government and identified issues and 
priorities. Partnerships "might or might not hit these." An example of a policy choice was 
between the emphasis on tertiary care development and primary care development. Should 
foreign assistance efforts focus on improving a neonatal intensive care unit, including the 
equipment, or promote effective prenatal care? These were fundamental choices that had to be 
made. 
Another major issue the official (May 1998) cited was in the type of approaches and 
solutions that the partnership promoted. According to the official, the Russians were especially 
fond of high technology solutions: 
I wish I had a nickel for every time I've heard a Russian say, 'We're not Uganda.' 
I could retire. There's truth to that. Other than the United States, who else has 
gotten a rocket up the air and built a space station? What was the first country to 
get somebody up in space? What they emphasized, where they worked, they 
achieved great things, but at the sacrifice of other areas. So they love the high 
tech, and they don't like low tech . And they equate low tech solutions often with 
developing countries . Neonatal intensive care units are one thing , handing out 
iron pills to every woman is another. We're not Uganda-though then they'll say 
that they have higher anemia rates than most countries . Low tech solutions 
aren't necessarily developing country-oriented, but there's an equation in Russia 
that anything that is low tech has to be developing country. We're not Uganda, 
and we're going to reject it. 
This suggested that even highly resourceful low technology programs may be seen as a 
compromise effort among the Russians, perhaps even a kind of low-cost, token foreign 
assistance. 
The USAID official (May 1998) admitted that the Magee-Savior's Hospital partnership 
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became a model site for partnerships by virtue of its location in Moscow. Sometimes the family 
planning center at Savior's was shown as a site for women's wellness even though it was not 
considered a model of USAID's women wellness centers . It was considered a program site, not a 
project site. Training was followed accord ing to Magee's protocols, and these may have differed 
from those at the USAID model sites. The USAID official noted some differences in information. 
In reflecting on partnerships, the USAID official also noted that partners could impart their own 
approaches without necessarily coordinating those with USAID approaches and policies. 
IV. Conclusions 
The AIHA program is a large cooperative agreement that has now disbursed over $140 
million in a wide array of programs in the NIS and CEEC. It should be noted that the formal site 
partnership approach as a policy tool of foreign assistance has been popular throughout the 
1990s in the NIS, even though some skepticism existed then and continues to exist over the 
extensive use of this approach in the region. AIHA continued to retain control over the activities 
of the partners, and could be seen to be operating with fairly top-down strategies. A dramatic 
example of this was the travel policy of the alliance. Partners submitted workplans with travel 
215 
plans and were not provided with or reimbursed for travel funds directly. Instead, AIHA in 
Washington developed an in-house travel mechanism that serviced the travel arrangements and 
sent tickets to the partners. This "efficiency'' gave AIHA central accounting control over travel, but 
it also left final decision authority in the hands of AIHA Washington staff. This contrasted with 
such development agencies as World Learn ing and IREX, which also were awarded cooperative 
agreements by USAID for programs in the NIS region but which gave partners more discretion 
and authority to determine and report on their activities. I REX and World Learning partnerships 
also differed from AIHA's approach in that the former agencies allocated more funding for 
administrative or coordinative functions and did not necessarily rely on volunteerism . Yet, 
selected programs from these agencies were also termed "partnerships." These organizations 
were similar in that they relied heavily on formal agreements with selected sites in the target 
countries and in that they were intended to work toward developing models and centers of 
excellence that could later be replicated elsewhere. The position of AIHA has been that this 
approach, at least in the NIS, was the most appropriate foreign assistance tool in that the 
transmission of broader-based strategies and pol icies through other types of programmatic 
vehicles would not work for a variety of reasons . AIHA acknowledges that the partnership 
approach, at least as practiced by AIHA itself, was an experiment to see whether private sector 
resources could be brought to bear on a major scale in international development efforts, whether 
US citizens could be engaged in foreign assistance, and whether such approaches would 
enhance the relationship between the United States and the NIS. AIHA suggests that its efforts 
as a whole have met that challenge. However, that does not mean that the partnership approach 
as a policy tool did not present a number of complications and issues with its various 
stakeholders. 
Analysis of the project's effectiveness can be considered in terms of the four categories 
(resource intensiveness, targeting, institutional capacity, and political risk) developed by Linder 
and Peters (1989) and Salamon (1989) as follows: 
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Resource Intensiveness: Rating: High. This category refers to the complexity of 
operations required for the project, including the level of technical assistance required 
and its costliness relative to the proposed solution. The solution proposed by AIHA has 
been to improve health care delivery in the NIS through a heavy emphasis on 
volunteerism in health services in the United States, peer-to-peer relationships, and 
model-building at more successful sites. AIHA believes it has successfully leveraged the 
enormous skill, energy and resources of a large number of health services professionals 
to improve health care delivery in the NIS region . Site partnerships are by definition a 
grass roots approach , and the AIHA believes that most, if not all, major policy changes in 
Russia and other republics will most likely occur only after demonstration models are 
available for replication since little direct transfer of American systems to NIS systems 
was possible. Grassroots approaches of this kind are by defin ition highly resource 
intensive, because bottom-up strategies take longer and involve more people than top-
down strategies, even when based on volunteerism in the private sector. To coordinate 
such strategies throughout the NIS has required major investments in time and 
resources . 
Targeting: Rating: Moderate . This category refers to the specificity of the project in 
terms of the intended population. Also in question are how precisely the population can 
be identified and how amenable to change the tool or intended solution could be. 
Though the AIHA project is designed to target the health care delivery system in 
the NIS and CEE, this system is made up of a vast number of components without a 
clear overall objective, in part because of scarce resources in the region and in part 
because of differences in belief about health care delivery. Most informants in the study 
could not identify a clear path of reform beyond the specifically targeted areas that have 
been the focus of AIHA efforts. These efforts have been in part selected because of the 
emphasis on improvements in low technology areas of the health system. In this sense, 
AIHA targeted reform by default, by what AIHA leadership and its partners believed was 
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possible within the constraints of the economic and health system in the NIS and within 
the constraints of the highly limited funding available for health services' reform or 
improvement through USAID. As a result of these constraints, AIHA may have made 
optimal use of the constraints under which it was operating, but the alliance may not have 
pursued the optimal solution to health care reform in the region . For instance, it was not 
clear from the research conducted in this study whether Russian leaders wanted to 
reform the most basic tenets of health care and move in the direction of the types of 
market-based systems in the United States. Models in OECD countries, especially 
Britain, might have health systems components that more resemble the social contract 
for health developed for over a century in Russia . 
An external evaluation conducted on AIHA in 1996 and 1997 credited the 
organization with making agile and effective shifts of focus from its original mission as a 
hospital partnership program. Increasingly, AIHA diversified its partnerships to focus on 
management education, healthy commun ities and primary care approaches. This 
brought the organization more in al ignment with USAID's country strategic objectives 
from 1995 and onward . However, as noted in the examples described in this study-the 
Savior's/Magee and Dubna/La Crosse partnerships-the early hospital based 
partnerships initiated programs akin to primary care approaches using the hospital as a 
base. 
Institutional capacity: Rating: High. This category refers to the ability of USAID, AIHA 
and the partnerships to deliver on the product. 
The strong case can be made the AIHA leveraged relatively modest resources 
from year to year (the first agreement with USAID was for $12 million) into a great deal of 
peer-to-peer activity. Most stakeholders were impressed with the level of volunteerism 
elicited out of the program. In add ition, AIHA decision-makers believed that the 
practitioners in the field were the best group to serve as partners, since they could share 
practical experience in the field and demonstrate on mutual site visits how tasks were 
done, how services were delivered . Though all parties in this project experienced 
considerable tensions for a variety of reasons, AIHA was able to deliver partnerships 
quickly to the region when no other major medical group would take responsibility for 
assistance in the region and it has sustained that effort throughout the 1990s. 
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Critics of the program noted that practitioners, often with little international 
experience, were not always the best group to formulate broader policy initiatives that 
needed to be developed as part of health reform in the region. Even if fine practical 
models were launched and sustained, practitioners did not necessarily have the policy 
experience to translate program outcomes into policy successes. 
Political Risk: Rating: Low. This category refers to the risk of the project objectives as it 
may affect the target country or region . As various stakeholders mentioned, a program 
that brings volunteers with expertise to share to specific sites in the NIS will be 
appreciated for that activity, unless issues of respect and financial control begin to 
consume the good will of the relationship . AIHA acknowledged that some of the 
partnerships would last and others would not. Some would continue long-term; others 
would be short-term. Some would be complex and ambitious; others would be relatively 
simple and limited in activity. The most recent cooperative agreement suggests formal 
status with AIHA for about three years before partners would "graduate" from the 
program . The political risk of an individual partnership thus was relatively low. 
On the other hand, the political risk that AIHA faced as a new organization in the 
early 1990s was relatively high. Skepticism toward the project approach only lessoned 
as AIHA demonstrated that it could get the job done. This left the project's skeptics 
intrigued, but not necessarily convinced that systemic reform would surface out of such 
atomic efforts. 
CHAPTER VI: 
Removing Radioactive Cesium from Milk Near Chernobyl: 
USAID's Cooperative Agreement with Selentec 
APPROACH: Experimental Technology 
Abstract: Part I of this case study on USAID's cooperative 
agreement with Selentec highlights the problem of the aftermath 
of the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Part II describes Selentec's 
efforts to implement an experimental technology at a dairy in 
Ovruch, Ukraine, to remove radioactive cesium still present in 
trace levels in the local milk supply. In Part Ill, stakeholder 
perspectives from USAID, Argonne Laboratories, Ovruch school 
staff, and the scientific research on the health effects of the 
accident are presented . In the final section, Part IV, the Selentec 
project is evaluated in terms of the four categories developed by 
Linder and Peters (1989) and Salamon (1989). 
I. Overview 
Statement of the Problem 
At 1:23 a.m. on April 26, 1986, a nuclear accident occurred in Reactor No. 4 of the 
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Chernobyl, Ukraine, nuclear power plant. The cause and magnitude of the accident will never be 
fully known, but sources reporting on the incident suggest that human error acting on poorly 
written test procedures triggered the tragic series of events. 1 Engineers began experimenting with 
the power system of Reactor No. 4 on April 25, in operation only since December 1983. They 
were testing the ability of the turbine generators to supply energy for a limited period in the event 
'Sources describing the Chernobyl accident tend to focus on the errors the engineers made in the 
process of conducting tests on April 25-26. Medvedev (1990), in The Legacy of Chernobyl, 
provides a more complex explanation for the missteps of the engineers at Reactor No. 4 in the 
early morning hours. He suggests several reasons for the accident: 1) the reactor was rushed 
into operation without adequate testing and the test conducted that night should have been 
completed before the reactor was put into full power; 2) the reactor's electrical generation system 
and other design defects made it unsafe; 3) the test program was inadequately planned and had 
not received formal approvals; 4) the test operators conducting the tests were inadequately 
prepared to carry out the tests and were unaware of danger thresholds, such as in withdrawing 
certain numbers of control rods . In spite of these issues, the operators may have believed a 
nuclear explosion was unthinkable. One operator at Chernobyl stated that technicians were 
taught in classrooms that reactors could not explode. This is supported in the International 
Advisory Committee's (1991) study. Early reports of the explosion were not believed because 
many Soviet nuclear experts did not consider an explosion of this nature possible. 
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of external power failure, until standby diesel generators could be brought into the operation . 
During procedures to reduce reactor power, the engineers conducting the test violated operating 
procedures, including overriding of in-built safety systems, and reduced the reactor to very low 
power- 30 megawatts compared to 700 to 1,000 megawatts (Appleby & Luttrell , 1993; Nuclear 
Energy Agency, 1987; WHO, 1995; Young, 1987). 
An uncontrolled surge in power occurred as test operators then tried to increase power 
withdrawing control rods that prevented the generation of neutrons released in nuclear fission. 
Within four seconds, reactor power increased to 100 times normal full power. In two explosions in 
quick succession , the roof of Reactor No. 4 was blown off and the reactor's core exposed. Fuel in 
the reactor ruptured , as a runaway chain reaction of uranium-235 in the fuel occurred , resulting in 
meltdown or exposure of the reactor's nuclear core, followed by a more powerful hydrogen gas 
explosion (Appleby & Luttrell, 1993; International Advisory Committee, 1991; Medvedev, 1990). 
Figure 6-1 on page 221 is a depiction of Reactor No. 4 shortly after the blast. 
In seconds, out into the atmosphere spewed tens of millions of becquerels2 of such 
radioactive elements as plutonium , iodine, cesium and strontium . Radioactive emissions 
continued in Reactor No. 4 amid frantic efforts to control fires that erupted in the initial explosions 
and to reseal the reactor core . A second fuel eruption occurred on May 5, increasing releases to 
70 percent of the accident on April 26, before leveling off at daily releases of 1 percent of the initial 
blast (International Advisory Committee, 1991 ). 
The news of the accident was not made public immediately outside of the Soviet Union, 
but a radioactive plume registered in Finland and Sweden in April 27 and fallout was observed 
from Hong Kong to North America by mid-May (Appleby & Luttrell, 1993; Medvedev, 1990). At the 
2 Radioactivity is the emission of particles or electromagnetic radiation from the nuclei of unstable 
atoms (Appleby & Harrison , 1993). Radioactive emissions are measured in kilobecquerels per 
square meter (kBq/m2) in the scientific literature on Chernobyl. A kilobecquerel is equal to one 
atomic disintegration per second (1 kBq = 1,000 atomic disintegrations per second} (WHO, 1995). 
The basic unit of radioactivity was changed from the curie to the becquerel , a smaller function , for 
ease in measuring minute amounts of radioactivity. A becquerel is an extremely small unit, equal 
to one billionth of a gram of radium (Gonzalez, 1996). 
Figure 1: Reactor No. 4 after Chernobyl accident . Source: Ljabah , M . (Ed .) 
(1996). lllMeHHfl aopi YopH06111!lb [[he Name of the Dawn : Chernobyl J. Kiev . 
Ukraine : YopHo611!IlbiHTepiHcpopM , p . 2 . 
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end of May, daily releases into the atmosphere continued to be higher than the total release of the 
Three Mile Island reactor in 1979 in the United States (Medvedev, 1990). Emissions continued 
until October 1986, when a concrete containment structure called "the sarcophagus" was built. 
The picture shown in Figure 6-2 on page 223 shows workers building the sarcophagus. 
Reactor No. 4 in Chernobyl , housed in its aging sarcophagus, today stands in grim 
testimony to its dubious legacy. It is not only the site of the largest industrial accident in history, 
but of the largest short-term release of radioactive materials into the atmosphere ever recorded 
(International Advisory Committee, 1991 ). The total radioactivity emitted from the Chernobyl 
nuclear accident is estimated to be 200 times that of the combined releases of the nuclear bomb 
explosions on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II (International Chernobyl Project, 
1991; WHO, 1995). 
By November 1986, when construction of the concrete sarcophagus was completed, 28 
persons were listed as dead from burns and radiation sickness. Up to 800,000 people called 
"liquidators," both civilian and military, were exposed to short-term, but high doses of radiation as 
they participated in rescue, cleanup and construction efforts . According to World Health 
Organization (WHO, 1995), an estimated five million people in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia- an 
area roughly the size of Texas-were exposed to potentially health-affecting levels of radiation 
from the accident. A WHO report (1995) estimated that about 70 percent of the total emissions 
from the accident fell on Belarus, located north of Chernobyl. 
The health effects from the Chernobyl accident on this population continue to be 
investigated. Some effects may surface many years or even decades after exposure. 
WHO (1995), for instance, estimates that the incidence of thyroid cancers , a disease commonly 
linked to radiation exposure, may not peak until the years 2005 to 2010. Health experts also 
continue to study this population because radionuclides are still present in the environment and 
little is known about the low-level effects of exposure over a long period . The many indirect factors 
involved in the accident, including bans on consumption of certain foods and major upheavals for 
F igure 2 : Workers construct the sarcophagus following the Chernobyl accident. 
Source : Ljabah , M . (Ed . ) (1996). i/!MeHH8 3opi YopH06'1nb IThe Name of the 
Dawn· Chernobyl] . Kiev. Ukraine : YopH06'1nbiHTepiHcpopM. p . 55. 
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hundreds of thousands of families, make it difficult to determine health status based only on 
radiation exposure. A radioactive cesium isotope, cesium-137 (Cs 137), with a half-life of 
30 years, 3 has been the main focus of health concern in the region, though a number of other 
isotopes were spewed into the atmosphere. 
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Of the more common isotopes emitted after a nuclear explosion, some which will remain 
radioactive in the area the longest are plutonium-based . Plutonium is bel ieved to be dangerous 
because of the high intensity of biologically damaging radiation emitted in its slow decay. If 
plutonium is absorbed into the body, where it is known to concentrate in the bones, it remains 
permanently trapped (Cohen, 197 4 ). The greatest concentration of plutonium particles settled 
within a 30-mile radius of the blast, an area designated by Soviet authorities at the time of the 
explosion as unfit for human habitation . Nearly 135,000 people living with in this radius were 
evacuated within a few days of the accident. The circular dotted line on the map on page 7 on 
Figure 3 designates th is 30- kilometer zone- referred to variously as the Restricted , Exclusion or 
Forbidden Zone. The half lives for the most common plutonium isotopes present in this zone, Pu-
239 (Pu239) and Pu-240 (Pu240) , are 24,100 years and 6,537 years, respectively (Appleby & 
Harrison, 1993; Shapiro, 1993). The distribution of plutonium was estimated by the USSR State 
Committee on Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring based on aerial photographs and 
3 The half life is defined as the amount of time in which half the nuclei of a given radioisotope 
disintegrates. Radiation is the collective name given to particles emitted from unstable atoms that 
are shooting off at high speed. As these particles are emitted the nucleus of the atom loses 
energy and is said to decay (Appleby & Harrison, 1993; Cohen, 1974). Scientists distinguish 
between a chemical and a nuclear reaction . Cohen (1974) explains the difference : In the burning 
of coal , for instance, a chemical reaction takes place as carbon atoms in the coal are struck by 
oxygen atoms from the air. Carbon dioxide is formed as they interact, in wh ich the electrons fall 
into a lower energy configuration . Particles of light shoot out as energy is released , and these 
strike surrounding atoms, wh ich in turn are heated . Nuclear reactions are caused when the nuclei 
of atoms collide in an element such as uran ium and the constituent parts of the atoms are 
rearranged into lower energy configurations . The excess energy emitted amounts to high energy 
particles of light. But a nuclear reaction involves much more energy transfer than a chemical 
reaction . Cohen (1974) states that the energy released in a pound of material from a nuclear 
reaction can be three million times greater than the energy released in burn ing a pound of coal. In 
addition , because radioactive elements decay at varied rates, the material remaining from a 
nuclear reaction continues to emit energy, or radiation , sometimes for long periods. This does not 
usually happen in a chemical reaction . 
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soil and water samples taken after the accident. The official map of the committee's findings is 
shown on page 226. Though the plutonium is sinking deeper and deeper into the soil and 
waterways as time passes, the Restricted Zone will wear a mantel of plutonium for many centuries 
to come. 
In the years following the accident, in part from pressure from the international 
community, the remaining three reactors at Chernobyl were closed down one by one. In October 
1991, a huge fire forced the closure of Reactor No. 2. Reactor No. 1 was closed in November 
1996 when its safe lifespan ran out. Reactor No. 3, located next to Reactor No. 4, was shut down 
at the time of the accident, but was started up again in 1998, in spite of public outcries from the 
international community, to supply badly-needed energy for the people of Ukraine. Potentially 
dangerous mechanical, electrical and structural issues continue to arise in each of the reactors 
after the 1986 accident at the Chernobyl site (IAEA, 1992; Stone, 1999). 
Following the startup of Reactor No. 3, President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine negotiated 
with western countries to win hundreds of mill ions of dollars in return for closing the outdated and 
dangerous plant. Kuchma admitted that Reactor No. 3 would have been forced to be shut down 
for capital repairs, estimated to take a year and a half to complete. In December 2000, a short 
time before the officially designated date of closure on the plant, an ice-covered electrical wire 
snapped and forced the temporary shutdown of the plant. It proved to be the last day of 
operations for Reactor No. 3. Ukraine reportedly looks to Western countries to provide funds to 
build two replacement reactors at Rivne and Khmelnitska. Estimated short-term costs to shut 
down Chernobyl and to build the new reactors are expected to run $1 .2 to $2 billion . 
As for damaged Reactor No. 4 and its sarcophagus, most scientists believe the possibility 
of another explosion is remote. However, political and scientific policymakers alike acknowledge 
the need for a better structure to entomb the station, and cracking is evident in the edifice. Inside 
the sarcophagus is reported to be 90 percent of the original uranium fuel, now solidified, mixed 
with such materials as sand and boron poured on the fire at the time of the explosion as well as 
metal and concrete from inside the reactor. A small number of scientists believe that the threat of 
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Figure 3: Estimated Plutonium-239 and Plutonium-240 released in the 
Chernobyl accident. Source: International Advisory Committee (1991). The 
International Chernobyl Project-Surface Contamination Maps . Vienna. Austria : 
International Atomic Energy Agency . 
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another explosion exists from rain leaking into the edifice. The sarcophagus was built with open 
areas to allow for ventilation, but they are carefully monitored (International Advisory Committee, 
1991; Stone, 1999). Others are concerned that the changing chemical composition of the 
multicolored "chernobylite" mixture may pose a threat (Schmidt, 1995; Stone, 1999). One report 
stated that this mixture, along with tons of radioactive dust believed to be building up in the edifice, 
would be "hot" for hundreds of thousands of years to come (Schmidt, 1995). Because of the 
uranium in the mixture, this estimate may low. 
Chernobyl stands in the public eye as a reminder of its worst fears about nuclear reactors . 
Though most nuclear scientists believe that nuclear power is a relatively safe form of energy, the 
public does not share this perception (Williams, 1998). As A.J . Gonzalez (1996), a nuclear 
scientist, writes," .. . the public at large, appear to be convinced that radioactive materials are an 
undesired, evil by-product of the nuclear era and that the radiations they emit and the toxicity they 
entail are the fifth rider of the Apocalypse-a menace to the survival of mankind" (p. 49).4 
Policy case study described 
The subject of this case study is a project that proposed one solution to abating the health 
and economic problems left in the wake of the Chernobyl accident, a USAID cooperative 
agreement signed in December 1996 with Selective Environmental Technologies (Selentec), Inc., 
Atlanta, Georgia. The project proposed to remove cesium-137, the most important isotope still 
present in the region affected by Chernobyl , from the milk collected in a dairy at Ovruch 
4 As of 1990, the United States had 111 commercial nuclear power plants in operation. 
Expansion of such plants was halted in the United States because of the public concern for safety, 
the economics of nuclear power, and the problems of waste disposal (National Research Council , 
1992). Most public fear focuses on the imminent threat of nuclear explosion, while most nuclear 
scientists believe nuclear energy is a relatively safe form of energy production (Williams, 1998). 
Scientific concern for the safety of Chernobyl is focused on the operating standards and 
maintenance, which do not approach U.S. standards (Schmidt, 1995; Stone, 1999). 
Less public attention is paid to the problems of nuclear waste management, an issue that 
the Chernobyl accident also highlights. Spent fuel in current reactors contains some fission 
products with extraordinarily long half lives. The half life for one such isotope, Technetium-99 (Tc-
99), a transition metal element that does not exist on earth naturally, is 210,000 years . The half 
life of lodine-129, another fission product in spent fuel, is 16 million years (OECD, 1997; Shapiro, 
1993). 
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(alternatively spelled Obruch, Ovruc), a district of about 80,000 Ukrainian residents located in an 
agricultural region about 80 kilometers due west of Chernobyl. 
Selentec demonstrated that its experimental technology, called the MAG*SEP process, 
was able to remove much of the cesium-137 present in milk . At the beginning of the project, 
Ukrainian scientists connected to the project believed that milk was the single largest source of 
radiation present in the food chain . Selentec installed its experimental MAG*SEP prototype at 
Ovruch dairy, one of the officially acknowledged contaminated regions in northwest Ukraine, and 
cesium-137 (Cs 137) was being removed from experimental samples of milk at this site. 
In late 1997, with scientific validation studies still underway in Ovruch on the MAG*SEP 
process, Selentec filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 because of the company's inability to 
pay back investor loans. In Fall 1998, Selentec was dissolved as a legal entity and company 
patents, both domestic and international , were transferred to investors in lieu of payment on loans. 
A follow-up proposal submitted to USAID in early 1998 to expand the MAG*SEP system into more 
dairies receiving milk contaminated with cesium-137 was not approved for funding . Validation 
testing of the system continued in Ovruch through the Summer of 1999, when the dairy expected 
to run out of MAG*SEP particles to continue the process. Experimentation with the prototype 
MAG*SEP system was halted in Fall 1999 pending new arrangements to be made with the current 
patent holder of the process, Kiwi International. 
This study provides a brief description of the process leading up to the cooperative 
agreement, including background on Selentec and the MAG*SEP technology. The political , 
technological and scientific issues related to the implementation of the project are discussed in 
terms of how they impacted the strategic intent of the cooperative agreement sponsored by 
USAID. Documentation of the case is based on site visits to Kiev and Ovruch, Ukraine (May, 
October 1998; interviews with representatives from the Coordinator's Office of the NIS, 
Washington, DC, (November 1997) and USAID, Washington , DC, and Kiev (February, May, 
October 1998); and decision makers connected to the project in Kiev and Ovruch , Ukraine (May 
1998), and at Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Illinois. A Freedom of Information request 
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filed with USAID in 1998 to obtain further documentation on the project was subsequently denied. 
Michael Dunn, former president and chief spokesman for Selentec, Inc., Atlanta, Georgia, 
supplied the proposals used in writing this study. Mr. Dunn also served as the chief spokesman 
for Selentec's activities for this study and provided feedback on early drafts (May 1998; February 
2000). 
Representatives of the NIS Coordinator's Office, State Department, Washington, D.C., 
recommended this cooperative agreement in November 1997 as an example of a political 
"lightening rod" case (Cohen & Kuskevics, 1997). This project differs from other projects in the 
study for three reasons. First, unlike most proposals submitted to USAID, the initial proposal 
submitted by Selentec was unsolicited, that is, it was not the result of a formal request for 
proposals issued by the agency. Pressure for funding this proposal came from members of 
Congress and the Coordinator's office, and executive management at USAID was eventually 
asked to approve Selentec's proposal, after several negotiated revisions, as a cooperative 
agreement. Second, the MAG*SEP technology involved was experimental, in that it was not a 
proven technology in commercial use in the United States. Representatives of the Coordinator's 
Office and of USAID realized from the beginning that this made the outcome of the case more 
risky than many cooperative agreements . Third , the application involved a consumable, milk, with 
attending worries over the impact on the targeted population . Each of these factors affected the 
implementation and outcome of the project. 
A major issue that arose in the case revolved around the question of the known effects of 
cesium-past, present and future-on the population in the Contaminated Zone. The Contaminated 
Zone, to be distinguished from the 30-kilometer Restricted Zone, covers a broad geographical 
area encompassing parts of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia known to have had potentially damaging 
levels of radiation as a result of the accident. Discussion of the scientific issues of the case is 
based on a review of the literature on radiation related to Chernobyl. An attempt is made to 
address this question as it bears on the case . Conclusions and recommendations are noted in the 
last section of the case study. 
II. Selentec's developmental technology 
The MAG*SEP technology 
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Selentec's patented MAG*SEP process showed considerable technological promise.5 
The technology is designed to adsorb selected contaminants from aqueous solutions such as 
groundwater and remove trace amounts of such chemicals as arsenic, radium, copper, mercury, 
iron, lead, nickel, and cobalt, among others. The process appears misleadingly simple. Particles 
from 100 to 500 microns in size, specially selected depending on the chemical makeup of a 
contaminant, are added to a contained amount of liquid solution . The core of each of the particles 
is made of magnetic material (magnetite), surrounded by a polymer coating mixed with an 
inorganic adsorber. Part of the process of perfecting the technology for a given context depended 
on finding the material that most effectively adsorbed the contaminant. 
After the particles are added to a fixed amount of a contaminated fluid, a magnetic filter or 
collector then separates out the particles with the targeted contaminant now attached to the 
particles. Because the process is magnetic, involving ion exchange, the chemistry of the 
remaining solution once particles are removed in principle remains unchanged. The strength of 
the process, then, is not in removing all chemicals or contaminants from a liquid solution, such as 
in purifying water, but in extracting one or two undesirable contaminants present in trace amounts 
in a given solution (Dunn, May 1998; Selentec, 1997). 
Though not in place in a commercial operation in the United States or elsewhere, the 
MAG*SEP technology had been tested experimentally in 1993 at Argonne National Laboratories, 
a research lab of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) located in Argonne, Illinois, a suburb of 
Chicago. To perfect the system for commercial use, however, the technology needed to move out 
of the laboratory and onto a beta site. The process needed to be tested with larger quantities of 
solution, subject to real world limitations and challenges. Complicating this process was the fact 
that each contaminant presented a unique set of problems to overcome. 
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Management of the company believed that by the early 1990s, the technology had 
reached a critical juncture: pending successful completion of scientific validation studies, the 
MAG*SEP process was ready to be commercially marketed. But this also created financial 
vulnerability for the developers. Successful commercialization required private investors and 
clients and complicated approvals for new chemical processes from such governing bodies as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the case 
of consumables . According to Dunn (May 1998), permission to use a new technology required 
lengthy and complicated application processes at both the federal and state levels, and 
requirements from state to state differed so that applications had to be filed in individual states. 
This cumbersome process created a formidable barrier to entry into commercialization for small 
development companies with limited investment capital (Dunn, May 1998; Selentec, 1997). 
Dunn (May 1998) emphasized that MAG*SEP process was not limited to cesium removal , 
or even to chemical or radioactive contaminant removal from fluids . A wide variety of applications 
were possible even in milk, such as removal of protein, enzymes or vitamin molecules from milk 
solutions. 
Early research and development of MAG*SEP 
Between 1989 and 1996, research and development on the MAG*SEP process and 
related technologies were primarily funded by grants and contracts from the U.S. Department of 
Energy. Three patented technologies emerged from Selentec's efforts, each designed for 
environmental remediation , or removal of contaminants from selected sources. Development 
occurred under the legal name of Bradtec, Ltd ., formed in April 1989, with its offices on the site of 
the University of Western England, Bristol. Bradtec, Ltd ., itself was formed in the phaseout of 
Central Electric Generating Board in the United Kingdom, when the company founders obtained 
5 All information on the MAG*SEP process is taken from Selentec's proposals to USAID and 
company marketing literature; newspaper articles on Bradtec and Selentec; and interviews with 
Michael Dunn . 
rights and licenses to continue pursuit of some technologies developed under this program 
(HPLC, November 1992). 
232 
In 1991 , Bradtec, Ltd ., consisted of 10 employees, mostly industrial chemists (Bradtec, 
Ltd ., 1993). Principle inventor and developer was Adel Hendawi, Ph.D. Bradtec-US, Inc., was 
soon formed with a small office in Atlanta, Georgia. President, co-founder and chief spokesman 
for Bradtec-US, Inc., was Michael Dunn . Bradtec, Ltd . distinguished itself in 1991 by winning R&D 
Magazine's "R&D 100 Award" for one of its technologies, an electrochemical ion exchange 
process that removed radioactive elements from decontamination solutions used in nuclear power 
plants. The award was shared with Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto, the beta site for 
the technology (Bradtec, Ltd., 1993). Bradtec was legally reconstituted in the mid-1990s as 
Selentec, as the commercial potential of MAG*SEP moved forward. 
Versions of the MAG*SEP process were used to explore how to recover plutonium 
leaking out of the Department of Energy's Mound, Ohio, nuclear facility and to recover minerals 
from the Berkeley Pit Water site (Johnson, Negri & Oriandini, 1993). Development and validation 
testing for the MAG*SEP technology was contracted to Don Johnson, Associate Division Director, 
Energy Systems Division, Argonne National Laboratories in Argonne, Illinois, a large Department 
of Energy research facility. The first laboratory testing on the MAG*SEP process at Argonne 
began in 1992 and continues to this day at Ovruch Dairy in Ukraine (Johnson, Negri & Oriandini, 
1993; Johnson, April 1999). 
The direction of the company's research and development took a major turn in 1993. 
Early in 1993, Bradtec representatives and officials from Ukraine began to explore the possibility 
of applying the MAG*SEP process for radioactive contamination still found in minute amounts in 
ground soil and water from the 1986 industrial accident at Chernobyl. Bradtec-US President 
Michael Dunn stated that the company originally was interested in cleanup of certain radioactive 
hot spots near the Dnieper River in Ukraine, a source of drinking water for the country's 
population . But discussion soon turned to another source of contamination, cesium-137 and 
strontium-90 still found in milk, absorbed through the food chain by dairy cattle. 
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Attention focused in particular on cesium-137, since Ukrainian officials believed it had 
significantly greater biological impact. Ukrainian scientists estimated in 1994 that up to 80 percent 
of all sources of radioactivity in the local population came from cesium in milk, a major source of 
nutrition for the population . The idea arose to install MAG*SEP treatment systems in Ukrainian 
dairies to filter out cesium-137 from the milk processed at the dairies in the contaminated zone. 
The map on Figure 6-4 (page 234) depicts the area of contamination for strontium-90 estimated 
by the USSR State Committee on Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring following the 
accident. The map in Figure 6-5 (page 235), also the work of the same committee, shows the 
much larger estimated area of contamination for cesium-137 than for Strontium-90. This is one 
explanation as to why scientists focused most heavily on the long-term effects of cesium-137 on 
the population rather than on any other single isotope emitted in the accident. 
The idea to remove radiation from milk also had media appeal. From a lead provided by 
Selentec, Chicagoland Television News on April 3, 1993, developed and ran a story about a new 
technology that would remove radioactive cesium from milk in the region near Chernobyl. 
Featured in the story were Professor Oles Piatak, Deputy Director of the Ukrainian Research 
Center for Radiation Medicine (URCRM), visiting from Kiev, Michael Dunn of Bradtec, and 
Don Johnson of Argonne Laboratories. CNN picked up the story, and three days later, on April 6, 
aired a similar segment on the effort to remove radioactive cesium from milk affected by the 
Chernobyl accident. Segments of a promotional videotape developed by Bradtec for the 
Department of Energy were aired in both segments. Dr. Piatak witnessed laboratory tests of the 
MAG*SEP system at Argonne Laboratories during his visit. Following this meeting, on August 18, 
1993, Bradtec signed with URCRM in Kiev a joint agreement for scientific collaboration . A small 
mobile MAG*SEP unit was later taken into villages in the Rovno region to demonstrate the new 
process (Dunn, 10 September 1993). 
In the meantime, Bradtec was restructured and Selentec became the US operating entity. 
The company's patents continued to gain recogn ition in the area of radioactive waste 
management. The DOE was one agency that recognized the considerable promise of the 
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MAG*SEP technology and funded Selentec's technology demonstration efforts. AI Gore, Vice 
President of the United States, announced the Administration's strategy for economic 
development through technology at a conference in Denver on July 15, 1994. Senior DOE officials 
and leading environmental companies in the environmental field attended the conference. The 
DOE provided ten exhibits at the announcement ceremony, one of which was Selentec's, the only 
private-sector company represented . Another honor was Selentec's selection in 1996 to 
participate in the Administration's Rapid Commercialization Initiative (RCI). The goal of the 
initiative was to take environmental technologies that showed promise and to move them rapidly 
through the regulatory process so that they could be implemented more quickly and be exported 
to help with U.S. trade issues. Out of about 400 applications, ten technologies were chosen by a 
joint committee of the Departments of Commerce, Energy, and Defense. MAG*SEP was one of 
five technologies awarded for treatment of contamination . The other four proposals selected 
focused on measuring and evaluating the nature of contamination (Dunn, May 1998; Selentec, 
April 1998). 
Selentec continued to negotiate aggressively with several U.S. and foreign agencies to 
move forward a plan to install MAG*SEP systems in Ukraine or Belarus. But it was not until 1996 
that Selentec was able to put into action a plan to install a full-scale MAG*SEP milk treatment 
system in Ukraine. In the intervening months, Selentec and Argonne National Laboratory 
continued to work on finding the most effective adsorber for cesium-137 in milk, a much more 
complex liquid than water, and for determining the refinements required to develop a full scale 
working prototype. 
Selentec and USAID's cooperative agreement 
Selentec in January 1996 submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Environmental Division 
of Environmental Policy and Technology at USAID. Initially rejected, the proposal went through 
several drafts and was finally signed off in December 1996. The original proposal , submitted in 
conjunction with Argonne National Laboratory, was to "optimize the application of the technology 
for milk , juice, baby food and water in Ukraine" (Selentec, January 1996, p. i). Following 
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successful testing and demonstration of the technology in these applications, Selentec (January 
1996) proposed to "establish a Ukrainian business venture for private sector application of the 
technology in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia" (p . i). Total estimated cost for the initial proposal was 
$8.5 million . At the end of negotiations, several months later, Selentec was awarded funds for a 
single prototype to be tested on milk. Cooperative agreement NIS-A-0097-00002-00 called for 
program costs of $1,386,963, with USAID supplying up to $900,000 of these costs . Selentec was 
responsible for the remaining $486,963, supplied by private investors, including Dunn himself. 
This sum excluded Department of Energy grants to the organizations responsible for 
scientific validation studies of the process, Argonne National Laboratory ($240,000) and the State 
Committee for Ukrainian Food Industry ($240,000) . The project could not be funded without such 
validation studies, since it involved a technology not in commercial use in the United States and 
the chemical processing of foods. According to Don Johnson (April 1999) of Argonne National 
Laboratory, the $480,000 in Department of Energy funding allocated for th is agreement came out 
of Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) funds . These funds were available for projects that 
encouraged transfer of personnel out of testing and research on military nuclear applications to 
work on peacetime civilian projects. IPP funds required that 50 percent of personnel involved in 
the project be located in one of the former Soviet Union states. After some effort, scientific 
personnel from Ukraine were located to fill at least 50 percent of the research slots required for 
the project. 
According to Dunn (May 1998), negotiations to obtain foreign assistance support were 
difficult. Selentec had worked with the Department of Energy in the developmental stages of the 
company's three patented technologies, including MAG*SEP, but department officials told the 
company that they did not have a mandate to support commercialization of the project. DOE 
officials made introductions for Dunn to the Department of State, including the office of Timothy 
Wirth, Under Secretary for Global Affairs. The project received the endorsement of then U.S. 
Ambassador to Ukraine, William Miller. A letter from Ambassador Miller to Timothy Wirth, dated 
December 5, 1995, outlines a political agenda for funding the project. Miller called attention to 
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Ukraine's intent to shut down the entire Chernobyl reactor station by the year 2000, and the 
country's formal agreement signed in January 1994 to give up all nuclear weapons. Applauding 
these political efforts, Miller (5 December 1995) states: 
The contamination of the land and water of Ukraine by the effects of the 
Chernobyl disaster of April 1986 is a continuing catastrophe and an ever present 
danger. The technology I discussed in detail with Mr. Dunn seems to me to offer 
a remarkable opportunity to give Ukraine some clearly beneficial assistance that 
would not only help alleviate the consequences for many people in Ukraine, but 
would also give the U.S. a tremendous political reward. The project idea of using 
the technology to remove cesium isotopes from milk and juice and heavy metals 
from the water supply seems to me a first priority idea. If it proves to be feasible, 
I would like to put the project into effect as soon as possible and to get it 
underway now as a direct response to the decision made by Ukraine under 
President Kuchma's leadership to close Chernobyl .... I would like to do this as 
soon as possible because it would demonstrate in a humane, practical way our 
gratitude for the Ukrainian decision on Chernobyl and our concern for the burden 
its people have to bear as a result of the Chernobyl disaster. (pp. 1-2). 
Though Miller's endorsement added strength to the project's chances for funding, Dunn 
(May 1998) suggested that it was Ambassador Morningstar himself, NIS Coordinator in 1996, who 
made the funding possible. Dunn stated that the funding came from Morningstar's office "as a 
special transfer of funds to AID to support this project. There might have been other mechanisms 
available, but we were not aware of them and did not have access into whom it would be 
appropriate to seek that funding . It was through Ambassador Morningstar's assistance that we 
really moved this project through USAID" (Dunn, May 1998). 
USAID's cooperative agreement was intended to assist in the development of a design 
and installation of a prototype MAG*SEP system at Ovruch. In return for housing the prototype, 
the Ovruch dairy, at Ukraine's expense, made major adjustments in its milk processing equipment 
to accommodate the MAG*SEP treatment process, an in-kind donation to the project estimated to 
cost more than $1 million in U.S. dollar terms. Estimated costs for the project in 1997, including 
contributions from all parties, are shown in Table 6-1 below. 
TABLE 6-1 
Funding Sources for the Selentec Project 
USAID Cooperative Agreement 
Selentec and other interested parties 
State Committee of Ukraine for Food Industry (facility support) 
Department of Energy: Argonne National Laboratory ( 1997) 
Department of Energy: State Committee of Ukraine 
for Food Industry Testing ( 1997) 
TOTAL: 
$900,000 
76,500 
1,090,000 
240,000 
240,000 
$3,046,500 
Source: Technology Acquisition Company, LLC (17 April 1998). Decontamination of milk in 
Ukraine by applying the MAG*SEP technology: Technology and price proposal. Unsolicited 
proposal submitted to CNFA and USAID, Washington , DC. 
The early implementation work proceeded quickly. The time line for the cooperative 
agreement was expected to be as short as 12 to 15 months. A MAG*SEP prototype was 
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fabricated by Cadence Industries, Atlanta, Georgia, and the equipment was shipped to Ukraine in 
September 1997. In the meantime, Argonne Laboratories worked closely with Selentec to perfect 
composition of the MAG*SEP particles that were the key to removing cesium-137 effectively from 
the samples to be brought into the Ovruch dairy. By November the prototype was installed and 
was up and running . In addition to installation of the prototype, Selentec was responsible for 
preparing the test procedures, reviewing the procedure with Argonne National Laboratory, 
assisting the Argonne and Ukrainian staffs by responding to safety review questions, and 
providing technical support, including training to personnel on-site . 
A ceremony was held on November 17, 1997, in Ovruch, which United States and 
Ukrainian officials attended , to commission the installation of the first MAG*SEP prototype at the 
milk canning facility. No USAID or Department of State officials were present. Michael Dunn was 
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awarded a medal by the Congress of Ukraine for his outstanding contribution to the development 
of Ukraine.7 
At the ceremony, a number of endorsement letters were read aloud in support of the 
process. William Desmond, Director of the U.S. Department of Energy's IPP Program, Office of 
Arms Control and Nonproliferation, whose office had supported the research and development on 
MAG*SEP, wrote: 
I would like you to know of our pride in the successful beginning of 
commercialization of your project. It will make a very real difference in the lives of 
many people. Your project truly embodies the vision of the Initiatives for 
Proliferation Prevention Program in creating commercial opportunities for former 
weapons technology and personnel. (Desmond, 1997, p. 1) 
Terry Lash, Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology, U.S. Department 
of Energy, wrote : 'The project represents real work that can touch the lives of people and gives 
hope in the aftermath of the 1986 catastrophe" (Lash, November 1997, p. 1 ). And Newt Gingrich, 
then Speaker of the House of Representatives , stated in his endorsement: "This project 
establishes a standard of how public and private sectors can work together toward a common 
humanitarian goal" (Gingrich, November 1997, p. 1). 
In the ensuing months, Argonne and Ukrainian officials continued to run validation tests 
as part of their responsibilities in the cooperative agreement. Testing in Ukraine was the 
responsibility of the Ukraine Academy of Sciences, including the Ukrainian Research Center for 
Radiation Medicine (URCRM). All testing related to suitability of the process for a consumable, 
since milk was a designated food substance, was the responsibility of the Ukrainians. Tests 
conducted at Argonne Laboratories focused solely on demonstrating the cesium capacity for the 
particles, determining the most effective particle type and constitution, and insuring the particles 
could function after sanitizing. 
7 The award was presented to Dunn by the Duma, the congressional body of Ukraine, at the 
installation of the MAG*SEP system. 
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As not infrequently happens in experimental prototype testing, delays occurred. 
Researchers found that the water supply at Ovruch contained bacteria , which could contaminate 
future testing. So final testing of the prototype was extended into Spring 1998, even though 
funding was running out. The Department of Energy extended another $240,000 to Argonne 
National Laboratory to continue testing through 1998. Successful completion of tests was needed 
to obtain Ukrainian certification of the system, which would in turn allow the Ovruch dairy to use 
the prototype commercially. No milk run through the MAG*SEP prototype was consumed: the 
government of Ukraine needed to certify use of the treated milk for the public following completion 
of all testing . 
To continue the treatment process through 1998, more particles were needed . Argonne 
ran out of particles by late 1997, and the dairy at Ovruch was operating in small batch modes to 
continue running tests. No new particles could be produced because of pending Chapter 11 legal 
action by Selentec. To improve operating conditions at the dairy, Selentec in its second proposal 
to USAID in April 1998 suggested that a better water treatment system be installed, rinse 
operations improved, and key components protected from scaling and corrosion . The estimated 
cost for these upgrades was projected to cost $466,354. 
Testing throughout the process, however, appeared to demonstrate the potential of the 
technology for effectively removing cesium, and only cesium, from milk. In 1993, tests conducted 
by the Ukrainian Research Center for Radiation Medicine (URCRM) in collaboration with Selentec 
showed that the MAG*SEP particles could remove 94.5% of cesium from contaminated water 
samples. Demonstration tests conducted at Argonne Laboratories in April 1993 on cesium-spiked 
milk showed the MAG*SEP system at that point could remove 77.2 percent of the cesium. 
Validation tests continued on all aspects of the system to insure proper operation. Later URCRM 
tests on milk focused on such issues as the optimal concentration of particles for a batch of milk, 
the amount of contact time needed for transfer of cesium ions from the milk to the particles, and 
the optimal size for the particles. Some of the most important tests conducted by URCRM showed 
no significant changes in milk density, acidity, fat, protein, amino acids, calcium, magnesium or 
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fluorine content after treatment in the system. Researchers at the Ukrainian Scientific Research 
Institute of Nutrition noted no detrimental effect to the milk's color, smell, or chemical or nutritional 
quality. Finally, tests on rats that were fed the particles showed no adverse reactions, and the 
conclusion of the researchers was that the treated milk was safe for human consumption. 
UCRCM continued to run tests on the milk before and after treatment, on the particle integrity, and 
on microbial growth in processed milk. All tests were to be completed before the approval of the 
use of the milk for consumption . 
Unable to obtain an extension of the cooperative agreement with USAID, Selentec 
submitted a proposal in April 1998 directly to the Citizens Network for Foreign Affairs , Inc. 
(CNFA), a lobbying group in Washington . The proposal was submitted under a new corporate 
entity, Technology Acqu isition Company, LLC. The goal in this new proposal was to extend the 
system into seven designated dairies in Ukraine and to upgrade the prototype operation in 
Ovruch. A summary of the proposed financing requested by Technology Acquisition Company is 
depicted in Table 6-2 below. 
Dunn (May 1998) stated in an interview that CNFA already supported grants in Ukraine 
and appeared to be a more suitable match for th is project than USAID. A not for profit 
organization established in the Bush Admin istration , CNFA's mission was, according to Dunn, to 
deploy foreign assistance to support U.S. pol itical objectives. CNFA was responsible for about 
$30 mill ion out of USAID's $225 million budget in Ukraine. CNFA already supported work in 
Russia and Ukraine related to dairy and herd industry development and product distribution and 
sales. Milk decontamination, he suggested, "fit neatly into those areas because as herds are 
developed, that produces larger quantities of milk . . . " (May 1998). Dunn believed CNFA had the 
ability to hire technical experts to support a particular project and evaluate it, "whereas one of the 
things AID has said recently is they didn't have the technical expertise to evaluate the project. 
CNFA can overcome that" (May 1998). 
TABLE 6-2: 
Funding Request: Proposal Two 
Engineering 
Upgrade Ovruch system for full-scale production 
Development of Ukrainian resources to support and deploy 
MAG*SEP treatment systems 
Deployment of 7 MAG*SEP treatment systems 
Department of Energy: Argonne National Laboratory (1998) 
Department of Energy: State Committee of Ukraine 
for Food Industry testing (1998) 
TOTAL: 
1,058,659 
466,354 
329,908 
10,463,455 
240,000 
240,000 
$12,810,534 
SOURCE: Technology Acquisition Company, LLC (17 April 1998). Decontamination of milk in 
Ukraine by applying the MAG*SEP technology: Technology and price proposal. Unsolicited 
proposal submitted to CNFA and USAID, Wash ington, DC. 
But the proposal was not funded. Wh ile Selentec waited for a decision on the second 
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proposal , the company's primary lenders had already placed demands upon Selentec and refused 
to continue investment arrangements. Unable to obtain the necessary investment capital, 
Selentec filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in December 
1997. 
Even while this legal action was taking place, the MAG*SEP process was selected as one 
of the top 100 technological developments of 1997 by R&D Magazine. Studt (1997), editor-in-
chief, congratulated company president Michael Dunn on his "magnificent accomplishment" (p. 1 ). 
With no funding forthcom ing from CNFA, Selentec divested of its patents , both national 
and international, to settle investor claims in Spring 1998. By Fall 1998, Selentec was dissolved as 
a legal entity. U.S. patent rights for MAG*SEP were transferred to Jane Eustis of Morgan Franklin 
Fund, Inc., New Orleans, LA, and international patent rights went to Kiwi Cooperative Dairies, Ltd ., 
New Zealand, both investors in the original project. 
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As Selentec and its patents transferred ownership, Argonne National Laboratory and the 
URCRM in Ukraine continued validation testing. Argonne ran out of particles in December 1997 
and was no longer able to continue validation testing on this aspect of the project. The URCRM 
continued validation testing through the summer of 1999. The Ukrainian government, meanwhile, 
began to seek funding from other sources to continue the testing. The dairy was expected to run 
out of particles for testing in summer 1999. 
Ill. Stakeholder Perspectives 
Selentec's project described as development: Selentec's initial proposal to USAID in 
January 1996 did not contain a rationale for submitting the proposal to the chief bilateral foreign 
assistance agency in the United States, USAID. Subsequent versions of the proposal did contain 
wording to defend the project as development assistance and appropriate within USAID's mission. 
The most extensive documentation, however, can be found in Selentec's second, unfunded 
proposal of April17, 1998. 
The introduction to the proposal stated that the project provided "humanitarian assistance 
to alleviate suffering caused by previous developments" (p. vi) . It met the objectives for 
sustainable economic growth for Ukraine by expanding food (milk) production both for 
consumption within Ukraine and for export. Finally, the project promoted economic growth and 
political stability by contributing to safe food in a region rife with environmental problems and 
poverty. 
An agricultural country once known as the "bread basket" of the Soviet Union, Ukraine 
relies heavily on dairy products, in particular milk, to supply a substantial portion of the country's 
dietary nutrients. Much of the milk supply in the northern contaminated regions of Ukraine 
contained low levels of cesium-137, though these levels were for the most part below 
internationally accepted standards as suitable for export. However, unidentified numbers of 
farmers were producing raw milk that exceeded international standards for consumption. 
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One of the difficulties in defining impact in the project arose because no single consensus 
existed on the level of cesium-137 that constituted a threat to health if taken on a daily basis . 
Moreover, cesium-137 was known to accumulate in the body, but unlike the known effects of 
radioactive iodine on the thyroid, no scientific consensus existed as to the effects of cesium on the 
body. But milk produced in Ukraine continued to carry the stigma, if not the reality, of radioactive 
milk, domestically and internationally. The accident itself, coupled with the loss of international 
export markets for the country's dairy products , devastated the Ukrainian economy. Removal of 
the cesium, the most important radioactive product in the milk, would reduce the health risk to the 
public and increase the desirability of Ukrainian milk domestically and internationally. 
In his interview in May 1998, Dunn stated that his project to remove cesium-137 from milk 
would help to revitalize the dairy industry in Ukraine by supplying milk to the local population that 
was 95% free of cesium-137. He stated that he hoped that the Ukrainian government would 
manufacture future versions of the MAG*SEP system at lower cost than would be possible in the 
United States. Based on his knowledge of the agencies in the United States that provided 
cooperative agreements of economic assistance to the region, Dunn stated that he believed 
USAID was the appropriate agency to support the Selentec project. 
Ovruch school staff members describe health issues since Chernobyl: General Education 
School No. 6 is the smallest of three schools in Ovruch.8 School Director Tamara A. Zholud (May 
1998) reported that 408 pupils, from first to eleventh grade, were enrolled in the school in 1998. 
Each of the other two district schools served more than 1 ,000 students. 
Zholud recounted that the date of the Chernobyl accident, Saturday, April 26, was sunny 
and warm . Many children from the school went hiking in the woods. On Monday, April 28, Zholud 
first heard rumors of an accident at Chernobyl. No changes in school activities were ordered, so 
classes continued as usual. Teachers were expected to continue with their work. Classrooms 
8 Information for this section is based on interviews with and documentation provided by the 
director and teachers of General Education School No. 6 of Ovruch in May and October 1998 and 
in February 2000. 
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were washed repeatedly to avoid collection of radioactive dust. May 1, a traditional labor holiday in 
the former Soviet Union, was held as usual with open air celebrations . Victory Day celebrations on 
May 9 also were held in spite of the growing reservations of some of the local residents . Some 
children lost consciousness during the festivities. Only after all the holidays were over did the 
authorities start to take stronger measures. School was closed on May 20, five days early, and 
children were evacuated from the area. 
Zholud stated that, to the best of her recollection , the local community was told only in 
September to avoid buying raw fish and meat and fresh fruits and vegetables at the local market. 
Locally produced food was believed to have elevated levels of radioactivity. Regions in the 
contaminated zone began to receive "clean" food shipped in from other regions and republics . At 
this point, many families from the Ovruch region migrated out of the area. In 1985, General 
Education School No. 6 had nearly 900 students, nearly double the school 's current enrollment. 
Parents tried to take their children away from Ovruch; some never returned. Memories of the 
empty streets and abandoned gardens still lingered. 
The following year, Ukrainian authorities introduced a free meal program for the children. 
Three meals per day were offered at the school , but many children did not wish to return for the 
evening meal. In 1998, for the first time since the accident, the Ukrainian government began to 
charge students for the meal program if they were not in Ovruch at the time of the accident. The 
shipment of food from noncontaminated regions has stopped, and children at the school now eat 
food prepared locally. 
Zholud and her staff (May 1998; October 1998) indicated that the Chernobyl accident was 
responsible for major health problems for children now attending the school. Teachers and 
administrators found academic performance hindered by reports of dizziness, headaches, fatigue 
and a host of other complaints . Absenteeism was high, though students were required to supply a 
medical excuse for staying out of school. Teachers reported loss of concentration ability and 
reduced mental acuity in the students. 
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These health issues also have extended to the teachers and their families. Zholud, who 
suffers from hypertension , stated that she has undergone multiple tumor operations. Her mother 
was diagnosed with diabetes and thyroid cancer soon after the Chernobyl accident; her father 
died in 1992 at the age of 72 of intestinal cancer. Zholud suspected that each of these outcomes 
was connected to the accident. Other staff members recounted similar experiences. 
Zholud stated that once a year the Regional Medical Union of Ovruch examined the 
health status of the students at the school. In 1998, the school was informed by these health 
officials that 100 percent of the children were experiencing medical difficulties. Many of the pupils 
were diagnosed with multiple conditions. Zholud presented health data, shown in Table 6-3 on 
page 249, provided to the school by the medical group on students attending the school from 
1996 to 1998. The chart in Figure 6-6 depicts the incidence of diagnosed illnesses between 1996 
and 1998. 
More than 90 percent of graduates of the school now go to colleges in Ukraine. Those 
who have been diagnosed with illnesses are given certificates stating that they are disabled . This 
gives them virtual open admission to local colleges, and such students are allowed to graduate 
with reduced requirements . Zholud reported that the percentage of students at the school who are 
medically certified as disabled increases each year. 
Zholud stated that specialists from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visited 
Ovruch a short time after the Chernobyl accident. IAEA representatives predicted that residents 
would start to feel the consequences of the catastrophe after ten years . She added : 
Only now, we see the increase in cancer cases and other illnesses . Soon after 
the accident, we witnessed great efforts by the other republics to help the region . 
With the passing of time and the collapse of the Soviet Union, we have been left 
alone with our troubles . Now it looks like we must fight the consequences of that 
catastrophe ourselves because we do not receive the attention we did right after 
the accident. We are extremely grateful for those who continue to try to help us in 
any way. Those people who believe that the area has a supply of "clean" food 
from decontaminated areas are wrong. That's why we are especially grateful to 
those who are trying to install decontamination technology for milk, for example, 
because it is vital. (May 1998) 
As stated in Russian: 
0611UlHO TO 4TO Kor .na 61:::.111 CoseTCKVIIII Co103 VI noc11e Toro KaK 
C.I1)'4VIJ1acb KaTac-rpo$3, noc-rpa,naBlllt1M JliO.llflM noMorMVI see 
6blsi.IJVIe pecny611V1KVI. Cell14ac ~He see cBalleHo Ha o.nHy c-rpaHy, Ha 
YKpaVIHY. Ka1H,llblli1 OCTaJlCfl CO CSOVIM ropeM. Mbl IHe IHVISeM Ha STOii1 
TeppVITOpVIVI, Mbl IHe noCTpa,naBUJ.1e, Mbl IHe ,llOJliHHbl CaMVI Ce6e 
noM04b. Ec11V1 paHbllle Mbl OUJ.YUJ.MVI noMOUl.b, no 6oJlbllleli1 Mepe, Vl3-3a 
rpaHVIUbl, TO celi14ac C4VITaeTcfl 4To y Hac see xopowo, noMOUJ.VI y~He 
He Ha,llO VI BCIO.llY npeKpaCHO. XoTeJlOCb 6bl 4T06bl JliO.llVI npVIeXMVI, 
YSI!UleJlVI VI nposepVIllVI. Be,nb MOIHHO nposepVITb no CTaTVICTVIKe; 
6yKBallbHO Ha KaiH,llOM npe,nnp~TVIVI J11060ii1,llaCT CSOVI pe3yJlbTaTbl. 
Bee :no y~He HVIKOrO He VIHTepecyeT. noaTOMy, Mbl 04eHb 
6Jlaro,napHbl TeM JliO,llHM VI TeM opraHV13aUVIflM, KOTOpble 
,neli1CTBVITeJlbHO nOMOraiOT HaM VI KOTOpble SVI,llflT 4TO y HaC STO 
rope. Be.nb caMoe r JlaBHoe cTpa,natOT .neTVI. Ec11V1 Mbl y~He 
HeMHOIHKO npOIHVIJlVI TO ,neTHM eUJ.e IHVITb, a OHVI y~He He 3.ll0p0Bb1, OHVI 
y~He 6oJlbHble. Ec11V1 KTO-TO .nyMaeT 4TO y Hac y~He see npo.nyKTbl 
4VICTble, 4TO HaM He HYIHHa nOMOUl.b, HanpVIMep, no o6pa60TKe MOJlOKa 
TO OHVI r 11y6oKO OUJVI6aiOTCR HaM 3,lleCb IHVITb, HaM 3,lleCb pa60TaTb 
VI paCTVITb ,lleTeli1. (Mali11998) 
Medical professionals outside of Ukraine who reviewed these data stated that the 
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illnesses listed were too general to be interpreted. Some noted that a bias toward overreporting of 
illness may be present because financial and health benefits could be gained from acquiring 
disability status. Others noted that the economic deterioration of Ukraine following the accident 
and the breakup of the Soviet Union might have played a major role in the health status of the 
children . However, the administrative and teach ing staff at General Education School No. 6 
believed they were teaching a school full of sick children who continued to suffer the 
consequences of radiation from Chernobyl. 
Echoing Zholud's comments, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported in 1995 that 
funding for Chernobyl victims was drying up at a time when illnesses were increasing. The report 
noted that many medical conditions associated with radiation exposure could take many years to 
surface. Another source indicated that an estimated 400,000 adults and 1.1 million children in 
Ukraine today are entitled to receive state aid for Chernobyl-related health problems. In the 
meantime, the Ukrainian government has been unable to keep up payments designated for 
Chernobyl survivors and much international fund ing has evaporated . 
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TABLE 6-3 
Health Status of Children Attending General Education School No. 6, Ovruch, Ukraine, 
1996-1998 
Medical 
Problem 
Heart/ 
Circulatory 
Illnesses 
Stomach/ 
Intestinal 
Illnesses 
Thyroid 
Hyper-
PI asia 
Eye 
Illnesses 
1996 
Students Percent 
Total: 478 
195 
110 
126 
78 
1997 1998 
Students Percent Students Percent 
Total: 442 Total: 408 
181 235 57% 
204 237 58% 
116 152 37% 
93 80 19% 
FIGURE 6-6: 
Incidence of Illnesses of Children Attending General Education School No. 6, Ovruch 
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SOURCE: Zholud, T.A. (May 1998). Memos of student medical conditions. General Education 
School No. 6, Ovruch, Ukraine. 
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Also acknowledged was the common perception of many people in the contaminated 
zones in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia that the Chernobyl accident was a tragic watershed in their 
lives. A journalist who visited the Russian town of Uzlovaga in 1995 noted: "In early May 1986, 
heavy rains soaked the town with fallout from the Chernobyl power station explosion, 500 
kilometers away. Nine years later, as stories of illnesses caused by the radiation multiply, local 
people . . . blame anything from a nosebleed to rheumatism on Chernobyl" (Coles, 1995, p. 13). 
Argonne researchers test the MAG*SEP process 
The principal investigators on the Selentec project from Argonne Laboratories in Chicago, 
Illinois, Donald Johnson and Cristina Negri, stated in interviews in April 1999 that their role in the 
project focused on the technical validation of the MAG*SEP process.9 Argonne Laboratories, a 
large Department of Energy facility located in a suburb of Chicago, contained facilities for testing 
of radioactive materials. As early as December 1990, Johnson and Negri first worked on other 
waste management applications with what was then Bradtec, Ltd ., while early development on 
MAG*SEP got underway. 
Negri (April 1999) stated that much of Argonne's validation testing focused on the 
particles used in the MAG*SEP process. The work on the particles prior to December 1996, when 
the cooperative agreement went into effect, was "proof of concept" work, in which the lab proved 
that the particles could in fact remove cesium from milk. These early tests were conducted in 
1993. When Argonne received its share of the funding from DOE, the work became more 
9 Information for th is section was obtained through interviews with Donald Johnson and Cristina 
Negri at Argonne Laboratories, Argonne, Ill inois, in April 1999. Requesting further information on 
biographical background on both researchers. Both researchers have previous experience in 
working with Selentec and both were experienced in their areas of research, Negri in food science 
and Johnson over a long professional life as a project manager. Both were particularly intrigued 
by the project, not so much the MAG*SEP process, but by work with international scientists in 
Ukraine. 
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structured. The key test was to find the best substance that could take out the cesium and nothing 
else. 
During the early months of 1997, after the cooperative agreement went into effect, 
Argonne researchers tested a number of particles of different chemical constitution and form 
shipped to them by Selentec's particle manufacturer. Argonne would feed back the results of tests 
to Selentec, and another set of particles would be prepared . An inorganic compound called CST 
(chemical composition protected by patent) was found to be a superadsorber for cesium and 
Argonne validated that this compound was effective in removing cesium , and only cesium. CST 
also proved to be a very expensive compound to manufacture, but a decision was made to go 
forward with this particle in the hope that ways could be found in the future to minimize 
manufacturing costs and to maximize use of the particles. The compound was then tested using 
different variables, such as different types of milk and temperature variations in the milk. Once the 
application conditions were established, Argonne also experimented with multiple uses of the 
particles to try to minimize costs and still achieve results. 
Later on in the process, Argonne became involved in figuring out a cleaning process for 
the technology, particularly the particles. Negri (April 1999) stated that milk was a difficult material 
to work with because protein coagulated on the particles and machinery. Conventional sanitizing 
methods might work, but they might also harm the particles. In the midst of this work, in 
December 1998, Argonne ended testing on the particles because Selentec filed for Chapter 11 
and could supply no more particles. Johnson (April1999) explained, "Some of the work stopped 
at that point because of lack of material, and it didn't make sense to manufacture other particles. 
We knew that we had to make some changes with the particle manufacturing process, so that 
project ... is stalled there until someone picks it up and decides they're going to go forward with 
those particles." He added that the Ukrainians committed to the project were seeking other 
sources of support to continue testing of the system. Failing that, the project would shut down. 
Negri and Johnson (April 1999) pointed out that a number of technical issues arose in the 
course of testing the system, some of which Argonne became involved in addressing. Some 
252 
issues focused on the mechanical properties of the particles. The particles were pumped through 
a complicated mechanical process, then washed and reused . The particles were irregular in 
shape, so this made washing particularly difficult. The irregular shape also made it difficult to see 
through visual inspection whether the particles were breaking up. The system was designed to 
magnetically pull out the particles for rinsing, but pieces of particles that did not contain magnetite 
in them could conceivably break off and remain in the milk. Thus, Argonne researchers were not 
able to determine the longevity and fragility of the particles. Negri (April 1999) stated that Selentec 
was aware of the problems with the particle's shape but was unable to manufacture the particles 
differently at the company's manufacturing facility. She acknowledged that toxicology tests on rats 
conducted by the Ukrainians showed no ill effects from ingestion of the particles. 
Johnson and Negri (April 1999) also stated that a number of other problems were left 
unresolved in the project. One area related to the high cost of the superadsorber, CST, and the 
most cost-effective way to use it. In order to reuse the particles for maximum absorbency, they 
had to be washed over and over again to remove the buildup of milk protein. The lab did not 
determine how long the particles could hold up to washing or the effect of cleaning on the 
particles. Nor did Argonne researchers determine whether it was possible to use the particles ten 
times or one hundred times. If the absorber proved capable of sustaining many washings, this 
increased the radioactivity in the particles. The more times the particles were recycled through the 
system, the more radioactivity collected in the particles. If the particles were used many times, 
personnel at the dairy would require shielding from the radioactivity locked in the particles. Such 
shielding was not available at the time of the early batch experiments at the beta site in Ovruch. 
While Argonne researchers focused on a cleaning process for the particles, the Ovruch 
dairy had to resolve a number of related issues. The water used for cleaning the process had to 
meet sanitary conditions for testing, and Ovruch representatives worked on resolving that issue. 
The dairy had problems not only with the microbiology of the water, but also with the chemistry. 
Water hardness and iron content were too high . A small cleaning system was brought in to 
sanitize the water for the batch runs of the MAG*SEP prototype installed. After running batches 
through the MAG*SEP machine, Ovruch personnel each time had to clean out the system 
manually until suitable cleaning equipment could be installed. 
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Johnson and Negri (April 1999) were aware of a number of other issues with the project, 
though many of these were beyond the scope of their responsibilities . They stated that the 
separation technology designed into MAG*SEP was not new, basic research. In fact, Argonne 
was developing a particle for a different kind of separation process not unlike the MAG*SEP 
process. In their estimation, the uniqueness of the Selentec project was in bringing a separation 
technology so close to commercial use and in using milk, with its highly complex chemical matrix, 
as the aqueous solution . 
But Johnson (April 1999) did not necessarily believe that milk was the optimal application 
for the MAG*SEP system, since he saw more appl ications for the process in cleaning up ground 
water, waste water or drinking water. The Chernobyl region faced a unique problem with 
radioactive contamination, so this limited the scope of the project for future applications. However, 
since each contaminant required a unique set of conditions to test, other applications would 
require years of further research and development to perfect. Johnson (April 1999) stated that he 
was particularly disappointed over the growing possibility that the technology would not be allowed 
to develop fully. He also expressed concern that foreign investors might capitalize on the 
preliminary research and development already completed for the project. 
Negri (April 1999) also noted that cost factors were not projected accurately for the 
manufacturing of the equipment and particles. The cost of maintaining the system was heavily 
dependent on the cost of the particles. Until optimal use of the CST particles was found and a less 
expensive way to manufacture them, the cost of supplying particles alone could run into hundreds 
of thousands of dollars per year, depending on the volume of milk treated at the dairy. Project 
participants hoped to eventually reduce costs of the manufacturing by producing the equipment 
and particles in Ukraine. Negri (April 1998) also expressed frustration over the lack of 
quantification of other aspects of the project. She said, "One of the problems was that we never 
knew how much of the contaminated milk was actually available for this, and this is one of the 
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typical self-feeding type of questions ... . The milk was not there because the cows were not there 
in the first place, because if they grazed on that land, they'd be getting contaminated milk. So we 
were never able to get a good idea of how much milk we were talking about to treat" (April 1999). 
Johnson (April 1999) expressed concern that the IPP funds designated for testing of the 
process were equally distributed between the Ukrainian researchers and Argonne researchers. 
Since the cost of living in the two countries was not equal, the amount of testing time purchased 
with these funds at Argonne was more limited than in Ukraine. He also noted that Argonne 
Laboratories incurred unexpected costs in supplying services to operationalize the project, ranging 
from supplying interpreters when Ukrainians visited their facilities to coordinating the research 
effort. 
Though many issues remained at the conclusion of the project, Negri (April 1999) 
reported that she found the Ukrainians who worked on this project to be very excited about it. The 
Ovruch area was seriously depressed, and the dairy industry in the region had been seriously 
crippled from the Chernobyl incident. She added : "I think they really felt this was helping them , 
they were getting something very useful out of it .... We've been working with the scientists from 
these institutes, but also with people that work in that dairy, and it was really, really good to see 
how much they believed in this project at their own level. I think they felt it was a very important 
project for them" (April 1999). 
Negri observed differences on occasion in the way the Ukrainian scientists viewed 
aspects of the project compared to American scientists . She stated that Ukrainian attitudes 
toward medical conditions left more room for possibil ity than strict evidence-based standards 
common in the United States. Aware of the difficulty in attributing health problems to radiation 
effects in the population exposed in the Chernobyl accident, she added, "If you tell them, the rest 
of the world thinks that radiation is not a concern, you shouldn't be concerned with that, they'll 
scream at you. They'll scream at you, 'You don't see this. Go to the local school and see it for 
yourself! "' (April 1999). 
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USAID technical staff questions the impact 
Officials interviewed at USAID 10 stated that the technical staff that reviewed Selentec's 
initial unsolicited proposal in January 1996 of $7 million rejected it for a variety of reasons . The 
proposal did not have a clear statement of the project's impact, "demographic information .. . that 
suggested actual impacted populations" (USAID, May 1998). The lack of hard data on impact 
involved two aspects of the project, the scientific evidence in support of the health effects of 
radioactive cesium and the population affected by th is problem as well as by the proposed 
solution . 
The technical staff also had concerns about supporting a new technology dealing with a 
food product. The Selentec technology had been laboratory tested as a selective chemical 
removal process, but the fluids processed through th is technology had not been consumed by 
human beings. The technical staff raised concerns about previous projects supported by USAID 
involving consumables that were later shown to be detrimental to the health of the local 
population . 
Yet another concern raised was the fact that low-level radioactive waste would be created 
in the separation process because the technology removed , rather than destroyed, the cesium. 
No provisions were indicated in the original proposal as to how the waste would be stored. Thus, 
while the technical staff recognized compelling aspects of a project designed to diminish the 
impacts of Chernobyl- a matter of continuing concern to all Ukrainians- Selentec's initial proposal 
was rejected on its technical merits . 
After receiving notice that its original proposal was rejected, Selentec reduced the scope 
of the project and submitted a revised proposal. Rather than six beta sites at dairies in 
contaminated regions in Ukraine, Selentec now proposed one with a cost to USAID of less than 
$1 million, excluding support grants from the Department of Energy. The negotiations for 
approval of this proposal continued with senior State and USAID decision-makers, and the 
10 Information from this section is based on interviews with selected USAID technical staff in 
January, February and May 1998. 
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wording in parts of the proposal was redrafted several times. The proposal was endorsed by 
several U.S. Congress members, various Ukrainian ministries, and the State Department 
Coordinator's Office. USAID officials (February 1998; May 1998) interviewed on this project 
acknowledge that the decision to approve the more modest cooperative agreement with Selentec 
was a political decision- "it was not made on the technical merit of the activity." One USAID 
official (May 1998) added that it was "impressive to get letters from people like that, but then I've 
been told that these kinds of letters are really easy to get, really easy to get." 
The cooperative agreement was executed in December 1996, nearly eleven months after 
the initial proposal was submitted . Though the cooperative agreement was ready for 
implementation by September 1996, a further delay occurred when Selentec became the first 
"data" to be placed on USAID's New Management System (NMS). According to one official (May 
1998), technical staff spent "dozens of hours" working out the problems with the system, so that it 
was December before the cooperative agreement was issued. 
The technical staff at USAID negotiated for a one-time only agreement and was 
left with many questions, technical, scientific, and political , concerning the proposal. USAID 
technical staff made some effort to address some of the issues, "but not nearly as much as would 
be appropriate to do something like this" (May 1998). A USAID representative connected to the 
project noted that as much as two years could be spent in developing proposals for environmental 
projects, but the Selentec agreement was approved in the face of unresolved technical issues. 
To address the issues related to food consumption, according to a USAID official involved 
in the process in 1996, Selentec offered to engage the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as 
"an honest broker in the process. FDA would in fact look at the technology and provide some kind 
of value judgments or some kind of technical assistance as to what would be an appropriate 
protocol or appropriate decision for determining whether or not this stuff could be utilized for 
human consumption" (May 1998). According to this official, this process was just beginning when 
the cooperative agreement went forward . A steering committee meeting was held in February 
1997 in Chicago at Argonne National Laboratories. Argonne's role was designated at this meeting 
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specifically to test particle integrity, so the responsibility for health testing of the process fell to the 
Ukrainian researchers. According to a technical officer with the project, FDA made a commitment 
to provide some health guidance at the meeting. The project continued into the summer without 
feedback from FDA on the health aspects of the project. In July 1997, FDA did send a list of its 
concerns, and correspondence and meetings ensued between FDA and Selentec. USAID 
officials involved with the project continued to have concerns regard ing FDA's role in the project in 
1998, near the end of the testing. 
USAID officials interviewed acknowledged that the health issues with this process were 
not addressed adequately or built into the system soon enough. On the other hand, they 
understood that the magnetic separation process was not shown to change the chemical 
composition of milk in lab tests, so the FDA issue was not necessarily a serious problem with this 
technology. USAID technical staff found themselves in the position of answering questions 
intuitively rather than on the basis of hard data, and this made them uncomfortable. 
As for storage of the radioactive drums left as waste from the MAG*SEP process, 
Selentec was to take responsibility for resolving the waste storage required for the drums holding 
radioactive particles left from the MAG*SEP process to the satisfaction of the Ukrainian 
government. If Ukrainian standards were substantially below United States standards for waste 
disposal, Selentec was to try to elevate Ukrainian standards on waste disposal for MAG*SEP 
particles. 
Because this was a cooperative agreement, according to one USAID official (May 1998), 
USAID had little direct oversight responsibility for the implementation phase of the prototype. 
USAID officials interviewed for this project recognized the commitments required for short-term 
experimentation with a new technology, but the "scope of AID's involvement was 'pay these bills 
and leave' to some degree .. . " (May 1998). This was seen in part as the nature of cooperative 
agreements at USAID. Such agreements were viewed as grants, in which agency involvement, 
even when regarded as significant, was minimal. USAID's responsibility was to facilitate the 
process to pave the way for Selentec to develop a market for the technology. The environmental 
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division also did not want to become involved in the marketing of the product because the agency 
was not involved in venture capital opportun ities. 
The agreement called for completion of the project within a 15-month period, and 
Selentec was to take responsibility for coord inating the agreement. Selentec was required to 
develop a coordinating group, or steering committee, consisting of such stakeholders as Argonne 
Laboratories, FDA, and appropriate Ukrainian counterparts, to discuss the issues. Several 
steering committee meetings were to be held during the course of the project, such as the one 
held in February 1997 at Argonne Laboratories involving FDA. USAID technical staff did not want 
to undermine something that might be useful and successful , but staff did not want to commit 
large amounts of time to monitoring research and development for the project. One USAID official 
stated (May 1998), "It's only $900,000 in a $225 million budget per year, so move on." 
Finally, the one USAID official (May 1998) noted that at the time the Selentec project was 
being reviewed , the expectation was that the U.S. economic assistance program in Ukraine would 
be short-term . Since the planning cycle was perceived to be short-term , a one-time project such 
as this fit into that framework. Freedom Support Act funds served as transition funds in the region, 
and USAID's role in the project was to facilitate short-term development of a technology. The 
official added that (then) Coordinator Morningstar's role in 1996 was such that he was prepared to 
request funding approval for designated projects . 
Though USAID facilitated work on the project, the project ended with a number of 
unanswered questions, many of the same questions with which the project began. USAID 
technical staff was uncomfortable with the lack of concrete data on a host of related scientific 
issues such as the documented health effects of cesium-137 and the variation in national and 
international standards for maximum levels of radiation allowed in milk. Also disturbing to them 
was that strontium-90, the other radionuclide of concern in the region , was not being removed as 
well . The ambivalence of the technical staff toward the project was evident in this statement made 
near the end of the project: 
The scientific merit is deeply in question. Intuitively, it is probably not going to be 
imparting anything harmful. And the question arises, Is it going to be doing 
anything beneficial? That's a separate question , too. Is there a need? And that 
question remains unanswered, remains unanswered ... . If somebody wants 
treated milk that doesn't really need to be treated or has never made a market or 
got state approval , they can do that if they want to. But supposedly the need 
would drive whether or not the state wanted to make this approval, the need 
would drive whether or not somebody wanted to invest the capital , and so we 
were largely looking at those market forces as having the ability to answer or tie 
together some of the loose ends. Nobody is going to invest hard-earned venture 
capital without most of these questions being attended to. (USAID Interview, May 
1998). 
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A USAID technical staff member (February 1998) acknowledged that Ukraine's reputation 
as an agricultural market was greatly hampered after the Chernobyl accident. To the extent that 
the project attempted to deal with the catastrophic effects , it was appropriate for the agency to 
support the cooperative agreement. USAID technical staff also recognized that the project was 
popular with Ukrainians, but this represented a risk: "If it turns into a success, it could be a very 
great success. But it could also turn out to be something of a waste of money if it doesn't work 
out, and that's why we said it was R&D" (February 1998). The official stated that environmental 
problems in Ukraine were immense, beyond the budgets allocated for this sector. The 
environmental division at USAID tried instead to assist in putting the legal, regulatory, 
administrative policy underpinnings in place so that "over the next 10 to 20 years they can begin 
their own process of using international financing institutions and their own resources in trying to 
seriously address their problems" (February 1998). USAID programs emphasized risk 
assessment techniques so that Ukrainians could prioritize their own environmental policy and 
planning in the future . 
A USAID official (February 1998) compared the Selentec project with a more typical 
project funded by USAID underway in L'viv, Ukraine, one of the country's major industrial cities. 
Like many cities throughout the former Soviet Union, L'viv suffers from serious problems with the 
water and sewage systems. Because water, sewers and electricity were commodities free to 
citizens in Soviet times, no meters existed in businesses and residences. Water and sewer 
agencies had no incentive to be energy efficient because they merely existed to supply these 
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services. But no pressure to conserve did not automatically translate into unlimited water supplies 
and high quality sewage systems. In L'viv, water quality was low, and water, both hot and cold, 
was available only part of the day in many homes. 
The shift to a service orientation and private sector payments for energy were major 
changes for energy industries. The agencies have been handed over to local governments to 
address management, pricing and service issues. Much of the former Soviet Union today suffers 
from poorly maintained water and sewer systems, which have deteriorated even further in hard 
economic times since the breakup. 
L'viv today does not have the money to rip up its own systems, and so the environmental 
division at USAID has engaged local agencies to try to identify the most critical points in the 
system to eliminate the largest of the leaks. In one of its cooperative agreements, USAID is 
working with local industries on a new lining system for water and sewer pipes. Laborers go into 
the sewers and water lines and spray a mortar mixture around the pipes, inside and out, to seal 
the leaks. This is a low cost solution that might give the pipes an additional ten years of service 
before they need to be replaced because of structural failures . 
But low-cost repair of the water and sewer lines was only one facet of the work on this 
agreement. The USAID official (February 1998) who described this project stated that the 
Ukrainians have entered into an agreement with an American company to manufacture the 
machines for this work and to import only the nozzles. A fine-grained sand required for the mortar 
mixture was found in St. Petersburg, Russia, so the material for the mortar could be made in the 
region. The World Bank negotiated a loan for Ukraine to enable the country to roll out this 
program in eight or ten cities. This would involve Ukrainian labor and manufacturing of the 
machinery and materials, and perhaps lead to exporting it to other countries in the region. In sum, 
the mortar project represented a coordinated assistance approach that addressed a series of 
problems: energy use, low cost maintenance, manufacture of the materials and equipment 
needed for the repairs, and possible expanded markets to other parts of the region . 
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This intervention occurred in a process that helped transfer the once command-control 
industry into a service-oriented industry. Because of its modest cost, the mortar technology 
showed more promise of becoming an indigenous technology than the Selentec technology. It 
also was a more coordinated approach to an array of environmental , technological and market 
problems. The USAID official (February 1998) contrasted this approach to economic assistance 
with the Selentec project: 
Who is going to put in these machines that Selentec has developed? Who is 
going to buy them? There's a lot of insti tutional development on the side of th is 
going from being a research idea that proved out to being something that actually 
affects Ukraine. And we're not at this stage, at least I'm not aware of any major 
emphasis on that part of the program .. .. This is not, the last time I checked, a 
country that has a strong record in market development and distribution ... The 
difference I think between the L'viv project and mortar lining and the Selentec 
project and cleaning milk is that the Selentec project did not fit into an overall 
framework we had established to try to change a whole institution. Instead, it was 
a one-problem, one-shot response, which is going to have a lot more trouble 
being widely accepted and used effectively. (USAID Interview, February 1998). 
Scientific lessons from Chernobyl 
Some of the major questions posed by USAID technical staff and others concerned the 
impact of the Chernobyl accident on the environment and on the health of the millions of people in 
Ukraine, Belarus and Russia who were in the path of the most severe radioactive emissions. 
Millions continue to live in the contaminated regions around Chernobyl and to ingest low-level 
radiation absorbed through the food chain, since the isotopes still radioactive have settled into the 
fol iage, soil and water. 
These millions are in many ways also stakeholders in the Selentec project. Scientists will 
be studying the health effects of the Chernobyl accident on this population for decades to come. 
Much of the focus will continue to be on the initial doses absorbed in the days and weeks following 
the accident. But critical unanswered questions remain as to whether the low levels of radiation 
these populations continue to ingest is damaging to their health, and if so, how their health is 
affected . 
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This section of the case study will highlight some of the findings in the scientific literature 
on Chernobyl as it bears on the project. Selentec did not justify its claims in terms of the scientific 
findings on radiation , but explained its rationale in terms of broad economic trends and possible 
links with the radiation emitted in that catastrophic accident. This section of the case study will 
take the analysis one step further to discuss some of the major scientific studies on Chernobyl. 
The complications involved in studying radiation also are considered. 
Radiation and its effects 
The effect of high- and low-level rad iation of all kinds has been explored in thousands of 
scientific studies. In its broadest sense, the term "radiation" simply refers to energy propagating in 
the form of electromagnetic waves or photons, or in the form of subatomic particles (Gonzalez, 
1996). Radioactivity can be naturally or artificially created and released . Natural sources are the 
main contributors to human exposure. Natural radiation occurs from cosmic rays of solar and 
galactic origin (Appleby et al., 1993; Gonzalez, 1996). Human activities also cause the release of 
natural radiation. The burning of fossil fuels- coal and oil-are the largest sources of direct 
atmospheric release of natural radioactivity worldwide. Coal contains such radionuclides as 
uranium, radium, and thorium . Contaminants in petroleum include radium, polonium, and radon . 
Most mature oil fields actually have operational problems in controlling radioactivity (Shapiro et al. , 
1993). The most powerful kind of radiation , sometimes called ionizing rad iation, comes from 
radioactive substances. It has long been known that ionizing radiation has sufficient energy to 
prevent a cell from dividing or to damage its genetic structure (Sweet, 1988). This basic fact 
makes radiation a feared form of energy. At the cellular level , there may be no safe dose of 
radiation-natural, man-made or artificial. Fossil fuel burning and cosmic rays are only two of the 
many sources of radiation , both natural and artif icial , on daily life. The National Council on 
Radiation Protection and Measurement (1987) publ ished the estimated sources of exposure of 
the average American . These exposure rates are listed in Table 6-4 on page 264. 
In contrast to naturally created radioactivity, artificially created radionuclides are 
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emitted from nuclear weapon explosions or nuclear accidents, most often an outcome of neutron-
induced nuclear fission. As the information in Table 6-4 suggests, artificially created radionuclides 
make up a very small portion of the total sources of radiation (less than 1 percent). Those areas 
which have been exposed to nuclear accidents or explosions are, of course, subject to far greater 
doses. 
In terms of outcomes, nuclear scientists by and large do not distinguish between natural 
or artificial doses of radiation . The International Atomic Energy Agency in 1995 published a 
comparison of estimated life time doses received in European countries compared to those 
absorbed in the contaminated zones surrounding Chernobyl (see Figure 6-7). A high level 
corresponds to the 30-kilometer Restricted Zone. Based on the agency's estimate, residents of 
Finland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden will absorb higher lifetime doses of natural radiation in their 
lifetimes than the combined artificial and natural doses absorbed near Chernobyl. A limitation of 
the estimate is that natural exposure usually does occur in the form of concentrated doses of 
radionuclides over a short period, followed by long-term low absorption. A designation of average 
dose also is not sensitive to the major differences in exposure that individuals absorbed who lived 
near Chernobyl at the time of the accident or who served as liquidators. 
Shapiro et al. 's ( 1993) scientific research on radiation suggests that the most important 
artificial isotopes emitted in nuclear accidents such as Chernobyl are now believed to be iodine-
131 , strontium-89 or -90, and cesium-137. The human body can absorb each of these isotopes, 
so their effects on the human system are important. lodine-131 , with a half of 8 days, is absorbed 
through the skin, lungs and alimentary tract and concentrates in the thyroid . Strontium-90, with a 
half life of 29 years, is chemically similar to calcium; cesium-137, with a half life of 32 years , is 
chemically similar to potassium . Both of these isotopes are significant to human beings, since the 
body can "mistake" strontium for calcium and cesium for potassium. Shapiro (1993) suggests that 
strontium, when absorbed into the digestive tract, may be incorporated into the bone much like 
calcium, the alkaline earth metal it resembles . The damage to bone marrow with concentrations of 
I 
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TABLE 6.4: 
Sources of Natural and Man-made Radiation 
Natural Radiation: Man-made Radiation: 
Estimated 80% of total exposure Estimated 20% of total exposure 
Radon: 55% Medical X-rays: 11% 
Description: Radon is a noble gas that begins 
with uranium and decays into various isotopes, Description: X-rays "pictures" are routinely 
the final one being lead-21 0. Radon often taken to aid in diagnosis of a host of medical 
enters homes through their understructures. In and dental conditions. Before radiation was 
the United States, the highest levels are found considered dangerous, people were exposed to 
in Maine, Montana, North Dakota, Colorado, massive doses of X-rays for diagnostic and 
Washington State, Pennsylvania, New Jersey therapeutic purposes. Today, exposure is 
and New York. If inhaled, radon will collect in limited and patient and doctor are protected 
the lungs and will most likely decay to lead-210, from exposure as much as possible. 
irradiating the surrounding tissue in the 
process. Radon is believed to chemically 
interact with cigarette smoke to enhance the 
chances of lung cancer. 
Cosmic: 8%+ Nuclear medicine: 4% 
Cosmic rays from outer space consist of Treatments using nuclear techniques for 
radioactive rays that are highly penetrating. cancer are "bullets" of radiation shot into 
Most cosmic radiation originates outside the targeted areas to stem the growth of cancerous 
solar system. The effect of cosmic radiation will cells by killing them . Nuclear medicine makes 
increase with the thinning of the ozone layer. use of one of the key effects of radiation. 
Terrestrial: 8% Consumer products: 3-4% 
The earth contains naturally radioactive Though luminous radioactive dials no longer 
substances. Typical soil can contain potassium- grace the faces of alarm clocks , a host of other 
40, a radioactive form of this chemical , trace products emitting radioactivity have taken their 
elements of thorium and uranium. Fossil fuel place. These range from high voltage power 
burning also can be included in terrestrial lines and radar installations to microwave 
sources of natural radiation . ovens. 
Internal: 11% Other: < 1% 
Radiation can come from natural sources This category includes occupational exposure, 
absorbed into the food chain or from irradiated fallout from nuclear accidents, decay in the 
food and fluids . nuclear fuel cycle , nuclear testing and other 
activities. Some isotopes present in spent 
nuclear fuel and nuclear accidents do not exist 
in nature and therefore are said to be artificial 
radionuclides . 
SOURCE: Adapted from Sweet, W . (1988) The nuclear age: Atomic energy, proliferation and the 
arms race. 2"d Ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly. Percentages listed are gross 
estimates. 
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FIGURE 6-7 
International Atomic Energy Agency's (1995) estimate 
of the total additional dose of radiation absorbed 
by the residents living in the contaminated zones 
surrounding Chernobyl 
Contributions to lifetime dose in countries of western Europe 
and in typical areas of the Chernobyl zones (mSv) 
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strontium is not quantified. Studies on cesium suggest that the isotope is taken up and 
metabolized in mammals quite easily. 
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Cesium-137 is readily secreted into milk, and milk is a major source of radionuclide 
contamination to the extent to which it is a food source. Kirchman's (1993) research on a variety 
of nonhuman primates suggests that cesium ingested in a soluble form such as milk actually 
increases the body's absorption of the isotope. Once absorbed, cesium settles "readily and 
uniformly into the soft tissues. At equilibrium it occurs in approximately similar concentrations in 
muscular tissue and in several organs, notably the kidney'' (pp. 125-126). 
Though these isotopes emit radiation, they have important differences. Each emits 
radioactive energy in a somewhat different way. Iodine is an alpha emitter, strontium a beta-
emitter, and cesium a gamma-emitter. In addition to alpha, beta and gamma rays, radiation may 
be emitted as X-rays and neutrons. These forms of emission cause different degrees of biological 
damage for the same adsorbed dose (Appleby & Harrison, 1993). Alpha and beta particles can be 
extremely harmful if they enter an organism by ingestion or inhalation, but they tend to be weak 
penetrators of surfaces such as skin. Gamma rays and X-rays can be highly penetrating through 
surfaces but tend to be ionized at a lower level. The ionizing level or density matters because this 
determines the potential for biological damage. Beta and gamma rays have lower ionization 
density than alpha and neutron radiation , in which a single particle can cause irreparable cell 
damage (Sweet, 1988). This suggests the possibility that iodine-137, an alpha emitter, may have 
more potential for biological damage at even very low levels compared to strontium and cesium . 
However, cesium-137, as a gamma-emitter, may more readily penetrate the skin than iodine. 
To make matters more complicated , Woodhead (1993} suggests that radiation is 
absorbed differently by all matter, inorganic or organic, and by all species . It also is possible for 
organisms, or organs within living bodies, to discriminate rays, either to prefer absorption or to 
discriminate against absorption of a given rad ionuclide. Thus, it is very difficult to make 
generalizations about radiation absorption for any given nuclide, natural or artificial, or for any 
given organism . 
267 
Research on a wide range of plant and animal species suggests that radiation deposits 
energy and induces change at the molecular level. Thus, there can be no effect at any higher level 
of organization without detectable changes at lower levels (Woodhead, 1993; Haux & Forlin, 
1988). The scientific consensus today is that ionizing radiation transfers energy and ionizes atoms 
in cellular molecules. This process changes atoms and molecules, and may damage cells . If not 
adequately repaired, damaged cells may die or carry modified genetic information (Gonzalez, 
1996). 
But the scientific search to understand radioactive effects above the atomic level is 
fraught with difficulties, particularly in real world conditions in which many factors, including natural 
radiation, are at play. In his overview of the scientific consensus on the impact of Chernobyl, 
Gonzalez (1996) made the important distinction between deterministic and stochastic effects. He 
explains that deterministic effects are somatic, or physical , effects, resulting from the killing of 
cells. Cell death may or may not become life threatening, depending on the number of cells 
affected. A certain threshold dose of radiation is required for such effects. Stochastic effects, on 
the other hand, develop out of modified cells that have been irradiated. Such modifications over 
time can develop into cancer or other cell-based diseases, even after long periods, or may be 
expressed in the children of the exposed person as hereditary effects. 
As might be expected, Gonzalez (1996) explains, stochastic effects are much harder to 
establish than deterministic effects and often can be traced, if at all, through study of large 
samples. One effect of radiation exposure, whether natural or artificial, could be cancer, but the 
probability of dying from some kind of cancer is about 20 percent in the general population . Thus, 
it is difficult to attribute any particular case of cancer to radiation, or even large numbers of cases 
in a selected sample. Hereditary effects are particularly hard to establish because a substantial 
percentage of the population is born with inherited genetic disorders. 
Gonzalez (1996) relied for his analysis of the impact of Chernobyl on the findings of the 
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), published in 
the early 1990s. The conclusion of UNSCEAR was that neighboring countries such as Bulgaria, 
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Austria, Romania and Greece in the first year following the accident were exposed to levels of 
radiation from Chernobyl that were well under the dosage received from natural sources, but were 
in addition to natural sources. In the countries most affected, the dose rates were unclear. 
According to Gonzalez (1996), the findings of the International Chernobyl Project (1991 ), the 
largest single assessment taken of the accident to date, continue to be the scientific consensus 
today. Further explanation of this project is therefore useful. 
The International Chernobyl Project (1991) was a large, voluntary study conducted 
between March 1990 and January 1991 . About 200 experts from 25 countries and seven 
multinational organizations participated in collecting and analyzing data. The project did not focus 
specifically on the liquidators or on the 30-kilometer Restricted Zone. Designated "hot spots," 
areas where radiation was believed to be extremely high, were excluded from the study to focus 
instead on average concentrations. Radio-iodine contamination from the accident could not be 
verified because the iodine isotopes (with an 8-day half-life) present in the environment had 
completely decayed within months after the accident. 
As one part of the study, samples were taken of the soil and water in selected settlements 
to verify the accuracy of the official maps on plutonium, cesium and strontium contamination 
prepared by the USSR State Committee on Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring 
following the accident (pages 226, 234 and 235 of this study). Attention focused on a 25,000 
square kilometer area encompassing parts of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine reported to have 
levels of cesium-137 above 185 kBq/m 2. Ovruch was one of the 28 contaminated settlements 
included in the study. The international team for the project concluded that contamination levels 
from samples taken for cesium in 1990 agreed well with the official maps, but that contamination 
levels for strontium and plutonium were overestimated by as much as a factor of four. 
Project researchers acknowledged that the largest proportion of exposure came from 
cesium-137after the first few weeks of the accident, since the half life of iodine-131 was eight 
days. Gonzalez (1996) provides one interpretation of the levels of cesium-137 exposure to the 
local population estimated on the official map on page 19, which is only a partial mapping of the 
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documented cesium contamination . His analysis is summarized in Table 6.5 on the next page. 
This suggests that even the highest levels of radioactive cesium were at levels that could be found 
in certain locales in the natural environment, but were in addition to natural radiation already 
present in the environment. 
Water samples collected in Ovruch and other settlements for the International Chernobyl 
Project (1991) normally showed cesium concentrations below the limit detectable by the 
instruments used. However, in samples with relatively high levels of cesium in the top layers of the 
ground, researchers suggested that cesium could present a future source of contamination as it 
seeped into deeper layers of the soil. 
Cesium-137 found in food samples (bread, potatoes, vegetables) in Ovruch and 
elsewhere showed a wide variation in measured levels of cesium concentrations. Levels usually 
were below those recommended in 1989 by the Codex Alimentarious Commission of 1000 Bq/kg 
for food moving in international trade. However, a few samples of food and milk showed levels 
considerably higher than the other samples. In one comparison of total diet samples, the highest 
Dose Level 
185 kBq/m 2 
555 kBq/m 2 
1480 kBq/m 2 
TABLE 6-5: 
Estimated Impact of Dosages of Cesium-137 
Impact 
Could give rise to doses due to external irradiation of the 
population which are sl ightly below those due to the average 
natural background radiation but which will be incurred in 
addition to the background. 
Could give rise to doses sl ightly above those due to the average 
natural background. 
Could give rise to doses which are not uncommonly found in the 
natural environment. 
SOURCE: Gonzalez, A.J . (1996). The perception of radiation effects on humans: The case of 
Chernobyl. E.J . Kirk (ed.). Assessing the risks of nuclear and chemical contamination in the 
Former Soviet Union, 49-71 . Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 68-
69. 
concentrations were found in Ovruch (range, 15-800 Bq/kg wet wt) compared to Russia's 
Novozybkov region (3-630 Bq/kg wet wt) and Belarus's Bragin region (5-80 Bq/kg wet wt) . 
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Measurements were also taken of 9,000 people living in the contaminated settlements to 
determine cesium levels (both 134 and 137) in their bodies, known as whole body counting . An 
important finding was that researchers did not find a direct relationship between the amount of 
cesium in the body and official values for surface soil contamination . For example, Ovruch 
subjects showed one of the highest levels of body contamination compared to other sample sites, 
despite relatively low levels of surface contamination . Project researchers suggested that some 
residents in the Ovruch region did not comply with restrictions regarding the consumption of 
locally produced food and milk. Figure 6.8 below shows a comparison of average whole body 
counts to cesium-137 contamination in some of the contaminated sites. 
Some 8,000 subjects were asked to carry radiation dosimeters, a film badge that 
monitored external radiation at the time of the study. Ninety percent showed results below 
the limit of detection on the dosimeter. Those subjects with higher dosimetric readings lived in 
highly contaminated areas or worked in open fields or forests for long periods. Air samples also 
taken indicated low gamma (cesium) and alpha (iodine) outdoor air concentrations. 
The health trends noted in the International Chernobyl Project became the early standard 
for the international community for interpreting the health effects of radiation emitted from the 
accident in Chernobyl. Health findings were based on the medical findings of a sampling of 1,356 
subjects . An important component built into the design of the study was that researchers 
compared samples of equivalent groups in "clean" locations in the affected countries to those who 
resided in the "dirty'' zones. Some of the data also were compared with health indicators from 
other countries. Highlights of the findings are summarized in Table 6-6 on the following page. 
The researchers found that the vast majority of subjects who participated in the project, 
from both contaminated and clean settlements, "believed or suspected they had an illness due to 
radiation" (p . 33). The report noted that the population living in contaminated zones continued to 
believe they were living in conditions that were "very dangerous" (p. 37) . 
FIGURE 6-8: Comparison of average whole body radiation 
counts with average cesium-137 contamination at selected sites 
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Given the health findings of the study, however, project researchers concluded that some 
of the policies instituted at the time of the accident, such as the number of evacuations or 
relocations of settlements near Chernobyl and the extent of restrictions placed on local food 
production, were unnecessary and contributed to the psychological stress of the situation . The 
report noted the negative effect of attributing various biological and health outcomes to radiation 
when these could not be verified , since this provoked additional stress-related health problems. 
The report called for programs to train medical personnel to better understand radiation-induced 
illnesses and to educate the general population on the effects of rad iation. 
Later research acknowledged the contribution of the International Chernobyl Project 
(1991) to the understanding of the effects of the Chernobyl accident on the population in the 
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contaminated zones, but this study contained a number of limitations. In their attempt to find 
generalizable results and average indicators over a wide geographical area, project researchers 
did not study the people and sites most at risk in the accident. Scientists will continue to study the 
outcomes of that accident from various perspectives for years, decades or even generations to 
come. Important research underway in several countries continues to put a new perspective on 
the understanding of radioactivity and its effects. 
Morbidity and mutation findings from Chernobyl 
Woodhead (1993) suggests that radiation damage threatening the continuation of a 
population is deemed significant through changes in certain response markers: morbidity 
(death), fertility (ability to procreate), fecundity (production of offspring) and the gene pool. 
Protracted radiation exposure in general increases the dose necessary to cause mortality 
because nonlethal cell damage is reparable and organ function can remain viable despite 
radioactive damage through cell replacement. Estimates are that prolonged exposure may require 
two to ten times total accumulated dose to become lethal. 
Morbidity: Official reports on the Chernobyl accident indicate that 238 persons suffered 
from acute radiation exposure at the time of the accident. Twenty nine of these died in the 
explosion or in fighting the fires after the explosion, and the rest continue to be under observation. 
Given the magnitude of the blast, the accident resulted in a miraculously low number of deaths. 
Strict deterministic analysis suggests that the Chernobyl accident represented a low threat to 
continuance of the population . These deaths are cited as the only mortalities in the accident in 
most of the scientific literature. 
Preliminary stochastic studies suggest the possibility of increased morbidity rates in the 
population in proximity to the explosion . Scientific findings are inconclusive because of the 
difficulty of establishing the link to radiation as the primary cause and because of the need to track 
large samples longitudinally for evidence of emerging health trends. 
273 
TABLE 6-6 
Summary of Findings of the International Chernobyl Project (1991) 
• Growth patterns of children in the contaminated and clean samples were within published 
norms in the United States and USSR. The ch ildren were found in general to be healthy and 
their diet adequate. 
• Hematological (blood) comparisons for adults and children showed no statistically significant 
differences between the contaminated and control samples in hemoglobin levels and red cell , 
leukocyte and platelet counts. 
• No significant variations were found in the immune systems of those examined in the 
contaminated zones, as indicated by lymphocyte level and prevalence of other diseases, 
compared to those in the control settlements. 
• No statistically significant differences were found between the thyroid function of children in 
the contaminated zones compared to those in control settlements. The researchers found no 
abnormalities in the thyroid function of children 2-10 years of age. The researchers noted that 
a "statistically detectable increase in the incidence of thyroid tumours" might occur in the 
future based on dose estimated of radioiod ine emitted in the accident (lAC, 1991, p. 32) . 
• Though research was still being conducted at the time of publication of the project, the report 
noted no statistically significant differences between contaminated and control settlements in 
chromosomal and somatic cell mutation. 
• No evidence of radiation induced cataracts was found in the contaminated sample. 
• No statistical difference was found between contaminated and control samples in systolic and 
diastolic blood pressure, though both samples indicated many hypertensive adults. 
• The researchers could not report increased incidence of cancer rates in the region because it 
was not possible to tell whether the increase was due to better reporting and diagnosis, 
deteriorating economic conditions, or other factors . 
• CONCLUSIONS: Medical researchers could find no health disorders that could be attributed 
directly to radiation exposure, but significant nonradiation-related health disorders were found 
among the adult population in both contaminated and control samples. The researchers found 
that 10 to 15 percent of the adult population examined needed medical attention. The 
researchers noted severe anxiety and stress related to the accident, but found these to be 
"wholly disproportionate to the biological sign ificance of the radioactive contamination" (lAC, 
1991' p. 32). 
SOURCE: International Advisory Committee (1 991 ). International Chernobyl Project. Vienna, 
Austria: International Atomic Energy Agency. 
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However, scientific studies of Chernobyl have by and large not explored anecdotal 
evidence of a potentially larger number of liqu idators and others in highly exposed areas who died 
within a limited time after the accident. In his visit with Russians in the town of Ozlovaya, for 
instance, Coles (1995) noted a conversation with a miner named Victor Vaselivich who helped to 
dig a tunnel under the smoldering core at Chernobyl to install cooling equipment. About forty 
miners were reported to be involved in the effort. The project was later abandoned. The miner 
stated that eight of his coworkers died afterwards and all of the others were too ill to work. In 
1995, their average age was reported to be 40. The prestigious scientific journal Nature reported 
in April 1996 that Ukrainian health officials announced that an estimated 125,000 people had 
already died from the accident. The suggestion was met with skepticism outside of Ukraine. 
Fertility, fecundity and the gene pool: Laboratory experiments on a variety of species, 
such as fish, dogs and insects, have shown that exposure to ionizing radiation can cause sterility, 
either temporary or permanent. Irradiation of germ cells may produce mutations and aberrations 
in the chromosomes, especially DNA strand breakage (Michalik, 1992; Woodhead , 1993). 
Much of the research on the Chernobyl accident is focused on possible organ disease 
conditions, especially malignancies. Relatively little research has been conducted to date on 
damage to the reproductive systems of men and women exposed to various levels of radiation in 
the accident or to mutations in the gene pool possibly associated with exposure. Yet, there 
continues to be widespread concern among the population most affected by the accident that 
damage to their reproductive systems or their offspring may exist. Some important studies on 
germline research are noted below. 
A study by Fischbein et al. (1997) on the sperm characteristics of a selected sample of 
liquidators has important implications. A great number of persons- estimated to be as many as 
180,000- who participated in the cleanup of the Chernobyl accident or lived in the vicinity of the 
damaged plant subsequently moved to Israel. The researchers studied 18 liquidators residing in 
Israel, seven of whom worked inside the power plant for a few minutes at the time of the accident 
and eleven of whom worked up to eight months within a 30 kilometer radius of the plant. A control 
group consisting of 18 Ukrainian males also living in Israel with no record of exposure to the 
accident was selected for comparison purposes. 
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Sperm samples from the two groups were collected and random cells were selected for 
analysis using transmission electron miscroscopy (TEM) and scanning electron microscopy 
(SEM). These techniques enabled the researchers to see cross-sections of the cell and two-
dimensional images of anatomical details . Findings were complicated because of the great 
number of malformations that can be found in typical sperm samples . The researchers found no 
significant differences in a number of categories, such as sperm density, volume, viability and 
morphology (structure) observed under light microscopy. However, the experimental group 
differed statistically (p < .01) from the control group with a lower percentage of motile and 
progressively motile spermatozoa. Higher sperm motility is related positively to higher fertility. The 
more important part of the experiment, utilizing ultramorphological analysis for highly magnified 
views of the details of the cells, showed interesting findings. Samples from the experimental and 
control groups showed one statistically significant (p < .01) difference in a number of 
comparisons: the exposed males in the experimental group showed a pathological pattern of 
incomplete genesis of the nucleus of selected organelles. 
Depicted in Figure 6-9 is a sample of what the researchers found . Figure A shows a two-
dimensional (TEM) micrograph of normal spermatozoa magnified times 10,000. Figure B shows a 
(SEM) micrograph of normal spermatozoa; Figure C shows the (SEM) amorphous head shape of 
spermatozoa found in the experimental group at the same magnification. Findings from this study 
suggest that a special type of sperm abnormality occurred as a result of short-term exposure to 
radiation emitted at Chernobyl. 
Another important study, conducted by Weinberg et al. (1997), focused on molecular genetic 
mutations occurring in the children of persons exposed to ionizing rad iation in the Chernobyl area. 
As in the Fischbein et al. ( 1997) study, Weinberg and his coresearchers focused on selected 
liquidators who moved to Israel after the accident. They collected blood samples from 150 
unrelated liquidators and 47 persons from 13 fam ilies of liqu idators (both parents and one or 
Figure 6.9: Micrographs of normal and abnormal spermatozoa of Chernobyl 
liquidators 
A 
SOURCE: Fischbein et al. (1997). Ultramorphological sperm characteristics in the risk 
assessment of health effects after radiation exposure among salvage workers in Chernobyl. 
Environmental Health Perspectives. 105, Suppl. 6, p. 1448. 
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two children). The control sample consisted of three families living in Israel originally from East 
and West Ukraine who lived outside of the contaminated zone. 
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Inspection of the samples for DNA band patterns showed new bands in some of the 
children of irradiated parents born after the Chernobyl accident as compared to the patterns of 
their parents. In the 13 families in which one child was born before the disaster and one after, new 
bands were detected only in the child born after the accident. New bands were also found in 
children without siblings born after the accident. The researchers found a total of 37 new bands 
in the experimental group. No new bands were found either in the children born before the 
accident in the experimental group or in the children of control families not exposed to measurable 
levels of radiation from the accident. Depicted in Figure 6-10 on the following page is a sample of 
new DNA bands (*) that appeared on subjects in the experimental group. 
The importance of the findings is that the dosages present in Chernobyl were sufficient to 
lead to heritable changes in germ cells and to the increased possibility of mutation in the offspring 
of exposed persons. Weinberg et al. (1997) concluded that the new bands "are a manifestation of 
genetic changes in the germline" (p. 1481) or the new bands would have shown up in the DNA 
strands of siblings born before the accident (p . 1481 ). The suggestion also is that even low doses 
of radiation may lead to changes in genetic material. 
These are not the only studies that have been conducted on germline risk to the human 
population. The first major study on germ line mutation to be published in an internationally-
recognized journal appeared in Nature in April 1996. Dubrova, et al. (1996) collected blood 
samples from 79 families from the heavily polluted, rural regions of Mogilev district in Belarus, 
located about 300 kilometers from Chernobyl. Children included in the sample were born in 1994 
of parents who resided in the Mogilev district from the time of the Chernobyl accident. The 
investigators took blood samples of a control group in the United Kingdom, since the entire 
country of Belarus was contaminated . The researchers studied genetic material regions called 
minisatellites, areas prone to high mutation rates when subjected to damaging agents. The 
FIGURE 6-10: Evidence of germline changes in liquidators from Chernobyl 
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Figure 1. RAPD detection of new amplimer in experi-
ment and contro l families in offspring born after the 
Chernobyl accident. RAPD PCR products were sepa-
rated on 5% polyacrylamide (PAA) and stained with sil-
ver. C. negative control. which included all the reaction 
reagents except DNA. Ma corresponds to pGEM 
(promega) marker restricted by Hinfl. Rsa I and Sin I. 
Lanes 1 to 4 correspond to external control family 
members: F. father; M. mother; DB, daughter before; 
DA, daughter after. Lanes 8 to 11 correspond to 
Chernobyl liquidator family members: DB; SA. son 
after. with RAPD primer OPT16; F; M. Asterisks indi· 
cate the new band that was revealed in the offspring 
born after the disaster. Note that no such new band 
appeared in his F, M. or sibling. 
F M DB SA F M DA SB Ma 
1 2 3 45 6 78 9 
Figure 2. AP PCR detection of new amplimer in experi-
ment and control families in offspring born after the 
Chernobyl accident. AP PCR products were separated 
on 5% PAA and stained with silver. Ma (lane 9) corre-
sponds to 1 kb ladder marker. Lanes 1 to 4 correspond 
to external control family members: F; M; DB; SA, son 
after, with microsatellite primer BC 887. Lanes 5 to 8 
correspond to Chernobyl liquidator family members: F; 
M; DA; SB, son before . Asterisk indicates the new 
band that was revealed in the offspring born after the 
disaster. Note that no such new band appeared in her 
F, M, or sibling. 
SOURCE: Weinberg , H-S, et al. (1997). Molecular changes in the offspring of liquidators who 
emigrated to Israel from the Chernobyl disaster area. Environmental Health Perspectives 
Supplement, 105, Sup pl. 6, p. 1480. 
minisatellites are known to be good screening indicators of mutations, but their purpose is not 
known since minisatell ites are not believed to affect health status. 
Dubrova et al. (1996) found in successive probes that the children from the Mogilev 
district had double the mutation rates in the minisatellite regions than the ch ildren in the control 
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group. The researchers stated that a likely cause for th is increased rate of mutation was germline 
mutation in the sperm or egg of the parents after exposure to radiation from Chernobyl , though 
chemical pollution also might have contributed to the mutations. The findings from this study are 
important because previous stud ies on survivors of the bombings of Nagaski and Hiroshima failed 
to showed statistically significant differences in DNA mutations between exposed and control 
families (Dubrova et al., 1996; Hillis, 1996). 
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To support their hypothesis that Chernobyl was the direct environmental link to these 
observed mutations, the researchers found that the total mutation rate was 1.5 times higher in 
areas of Belarus known to have high cesium-137 surface contamination compared to areas of low 
contamination . The investigators hypothesized that the mutations may have been caused either 
by the first acute exposure to iodine-131 or that chronic doses of cesium-137 have been 
underestimated. However, they noted that nonradioactive contaminants from the accident may 
have contributed to the findings in the study. 
J. Neel, a well-known geneticist at the University of Michigan, responded in the New York 
Times (April 1995) to the study with skepticism, stating that sensitivity to genetic effects was not 
evident in his experimental work on fruit flies or mice, or in his studies in Japan. He noted: "This is 
such a sensitive subject. There's near hysteria in Russia over it" (p. 12). 
Research underway on mutations does not only extend to homo sapiens. The radioactive 
environment near Chernobyl also has provided an opportunity for plant and animal geneticists to 
explore changes in the local ecosystem. Kovalchuk et al. (1998) focused on genetic 
recombination in Arabidopsis thaliana after seeding 200 of these small, simple plants in soil 
collected from seven locations just kilometers from Chernobyl. A comparison sample was planted 
20-30 kilometers southeast of Chernobyl. The soil in the experimental samples contained a 
number of radionuclides, but the majority of radioactivity was due to cesium-137. Up to five 
genetic recombinations were found per plant. The number peaked at a soil contamination level of 
about 1 ,000 Ci/km2 (range: 20 - 6,000 Ci/km2 ) , at which recombination levels fell. The 
researchers hypothesized that, at higher levels, the recombination process may be less precise. 
Kovalchuk at al. (1998) studied not only the numbers of recombinations, but the kinds of 
aberrations taking place in the chromosomes. Figure 6-11 on the next page shows a rare view of 
chromosomal aberrations in plant cells from A. cepa root tip cells as a result of irradiation found in 
the soil near Chernobyl. The investigators observed several kinds of aberrations. Less damaging 
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are chromosomal breaks called bridges (b) and fragments (f) and weak chromosomes called 
vagrants (v). In contrast, sticky (s) or c-m itosis (c) chromosome aberrations are usually highly 
toxic and irreversible, resulting in cell death. Figure 11 below depicts a normal cell assay, with 
each of the chromosomal aberrations shown in B, C, and D. 
These findings on kinds of cell aberrations add an important component to the study. The 
investigators found that the percentage of aberrant cells was strongly correlated (r = 0.9737) with 
the pollution (radioactivity) level of the soil. So even though recombination events began to 
diminish beyond 1 ,000 Ci/km 2 , the number of aberrant cells continued to rise. At soil radioactivity 
levels of 1 ,000 to 6,000 Ci/km2, the spectrum of damage was mostly from c-mitoses and sticky 
chromosomes, the most toxic and irreversible kind of aberration . This might explain why A. cepa 
plants at the highest rad ioactive levels germinated at a low rate: the plants did not survive the 
aberrations. 
FIGURE 6-11: Chromosomal aberrations in root cells from A. cepa samples 
germinated near Chernobyl 
SOURCE: Kovalchuk, 1., et al. (1998). Transgenic plants are sensitive bioindicators of nuclear 
pollution caused by the Chernobyl accident. Nature Biotechnology, 16, p. 1057. 
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Baker and coresearchers ( 1996) reported in Nature on their genetic work on voles, a type 
of field mouse that lived near Chernobyl. Baker and his colleagues studied mitochondrial 
cytochrome b gene. Two species of voles, totaling nine, were collected from one of the most 
contaminated sites near Chernobyl, about 1 kilometer southwest of Reactor No. 4, to serve as the 
experimental sample. The comparison sample consisted of ten voles collected 32 kilometers 
southeast of the reactor site. The investigators found base-pair substitution rates in the 
experimental group significant at the p < 0.0003 level. This meant that the amino-acid sequence 
of the Chernobyl moles living 1 kilometer away was changing, or mutating, at a high rate. Embryos 
of one female vole also were studied, and three showed a variation in the cytochrome b gene 
sequence of their mother. This meant that the mutations were carried into the progeny of the 
voles and were not the result of external immigration of voles to Chernobyl. The researchers also 
found that the mutations were cumulative: they increased with each generation. The voles 
examined for the study appeared to be healthy. Only eight of 191 specimens near Chernobyl 
showed enlarged spleens, which could signal infection or the onset of cancer. The investigators 
were surprised that the voles tolerated such a high mutation rate and still thrived . 
Baker and his research group clarified the findings of their study in an earlier U.S. News 
and World Report (1995) . They noted that field mice in the Exclusion Zone were "undergoing an 
extremely rapid rate of evolution" (p. 52). Though the mice appeared normal on inspection, they 
showed many breaks in their DNA strands and a high mutation rate . The researchers found that 
the gene sequences and the proteins of all five voles living in the Restricted Zone were different 
from the voles living outside the zone. They reported that the differences between the two sets of 
voles "were greater than those normally found between mice and rats, species that diverged 
about 15 million years ago" (p. 53) . The researchers planned further research to find out if the 
mutations extended beyond the cytochrome b gene. 
Studies on the genetic effects of radiation are sensitive and difficult to interpret because 
of the complex nature of DNA structure, even in plants. Studies on DNA changes and possible 
germline mutation in humans are especially difficult as well as expensive. However, preliminary 
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studies are suggesting chromosomal damage from the accident and the possibility of germline 
effects. Though the case for genetic damage is growing, scientists do not know how this damage 
is expressed in terms of the health of the populations stud ied . 
Beyond morbidity and mutations: Monitoring long term health effects 
A number of longitudinal studies have been conducted or are underway to measure the 
stochastic, or indirect, effects of the accident on illness and illness behavior attributed to 
Chernobyl. Stochastic studies focus on trends over large populations, since it is difficult to link 
individual outcomes to radiation exposure unless the individual is diagnosed with radiation 
sickness. Virtually all other illnesses are associations historically linked with radiation exposure, 
the strongest of which is thyroid cancer from radioiodine exposure. Researchers who trace the 
health effects of Chernobyl are hindered by the uncertainty over precise dose estimates in the 
population and the deteriorating socioeconomic climate in the countries most affected. Illness 
behavior refers to the health problems that may be linked to psychological stress from the disaster 
rather than to radiation-induced effects. 
The scientific consensus today acknowledges one prediction of the International 
Chernobyl Project (1991) that the major recognized health outcome to the population might be 
increased thyroid cancer from exposure to iodine-131 . Project researchers at the time 
hypothesized that the most detrimental exposure was from iodine radiation in the first several 
days following the blast. 
A major health study published in 1995 was WHO's International Programme on the 
Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident (IPHECA). Close to 200 professional staff contributed to 
this effort beginning in 1991 at an estimated cost of $20 million US, not including contributions 
from the countries involved and the international community. The outcome of the research 
showed a sharp increase in thyroid cancer, especially among children. The WHO (1995) report 
stated that close to 5 million people were reported to have received nonradioactive iodine tablets 
shortly after the accident to block the effects of iodine-131, but apparently many children did not 
receive the tablets. The sharpest increase noted was in the Gamel district of Belarus, known to be 
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in the direct path of the initial radioactive plume. Thyroid cancers increased from 1 per million 
before the accident to 100 per million children in 1994. The report noted no significant increase in 
the incidence of leukemia or other blood disorders, but predicted that blood disorders might 
surface at least 1 0 years after the accident. Some research findings from a small sample of 
children exposed in utero suggested the possibility of retarded mental development and 
behavioral and emotional deviations. The researchers also noted the stress and trauma 
associated with the accident may have contributed to increased incidence of diseases not directly 
related to radiation . 
Echoing the findings of the WHO (1995) study, Goldman (1997) in his summary of 
radiation accidents in the former Soviet Union, notes the significant increase in childhood thyroid 
nodules and cancers, believed to be mainly the result of ingestion of large quantities of 
radioiodine. The normal rate for children with thyroid neoplasms in the region under 15 years of 
age was relatively rare, believed to be .5 per million. Within five years after the accident, this rate 
increased to 3 to 100 per million children , depending on the area. Goldman also noted increased 
reports of cataracts in children , even at low threshold levels of radiation , a cond ition not found in 
the International Chernobyl Project (1991 ). 
A number of important studies have explored illness and illness behavior as a result of the 
accident. Part of the difficulty of defining the effects of radiation is the psychological distress that 
accompanies an accident of this magnitude. Havenaar et al. (1997) surveyed residents of the city 
of Gamel, Belarus, located 50 miles northeast of Chernobyl, a designated contaminated area, and 
in Tver, Russia, located 700 miles northeast of Chernobyl, well outside the range of significant 
radiation fallout. The survey was conducted in two phases. Respondents were first asked to 
assess their subjective health, psychological well-being and health-related behaviors. In the 
second phase, a percentage of the respondents were given medical examinations and psychiatric 
assessments. Respondents ranged in age from 18 to 65, and over 90 percent in both samples 
were employed. The researchers completed phase one in fall1992 and phase two in spring 1993. 
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Havenaar et al. (1997) found that the general health status of both groups was relatively 
poor. More respondents in the Gamel (contaminated) region than in Tver (clean) were found to 
have at least one clinical condition or psychiatric disorder, but the difference between the groups 
was not statistically significant. The clinical diagnoses of illness found in the Gamel group could 
not be directly attributed to exposure to ionizing radiation. A high percentage of both groups self-
assessed their health as fair or poor (Gamel , 74.5%; Tver, 56.5%) or reported that they were in 
psychological distress (Gamel, 64.8%; Tver, 48.1 %). An important finding in the study is that more 
than 50 percent of the residents in these two cities were diagnosed with at least one medical 
condition. This represents a sharp increase over the estimates of the International Chernobyl 
Project ( 1991 ), though different criteria for referral might have been used in each study. 
In contrast to the diagnosed health cond ition of the two samples, the differences in the 
self-assessments between Gamel and Tver were statistically significant. Based on these findings, 
the researchers suggested that Gamel residents in the contaminated zone might have an 
increased or exaggerated perception of poor health or psychological distress, an indication of a 
possible illness behavior effect from Chernobyl. The results of the comparative survey are 
summarized in Table 6.7 below. 
However, a number of limitations must be considered in the findings of the study. The 
researchers noted that over 90 percent of the respondents were either in school or employed at 
the time of the study. Excluded were respondents who were disabled, bedridden or hospitalized, 
an unknown portion of the population . The Tver sample also contained more women, elderly, 
divorced and widowed persons, and fewer people with higher education. Though Tver is 700 
miles northeast of Chernobyl, the researchers did not indicate whether the respondents believed 
they were affected by the accident at Chernobyl. Research on Chernobyl suggests that residents 
in broad areas of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus continue to believe that they have been adversely 
affected from the fallout at Chernobyl, even though they are located outside the contaminated 
zone. Moreover, Tver is located 50 miles away from another nuclear power plant. The 
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TABLE 6-7 
Sampling characteristics and findings of 1992-1993 health survey in Gomel, Belarus, and 
Tver, Russia 
Sampling: 
Number participating in phase I 
Number participating in phase II 
Self-reported health: 
Health fair or poor 
Psychological distress 
Visited doctor last four weeks : 
Used medication last four weeks: 
Clinically diagnosed health status: 
Diagnosed with at least one physical condition 
Medical case* 
Diagnosed with psychiatric disorder 
Go mel 
1617 
265 
Percent 
74.5 
64.8 
47.7 
69.9 
63.7 
43.5 
35.8 
Tver 
1427 
184 
Percent 
56.5 
48.1 
41 .1 
60.4 
55.1 
36.5 
37.1 
*A medical case included two subcategories: 1) the respondent on examination showed fair 
health with good performance but needed medical attention; or 2) the respondent showed poor 
performance status and was clinically ill. Dutch physicians participating in the study made the 
clinical diagnoses. 
SOURCE: Havenaar, J., et al. (1997). Health effects of the Chernobyl disaster: Illness or illness 
behavior? A comparative general health survey in two former Soviet regions . Environmental 
Health Perspectives, 105, Suppl. 6, pp. 1533-1536. 
researchers found this to be a parallel between the two sites, but this also presents a possible 
confounding factor since the status of the nuclear plant near Tver was not discussed . 
While Havenaar et al. (1997) focused on the health status of adults, aged 18 to 65, in the 
contaminated zone, Lomat and his coresearchers (1997) highlighted some of the emerging trends 
with children in the region affected by the Chernobyl accident. The researchers noted that 
children are believed to be more sensitive than adults to radiation , so study of this population 
could indicate radiation effects more quickly than a comparable study on adults. 
Lomat et al . ( 1997) estimated that 20 percent of the children of Belarus today- nearly 
460,000 children-live in regions contaminated by more than 37 kBq/m2 of cesium-137. The 
researchers noted that study of the stochastic effects of radiation has been greatly complicated 
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because of the concurrent deterioration in quality of life indicators throughout the former Soviet 
Union since its dissolution. For hundreds of thousands of people in Ukraine, Russia and Belarus 
who were living in the regions most affected by the radioactive emissions, the Chernobyl accident 
resulted in a catastrophic change in their lives, including restrictions on the local food they could 
eat. Thus, it is difficult to disentangle the possible reasons for changes in health status of the 
children living in these regions. 
A decrease in birth rate has been noted since 1988, and an increase in infant mortality 
recorded since 1991 . The authors noted an increase in the incidence and prevalence of childhood 
morbidity for most disease classes in Belarus from 1987 and 1995, and an increase in the 
incidence of malignant neoplasms per 100,000 children. In 1986, malignant rates were recorded 
as 9.9 per 100,000, increasing to 15.4 and 15.8 in 1994 and 1995, respectively. 
To indicate trends, the authors compared national rates in Belarus in 1995 to those found 
in the categories of the Chernobyl Registry of Belarus, a data base that contains health 
information on 65,000 children, of which 32,000 were 0 to 14 years of age at the end of 1995. 
The children in the Chernobyl registry were sorted into three groups, as described in Figure 6.12, 
and compared to national trends on selected diseases. It is important to note that the authors 
extrapolated to a population of 100,000 based on the data from a total of 65,000 children in the 
registry, so the numbers in groups 1, 2 and 3 are estimates, assuming a larger population. In 
addition, since children in the Chernobyl Registry were included in the childhood population of 
Belarus, their health data are part of the national statistics for Belarus (national). These trends are 
best interpreted as comparative estimates of incidence by group. 
The researchers noted that diseases included in the data in Figure 6.12 may be more or 
less serious. Most frequent conditions cited in the digestive organs were gastritis and 
gastroduodenitis, and an increased incidence of bile duct pathology. Children in the registry 
groups are considered to be 3.8 times higher risk for thyroid disease, but other endocrine 
conditions were reported in the Chernobyl Registry. The incidence rates for thyroiditis in the 
registry sample were 75.5 per 100,000, compared to 19.8 in the general population. Incidence of 
287 
nodular goiters was listed at 113.3 per 100,000 in the registry group, compared to 47.4 nationally. 
Anemia, a condition often caused by poor nutrition, was found to be 2.8 fold higher in the registry 
groups than in the national population of children in Belarus. High rates of chronic tonsillitis and 
adenoiditis were found in all registry groups. In noting these trends, Lomat et al. (1997) cautioned 
against drawing conclusions about radiation effects. The data at best suggest trends in health 
status of more or less seriousness that are compared with general trends in the state of Belarus. 
Finally, some of the lessons learned from one other group of clinical researchers are 
noted in this study. Quastel et al. (1997) highlighted some of the lessons learned from clinical 
work with immigrants who migrated to Israel from the former Soviet Union. They noted that up to 
700,000 people from the former Soviet Union emigrated to Israel, of which an estimated 140,000 
were from contaminated regions in Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. Medical staff at Soroka Medical 
Center and the Faculty of Health and Sciences of Ben-Gurion University, Beer Sheva, Israel, 
established a volunteer clinic in February 1991 to evaluate health concerns of immigrants about 
their exposure in the accident. Quastel et al. ( 1997) based their analysis on the information 
gleaned from the clients who came to the clinic. The authors noted the benefit of obtaining data 
from immigrants living in close proximity from all three of the main radiocontaminated countries . 
Quastel et al. (1997) measured whole-body cesium counts of 1,228 volunteer men, women and 
children and conducted medical assessments and examinations. They found that the level of 
radiocesium was strongly dependent on the time living in Israel: the most recent immigrants had 
the highest levels of the isotope. Area of previous residence also mattered . Immigrants from 
Gomel had significantly higher body burdens compared to those of Kiev, a major city in southern 
Ukraine. The official map of cesium-137 shown on page 235 of this report shows Kiev to lie just 
south of the lightest region (37 -185 kBq/m2) of exposure. Thus, Kiev is not considered part of the 
contaminated zone. Of the most recent immigrants, researchers at the clinic noted that only 15 
percent from Kiev had body burdens of more than 50 Bq, while 53 percent of those from Gomel 
and other towns in the contaminated region showed levels beyond 50 Bq, a level not considered 
health threatening. They found that women and children had considerably lower levels of 
II) 
Cll 
II) 
~ 
II) 
i5 
FIGURE 6.12 
Incidence of some disease classes per 100,000 children during 1995 
in the Chernobyl registry compared to the national average in 
Belarus 
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NOTE: Data from each of the groups in the Chernobyl Registry of 65,000 children in Belarus 
have been extrapolated to a population of 100,000. 
Group 1: Children evacuated from a 30-kilometer area around Chernobyl, 5.4%. 
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Group 2: Children who reside in or who moved from areas with radioactive contamination higher 
than 555 kBq/m, 63.4%. 
Group 3: Children born to parents exposed to radiation (i.e ., liquidators, evacuees from the 30-
km zone surrounding Chernobyl, and people resettled from areas with cesium-137 
ground contamination greater than 555 kBq/m 2, 31 .2%. 
SOURCE: Lomat, L. et al. (1997) . Incidence of childhood disease in Belarus associated with the 
Chernobyl accident. Environmental Health Perspectives. 105, Suppl. 6, p. 1531. 
radioactive cesium in their body counts. The researchers attributed this to the lower body mass 
and faster excretion rate of women and children . It should be noted that body count indicates only 
a fraction of total radiation exposure, since only some of the radionuclides remain in the body. 
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For purposes of their analysis, Quastel et al. (1997) divided the volunteers into 
comparison groups from high (more exposed) and low (less exposed) contamination areas. They 
(1997) studied a number of health indicators as follows: Blood pressure: Researchers found that 
older immigrants from high exposed areas had significantly higher blood pressure levels (p < 
0.01) than those from less exposed areas. 
Thyroid: The thyroid status of 300 participants who were 0 to 16 at the time of the 
accident was examined. The researchers found enlarged thyroids in about 40 percent. One 3-
year-old girl from Gamel was found to have a malignant papillary carcinoma, and another 23 had 
thyroid irregularities. Serum antibody levels from 73 children from Gamel (high exposure region) 
were elevated. Thyroid stimulating hormone for girls in high exposure regions was elevated, but 
within normal limits. 
Chromosome damage: C/astogenic Factor (CF). Researchers collected plasma from a 
limited number of liquidators, adults and children from highly contaminated areas and compared 
the samples with those from noncontaminated regions of the former Soviet Union . They looked for 
clastogenic factor, substances in the plasma that induce chromosome damage from exposure to 
ionizing radiation. Elevated levels of CF were found in 33 out of the 47 liquidators studied 
compared to 2 out of 47 of the healthy blood donors. Children from Kiev and Gamel showed 
significantly higher levels (40 out of 170) compared to unexposed children (3 out of 70), and the 
difference was statistically significant (p < 0.001 ). Glycophorin A (GPA). Researchers 
(Wishkerman et al., 1997) carried out a sensitive technique to measure the frequency of red cell 
mutations in the GPA locus in the bone marrow, a procedure used to assess cancer risk. Blood 
specimens from liquidators measured for frequency of somatic mutation in their red cells showed 
significant elevation (p < 0.001) compared to an unexposed control group. 
Psychosocial Effects: Psychiatric researchers connected to the clinic conducted 700 
interviews, of which half were immigrants from contaminated areas and half were from areas of 
the former Soviet Union far from Chernobyl. They noted a dramatic association , significant at the 
p < 0.001 level, between the percent of elevated scores on an inventory for Impact of Events (IEC) 
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of immigrants from contaminated regions and the degree of contamination in their country of 
origin . Researchers who studied this association suggest that this provided evidence, along with 
other research, of the existence of Posttraumatic Shock Disorder (PTSD) among the immigrants. 
Researchers found evidence of this disorder in 7 percent of the immigrants from the control 
group, 15 percent from regions in low exposure areas, and 30 percent in persons from high 
exposure areas. They also noted significant correlations between blood pressure increase and 
cancer fear, and between somatization of symptoms and symptoms of PTSD. These findings lend 
support to the importance of psychosocial aspects of the accident and illness behavior, important 
aspects of the search for an understanding of the health consequences of the Chernobyl accident. 
In summarizing the lessons they have learned from their experience with former Soviet 
Union immigrants, Quastel et al. (1997) made three recommendations for further study on the 
impact of Chernobyl : 
First, the researchers noted that the early onset of thyroid cancer among immigrant 
children and the absence of onset of leukemia were not expected trends following the accident. 
They recommended that scientific studies avoid assuming that the health studies conducted on 
survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki will predict the future of the exposed population from 
Chernobyl. Well-controlled epidemiological studies with original data should be continued. 
Second , Quastel et al. (1997) recommended further studies using designs comparing sample 
groups that were exposed to low and high radiation levels. They noted the great difficulty of finding 
equivalent groups for these studies with the same ethnic and environmental backgrounds. Third, 
the investigators ( 1997) suggested the need for more subtle indicators of health effects in 
scientific studies on the impact of the Chernobyl accident. They noted: "Not all radiation effects 
that affect quality of life are malignant. Therefore, it would be unwise to select malignancy as the 
only parameter for the assessment of health effects" (p. 1526). 
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IV. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The social and economic consequences of the Chernobyl accident continue to affect the 
health and well-being of citizens in parts of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. Great differences of 
opinion exist over the actual health impact of the accident. At one end of the spectrum are policy-
makers who believe that the lower quality of life in the region that has occurred since the 
disintegration of the Soviet republics is perhaps the leading cause of increased illness in the 
region most affected by Chernobyl. The major disruption in life style throughout the NIS region 
was made worse when thousands of citizens living near the Chernobyl site were uprooted and 
forced to move to a location farther from the accident, a possible overreaction by public officials. 
Such stakeholders point out that medical and health studies conducted following the 
accident show relatively limited damage from radiation fallout. Many insiders in the nuclear 
industry, for instance, believe that the public terror of radiation is unfounded in the face of 
evidence from general radiation research and from previous accidents , especially Chernobyl. 
Some indirect effects, such as increased blood pressure and depression, are more the result of 
perceived trauma and pain and less the result of damage from exposure to radionuclides . Those 
policymakers who take this view believe that the disability payments made to liquidators and other 
survivors of the accident exceeded actual damage to their health and have burdened excessively 
such governments as Ukraine and Belarus. 
At the other end of the spectrum are those who believe the costs of the Chernobyl 
accident must not be calculated primarily in terms of risk of mortal ity from direct exposure to 
radionuclides. Such stakeholders believe that the social and economic consequences of 
Chernobyl far exceeded current estimates. Whether the increased levels of illnesses documented 
in the Chernobyl zone have been the result of exposure to damaging radionuclides, or of such 
other factors as the lack of an adequate food supply, the disruptions in the way of life, the loss of 
income and markets in a largely agricultural reg ion, and so on , does not matter. Risk analysis 
must take account of all of all of these factors , not simply target the impact of rad ioactive nuclides. 
By adding the cost of closing Chernobyl and of maintaining the sarcophagus for centuries to 
come, the actual costs of the Chernobyl accident are beyond comprehension . 
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The cooperative agreement with USAID and Selentec to some extent became caught in 
the scientific and policy issues that continue to surround Chernobyl. Analysis of the project's 
effectiveness can be considered in terms of the four categories (resource intensiveness, 
targeting, institutional capacity, and political risk) developed by Linder and Peters (1989) and 
Salamon (1989) as follows : 
Resource intensiveness: Rating: High. This category refers to the complexity of 
operations required for the project, including technical expertise required, and its 
costliness relative to the proposed solution . The solution proposed by Selentec was to 
install MAG*SEP machines at a number of dairies in the exclusion zone to remove 
radioactive cesium from milk, though juice and water were at one point also targeted . Mr. 
Dunn believed that the government of Ukraine was interested in supporting some of the 
costs of possible installations of the machine, once the prototype in Ovruch could be 
shown to work. Thus, though the pilot project was not considered large, the original 
request from Selentec for installations of several machines would have involved a 
substantial investment. 
The project must be considered highly resource intensive because it required the 
engineering expertise of Selentec and the testing expertise of groups at Argonne 
Laboratories and the State Committee of Ukraine for Food Testing for experimentation 
with food involving radioactive substances. USAID officials expressed discomfort with 
this project in part because the expertise involved was beyond that of the technical 
environmental staff at USAID and because the process had not been used or even 
approved for use in the food industry in the United States. 
Targeting: Rating: Low. This category refers to the specificity of the project in terms of 
the intended population. Also in question are how precisely the population can be 
identified and how amenable to change the tool or intended solution could be. 
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Though the Selentec project appeared to be highly targeted in its tasks, that is, it 
would serve to remove radioactive cesium from milk in a selected dairy in Ovruch. But 
the location of the project was about all that was obvious about the project. A major 
question lingered throughout the project as to the standards to use in identifying milk that 
was acceptable for export or for consumption . Questions arose as to what levels of 
cesium were actually in the milk, and whether cesium at such low levels was a clear 
problem. To make matters more complicated, the health impact of radioactive cesium is 
today still open to question because cesium absorbs into the body evenly, unlike 
radioactive iodine, which concentrates in the thyroid . USAID technical staff found 
themselves drawn to help Chernobyl survivors, but without a concrete sense of what the 
project could actually do to resolve the bigger problem of low-level cesium found in the 
contamination zone. USAID officials also questioned whether the Ukrainian groups 
involved in the project had the financial capability to carry on the project through 
investment of their own resources in the future. 
Since the magnetic separation process, however technologically promising, had 
not been approved for use in the United States in an appl ication such as this, much 
project time and cost was directed to proving the efficacy of the process rather than 
proving the efficacy of the benefit to the local community in Ukraine. For instance, much 
time was taken up in finding the best particle mix to remove cesium. The chemical 
mixture eventually chosen and manufactured for use in the Ovruch dairy turned out to 
cost considerably more than had been projected . The experimental nature of the 
process, coupled with setbacks that occurred at the dairy itself, led to inevitable delays. 
The argument could be made that insufficient time had been set into meeting the 
objectives of the project, and this led to increased frustration . As costs began to exceed 
projections and the Selentec project was not approved for add itional fund ing, frustration 
mounted on all sides. 
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Institutional capacity: Rating: Low. This category refers to the ability of USAID and the 
contractors to deliver on the product. The argument could be made that USAID was not 
suited to deliver on a project requiring such high technical characteristics. Selentec, 
Argonne Laboratories and the Ukrainian Committee for Food Testing were capable of 
delivering a product, but the time frame allocated to it was not reasonable. In this sense, 
the contract partnership between USAID and the parties in the project was not well 
matched. A partnership between the Department of Energy or the Food and Drug 
Administration might have provided a better match in managing the agreement. 
Unfortunately, no other governmental body appeared to have the authority to implement 
the Selentec agreement. 
Though Selentec had the technical capacity to deliver the system, unexpected 
delays and cost overruns led to the premature shutdown of the project. Selentec began 
to have financial difficulties when cred itors began to ask for loan repayments . USAID was 
not sufficiently aware of the financial agreements between Selentec and its creditors. 
Under-capitalized, Selentec was not able to continue the project through its own 
resources. As a consequence, Selentec gave away its right to the MAG*SEP patent to its 
creditors in lieu of loan repayments . This prevented further work on the project to be 
completed. 
Political risk. Rating: High. All parties knew at the outset of the project that the risk was 
high for the Selentec Cooperative Agreement. If the process succeeded scientifically and 
more models could be installed at other locations, the potential existed for a highly 
targeted solution to removing low levels of cesium in milk and potentially in juice and 
water, after further testing. Since milk was an important component of the diet in the 
region, the prospect of lowering a potential health risk to the local population, in particular 
the children , would be a beneficial outcome. Selentec would have the opportunity to 
prove the efficacy of its system for another industrial use. Argonne Laboratories was 
interested in taking the potential of the technology further and testing the magnetic 
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separation process more fully. Each of the stakeholders thus had different reasons for 
promoting the project. Because the project was not completed, however, none of the 
stakeholders were able to meet their expectations. 
In spite of the many difficulties with the project, USAID officials also recognized 
that the Selentec project was highly popular in the Ovruch district and among other 
Ukrainian people who knew of it. Rather than words and reams of paper, the project 
promised a concrete product with a welcome solution to Ukrainians who worried on a 
daily basis about the impact the low levels of cesium still in the food chain. But the failure 
of the project to reach completion even as a prototype left a strong sense of frustration for 
everyone involved. 
CHAPTER VII: 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Abstract: In Part I of this chapter, a brief summary is provided 
on the current status of the assistance program in the NIS. This 
is followed in Part II by a discussion of the evaluative findings 
of the study in terms of the categories developed by Linder 
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and Peters (1989) . Part Ill includes a review of the scholarly 
literature on such issues as the conflicts in politically- and 
economically-driven development and the domestic policy-
making framework for foreign aid . In Part IV, recommendations 
are made to refocus the current effort in the NIS toward 
developmental strategies . Sen 's (1996) concept of Development 
as Freedom is suggested as a unifying strategic goal for social 
sector programs. 
As Linder and Peters (1989) suggest, governments use a variety of policy tools , both 
direct and indirect, to further their policy objectives. Multilateral and bilateral foreign assistance 
since the 1960s has become a common policy tool for Western industrialized nations to further 
their global policy objectives and to provide humanitarian assistance for low- and middle-income 
countries around the world . The purpose of this research study was to explore the policy 
objectives and strategic intent of the United States bilateral foreign assistance effort in the New 
Independent States (NIS) through three projects in the social sector funded by the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the major bilateral agency for US foreign 
assistance. Though the Office of the Coordinator of US Assistance to the NIS, located in the 
Department of State, has been entrusted with overall responsib ility for implementing foreign 
assistance initiatives in the region , USAID continues to serve as the main implementing body for 
much of the assistance program in the social sector. 
I. The evolving foreign assistance program in the NISin 2000 and beyond 
The US foreign aid program in the former Soviet Union was described at its inception in 
the early 1990s as an assistance program with a short-term goal : to aid in the transition of the 
post-Soviet republ ics as they made the change from a single , centralized, control-command 
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economy to decentralized open-market democracies. Much attention has been paid to the billions 
of dollars of aid provided to the region, wh ich has included industry, school and university 
exchanges, political party and independent media building, humanitarian assistance, as well as a 
wide range of other projects and activities. Roughly 50 percent of the formal US bilateral efforts 
has been directed toward activities to support political and economic transition of the former 
Soviet republics toward free market democracies . 
It should be noted, however, that nearly 50 percent of the aid program to the NIS since 
the passing of the US FREEDOM Support Act in 1992 has been directed toward addressing 
national security issues, particularly concerns about the possible proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction . Aid efforts in this area are directed at a variety of potential threats to US national 
security, especially in the Russian Federation . They include the effort to negotiate arms control 
agreements, including reduction of weaponry to more desirable levels; to discourage sale of 
arms, technology and personnel expertise to nations perceived to be hostile or unstable; and to 
monitor current hold ings of nuclear arsenals and materials to avoid theft or illicit sale. 
The buoyant optimism of the early 1990s following the breakup of the Soviet Union within 
a few short years slipped into disappointment and skepticism as virtually all of the republics, 
including the Russian Federation , became mired in severe economic and financial problems. 
Financial setbacks and shocks year-to-year have been compared to those of the Great 
Depression in the United States in the 1930s. Many republics continued to average 20 to 22 
percent inflation per year even as the millennium approached. The structure to uphold financial 
and economic reform appeared to be lacking in suitable laws and practices or compromised by 
corruption at all levels. The political transition to democratic reform in the region was equally 
troublesome to many international observers, stymied by the same kinds of issues as economic 
reform . Though the Soviet Union was in a state of economic collapse at the time of its dissolution 
in 1991 , many residents throughout the region began to find what replaced it yet another bitter pill 
to swallow. 
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The annual report for 2000 (Taylor, January 2001) issued by the Office of the Coordinator 
of US Assistance to the NIS suggested that the status of US efforts for economic and political 
reform in the NIS had become an increasingly tenuous undertaking heading into 2001 . According 
to the report, the Coordinator's Office had begun to reorient the assistance effort in the region in 
recent years to be seen as a long-term transition process. The economic news in the NIS region 
was positive in the year 2000 in the sense that rampant inflation had been checked and all of the 
NIS countries registered positive GDPs. But these positive developments were countered by 
negative trends in democratic reform. The report noted that several presidential and 
parliamentary elections held in the NISin 2000 were deeply flawed , that many of the 
governments continued to stifle the development of civil society and nongovernmental institutions, 
and that media representatives were increasingly harassed or their offices shut down if they had 
been critical of their states. 
Conditionality, or the practice of setting of conditions for the disbursements of grants, 
loans and projects, was part of the US foreign aid package from the beginning. Ten years into the 
assistance program, the amounts and kinds of projects approved for individual republics 
continued to be closely connected to the perceived climate for reform . The report (Taylor, January 
2001) noted the diminishing budgets allocated to Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan for their 
resistance to economic and political reform , and the increased assistance to Moldova, Georgia, 
and Ukraine for the reform-minded efforts in some areas of these countries . The report 
discussed the heavy toll that corruption continued to inflict ind ividually and cumulatively on the 
republics . 
Unprecedented in the Coordinator's annual report for 2000 (Taylor, January 2001) was 
the acknowledgement of a growing skepticism over the value of US assistance in the NIS region . 
The United States had a long-term strategic responsibility to ensure that US national security 
interests were served , especially over concerns about weapons of mass destruction. But critics of 
the fore ign assistance program in the region pointed to the fact that none of the republics had 
attained the kinds of economic and pol itical trans itions witnessed in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The report noted that lessons of past successes and failures needed to be taken into account, 
particularly in light of growing criticism over the shortcomings of previous efforts . 
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After George W. Bush was declared to be the new president of the United States in 
January 2001 , the international community braced for a new era in foreign affairs , Republican-
style. In the early months of 2001 , the Administration spent time lobbying for education and 
election reform , monitoring sliding stock markets and promoting economic stimulus measures . 
But partisan battles over a host of domestic issues vanished in the morning of September 11, 
2001 , after the horrifying terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon . In the 
weeks that followed, the United States government sought the support and cooperation of many 
nations to determine the identity those believed to be behind the attacks and to punish those 
individuals and nations responsible for it. Subsequent investigations led the United States to 
begin air attacks on selected sites in Afghanistan in search of Osama Bin Laden and AI Quaeda 
training camps and within weeks to topple the ruling Taliban government, suspected of supporting 
Bin Laden and his efforts . 
Following the September 11 attacks, the war on terrorism became the main focus for 
foreign diplomatic relations throughout the world , and protection of the safety of American society 
became the paramount reason for governance in the United States . By spring 2002, President 
George W. Bush suggested that, starting in 2004, the foreign affairs budget should be increased 
incrementally, but not for the purpose of eradicating AIDS or to help the most needy. Instead, his 
proposed expansions would include even greater conditionality in aid disbursements than in the 
past and would be directed toward supporting forces around the world to control terrorist activities 
and organizations . Foreign aid now promised to become aligned with national security interests 
to an extent not seen since the height of the Cold War three decades before. But in a major 
reversal , in this new kind of war, some of the former Soviet republics might play a key role in 
cooperating to eradicate terrorism , a change that could bring about a new strategic alignment with 
the NIS region in the years ahead. 
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II . Findings: The complications of delivering foreign assistance in the NIS 
The three case studies in this study document three types of approaches toward foreign 
assistance in the region: classical technical assistance, formal site partnership and 
experimental technology. Classical technical assistance in this study is represented in the 
contract awarded to Abt Associates for ZdravReform , a regional program promoting system 
health reform. Project offices in Russia and Ukraine closed down at the end of 1996 and 1998, 
respectively, but ZdravReform Plus in the Central Asian republics, considered the most 
successful project site , continues its work in 2002. Formal site partnership is represented in the 
American International Health Alliance (AIHA) Partnership Program, also a region-wide project 
that continues to be active in 2002 . The third approach, employing experimental technology, is 
an unusual one for USAID. This approach is represented in USAID's cooperative agreement with 
Selentec, Inc., a private company promoting a magnetic separation process to remove 
radioactive cesium present in milk at low levels as a result of the Chernobyl nuclear accident. A 
prototype machine was set up at a dairy in Ovruch , Ukraine, located about 75 kilometers from 
Chernobyl , for beta testing . However, the Selentec project was shut down in 1998 after running 
out of materials with no new financing in sight before the final testing phase was completed. 
Each case embodies not only an approach to foreign assistance, but also the interests 
and agendas of a large number of stakeholders, both foreign and domestic. As a result of this 
complex context for implementing foreign assistance, this study is framed by a number of 
interlocking conceptual assumptions. One is that individual stakeholders in the study serve as 
representatives of institutions with particular roles and interests. A second is that individual 
perceptions in the study are not simply opinions, but also are suggestive of the larger institutional , 
social and cultural systems of which they are a part. A third assumption is that the large number 
of interests in any given project in foreign assistance will have differing agendas, and the result 
will be inevitable conflicts . The success of a project and the effectiveness of its implementation 
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may rest in some measure on how well the different stakeholders and their often-conflicting views 
are addressed and resolved . 
Particularly pertinent to this study is Guess's (1988) bureaucratic role conflict model for 
foreign assistance, which states that conflict will arise over resource allocations produced from 
different incentives and constraints within the existing foreign policy-making framework . Some of 
these conflicts are a dynamic and constructive part of negotiating funding within a highly 
constrained framework . However, some conflict may focus primarily on winning bureaucratic 
conflicts rather than on finding effective foreign policy initiatives . Guess's (1988) assumptions in 
this model are in fact an often-repeated complaint about foreign assistance policy-making in the 
United States: the foreign policy-making framework has become mired down by many competing 
interests who spend their time fighting bureaucratic wars rather than constructing an effective 
foreign policy framework. 
To explore these conceptual assumptions, this study is embedded in the constructionist 
parad igm for policy evaluation identified by Guba and Lincoln (1989) . Whereas traditional 
evaluation assumes a consensus about which goals should guide a project or about how well it is 
being implemented, the constructionist framework assumes that a number of different 
interpretations exist concerning the objectives of foreign assistance projects and how well they 
are implemented. Since these interpretations co-exist in any given project, there can be no 
single, correct construction of the effectiveness or impact of a project. Thus, individual 
perceptions and interpretations play a vital role in understanding complex, multi-institutional 
projects and their impacts. Such perceptions are not simply the opinions of stakeholders, since 
stakeholders to some extent are representative of the larger institutional, social and cultural 
systems of which they are a part. 
A discussion of the three projects in this study in terms of the categories developed by 
Rist (1994) and Linder and Peters (1989) can highlight the characteristics of each project and the 
areas of greatest challenge and conflict. Particular attention is paid as to how differences in 
donor and recipient stakeholder interests were discussed, taken under advisement and 
subsequently acted upon . 
Category 1: Resource intensiveness 
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Each of the projects in the study demanded a high level of resource intensiveness, 
insofar as each project required high levels of technical expertise to implement. Based on these 
three projects , this suggests that the effort to deliver a foreign assistance was complicated by the 
need for specialized expertise to design, implement and evaluate projects . 
The level of resource intensiveness in these projects was not necessarily a decision of 
the individual project officers , so much as the goal of the entire foreign assistance effort in the 
NIS. A widely-held perception among decision-makers in foreign affairs was that the task of the 
assistance to the region was to transition misdeveloped economic and political structures rather 
than to build upon · undeveloped structures. Since the Soviet Union boasted of some of the 
highest literacy rates in the world and a universal health care system, relatively less attention was 
paid to the austere living conditions by Western standards of the vast majority of citizens in the 
region . The arch itects of the early foreign assistance program underestimated the difficulty of 
replacing an elaborate interlocking system of institutions that supported the Soviet way of life and 
of supplanting this existing system with new kinds of structures and supporting sociocultural 
values not promoted before in the region . The formal and informal Soviet "way of doing things ," 
based increasingly on economic constraints and limited resources, extended throughout its 
network of institutions, whether military, educational and health . 
Of the projects described in this study, the Selentec project was the shortest in duration, 
but required special testing facilities for radioactive materials; scientists and engineers in the 
United States and Ukraine to test the beta system and its effects on milk while removing trace 
levels of radioactive cesium; and renovations to the dairy to enable specialized testing to take 
place on site under scientific conditions . USAID technical specialists assigned to the project 
complained that the expertise required to evaluate the phases of the project was beyond the 
scope of the agency. 
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USAID's contract with Abt Associates for ZdravReform and the agency's cooperative 
agreement with AIHA for the Health Partnersh ip Program engaged the expertise of large numbers 
of medical and health professionals throughout the NIS region . Though these projects were quite 
different in conception, execution and impact, both extended their project oversight through 
regional offices in the NIS. Their resource complexity rested not only in the health and medical 
expertise needed for the projects , but the complex multi-institutional collaboration requ ired in 
Washington, at the regional offices, and at the local demonstration sites . 
Category 2: Targeting 
The second category, targeting, refers to the degree of precision used in identifying the 
intended population . The level of targeting was rated as low to moderate in each of the projects 
for a variety of reasons . A major reason for th is targeting level stemmed, once again, from the 
scope of the foreign assistance effort in the NIS itself. OECD (1992, 1993, 1994) in its analysis of 
cumulative aid to the NIS region noted that few donor countries appeared to have obvious 
strategic objectives in their aid packages to the former Soviet Union in the first five years of aid 
disbursements . Project efforts were broad-ranging and scattered rather than focused and vertical 
in scope . 
When the FREEDOM Support Act of 1992 was passed to authorize official US assistance 
to the region , year-to-year funds were approved for what was then believed to be a short-term 
program . Since the Soviet Union had previously acted as a donor nation rather than as a 
recipient of foreign aid , few, if any, decision-makers in the foreign affairs community understood 
the kinds of institution-building strategies and approaches that would best su it the NIS 
environment. In add ition, because the Soviet Union remained a closed society for much of the 
twentieth century, few scholars and fore ign affairs special ists understood the intricacies of the 
interlocking social structures of the region and the concurrent socio-cultural characteristics of the 
society that evolved from it. Even less understood were the political and economic orientations of 
the outlying republics of the Soviet Union , each of which evolved into nation-states with distinct 
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characteristics in spite of their ties to the central Soviet government. The level of modernization in 
the NIS republics also varied widely. 
The contractors interviewed in this study supported the existing documentation that 
considerable pressure was placed on them to implement quickly within limited times frames . This 
was perceived to be precise goal-setting and targeting, but in this case it was undertaken with 
little understanding of environmental factors . The unstable political and economic environment 
following the breakup of the Soviet Union also presented ongoing challenges to the contractors in 
the study. The targeting became more precise in time in the longer-term projects (ZdravReform 
and the AIHA Partnership), though controversy continued throughout the duration of these 
projects over whether the targeting was appropriate or in phase with the institution-building 
needed in the region . Indeed, questions could be raised as to how much of the American health 
system could be imported into the Soviet context. And issues facing health delivery in the United 
States were not lost on at least some of the NIS counterparts . 
The large sums allocated to ZdravReform and the extensive media coverage of this 
health reform packaged placed high pressure on Abt Associates to perform , and to perform 
quickly. Health financing activities started up in three regions (the Russian Federation, Ukraine 
and the Central Asian republics) at once, but most funding was allocated to the highly visible 
Russian Federation . Serious conflicts developed over the intent and goals of the project in 
between USAID and Abt Associates in Washington and in Russia in the firs t year, and a variety of 
issues led to early closure of this project in Russia in 1996 after only three years . USAID's 
contract for ZdravReform in Ukraine ended two years later, in 1998, despite stronger programs in 
L'viv and Kiev, as little governmental support of health reform was in evidence. Funding ended 
just as ZdravReform representatives discussed the possibility of rolling out the lessons from its 
model sites to other locations. Abt Associates continued its health structuring and financing 
project work as ZdravReform Plus in the Central Asian region , focusing on highly specific 
activities. 
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In contrast to ZdravReform , the AIHA Hospital Partnership Program began inauspiciously 
in 1992 with limited funding to initiate partnerships between hospitals in the US and in the NIS. 
Through the networking capabilities of James Smith, Director of the newly-formed AIHA in 
Washington, AIHA was able to create partnerships with several hospitals within a few months 
after receiving funding for the project. At this level, the scope of the AIHA project was highly 
targeted by institution and strateg ic intent. AIHA was able to sustain momentum with a limited 
number of highly committed partners during the first several years of the project, some of which 
were already active in the region . Critics of the early hospital partnership program, however, 
noted that hospitals were not the best institutions in which to target reform in the N IS since they 
were the source of a highly bureaucratic and inefficient tertiary care system. 
Employing personnel pairing techniques , tra ining and exchanges, the AIHA program was 
able to combine information exchange through a variety of channels (on-site visits , conferences , 
internet access, newsletters) with a wide variety of types of training , both at local sites and 
through specially developed programs. The matching of institutions created a platform served as 
a platform for institution building because NIS partners could observe directly differences and 
possibilities for their own practices. Since neither NIS nor American health professionals were 
compensated directly for their time, the pairings were based on good will and extraordinary 
commitment. Partnerships also were not expected to be supported by AIHA for extended 
periods, so activities were limited to improving practices that could be sustainable within sort 
time-frames . Since the NIS system could not afford vast infusions of new technology to support 
their struggling system, the AIHA did not support partnership activities that were centered around 
medical care that required high technology investments. Offers of equipment also were highly 
limited or donated by the US partners. AIHA's partnership efforts in this sense were highly 
targeted and specific . 
As the number of AIHA partnerships grew, so did the types of activities intended to 
support the basic partnership approach . AIHA continued to grow incrementally even in the midst 
of tumultuous changes in the environment in the 1990s. AIHA's ability to create and sustain 
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many partnerships over the past decade earned it a reputation for excellence both in the United 
States in the NIS. However, criticism of the well-respected program throughout the decade has 
been directed toward what some believe is an inherent limitation in the basis of the approach : 
partnerships promote reform and training, but the path to reform through th is approach remained 
too local and specific to each locality. AIHA's response to such criticism has been to suggest that 
only through local model partnerships can systemic change take place since NIS leaders and 
medical providers needed to be able to observe successful alternatives at work . 
Selentec, Inc., a cooperative agreement awarded in 1996, well after the US foreign 
assistance program began in the region , might appear at first glance to be a highly targeted 
project. The project proposed to remove radioactive cesium still present at trace levels in the milk 
in the contaminated zone. But environmental technical officers at USAID were critical of the 
project for a number of reasons, and this led to unresolved tensions throughout the project 
planning and implementation stages. There was no clear indication in the scientific literature on 
the effects of radiation that the level of radioactive cesium in the local environment still presented 
a health risk . In fact , it is one of the many unanswered scientific questions from the Chernobyl 
accident . In addition , the project demonstrated no systematic promise of revitalizing the dairy 
industry, since the magnetic separation machinery was expensive and still experimental in its 
capabilities . USAID technical officers also believed that they were not qualified to evaluate the 
progress of the prototype and its capabilities, since USAID was not a research and development 
organization , and therefore questioned their involvement in the project. In spite of the popularity 
of the project in Ukraine, such unresolved differences resulted in conflicts throughout the project. 
Category 3: Institutional capacity 
Institutional capacity, or the ability of the organizations to deliver on their tasks , varied in 
these projects . However, once again, a distinction must be made between the overall US fore ign 
assistance effort in terms of the governmental institutions charged with the responsibility to carry 
this effort out and the specific contractors funded for the projects reviewed in this study. The 
question might be posed, "Did the United States foreign assistance program have the capability 
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to deliver on the optimistic expectations for transforming the Soviet Union when it was dissolved?" 
In fact, the foreign assistance institutional capacity to deliver assistance to the NIS did not exist in 
the United States prior to its breakup. 
A more basic question also could be asked , "Has the evolving foreign assistance effort 
provided the former Soviet republics with sufficient possibilities and opportunities to enable the 
transition from a centralized command/control economy to decentralized open market economies 
and democratic societies?" Some decision-makers and scholars argued for a kind of Marshall 
Plan to assist the region in the early 1990s. But the original Marshall Plan focused heavily on 
rebuilding infrastructure reduced to rubble in World War II. No precedent existed for reorienting 
an entire region to promoting open markets and transparent democracies where a markedly 
different system already existed . The answers to those general questions are beyond the scope 
of a qualitative research study on three projects in the region, but the assistance effort as a whole 
and the policy-making framework for foreign affairs in the United States without question serve as 
key factors in contributing to the outcome of the individual projects. 
Another challenge in understanding the institutional capacity of the projects in th is study 
is that the US foreign assistance effort was not restricted to capacity-building only in the NIS. 
Institutional capacity building for this assistance effort required the decision-making efforts of 
federal departments, agencies and other bodies of the US government at the highest levels; the 
add ition of a Coordinator's Office for the NIS in the State Department; the expansion of a division 
in USAID to execute and implement strategic efforts in the region; and the enlistment of the 
services of uncounted tens of thousands in the United States in the promotion of foreign aid to the 
NIS. In turn, each of the agencies, departments, and organ izations involved in this effort were 
involved in institutional capacity bu ilding : the institutional capacity to deliver aid did not pre-exist 
for this region. Indeed, it could be argued that the struggle for capacity-build ing in the United 
States to deliver aid was as great as that which occurred in the NIS. 
The combined institutional capability of Selentec, Inc., the testing laboratories and other 
personnel involved in the Selentec project appeared sufficiently sound to justify the cooperative 
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agreement, though considerable pressure was brought to bear to fund it from members of 
Congress. Representatives in the Coordinator's Office and at USAID knew the project was risky, 
experimental and atypical, but some believed that it also had technological potential with the 
admirable goal of helping the children of Chernobyl. But the limited time frame agreed upon for 
implementation and the one-time funding stipulation must also be considered a part of the 
project's institutional capacity. The various technical groups involved in the effort were not able to 
successfully complete each of the phases of the project under such constraints . Once the 
prototype system had been installed, a number of delays occurred as project participants 
addressed various unexpected problems. The additional costs encountered in refining the 
MAG*SEP materials and the prototype machine itself and in upgrading the environment at the 
dairy were problems that could be resolved , but not without more time and additional funding . 
Though the project was greeted with enthusiastic anticipation in Ukraine, USAID technical officers 
questioned the ability of future investment in such systems in Ukraine in an economy in deep 
distress. 
Questions arose about the institutional capability of Abt Associates to implement 
ZdravReform after the project was launched. To be sure, Abt Associates was a well-known 
consulting firm with a longstanding reputation in managing international health projects at the time 
that it was awarded the $50 million ZdravReform contract. Such a large award would not have 
occurred without a substantial history of funding success. Abt Associates claimed that the 
original concept of ZdravReform was proposed to be a model-building project for health financing 
reform based in the United States. After the contract was awarded, USAID program officers 
began to add many more components and activities to the project. In the ensuing months, the 
project was expanded to include a variety of areas of health reform. A regional office was set up 
and NIS specialists hired and trained to become ZdravReform representatives . 
A major issue arose in Russia over the country director which Abt Associates initially 
selected for ZdravReform . USAID believed that the project was compromised with ineffective 
leadership and demanded a new director. Thus, many of the issues of ZdravReform in Russia 
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developed over the institution-building that occurred as the concept and structure of the project 
was expanded . Some of the same difficulties arose in ZdravReform in Ukraine, in which periods 
of time would pass when a country director was hired after a contract was already underway or 
remained absent for periods of time from the program . Only in the Central Asian region, with 
central headquarters in Almaty, Kazahkstan , did a team educated in health management and 
financing remain established in the region long-term . In the ZdravReform project, leadership 
proved to be an important factor in garnering the resources needed to move forward with a long-
term multi-level project. 
In the AIHA Partnership Project, AIHA leadership was especially effective in seeking out 
medical and health expertise in the United States to serve in partnerships with targeted 
institutions or groups in the NIS. The AIHA as an institution in turn expanded as the need arose 
in the NIS and in Washington . In fact, AIHA by the late 1990s was highly centralized in its 
decision-making, services and financial accounting in Washington, in part because of the wide 
variety of services it provided to partners, which included local, regional and worldwide 
conferences, health newsletters, and technology support, in addition to training and exchanges . 
These enhanced activities in the project were introduced to enable the partners to share with 
other partners the lessons learned at local sites. The institutional capacity of AIHA grew to meet 
its expanding activities from year-to-year. AIHA leadership in turn complained of the short-term 
funding allocations negotiated with USAID in the early years of the program, which made it 
difficult for the nonprofit organization in Washington to project future needs . 
Category 4: Political risk 
The final category, political risk, refers to the environmental risks associated with each of 
these projects . All of these projects were implemented in a highly volatile recipient environment 
(the NIS) and a contentious and uncertain donor environment (the US foreign policy-making 
framework) . Considerable risk existed for the United States in initiating the foreign assistance 
effort along with many other countries to build partnerships with the fledgling republics in the 
wake of the Cold War. Individual projects included in this policy research study must be viewed 
within the context of the overall political risk of the foreign assistance effort. The foreign 
assistance program cumulatively and the projects individually all faced considerable risk in 
venturing into the largely undefined environment in the NIS. Project activity remained risky 
throughout the 1990s in the midst of political instability and financial setbacks in most of the 
republics. 
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The individual contractors in this study each began their initiatives in the NIS with a 
different status . AIHA was a newly formed nonprofit organization in Washington that many at first 
regarded as an outsider among the standard Beltway consulting firms , since it did not promote 
development through the typical technical assistance or consulting approaches. Abt Associates 
was a health consulting firm with a longstanding reputation for international development work in 
Washington . Selentec, Inc., under other legal names, had previously worked with the 
Department of Energy on small projects. 
Of the projects studied in this research, the AIHA partnership project was able to sustain 
its mission by minimizing political risk in a number of ways. AIHA remained a grassroots 
program, focusing on enhancing the level of medical and health practice at specific sites. 
Partners were not reimbursed directly for their time, so the possibility of misdirecting funding for 
salaries did not arise. Project funds were handled increasingly out of centralized Washington-
based operations to insure accurate reporting and careful monitoring. Only in the late 1990s did 
the AIHA expand its mission to include partnerships that were comprised of a number of health-
based, co llaborative organizations . The goal presumably was to intervene in health reform in a 
more systematic way to improve the practice of multiple health organ izations at once. Thus, 
AIHA evolved its mission and organization as the environment was better understood. 
With the exception of a few large partnerships, most partnership activities were set up to 
be relatively short-term interventions. If tensions remained unresolved, partnerships could be 
terminated ahead of schedule. The AIHA did not expect all partnerships to succeed, sometimes 
in spite of the best efforts of the parties involved . Partners were expected to negotiate their 
interests and differences directly and carefully at the beginning of each AIHA contract period . 
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AIHA increasingly set explicit rules on the focus and limits of partnership activity, and workplans 
were developed to carry these out. Four regional offices were added to assist in the development 
and enhancement of partnership activity, but the decision-making for the region-wide project 
remained in AIHA's Washington-based headquarters . It should also be noted that AIHA's legal 
relationship to USAID was that of a cooperative agreement. This type of agreement enabled the 
contractor to enjoy more independence than in a direct contract. The strong leadership 
throughout the 1990s of the founder of the alliance, James Smith, provided a continuity of 
leadership for the AIHA partnership program that might not have existed otherwise. 
In contrast to AIHA's collaborative relationship with USAID was the highly structured 
nature of the direct contract of Abt Associates with USAID for the ambitious ZdravReform project. 
USAID both in Washington and in the regions played a strong role in the direction and 
administration of the project. Abt Associate's relationship with USAID in Russia became highly 
contentious for a number of reasons . Though the basis of some of the differences are a 
documented in the project history, no participants in the ZdravReform effort in Russia were 
interviewed for this study. In Ukraine, despite considerably more cooperative effort, but the 
relationship involved continuing tensions . In the Central Asian area, the relationship with USAID 
and the ZdravReform group appeared to grow into a collaborative relationship after sorting 
through a variety of issues in the early years of the project. The project's goal of intervening in 
legal and structural reform ran into difficulties in Ukraine and Russia , since the governmental 
bodies of these republics were politically and financially unable to bring major institutional 
changes to the faltering and underfinanced health system. 
The ZdravReform project involved high political risk for several reasons. The project was 
widely touted in the press as a major initiative in the NIS with the expectation of major 
commitment and even greater results . The expectation of a major project paying expert 
American consultants high salaries garnered the expectation of a major reform, which in fact did 
not materialize. The activities of the project were closely watched and problems widely 
communicated. Though ZdravReform Plus in the Central Asian region and to some extent in the 
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Ukraine demonstration sites has been respected , but the impact of these programs pales in the 
face of a $70 million outlay. The issues that arose in ZdravReform in Russia soured the 
Coordinator's Office in particular on the effectiveness of Abt Associates as a change agent in the 
NIS. 
Selentec, Inc., the experimental technology project in this study, was the most risky 
project studied for this research . Though small in comparison to the contracts with AIHA and Abt 
Associates and short in duration, it was quite literally funded as an experiment. The project 
remained highly popular among the Ukrainians who worked with it because of the local belief that 
th is product could help clean up the "dirty'' zone and give Ukrainians in the area a concrete 
reason to believe that one source of their ·food supply would not be dangerous to digest with low 
levels of radioactive cesium present. But these same stakeholders in Ukraine grew embittered 
when the project was suddenly shut down when funding faltered . Thus, at the end of the risky 
project, Selentec, Inc., _was no longer a solvent legal entity, the MAG*SEP process testing 
process was not completed , and none of the stakeholders ended up with what they wanted . 
As this analysis suggests , the foreign assistance projects in this study were multi-
institutional undertakings of great complexity. Negotiation and confl ict formed an integral part of 
the delivery of such programs and could threaten their success at every step or phase of the 
process. Some of the most severe, unresolved conflicts actually occurred between US 
stakeholders, as in the cases of Selentec and of ZdravReform in Russia. Those project efforts 
that were able to resolve differences through direct discussion appeared to have been most 
successful in delivering their programs . AIHA in particular appeared to build into its 
implementation process the expectation of direct discussions of differences of interest and 
expectation . Given the inevitable struggles and conflicts that arise in these kinds of projects, 
foreign assistance stakeholders must emphasize and respect the importance of confl ict resolution 
techn iques in the del ivery process . 
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Ill. Perspectives on foreign aid: A review essay 
The foreign assistance program in the NIS officially began only after the dissolution of the 
former Soviet Union in 1991 . Prior to that time, the Soviet Union had been a donor nation, 
participating in foreign aid programs around the world . Since the assistance to the region was 
intended to be short-term, that is, assistance to a misdeveloped region rather than an 
undeveloped region, many decision-makers in foreign affairs believed that the lessons of 
development in the past did not apply to the NIS. Today, many of the same decision-makers 
would be less certain of that claim. 
To gain more perspective on the themes and issues raised in this study, it will be helpful 
to review some of previous studies conducted on US foreign aid and on the domestic policy-
making framework in Washington . Guess's (1988) scholarship on bureaucratic role conflict 
referred to in this study is but one perspective on the dynamics of US foreign assistance. 
Discussion of the content of a small number of scholarly studies that have attempted to address 
the complex issues of delivering foreign aid can place the NIS assistance effort in historical 
perspective. A discussion of some of the more comprehensive studies on the dynamics and 
direction of foreign assistance follows . 
Reflections on the goals and intent of foreign aid 
Perhaps the most ambitious effort to analyze the foreign policy-making framework in the 
United States is Ruttan's 1996 study on the domestic politics of foreign economic aid . His study 
provides important historical perspective on foreign assistance into the 1990s and is perhaps one 
of the few attempts to provide a comprehensive and historical perspective on the politics of 
foreign assistance. Ruttan classifies his 657 -page historical compendium as a "continuing 
dialogue between intellectual and institutional history" (p. xxii) . He describes the changing 
doctrines toward economic development as these are reflected in the policies and programs of 
the domestic constituencies most responsible for shaping foreign economic aid policy. In placing 
emphasis on institutions involved in setting such policy, Ruttan departs from the viewpoint that 
these constituencies are driven primarily by unique strategic interests and bureaucratic 
competitiveness, though these motivations play a role in the direction of policy-making. As an 
historian, he takes an eclectic approach to describing the complexities of foreign economic aid 
policy-making since World War II, drawing insights from other organizational approaches when 
appropriate. 
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The author notes that his analysis relies to a much greater extent on secondary sources 
than on primary sources, since he is focusing on the reflections of policymakers and scholars 
over 50 years of development activity. An extensive number of interviews were conducted with 
participants involved in the trends described in the book to clarify perspectives on events and 
policies. Also contributing depth to the analysis is Ruttan's work in development assistance as a 
manager, researcher and teacher since the early 1960s, spanning the historical period covered in 
the study. 
Ruttan (1996) maintains that domestic policies are at least as important as changes in 
the international environment in defining foreign policy, and these domestic interests and 
concerns are the main focus of the study. He identifies three objectives driving US foreign 
assistance-strategic, economic and humanitarian. When the strategic objective is paramount, 
the US provides assistance to strength the economic, military and political viability of a country 
precisely because the country is of strategic importance. The economic objective is at the 
forefront when the US acts to sustain the economic and political stability of a country because it is 
viewed as in the long-term interest of the US. The humanitarian aim , either long-term or short-
term, is designed to "relieve hunger and misery'' through technical or financial resources (p . 5) . 
While much economic development activity of the past 50 years involves multiple objectives, 
often one of these objectives dominates. 
Ruttan (1996) identifies the major stakeholders in Washington that decide the direction of 
foreign economic policy. These stakeholders are usually most oriented either toward the 
interests of the donor or the recipient country. Table 7-1 below depicts these stakeholders , along 
with the rating Ruttan gives them as to their orientation toward foreign assistance, as 
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demonstrated over 50 years of policy-making. This rating serves as a kind of thesis for Ruttan, 
as he weighs the role different constituencies have played in international economic 
development. 
Economic Constituencies 
For Development 
White House and State Department 
Office of Management and Budget 
Treasury Department 
Agency for International Development 
Congress 
• Idealist 
• Realist 
Foreign Policy Establishment 
• East-West wing 
• North-South wing 
Suppliers and Contractors 
Ethnic Communities 
Human Needs 
TABLE 7-1 
Donor oriented: 
political 
and strategic 
++ 
0 
0 
-0 
0 
++ 
++ 
++ 
0 
++ 
Recipient-oriented: 
economic 
and humanitarian 
0 
0 
+ 
++ 
++ 
0 
0 
+ 
++ 
-+ 
++ 
Symbols: ++strong positive concern ; +, moderate positive concern ; 0, neutral ; -, moderate 
negative concern ; -- , strong negative concern . 
SOURCE: Ruttan, V. W . (1996). United States development assistance policy: The domestic 
politics of foreign economic aid. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 10. 
Ruttan (1996) suggests that the White House and the Department of State are driven 
primarily by donor-oriented strategic concerns . Economic development of recipient nations has 
been a secondary objective to the extent that it contributes to political development and stability. 
The Office of Management and Budget, though holding important negotiating power over the 
annual budget process, does not play a significant role in defining policy. The Treasury 
Department plays a major role in monitoring the international balance of payments, the domestic 
capital market, and multilateral and bilateral assistance allocations . Because of its history of 
support for multilateral over bilateral aid allocations, the Treasury is considered in Ruttan 's 
topology as promoting primarily recipient country interests. 
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USAID, the next constituency in Ruttan's (1996) scheme, is motivated by a set of 
interests different from that of the State Department, the bureaucracy most tied to USAID's 
activities. Upholding a "development ideology'' (p. 12), the agency is strongly motivated to 
measure results in terms of economic growth or development in the recipient country. According 
to Ruttan, USAID from the 1960s onwards has regarded short-term political objectives as 
compromising to economic assistance objectives. The role of the agency is in principle to serve 
as a "constituency for efficiency in the use of assistance resources to further economic growth" 
(p . 12). 
Ruttan (1966) characterizes Congress as a constituency divided in the area of foreign 
assistance policy between "idealists" and "realists" (p . v) . He labels as "idealist" those 
Congressmen upholding liberal doctrine, defined as the belief that the American experience 
represents a perfecting political and economic evolution and that it is the responsibility of the US 
to lead the world in this evolution. In contrast, the "realist," or conservative, tradition is primarily 
security based : the nation must guard against corrupting influences by avoiding involvement with 
other parts of the world . In Ruttan 's analysis, much of the debate in foreign policy has been a 
dialectic over these two positions. 
The foreign policy establishment, the next grouping in Ruttan's scheme, is also divided in 
its efforts. The East-West wing is realist in orientation and places primary emphasis on strategic 
issues involving relations between major powers. The North-South segment focuses on the 
broad disparities or gaps between developed, most of which are in the northern hemisphere, and 
undeveloped countries, most of which are in the southern hemisphere. 
Also included in Ruttan's (1996) scheme are the beneficiaries of US economic assistance 
programs-US industries, businesses and other organizations, the ethnic communities that place 
pressure on the US government to support political and humanitarian interests in their home 
regions. These stakeholders are followed by the human needs constituencies , a category 
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including humanitarian interest groups, private voluntary organizations, church groups, and others 
of similar motivation. As a constituency, human needs advocates direct substantial public 
pressure against assistance as a political or strategic tool. 
Carefully sifting through decades of economic development, Ruttan (1996) describes 
policy changes that evolved from the interplay of these constituencies. For purposes of this 
study, the most important chapter concerns his analysis of the post-Cold War reform agenda for 
the 1990s. As set against the context of 40 years of development, Ruttan describes a foreign 
affairs budget that has shrunk increasingly in the last 10 years from "the same disparity between 
limited means and inflated objectives with which it had begun in 1951" (p . 451 ). This is 
contrasted with the flurry of reform reports, multiple Congressional task forces and Presidential 
commissions in the last decade in support of reform in global economic development in general, 
and USAID in particular. 
In addition to noting eroding budgets, Ruttan (1996) carefully traces the concurrent 
erosion of USAID's decision-making power to other agencies involved in economic aid-World 
Bank, the State Department, the Treasury, to name a few. The author recounts a growing 
division or lag in the major constituency organizations that tend to reflect their views through 
Congress-PVOs, agricultural, health and population, environmental interest groups-which have 
remained strongly committed to the human rights, basic needs, and poverty reduction orientation 
of the 1970s. The agency's executive management and the State Department, and the 
constituencies that tended to reflect their views through the Administration , regard these views as 
incongruent with the changes in the domestic and international economic environment of the 
1980s. Issues of debt restructuring and growth-oriented policy, the liberalization of domestic and 
trade policies, have been at the top of the Bush and Clinton administration agenda throughout 
much of the 1990s. Set in this conflict, Ruttan interweaves the growing support for Eastern 
Europe and then the former Soviet Union as a major recipient of economic assistance. 
In reflecting on these changes in the 1990s, Ruttan (1996) as historian and development 
practitioner concludes that reform will be extremely difficult without the support of strong 
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presidential leadership, a focus that the Clinton Administration did not provide in 1993 and 1994, 
the last years included in Ruttan 's study. The author suggests that political and economic 
changes in the early post-Cold War period have further called into question the rationale for US 
assistance programs: the containment or security rationale evaporated with the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union . In the past, increases in the US foreign assistance budget have been a direct 
response to rising tension between the US and USSR. The last decade of the 201h century has 
been a multiplying of regional alliances with no clear delineation as to the nature and rationale for 
international economic development. 
In the final chapter, Ruttan (1996) addresses the future of USAID and of US foreign 
assistance. He describes several of the reform agendas and notes that some of the reforms 
recommend extensive reorganization or even elimination of the primary agency for bilateral aid, 
USAID itself. Based on changes in world politics since the Cold War, Ruttan believes that the 
bilateral aid program as conceived and managed since the early 1960s is no longer viable. He 
notes a growing dis illusionment with the aid effort and a shift toward a realist vision as the growth 
of world disorder generates a powerful shift away from the idealist doctrine. 
In a rather circumscript fina l chapter, he describes no clear alternatives to the present 
system . America in the 1990s has become a country of blurred vision because there has been 
little articulation of the kind of world Americans want to live in during the first half of the 21 51 
century, the kind of vision that fuels the drive for economic development globally. The concept of 
what the national interest is has grown past national boundaries to a search for a stable world 
order. But without the specter of Soviet threat to mobilize public opinion, or Congressional 
support for strategically important countries, he found no replacement agenda emerging in the 
1990s. Ruttan (1996) states, "appeals to America 's role in building a New World Order remain an 
empty rhetorical capsule in search of policy context" (p . 475) . Somber in its final message, 
Ruttan's study remains the only work to date that has tried to place into historical context the 
successive phases of foreign assistance into the 1990s. 
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Another broad scholarly effort to study the scope of foreign aid into the post-Cold War 
period also provides useful guidance in this study. Hook's (1995) scholarship focuses on the 
concept of "the national interest" and foreign assistance. He focuses primarily on official 
development assistance rather than security and peacekeeping efforts usually associated with 
State Department foreign affairs efforts . A professor of political science at the University of 
Florida at the time of publication of his book, Hook constructed four case studies comparing 
trends in development assistance in France, Japan, Sweden and the United States. The 
comparative analysis is not about the institutions that deliver aid , but broad trends in donor 
country interests, as exemplified in the level and kind of official funding approved by region and 
function . Hook attempts to link these funding flows with what he regards as broad foreign policy 
patterns in each of the countries. The limitation of the book is that much of the data analysis 
focuses on the 1980s; though the book was published in 1995, financial flows are documented 
through 1990, the point at which th is policy research begins. However, the study provides 
important historical background on US foreign assistance with an emphasis on developmental 
aid . 
Hook (1995) suggests that the phrase "the national interest" is actually "a very elastic 
concept with multiple meanings across time and space. State leaders have invoked national 
interest in pursuit of widely varying strategies of foreign policy, including isolationism, neutralism, 
regional or global hegemony, collective security, and transnational cooperation" (p . 5). Hook 
briefly traces a major theme in political thinkers from Thucydides to Machiavelli to Henry 
Kissinger-the idea that the state must first act to preserve itself. Though the state can serve a 
mediating role in the pursuit of justice and other objectives, it must first of all survive. This is the 
fundamental basis of national self-interest. Beyond this constraint, however, "the national 
interest" becomes an ambiguous phrase with many meanings . 
Like Ruttan (1996), Hook (1995) characterizes development assistance policy historically 
in the United States as divided between "idealists" who sought to improve social welfare in 
developing countries and "realists" with narrow security and economic self-interest foremost in 
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mind. Differences between realistic and idealists were not only found in decision-makers in donor 
countries, but within the development industry itself. The realist position advocates for foreign aid 
to facilitate donor interests. Hook suggests that the realist position is typical of diplomatic activity: 
"Interstate relations are seen as generally conflictive .. . and foreign policies self-serving by 
necessity. Raison d'etat is the operating principle for diplomats, who pursue national self-
preservation as their primary, if not exclusive, objective" (p . 34 ). Challenging this perspective are 
the idealists , who advance a vision of cooperative relations in the world. In the ideal istic 
perspective, the state should minimize self-interest in donor assistance in favor of global 
humanitarian concern . Hood adds a third perspective, structuralism, to the theoretical 
perspectives on foreign assistance. The structuralist perspective is lodged in Marxist-Leninist 
assumptions about power and wealth . Espousers of structuralist thought suggest that foreign aid 
frequently serves to widen economic disparities between wealthy states and wealthy countries . A 
summary of each of these paradigms is shown in Table 7-2 below. 
In his analysis of selected countries, Hook (1995) makes the claim that official 
development assistance closely parallels the social values of the donor countries . Sweden is 
portrayed as the most altruistic of donor countries, "the darling of the Third World" (p . 93). While 
maintaining a neutral status as a political power, Sweden criticized major powers during the Cold 
War for interventionists' strateg ies. Though its role is modest in the world political arena, Sweden 
has taken an aggressive stand in promoting humanitarian development assistance. According to 
Hook, the country was allocating 80 percent of its foreign affairs budget to foreign aid by the mid-
1980s. Sweden has for decades pursued policies that appear to promote primarily the 
interests of the poor countries it funds . In the 1980s, the country consistently directed aid toward 
the world 's poorest people in terms that required little reciprocity in the form of loan credits or tied 
aid . Hook suggests that Sweden "advanced a vision of international relations by which the 
equitable distribution of wealth (between North and South and within states) would promote 
TABLE 7-2 
Contrasting Views of Development Aid: Evaluations and Prescriptions 
Normative Evaluation of Current Official 
Perspective Development Assistance 
Prescription for Future Official 
Official Development Assistance 
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Realist Appropriate only to advance 
donor interests 
Should be minimized ; security 
assistance should take priority; 
economic funds should be linked to 
efficiency of developing countries and 
investment" 
Idealist 
Structuralist 
Potentially beneficial in 
addressing collective 
interests of donors and 
recipients 
Instrument by which wealthy 
states exploit developing 
countries and institutionalize their 
dependence on the First 
World 
Should be expanded; "basic 
needs" and transnational 
problems should be priorities ; 
donors and recipient states 
must reform aid bureaucracies 
Should be abolished in current 
form ; international organizations 
should control redistribution of 
economic resources in pursuit 
of global economic equality 
SOURCE: Hook, S.W. (1995). National interest and foreign aid. Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, p. 35. 
political stability ... " (p . 1 05). This in effect represents Sweden's vision for world economic 
development. 
The geopolitics of US development assistance, in Hook's (1995) analysis , suggests quite 
another vision of international relations . If both security and economic assistance programs in the 
post-World War II period are included, the US is by far the largest donor in the world . Much of 
this disbursement of wealth in the Cold War period was directed at containing communism by 
creating anti-communist security alliances . Hook found relatively static trends in development 
assistance funding flows by region over the entire Cold War period . 
Hook ( 1995) notes that the US development assistance agenda has to some extent been 
defined by the institutional framework responsible for defining foreign aid policy and for 
implementing programs . Hook characterizes the dynamics of the "bureaucratic tangle" charged 
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with the responsibility of executing assistance as suffering from "ongoing confusion over the 
objectives of the myriad programs and constant clashes between federal agencies in planning, 
implementing, and monitoring aid" (p . 127). Though the post-Cold War period was to bring a re-
visioning of developing, he found little change in reg ional distribution in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, suggesting that the institutional framework in the few years leading into the post-Cold War 
period remained largely intact. 
Like Ruttan (1996), Hook (1995) found no alternative vision for development assistance 
loom ing in the early 1990s . He described a labyrinthine fore ign affairs bureaucracy in Wash ington 
that often reverted to "debilitating intergovernmental struggles" (p . 129). The comparative case 
study framework for his historical policy analysis is particularly cogent in that it suggests the 
elasticity of the concept "national self-interest," a term that continues to hold currency as a 
defining objective in US bilateral assistance in the post-Cold War era . Where his analysis suffers 
is in the lack of detail : the aid orientation of successive presidents in the last two decades each is 
summarized in one paragraph . 
These important studies provide perspective on the present research for a number of 
reasons. One is that foreign assistance policy development and implementation in the United 
States is set in a labyrinth ine array of interests , values , institutions, and processes. Simplification 
of any given aspect of it into a single model of confl ict or policy process does not capture the 
whole. All of these aspects have contributed to what constitutes the evolving framework for the 
foreign assistance effort toward the NIS region . Though some stakeholders may not agree with 
the research of Ruttan (1996) and Hook (1995) in their discussions of foreign assistance trends in 
the last decades, the complexity of their analysis places historical perspective on the present 
efforts in foreign assistance. A second reason is that Ruttan 's and Hook's studies also point to a 
central assumption of the present research, that institutions engaged in the promotion and 
execution of fore ign assistance efforts in the US promote different visions of foreign assistance 
and tend to show bias or interest primarily in donor or recipient interests. Such differences will 
lead to confl icts over the strateg ic intent of foreign policy. A thi rd point is that the very concept of 
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the national interest is elastic, and can change based on the dominant strategic interests of a 
donor country. A final lesson of these important studies is that the United States vision for foreign 
assistance in the post-Cold War was not immediately apparent in the early 1990s. In Ruttan 's 
(1996) domestic analysis of the foreign policy-making framework in the United States, he notes 
the involvement of increasing numbers of institutions in the federal government in the NIS effort. 
Such involvement signaled a shift toward a real ist perspective, with a concurrent decrease in 
leadership coming from the developmental mission of USAID. 
Diplomatic. political. and developmental aid 
Though less scholarly in approach than Ruttan 's (1966) and Hook's (1995) studies, two 
other case analyses should be noted as they relate to the ways in which foreign assistance is 
understood and used as a policy tool. One of these is Rossiter's 1983 study, The Bureaucratic 
Struggle for Control of U.S. Foreign Aid : Diplomacy vs . Development in South Africa , and the 
second is Zimmerman's 1993 study, Dollars. Diplomacy & Dependency: Dilemmas of U.S. 
Economic Aid. While Ross iter's study predates the end of the Cold War, both are included in this 
discussion because of the authors ' deliberate attempts to identify differences in the intentions of 
diplomatic and economic development efforts . Through extended examples, Rossiter and 
Zimmerman describe the conflicts that arise in giving priority to short-term political, or diplomatic, 
goals over developmental goals in foreign policy-making. 
Rossiter's (1983) policy case analysis focuses on what he terms the "realization process" 
(p . 29) for US foreign aid programs in southern Africa between 1973 and 1981, with particular 
emphasis on the process for program funding allowed by USAID during that period . The 
realization process is the underlying, largely unwritten system of transforming foreign pol icy goals 
into tangible development programs. Introductory chapters briefly describe official development 
assistance trends after World War II , foreign policy orientations of succeeding administrations, 
and the various categories of programs that are included as foreign aid . The key chapters in the 
study decribe aid programs in southern Africa , followed by a chapter on the process involved in 
actualizing or realizing these programs. Rossiter draws much of his evidence in the brief case 
studies on the realization process from interviews with key informants involved in the decision-
making. While suggestive, Rossiter's case studies suffer from a lack of depth and detail. He 
devotes only paragraphs to eight southern African countries, from Angola to Zimbabwe. 
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At the time of the study, Rossiter (1983) was on the staff of the bipartisan Congressional 
Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus. He previously served as a research writer for the 
Congressional Research Service and the Center for International Policy. The main interest with 
Rossiter's analysis for this research is the thesis driving his study. Rossiter contends that USAID 
and the State Department are engaged in a bureaucratic struggle over developmental and 
diplomatic mandates in this region . While USAID was ostensibly promoting a Basic Human 
Needs approach to development at the time, a popular approach in the 1970s adopted by the 
donor industry to supplant an emphasis on aid for physical infrastructure, Rossiter claims that 
actual outlays in fact were not in step with the mandate, consisting of cash outlays, sector import 
loans and physical infrastructure assistance. 
The major thesis of the book is to suggest how this mismatch occurred . The author 
argues that there are deep conflicts between the following two sets of interdependent goals: 
diplomatic/security goals: the advancement of short-term political and long-term 
strategic security objectives. 
developmental/humanitarian goals: the long-term promotion of economic 
well-being and/or growth and political stability, and the short-term alleviation 
of suffering . 
In this study, diplomatic/security goals are the primary mission of the State Department, while 
developmental/humanitarian goals are the primary mandate of USAID. A bureaucratic struggle 
ensues between these organizations and their agents when diplomatic or strategic interests are 
at stake, and this struggle is documented in page after page of the study. But Rossiter (1983) is 
not trying to oversimplify this conflict as a State Department!USAID struggle, since conflict and 
compromise between various fore ign policy objectives can be seen within and between a wide 
variety of programs. His predictive thesis, insufficiently developed in the study, is that 
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developmental objectives are held in abeyance because these mandates are imprecise, conflict 
with diplomatic needs and lack a strong constituency, either public or governmental. He suggests 
that humanitarian and commercial goals in foreign programs do not carry these limitations and 
can better withstand "the vicissitudes of diplomatic or strategic mandates" (p . 2) . 
A policy study that brings to bear more recent trends in US diplomatic and foreign 
assistance efforts is Zimmerman's (1993) study on the dilemmas of economic assistance. A 
veteran of over 20 years experience in the Peace Corps, at USAID, and with the State 
Department, Zimmerman was at the time of publication a consultant with Management Systems 
International, assisting USAID and other contractors working on the early democracy-building 
in itiatives in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union . The Director of the Institute for the 
Study of Diplomacy, the institute publishing the book, describes Zimmerman in the forward of the 
book as a maverick with "refreshingly iconoclastic" ideas (p . ix). Focusing candidly on 
controversial aspects of US economic assistance, Zimmerman's critique was intended to 
stimulate debate and reflection on a post-Cold War foreign assistance agenda. Practical and 
ethical dilemmas abound in Zimmerman 's analysis as development practitioners and politicians 
face "complex and uncomfortable realities while developing and implementing U.S. foreign 
policies and programs" (p. xi) . 
Drawing insight from his extensive experience in the foreign service, Zimmerman (1993) 
includes examples of US foreign assistance efforts in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle 
East. The most extensive and compelling country case analysis in the book describes the history 
of US foreign assistance to Egypt, a country in which Zimmerman served as a desk officer. 
Zimmerman also conducted more than 35 interviews with former foreign service officers in USAID 
and in the State Department as part of the research for the book. Also cited are formal 
documents, legislation and a limited number of secondary sources. 
In describing the dilemmas of foreign assistance in these countries, Zimmerman (1993) 
focuses primarily on the most controversial of the foreign assistance funds managed by USAID, 
the Economic Security Fund (ESF). His thesis is that foreign economic assistance in the United 
326 
States, as most dramatically demonstrated in the ESF, has failed to achieve its goals "primarily 
because this assistance has been first and foremost a diplomatic tool to promote U.S. political 
and security objectives" (p . 1 ). The ESF was specifically set up as a security-based foreign policy 
tool, so the fact that it was used to further political and strategic objectives is not a revelation . 
What Zimmerman attempts to demonstrate, however, is that US "diplomacy that used economic 
aid to advance U.S. strategic interests has impeded use of those resources to stimulate self-
sustaining development" (p. 1 06) . 
Some of the dilemmas in the book arise out of Zimmerman 's (1993) contrasting 
definitions of modernization and development, an argument he draws from Norman Jacobs 
(1971 ). Modernization denotes the maximization of a society's potential within the limits set by 
the society's goals and structures, while development is an open-ended commitment to 
productive change, a commitment to maximizing a society's potential regardless of the limits 
imposed by its present condition . In this sense, modernization has a more modest goal , while 
development is more open-ended in scope. A condition for authentic development is a 
commitment to productive change and empowerment of the citizenry, because the main 
resources of a society are its people. 
Though Zimmerman (1993) does not work out this theme consistently, he suggests that 
much of what has been considered development actually has been modernization . His approach 
may be criticized as idealistic, as posing an unresolvable dilemma. How does one determine 
whether one is modernizing or developing? The effect is a study in contrasts : the work of 
development practitioners is described largely as an effort to cope with continuing and usually 
short-term political and economic contingencies on both the donor's and the recipient's parts . 
Another dilemma Zimmerman (1993) poses is the implicit value hierarchy that exists in 
country-to-country foreign policy. In drawing up this hierarchy, he reminds us that we must look 
beyond the rhetoric of foreign relations to the underlying objectives of diplomatic actions. These 
underlying goals are shown in Figure 7-1 on the following page. The point Zimmerman makes is 
not that US foreign policy is primarily security oriented, but that all nations support similar value 
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hierarchies. Nations act first and foremost to preserve themselves, physically, politically, and 
economically. Self-protection is an overriding principle over general moral principle or 
humanitarianism. 
Zimmerman {1993) also suggests that much foreign policy action has no single objective. 
A single decision may be made that is perceived to support political stability, protect the human 
rights of those affected, and further humanitarian principles. 
FIGURE 7-1 
Hierarchy of Priorities in 
Government-to-Government Foreign Policy 
Priority 1: 
Protect the physical 
security of the United 
States (containing threats) 
Priority 2: Ensure the political security 
of and cooperation with strategically important 
states (promoting democracy, basic human rights, 
maintaining historic relationships, creating a supportive 
international environment) 
Priority 3: Promote economic security and growth 
(opposing acts by foreign countries that harm the US economy) 
Priority 4: Promote humanitarianism (American willingness to 
respond to man-made conditions of impoverishment and sudden 
natural or political disasters) . 
SOURCE: Zimmerman, R.S . {1993). Dollars. diplomacy. and dependency: Dilemmas of U.S. 
economic aid . Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp . 12-13. 
Development practice becomes infinitely more complex when this hierarchy is taken into 
account, since both donor and recipient countries are acting on distinct priorities. Zimmerman 
(1993) effectively argues that economic development practice inevitably becomes drawn into the 
politics of foreign policy because recipient as well as donor countries use economic assistance as 
a political tool. Hence, another dilemma in economic assistance arises in bilateral aid . The mix 
of political and economic objectives in country-to-country aid becomes inextricably intertwined, 
and the pursuit of economic development as an end in itself a distant, perhaps rarified goal. 
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An important point to note in Zimmerman's (1993) analysis is that he does not advocate 
for economic assistance as an economic tool separated from the politics of country-to-country 
aid . Indeed, he believes that political development is an important component of economic 
development. Objections are raised when short-term diplomatic considerations override longer-
term principles of development for the sake of short-term advantage. 
Zimmerman (1993) suggests that few countries , includ ing the United States, have a 
unified vision of their own economic development goals. Foreign aid in the United States is so 
controversial because it "has become a collection of programs to serve the diverse interests and 
views of development represented by the many participants in the U.S. policy process: 
Congress, special interest groups, and many agencies in the executive branch" (p. 30). 
Zimmerman focuses in much of the case analysis on the State Department, Congress, and 
USAID as they interact domestically and in the foreign arena. 
The absence of useful dialogue among the constituencies is well described in a chapter 
on the budgeting negotiations for country-to-country aid that take place as part of the approval 
process for the president budget. As he notes, the primary purpose of the presentations, the 
multi-volume documents produced each year in the proposed foreign affairs budget to Congress, 
is to advocate for fund ing . Weaknesses in or complications of programs are not effectively 
addressed because of the threat of funding cuts . Nor are political problems described out of 
regard for the sensitive diplomatic issues that might arise. Thus, little meaningful dialogue exists 
among the main constituencies involved in the annual budget process . 
In his recommendations , Zimmerman (1993) does not advocate for economic assistance 
programs removed from the political processes of the donor or recipient countries . He advocates 
for closer analysis of how political and economic processes affect economic growth and material 
well-being . His contrasts are heightened by focusing on one fund in the various categories of 
foreign aid , the Economic Security Fund (ESF). This category was expressly created as a 
diplomatic tool in foreign policy and includes funds to high security-oriented areas such as Israel , 
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Egypt, and Central America. Much of the book is concerned that the political agenda, often short-
term , receives such high priority that economic development goals are subverted altogether. 
Like Rossiter's (1983) analysis, Zimmerman's (1993) discussion of the intricacies of 
foreign aid is more suggestive than compelling . Both texts adopt a point of view that highlights 
conflicts of interest in the intentions of the State Department and USAID. Rossiter contrasts the 
Basic Needs Approach of USAID as incompatible with diplomatic objectives, since assistance to 
the poorest of the poor is far removed from the political agenda of most recipient countries . 
Zimmerman acknowledges the necessity for integrating political considerations with economic 
development, but he insists that the diplomatic record of the past few decades suggests that 
economic development has been undermined most frequently. 
In keeping with the assumptions of this study, Rossiter (1983) and Zimmerman (1993) 
point to the differences in institutional values promoted by the different organizations and 
agencies involved in the delivery of foreign aid. Their analyses suggest that studies that address 
foreign aid must also address the assumptions of the US foreign policy framework as it has 
evolved over the past decades. The multiple objectives of foreign assistance are presented as an 
entangled hierarchy of goals . Economic development as an end in itself or development aid of 
the altruistic kind are rare qualities in the politics of foreign aid . 
IV. The future of foreign assistance in the NIS: Recommendations 
Based on the findings of this study and on this brief analysis of the literature describing 
the foreign policy-making framework in the United States, the following recommendations to 
refocus the current foreign assistance social-sector effort in the NIS are offered : 
RECOMMENDATION #1 : The emphasis on the US foreign assistance program in 
the social sector in the NIS must now shift away from political strategies that are 
largely donor-oriented (emanating from institutional values in the United States) to 
more subtle developmental strategies that are recipient-oriented (focusing on 
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transitional values in individual N/5 republics), a shift that will bring the N/5 foreign 
assistance program for social programs more in line with USA/D's developmental 
mission in other regions. 
Though some exceptions were noted , most USAID representatives interviewed for this 
study described their efforts in the NIS region as "assistance" rather than "development," though 
there were some exceptions. The expectation among USAID representatives interviewed for the 
study even as late as 1998 and 1999, the time period when most interviews were conducted , was 
that the effort in the region was intended to be short-term transition assistance rather than typ ical 
longer-term developmental strategy. USAID representatives interviewed for this study appeared 
to weigh this qualification heavily in their thinking and planning . In contrast, contractors in the 
study tended to make fewer distinctions between assistance and development. No informants in 
the study referred to in-depth or esoteric definitions of development to distinguish a 
developmental mission from an assistance effort. These findings suggest an overwhelmingly 
realist orientation in the assistance effort in the NIS assistance effort, as defined by Ruttan (1996) 
and Hook (1995) in their scholarship. 
The most extreme position on the topic of foreign assistance and development was taken 
by a USAID administrator in Russia who stated emphatically that the assistance effort in the NIS 
was primarily politically driven: aid in the region involved cond itions and sanctions to drive reform 
in the Federation , and aid was dependent on evidence of such reform . USAID officers who 
attempted to work within traditional development modes, th is administrator suggested, tended to 
become frustrated with the effort in Russia . 
The lessons of the past ten years of foreign assistance in the region will help the foreign 
assistance program better understand the complexities of the system in the republics. The socio-
cultural orientations of the citizenry, progressive and conservative, need to be better understood . 
Since wholesale transformation of the institutions in transition will not occur, projects need to be 
designed to target incremental changes. Professional and school exchanges , though promoting 
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good will and public diplomacy in the NIS, will not be sufficient to develop incremental reform in 
these countries. 
The political, economic and social system within the Soviet system prior to the breakup 
was an elaborate, relatively consistent system that did not disappear when the USSR disbanded, 
or collapsed . Long-term incremental change within the existing system requires knowledge of the 
political, economic, educational, and social goals and values of the republics. Acceptable change 
for many will not come from dramatic changes, particularly in a climate with acute financial 
shortages and instability, but from more subtle shifts in the existing system. This calls for a shift 
away from donor-oriented (United States) programs toward more typical recipient-oriented 
developmental programs. Very few programs of this kind currently exist in the region . 
Incremental institutional change has been and continues to be the focus of development 
efforts. Political conditionality may set the boundaries of the limits of aid, but it cannot serve as a 
substitute for what is essentially a developmental task. USAID and other developmentally-driven 
organizations of the past decades have learned lessons in institutional development and these 
should be reviewed carefully in proceeding to the second decade of reform assistance in the NIS. 
Even with the increasing skepticism toward public institutions as a viable force in policy-
making domestically and internationally (Turner & Hulme, 1997) and an increasing faith in 
privatization as the answer (World Bank, 1995), certain institutional change principles are 
applicable in any context. Gow and Morss (1988) published a list of problems in project 
implementation that could have served as a checklist for the foreign assistance effort in the NIS 
over the past decade. Called the Notorious Nine, the authors listed nine obstacles to successful 
projects , which are described in Figure 7-2. 
The initial enthusiasm for the opportunity to transform the former Soviet republics led the 
early assistance effort to underestimate the political, economic and environmental 
constraints (1) of the region. But more important, the assistance effort appeared to pay little 
attention to the institutional realities (2) of the NIS, a particularly serious flaw in donor-based 
strategies. The intricate, interlocking economic, educational, health, and military systems could 
FIGURE 7-2 
The Notorious Nine 
Implementation Problems in Project Implementation 
1 . Political, economic and environmental constraints: There are four sets of 
constraints that project designers and implementers ignore at their peril: donor foreign policy, 
national politics , macroeconomic policy, and phys ical and socio-cultural factors in the local 
environment. 
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2. Institutional realities: The institutional context in which development activities 
take place is a major determinant of project success . Important institutional factors include 
administrative capacity, selection of project agencies for implementation, access to resources by 
development agencies and structures that support effective information flow. 
3. Host country personnel/imitations: Many developing countries have only a 
small cadre of personnel with appropriate techn ical and admin istrative skills . These people are 
often overextended . 
4 . Technical assistance shortcomings: There can be criticism of the quality of 
technical assistance (TA) personnel , confusion about the appropriate function of TA, and 
disagreement over the rules that such personnel should play. The abil ity to motivate and teach is 
often perceived to be vita lly important by recipients as this promotes sustainable development. 
5. Decentralization and participation: Decentralization and partic ipation are 
commonly believed to increase the likelihood of project success but lack of political commitment, 
bureaucratic resistance and inadequate resources have contributed to often disappointing results . 
6. Timing: Three types of tim ing problems interfere with effective project 
implementation : delays between project identification and start-up ; delays during project 
implementation; and inappropriate time-phasing of project activities . 
7. Information systems: Information generated by development projects is often 
used ineffectively or not used at all : information systems are designed but never implemented; 
data are collected but never processed; or the results are made available but are only used by 
researchers . 
8. Differing agendas: The principal actors in development projects try to achieve 
different and sometimes contradictory ends. When these agendas differ, project success and 
benefit sustainability will rarely achieve priority attention . 
9. The bottom line: sustaining project benefits: Although development projects 
are intended to foster a process of self-sustaining development, they have often provided little 
more than a temporary infusion of assets , personnef and services . Sustainability has been 
adversely affected by factors of a political , economic, institutional and financial nature. Financial 
factors include the use of excessively costly technologies and service delivery systems in a 
setting where revenues are insufficient to cover future financial needs . 
Sources: Gow, D.O. , & Morss, E.R. (1988). The Notorious Nine: Critica l problems in project 
implementation . World Development, vol. 16(12), pp . 1399-1418. Summarized in Turner, M. & 
Hulme, D. (1997). Governance. administration & development: Making the state work . West 
Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, pp . 76-7 . 
not be dismantled wholesale . For instance, several years into the US fore ign assistance 
program, surveys conducted in the Russian Federation that the cit izenry continued to expect the 
government to provide free basic health care . Legislation passed in Russia continued to uphold 
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the desire of the government to try to continue to provide free health care, a tradition that had 
existed in Russia for more than 100 years . These indicators suggest that the health system of the 
republics in the future may not even resemble that of the United States . As WHO studies on 
health systems in the past few years suggest, a variety of health systems may exist that better 
align with the values and possibilities of the former Soviet republics . 
The high literacy rate in the Soviet Union and highly educated population provided a 
unique opportunity to encourage host country personnel (3) to participate as partners in many 
types of programs. But some informants in the study found that the very language of programs 
brought to the NIS, such as in health care refinancing reform , needed to be taught to NIS 
counterparts . The technical assistance (4) levels in the foreign assistance programs for the NIS 
were required to be exceptionally high because of the complexity of the technical information and 
expertise exchanged. 
Efforts historically directed toward decentralized efforts and participatory (5) projects 
have been associated with successful development. In the case of the NIS, however, lack of 
political commitment to a greater or lesser extent in the Ministry, the relatively small sums of US 
foreign assistance devoted to social sector change in the republics , and financial setbacks all 
contributed to limited results in the region . Timing (6) issues turned out to be particularly 
troublesome in the foreign assistance effort of the past ten years . The short-term time frame 
established at the beginning of the effort created a host of problems. In terms of the specific 
projects discussed in this study, ZdravReform in Russia in particular was criticized as out of 
phase with the needs of the reform . The AIHA struggled through short-term budget modifications 
in the first years of operation because the assistance effort was expected to end at any time. The 
time frame established for the implementation of the Selentec project was not realistic for a new 
technology. All of these different types of timing issues impacted the outcomes of the projects . 
The information systems (7) that were developed in the projects in this study became a 
critical component of the foreign assistance effort, since the technical assistance level required 
was high . AIHA developed a variety of channels of communication for their projects, including 
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internet access, newsletters, and manuals. A notable failure in implementing such systems was 
ZdravReform in Russia . The computers that were to be used by ZdravReform researchers only 
arrived after the project ended. 
Perhaps the classic case of differing agendas (8) in this study can be seen in the 
Selentec case. Virtually all of the stakeholders were caught up in promoting interests that were 
rarely in agreement. This led to considerable frustration and anger during all phases of the 
project. The ZdravReform project in Russia suffered from major differences in the concept and 
execution of the project with USAID. Similar conflicts occurred between AIHA and USAID over 
the concept of the partnerships in the 1990s. USAID wanted AIHA to remain a hospital 
partnership program. but AIHA was given increasing leverage to take independent steps and 
chose to focus increasingly on primary and community health care approaches. 
This study did not focus specifically on the sustainability of project benefits (10) since 
ZdravReform and the AIHA partnership program continue to be active in the NISin 2002 . The 
Selentec project demonstrated little sustainability since it was terminated before the testing phase 
ended when funding ran out. 
The Coordinator's Office for the NIS needs to undertake sustainability studies of past 
projects across sectors as a part of future planning. A random study across sectors of the impact 
of past projects should be completed. In addition, the Coordinator's office should conduct 
successful project case studies, past and present. In such studies, recommendations from 
sought from a wide variety of decision-makers in the foreign assistance effort in both the United 
States and the NIS and study these programs. Finally, the Coordinator's Office must make a 
greater effort to replicate or roll out concepts, strategies and techniques that appear to be working 
or have worked in past programs. 
An example of one of the few donor-oriented , replicative efforts in the NIS foreign 
assistance effort is the Replication of Lessons Learned (ROLL) Program in Russia . The ROLL 
Program was recommended by Janet Ballantyne, then Mission Director of USAID in the Russian 
Federation , as the best program under the agency's purview in 1998. The ROLL Project was 
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conceived at USAID in 1996 to increase the impact of environmental projects already tested in 
pilot sites in Russia by replicating the most successful of these activities at new sites throughout 
the Federation . The goal of the replication was to increase the capacity of various sectors of the 
population to participate in managing effective environmental strategies. In response to USAID's 
formal Request for Application, the Institute for Sustainable Communities (ISC), a nonprofit, 
nongovernmental organ ization with headquarters in Montpelier, Vermont, submitted a technical 
project application in June 1996 and was subsequently selected to coordinate the effort. The 
program is unique in that it is regarded as Russian-to-Russian assistance, since the projects 
designed for replication already exist in Russia and are managed by Russians. Such initiatives 
are examples of transitional recipient-oriented strategies. Moreover, the objective of the program 
bears consideration in other sectors: to take successful initiatives and duplicate them throughout 
the Federation .1 
The point of this exercise on implementation problems is that the lessons of 
developmental projects in the past do have a great deal to teach the present foreign assistance 
effort in the NIS. Institutional change is by and large developmental change, and the decades of 
effort that USAID has invested in trying to understand successful development includes the key 
component of institutional change. Therefore, the lessons of USAID's developmental mission 
should be carefully reviewed for what it has to teach the NIS social-sector assistance programs. 
RECOMMENDATION #2: Concurrent with this shift, the US foreign assistance 
program in the future needs to incorporate principles for world economic 
development that extend beyond donor-based security strategies. An aggressive 
war on terrorism should be paralleled with a more explicit set of principles to 
1 For more information on the ROLL Program, see E. Bayerl (1999). The Replication of Lessons 
Learned (ROLL} program in Russia : A reputational case study. Journal of Education (Vol. 181, 
No. 1), pp . 1-18. 
promote economic development. Sen's (1999) principles of Development as 
Freedom are suggested as the basis for this shift. 
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The Coordinator's office has included such initiatives as the Partnership for Freedom in 
the NIS assistance program and USAID has promoted strategies for Sustainable Development in 
some of its global development strategies . However, since September 11, 2001, it has become 
clear that the US population has become more motivated to better elucidate the standards and 
principles that guide present and future development in the United States as a nation. But in the 
post-September 11 world, it has become clear that the values and standards that uphold 
American society are not well understood by many Americans, much less the rest of the world . 
Many throughout the world believe that, aside from its opulence, what the US most promotes is 
arrogant self-interest, consumerism, and world hegemony. 
And to some extent, American citizens and their leaders decide at any given time and in 
any given generation what the developmental goals of the country should be. Some perhaps 
believe that what the United States stands for is what the United States does. But for those who 
seek a more reflective way to proceed with the business of diplomacy and foreign assistance, a 
dialogue on desirable principles of economic development will be time well spent. US foreign 
assistance initiatives frequently are the showcase for such dialogue because they bring together 
the values and desires of nations quite different in orientation than the United States. 
Principles of world economic development should be distinguished from globalism, the 
notion that technological developments and the instantaneous communication networks that have 
evolved out of technological improvements in the last few decades are driving nations toward a 
single world order of markets and economies. Rather, world economic development principles 
focus more on the kinds of standards, rights and actions-individual, institutional and 
governmental-that enhance quality of life for the peoples of the world . Zimmerman's (1993) 
definition of development might be recalled : development is an open-ended commitment to 
productive change, a commitment to maximizing a society's potential regardless of the limits 
imposed by its present condition . This is contrasted with modernization, which denotes the 
maximization of a society's potential within the limits set by the society's goals and structure. 
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In our post-September 11 world , a word that has been resounded frequently is the notion 
of freedom as a central value in American society. This term , of course , means different things to 
different people. For a post-September 11 world, however, Sen's (1999) complex concept of 
Development as Freedom might well serve as a fruitful direction for a future set of principles on 
economic development, and the Partnership for Freedom in the NIS foreign assistance may well 
be a suitable framework in which to explore these concepts. A brief description of each of these 
categories is provided in Figure 7.3 below. The types of individual and institutional freedoms that 
the United States promotes may be unique in the world , but there is sufficient flexibility in Sen 's 
development of the concept to provide for alternative arrangements. 
A winner of the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economic Science, Sen's (1999) goal in proposing 
his concept is unabashedly economic rather than pol itical in motivation. He proposes a set of 
interlinking values and rights to uphold certa in intrinsic and instrumental freedoms . He suggests 
that the main goal of economic development must be focused on overcoming world problems of 
"deprivation , destitution , and oppression" (p . xi). Embedded in these terms is not a simplistic view 
of eradicating poverty or poor health, but an elegant set of principles that promote a cohesive 
vision of maximizing the well-being of the people of the world , a world increasingly polarized by 
major differences in beliefs and values in spite of increased interaction and communications. 
Sen suggests that the notion of development should be defined in terms of principles that 
go beyond such economic measures as personal income and gross national product or such 
social indicators as technological progress or modern ization. He acknowledges the close 
relationship between poverty and the ability to achieve substantive freedoms , since poverty 
deprives people of the freedom to satisfy hunger, to receive treatment for illnesses, to be 
adequately clothed and sheltered , and often to have access to clean water and effective 
sanitation. But, as Sen suggests , sometimes the unfreedom may stem from the lack of effective 
institutions in civil society or the denial of pol itical and civil liberties. The broad-ranging types of 
FIGURE 7.3 
Principles of Development as Freedom 
Sen (1999) 
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Political freedoms refer to the opportunities that people have to determine who should govern 
and on what principles, and also include the possibility to scrutinize and criticize authorities, to 
have freedom of political expression and an uncensored press, to enjoy the freedom to choose 
between different political parties, and so on. They include the political entitlements associated 
with democracies in the broadest sense (encompassing opportunities of political dialogue, dissent 
and critique as well as voting rights and participatory selection of legislators and executives) . 
Economic facilities refer to the opportunities that individuals respectively enjoy to utilize 
economic resources for the purpose of consumption or production, or exchange. The economic 
entitlements that a person has will depend on the resources owned or available for use as well as 
on conditions of exchange, such as relative prices and the working of the markets. Insofar as the 
process of economic development increases the income and wealth of a country, they are 
reflected in corresponding enhancement of economic entitlements of the population. 
Social opportunities refer to the arrangements that society makes for education, health care 
and so con, which influence the individual's substantive freedom to live better. These facilities 
are important not only for the conduct of private lives (such as living a healthy life and avoiding 
preventable morbidity and premature mortality), but also for more effective participation in 
economic and political activities. For example, illiteracy may be a major barrier to participation in 
economic activities that require production according to specification or demand strict quality 
control (as globalized trade increasingly does). Similarly, political participation may be hindered 
by the inability to read newspapers or to communicate in writing with others involved in political 
activities. 
Transparency guarantees deal with the openness that people can expect: the freedom to deal 
with one another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity. When that trust is seriously 
violated , the lives of many people-both direct parties and third parties-may be adversely 
affected by the lack of openness. Transparency guarantees (including the right to freedom of 
disclosure) can thus be an important category of instrumental freedom. These guarantees have a 
clear instrumental role in preventing corruption , financial irresponsibility and underhand dealings. 
Protective security is needed to provide a social safety net for preventing the affected 
population from being reduced to abject misery, and in some cases even starvation and death. 
The domain of protective security includes fixed institutional arrangements such as 
unemployment benefits and statutory income supplements to the indigent as well as ad hoc 
arrangements such as famine relief or emergency public employment to generate income for 
destitutes. 
SOURCE: Sen, A. (1999) . Development as freedom . New York: Random House. 
freedoms thus become the standard for development. With adequate social opportunities, 
individuals can effectively shape their own destiny and help each other. 
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His concept of development as freedom is based on the centrality of individual agency in 
addressing these problems, though such agency is constrained by the social, political and 
economic opportunities available to us. Sen (1 999) writes that a deep complementarity exists 
between individual agency and social arrangements: the centrality of individual agency or 
freedom and the force of social influences together determine the extent or reach of individual 
freedom . Sen breaches this gulf between individual agency and social arrangements by viewing 
individual freedom as a social commitment. The expansion of freedom from this perspective 
becomes both the end and means of development. 
Beyond the intrinsic importance of freedom is the instrumental effectiveness of freedoms 
to promote freedoms of other kinds. Sen (1999) also distinguishes between the processes that 
allow freedom and the actual opportunities that enable free decisions and actions. Unfreedom, or 
the lack of freedom, may stem from obstructions in either or both of these aspects. Stated 
another way, the task of economic development becomes the removal of "unfreedoms that leave 
people with little choice and little opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency" (p . xii) . 
Sen's (1999) essays in successive chapters of Development as Freedom focus on the 
relationships among several instrumental freedoms that he refers to as economic opportunities, 
political freedoms , social facilities, transparency guarantees, and protective security. A brief 
description of each of these categories is provided in Figure 7.4 below. These categories include 
institutions of various kinds , including the legal system, the markets, and political parties, which 
all serve to enhance and guarantee individual freedoms and play and must play an active role in 
doing so. 
Sen (1999) suggests that substantive freec;Joms should be the standard by which 
progress is evaluated and the achievements of development should arrive from the free agency 
of people. Sen contends that free agency is "a major engine of development" (p. 4) that tends to 
reinforce many kinds of freedoms. The right to receive basic health care and the right to political 
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participation are constituent components of development. Freedom in this sense becomes the 
principal end of development. To bolster his arguments, Sen features essays in which he makes 
a number of important links by drawing from the theoretical and research literature in economics 
and political science. One is that these components of development contribute directly to 
economic progress. And Sen's argument supports the strength of open markets to drive 
economic growth . On an individual level, the freedom to exchange and transact is one of the 
basic liberties that should be expected and valued . But he notes that he is not espousing the 
need for unbridled free market systems : public regulations and governance exist to monitor the 
roles and effects of market mechanisms. 
Sen focuses on five complementing types of instrumental freedoms, and these bear 
special note. Sen suggests that the research shows that these freedoms are closely linked to 
one another. "Political freedoms (in the form offree speech and elections) help to promote 
economic security. Social opportunities (in the form of education and health facilities) facilitate 
economic participation. Economic facilities (in the form of opportunities for participation and in 
trade and production) can help to generate personal abundance as well as public resources for 
social facilities . Freedoms of one kind can strengthen one another'' (p . 11 ). 
An in-depth analysis of Sen 's (1999) arguments for the concept of Development as 
Freedom is beyond the scope of this study. His arguments are suggestive for the present 
moment and for the NIS foreign assistance effort because they link together individual and social 
principles for promotion of greater well-being . Sustainable Development has been promoted as a 
complex concept and mission for much developmental assistance, but this term places priority on 
a sustainable world rather than on principles of action that link individuals and institutions to a 
common set of goals. For this reason, Sen's (1999) arguments in Development as Freedom 
deserve closer attention . 
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sight of the vision and values that have made America a great country. Its continued greatness 
as a country will be in part dependent on the ability of America's leaders in many arenas to 
communicate a vision of the nation 's developmental goals to the global commun ity and to the 
American people themselves . 
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